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Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

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17 pages
1 Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination Camille Cornand? and Frank Heinemann• Communication Proposal for the 22nd Symposium on Banking and Monetary Economics Strasbourg, Thursday 16th and Friday 17th June 2005 Abstract In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at driving agents' actions as close as possible to the economic fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information because its potential to serve as a focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of public announcements. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain condition not to all agents. Restrictions on the degree of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. The optimal degree of publicity is always positive. Keywords Transparency, public information, private information, common p-beliefs, coordination, strategic complementarity. JEL Classification C7, D8, F3. 1 – Introduction There is an ongoing debate about the relative merits of public information in financial markets and in macroeconomic environments that are characterized by positive externalities.

  • agent

  • economic fundamental

  • bang-bang solution

  • public signals

  • original economic

  • believe

  • agents' overreaction

  • has occurred

  • effective coordination

  • precision


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Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann  Communication Proposal for the 22nd Symposium on Banking and Monetary EconomicsStrasbourg, Thursday 16th and Friday 17th June 2005
  AbstractIn currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution.Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective marketcoordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at driving agents actions as close aspossible to the economic fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold publicinformation because its potential to serve as a focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of  publicannouncements. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision,but under certain condition not to all agents. Restrictions on the degree of publicity are a better instrument withwhich to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are.The optimal degree of publicity is always positive.  KeywordsTransparency, public information, private information, commonp-beliefs, coordination, strategiccomplementarity.  JEL ClassificationC7, D8, F3.  1  IntroductionThere is an ongoing debate about the relative merits of public information in financial marketsand in macroeconomic environments that are characterized by positive externalities. Duringspeculative episodes on the currency exchange market, agents not only have an interest in
                                                  Camille Cornand, GATE  CNRS, Lyon 2 University, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France,cornand@gate.cnrs.fr  Frank Heinemann, University of Munich, Ludwigstraße 28 R.G., 80539 Munich, Germany,frank.heinemann@lrz.uni-muenchen.de 
 
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