//img.uscri.be/pth/fed9070e1162eafcb2953311e03fabf5a7e5339f
Cette publication ne fait pas partie de la bibliothèque YouScribe
Elle est disponible uniquement à l'achat (la librairie de YouScribe)
Achetez pour : 126,59 € Lire un extrait

Téléchargement

Format(s) : PDF

avec DRM

Public Economics and Public Choice

De
This volume collects essays in honor of Charles Beat Blankart on the oc- th sion of his 65 birthday. Blankart's research is mainly in the area of public finance and public choice. He is also known for his interest in real world problems and intellectual curiosity. These features seem to be well c- veyed by the contributions. Born in Switzerland, Blankart completed his Ph. D. in Basel before moving to Germany. The typically Swiss perspective on individual freedom, h- ever, has remained with him. Blankart has taught at the Free University of Berlin, the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, Technical University and Humboldt University in Berlin. Throughout his prof- sional positions, Blankart has contributed to various fields, including p- lic finance, public choice, federalism and industrial organization and re- lation. He has left significant marks in these fields, emphasizing throughout how incentives shape the behaviour of individuals, be it in markets or in government. For example, his best selling textbook - fentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie, is unique in bringing a unified p- spective to the study of public finance, treating politicians as ordinary self interested individuals and doing largely away with the benevolent welfare maximizing social planner.
Voir plus Voir moins
Contents
Preface ........................................................................................................ V
1
2
3
Rights and Wrongs ........................................................................... 1Dennis C. Mueller1.1The Choice of Voting Rule .......................................................... 11.2From the Constitutional Voting Rule to Constitutional Rights.... 51.3Salient Characteristics of Constitutional Rights .......................... 81.410The Relative Nature of Constitutional Rights............................ 1.5Rights and Liberal Democracy .................................................. 121.5.1Conditional Rights ............................................................. 131.5.213Rights and the Tyranny of the Majority............................. 1.5.315Restrictions on Rights Once Again.................................... 1.6Conclusions................................................................................ 16References ............................................................................................ 17
Public Choice and New Institutional Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation Potentials ............................. 19Christian Kirchner2.1Introduction................................................................................ 192.2............................................................................. 21Public Choice 2.3New Institutional Economics ..................................................... 232.427Intermediary Result.................................................................... 2.5Methodology and Research Programme of Economics: Two Mechanisms of Resource Allocation and Distribution............... 272.6Developments in Public Choice and New Institutional Economics: A Process of Convergence? .................................... 312.6.1Public Choice ..................................................................... 312.6.2New Institutional Economics ............................................. 322.7Co-operation Potentials.............................................................. 33References ............................................................................................ 35
The Machiavelli Program and the Dirty Hands Problem........... 39Manfred J. Holler3.1Introduction................................................................................ 393.2The Machiavelli Program .......................................................... 423.3The Republic, the People, and the Law ..................................... 443.449The Circle of Life and the Course of History ............................ 3.5Learning About Cruelties........................................................... 533.6Dirty Hands, Secrets and Secret of the State ............................. 563.7Conclusions................................................................................ 60
VIII Contents
4
5
References ............................................................................................ 61
Esteem, Norms of Participation and Public Goods Supply ........ 63Geoffrey Brennan, Michael Brooks4.1The Issue .................................................................................... 634.265The Normative Relevance of Esteem ........................................ 4.3..................................................................... 67The Esteem Model 4.470What Level of Compliance Do We Want? ................................ 4.5What Levels of Compliance Are Feasible? ............................... 734.6Normative Evaluation, Feasibility Constrained ......................... 754.776Summary and Conclusions ........................................................ References ............................................................................................ 79
Fairness, Rights, and Language Rights: On the Fair Treatment of Linguistic Minorities .................................................................. 81Bengt-Arne Wickström5.1Introduction................................................................................ 815.2Rights, Freedom from Envy,Status Quo, and Extended Fairness....................................................................................... 835.2.185Efficiency and Distribution................................................ 5.3An Envy Free Initial Allocation of Rights in the Case of Exclusive Rights......................................................................... 875.3.1Envy Free Initial Allocation of Rights and Pareto Improvements.................................................................... 875.3.2........................................... 88The Case of Many Individuals 5.3.3Efficiency........................................................................... 895.3.489Extendedly Fair Allocations .............................................. 5.4Non-Exclusive Rights ................................................................ 905.4.1Language Rights ................................................................ 905.4.2................... 91Efficient Allocation of Non-Exclusive Rights 5.4.3Envy Free Status Quo ........................................................ 915.4.4......................................................... 92Pareto Improvements Absolutism .................................................................................92Liberalism ..................................................................................92Comparison................................................................................935.5An Example ............................................................................... 945.5.1Ex Post Fair Allocations .................................................... 965.5.2Laissez-Faire Allocations .................................................. 965.5.3Extended Fairness .............................................................. 975.5.4Comparison ........................................................................ 995.6................................................................... 99Concluding Remark References .......................................................................................... 100
6
7
8
Contents IX
Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth .... 103Lars P. Feld, Horst Zimmermann, Thomas Döring6.1From Efficiency Aspects in Fiscal Federalism to Economic Growth ..................................................................................... 1036.2Economic Growth, Innovation, and Federalism: Theoretical Approaches ............................................................................... 1046.2.1Federalism as an Efficiency Enhancing and Growth-Generating Process.......................................................... 1056.2.2Federalism and Innovation............................................... 1096.2.3Federalism and Agglomeration Economies ..................... 1126.2.4................................... 114Federalism and Structural Change 6.3115The Results of Previous Empirical Work ................................ 6.3.1Cross-Country Studies ..................................................... 1166.3.2Single Country Studies .................................................... 120Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in Transition Countries ..................................................................................122Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in Developed Countries ..................................................................................1236.4Concluding Remarks................................................................ 126References .......................................................................................... 128
Government Bankruptcy and Inflation ...................................... 135Peter Bernholz7.1Introduction.............................................................................. 1357.2Theoretical Relationship Between Government Deficit, Money Creation and Inflation for a Closed Economy. ............ 1367.3Empirical Evidence for Veiled Government Bankruptcy by Hyperinflation .......................................................................... 1397.4Government Deficits and Creeping or Moderate Inflation ...... 1417.5Conclusions.............................................................................. 145References .......................................................................................... 145
Political Support for Tax Complexity: A Simple Model ........... 147Pio Baake, Rainald Borck8.1Introduction.............................................................................. 1478.2149The Model................................................................................ 8.3............................. 151Optimal Tax Deductions and Progressivity 8.4Politics in a Numerical Example.............................................. 1528.5Discussion ................................................................................ 155References .......................................................................................... 156
X Contents
9
Does the Shadow Economy Pose a Challenge to Economic and Public Finance Policy? - Some Preliminary Findings ....... 157Friedrich Schneider9.1Introduction.............................................................................. 1579.2158Defining and Measuring the Shadow Economy ...................... 9.3The Development and Size of the Shadow Economy in German-Speaking and Other OECD-Countries ....................... 1599.4Interactions Between the Shadow and Official Economies ..... 1719.4.1171Allocation Effects ............................................................ 9.4.2173Distribution Effects.......................................................... 9.4.3Stabilisation Effects ......................................................... 1739.4.4174Impact on Public Revenues.............................................. 9.4.5Conclusion ....................................................................... 1759.5Measures Against and Reducing the Shadow Economy.......... 176References .......................................................................................... 178
10The Rankings and Evaluations Mania........................................ 181Bruno S. Frey10.1181The Market and the Public Spheres ..................................... 10.2Economists Evaluated.......................................................... 18510.3Academic Institutions Evaluated ......................................... 18710.4What to Do? ......................................................................... 18810.5Is a Change in Policy to Be Expected? ................................ 190References .......................................................................................... 191
11193University Education as Welfare?............................................... Roland Vaubel11.1What Are the Positive External Effects of a University Education?............................................................................ 19311.2Is the Current Subsidy to German Higher Education Optimal? ............................................................................... 19411.3Efficient Redistribution?...................................................... 19711.4Conclusion ........................................................................... 199References .......................................................................................... 199
12The Economics of Environmental Liability Law – A Dynamic View....................................................................... 201Alfred Endres, Regina Bertram, Bianca Rundshagen12.1Introduction.......................................................................... 20112.2The Social Optimum ............................................................ 20412.3206Abatement and Investment Equilibria Under Liability Law 12.3.1Strict Liability .................................................................. 206
Contents XI
Distortive Private Discounting.................................................206Welfare Comparison ................................................................20712.3.2Negligence ....................................................................... 207The Simple Negligence Rule ................................................... 207Distortive Private Discounting.................................................209Welfare Comparison ................................................................211The Double Negligence Rule................................................... 212Welfare Comparison ................................................................21412.4214Summary and Welfare Implications .................................... 12.5Example ............................................................................... 21512.6Conclusions.......................................................................... 217References .......................................................................................... 219
13On the Efficiency of a Public Insurance Monopoly: The Case of Housing Insurance in Switzerland ......................... 221Gebhard Kirchgässner13.1Introduction.......................................................................... 22113.2The Empirical Evidence....................................................... 22713.3232Why Are the Cantonal Monopolies Cheaper? ..................... 13.4Possible Reasons for Abolishing the Public Monopoly....... 23513.5Concluding Remarks............................................................ 239References .......................................................................................... 240
14A Note on David Hansemann as a Precursor of Chadwick and Demsetz .................................................................................. 243Bernhard Wieland14.1Introduction.......................................................................... 24314.2244Demsetz, Chadwick, and Hansemann.................................. 14.3249Biographical Sketch of Hansemann..................................... 14.4Conclusion ........................................................................... 253References .......................................................................................... 254
15‘Stepping Stones’ and ‘Access Holidays’: The Fallacies of Regulatory Micro-Management ................................................. 257Günter Knieps, Patrick Zenhäusern 15.1Introduction.......................................................................... 25715.2The Fallacies of Regulatorily Promoted Infrastructure Competition.......................................................................... 26015.2.1Systematisation of Micro-Managed Regulation .............. 260Unbundling and the ‘Stepping Stones Hypothesis’ .................260Regulation of Breather Permissions (‘Access Holidays’)........26215.2.2A Critical Appraisal of Micro-Managed Regulation ....... 263
XII Contents
15.2.3Europe vs. United States: The Opposite Reform Process 26715.3270Regulatory Reform Towards Rule-Based Regulation ......... 15.3.1Monopolistic Bottlenecks and the Concept ofEssential Facilities’.......................................................................... 27015.3.2Application of Regulatory Instruments to Monopolistic Bottlenecks....................................................................... 27215.3.3272Incentive Regulation of Access Charges ......................... 15.4Recommendations on the EU Communications Reform Process ................................................................................ 27315.4.1Exploiting Further Phasing-Out Potentials of Sector-Specific Market Power Regulation .................................. 27315.4.2Implementing Pragmatic ‘Double-’ and ‘Triple Play Tests’ ................................................................................ 274Acknowledgments ...................................................................275References .......................................................................................... 275
List of Contributors ............................................................................... 279
http://www.springer.com/9783540727811