Cet ouvrage fait partie de la bibliothèque YouScribe
Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le lire en ligne
En savoir plus

How to become a National Entrepreneur. The rise of Indonesian Capitalists - article ; n°1 ; vol.41, pg 89-116

De
29 pages
Archipel - Année 1991 - Volume 41 - Numéro 1 - Pages 89-116
28 pages
Source : Persée ; Ministère de la jeunesse, de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l’enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation.
Voir plus Voir moins

Monsieur François Raillon
How to become a National Entrepreneur. The rise of Indonesian
Capitalists
In: Archipel. Volume 41, 1991. pp. 89-116.
Citer ce document / Cite this document :
Raillon François. How to become a National Entrepreneur. The rise of Indonesian Capitalists. In: Archipel. Volume 41, 1991. pp.
89-116.
doi : 10.3406/arch.1991.2712
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/arch_0044-8613_1991_num_41_1_2712François RAILLON
How to become a National Entrepreneur
The rise of Indonesian Capitalists
«... and State, It is our to mission achieve to a better develop quality and further of life. Hence, enhance we the focus economy on three of the basic, Nation vital
areas, namely infrastructure, technology and, of no lesser importance, human
resource development. All our achievements we fully dedicate to the advancement
and prosperity of Indonesia...» (Bakrie Brothers, advertisement in Tempo magaz
ine, Oct. 13, 1990).
« Well-known is the name of Bima, the great Wayang character, a symbol of
honesty, justice and wisdom. Now, Bima's thundering spirits seethe in Bimantara's
business vision. Our work is wrapped with enthusiasm and professionalism, in a
sincere endeavor to advance our beloved country. As one of the national business
groups, we are driven by a deeply-felt philosophy - always compete in an atmos
phere of harmony, with an open attitude and a sense of togetherness ». Now, toge
ther with our partners, we uphold the ideals of moving Indonesia ahead, towards
the take-off era ». (Bimantara group, advertisement, Tempo, Dec. 2, 1989)
The recent economic boom invites observers to give another look at Indo
nesia's entrepreneurs and to reassess their fate and progress. Since the late
1980s, high growth has been back again. In 1990, domestic investment recor
ded a spectacular threefold increase. However, many still question the very
existence of Indonesian capitalists as a group, and see no genuine entrepre
neurs. One way to overcome the stalemate is to examine what lies behind sta
tistics by reviewing a number of biographies. While information is not always
reliable because of the emotional load of personal data, study of individual
cases should probably help verifying what macro statistics and economic tables
tell us about growth in Indonesia. It is not unlikely that a group of enterpri
sing people (capitalists?) account for rising curves and aggregate expansion.*
New life styles : Images of affluence
Some sectors of the Indonesian society are altering rapidly. To the dedi
cated observer positioned in strategic places such as large-hotel lounges, air
ministers' and other senior officials' ports, expensive restaurants, night-clubs, 90
anterooms, to whoever attends business seminars and other professional meet
ings in Jakarta and other cities, the sea change is apparent. In trade associa
tions offices (asosiasi and himpunan), even in KADIN, the national chamber
of commerce and industry, things are moving, and a new rhythm is felt in
institutional bodies that used to be rather sleepy places.
Products, signs, places, words and attitudes reflect the new climate. The
growth of a press catering for businessmen's and upper strata's needs (Ekse-
kutip, Swasembada, Warta Ekonomi, Matra, Prospek, and also Tempo, Edit
or, to name just a few) is revealing in itself, while it mirrors the changing
environment: New housing estates (to live in Pondok Indah, Kelapa Gading,
Bintaro Jaya, Depok, and soon in Bumi Serpong Damai, «the 21st century
city» designed for executives, professionals, traders, office clerks...), large
mansions, new office blocks, five-star hotels, fitness centers, more aggress
ive advertising, a new TV channel (RCTI), golf links, developers' mentalit
ies, the Indonesian Far East (IBT) as a new frontier, moving by plane and
fast cars, modern diseases (stress and strokes)... A renewed taste for conspi-
cuousness is manifest, «go public» and «expose yourself» are the new mottos,
while traditional malu (humble) feelings are contained or repressed. Secrecy
and privacy are assailed by PR attachés. Quite common in the press are pho
tographs of boards of trustees, of young professionals on a building site or
striking a pose before a computer - while pipe smoking, a favorite until the
early 1980s, has been relegated to the role of an emblem for subsidiary, con
servative figures. In business sets, senior capitalists enjoy being seen surroun
ded by young but respectful executives. Biographies of successful people
abound and tell positive stories about wealth and the delights of material cul
ture. Bondan Winarno, the chronicler of economic sagas, has identified the
emergence of Indonesian Young Urban Professionals who prefer material
satisfactions, want to be fît, play squash, do aerobic classes, and drive a Porshe
rather than a BMW («Kami Yuppies Indonesia», Swasembada or Swa for short,
Jan. 1989, pp. 54-55).
Places for entrepreneurs to be seen are easily recognized: De luxe hotel
lounges in Jakarta or Singapore; expensive management seminars; sports
clubs; fashion shows: Drs Abdulgani, Chief Executive Officer of Bank Duta
and chairman of Perbanas, the banking association, was thinking of impro
ving manners and art tastes of would-be managers and entrepreneurs in his
Advanced School of Economics, Finance and Banking, until he was engulfed
in the Bank Duta scandal (1990).
Conventional views
Facing such a showy life style, there is a temptation among observers to
deny the reality of the people observed. The uneasy feeling of déjà vu induces
serious doubts about Indonesian business people that cannot be taken at face
value.
Mythical, ersatz, or kabir capitalists ?
More specifically, the existence of a significant, self-reliant group of ind
igenous entrepreneurs is mostly challenged by observers. The common view
is that of a group heavily dependent on the government, foreign connections 91
and biased regulations. Local entrepreneurs are perceived as not genuine,
fake; images of affluence are only a delusion of consumptive wealth, without
substance, while relations and cooperation between officials and business peo
ple are seen as sheer cronyism.
Three recent essays have popularized these preconceptions. The latest one
is James Clad' s Behind the myth : Business, money and power in Southeast
Asia (1989), where the DUPPIES «Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking»
entrepreneurs, are denounced as mythical business people practising rentier
capitalism and thriving on facilities and favoritism; no real play of free mar
ket forces and free enterprise is admitted.
Yoshihara Kunio (The rise of ersatz capitalism in Southeast Asia, 1988)
identifies an «inefficient superlayer» made of Southeast Asian businessmen,
regarded as either state-assisted or foreign capital-dependent (compradores).
They are nothing more than front men-type capitalists. It is certainly ironical
that Yoshihara should forget Japan's own experience, when the Meiji state
deliberately acted as a capitalism-producing machine by breeding industrial
entrepreneurs: It provided unemployed samurais with capital to rush them
into trade and industry; government-built industries were given away or sold
at a low price to private capitalists, resulting in the zaibatsus through a system
of state favours and enticements.
In Indonesia, The rise of Capital (1986), Richard Robison offers a new ver
sion of the old marxist kabir critique. Most indigenous entrepreneurs are seen
as capitalist bureaucrats (kabir), connected to or dependent on state power.
A rise of capital is acknowledged, but capitalists are out of sight; a bureauc
ratic bourgeoisie is accumulating money, but without risks nor entrepreneur-
ship... While Robison has somewhat mellowed recently (1987), he remains basi
cally pessimistic about the prospects of an autonomous pribumi (indigenous)
class of entrepreneurs.
Is Javanese culture adverse to entrepreneurship ?
Far from Robison' s class analyses, but conveying similar perceptions on
the ingrained incompetence of indigenous entrepreneurs, is the cultural
approach. Although gradually changing, a few stereotypes developed under
the Dutch still stick to the Indonesian private sector. Viewed as the core of
pribumi values, Javanese culture is defined as not propitious to economic acti
vity. The Javanese community sense of belonging, the gotong royong (mutual
help) system and the appanage vision of the economy (seen as a feudal spoil
system) would be adverse to western ways of doing business. An updated ver
sion of these old-style values could be the equalitarian and family principles
of pemerataan and kekeluargaan, which do not support differentiation and
individualism required by modern business, and form the basis of an anti-
capitalist ideology. A further corollary of those principles is the ideal of the
pengusaha pejuang, the «fighting entrepreneur», bound by national solidarity
and republican duties, who sacrifices his business interests to advan
cement, which the Chinese do not do, at least according to pribumi. The figh
ting spirit would account for failure.
At variance with the «genuine» Javanese from the interior, the pasisir (coast
al) people and «overseas» Indonesians (orang seberang) are deemed to be more 92
talented entrepreneurs, because of their age-old trading habits.
Indigenous vs Chinese business : The old comparative disadvantage
One of the most commonplace reasons used to account for the weakness
of indigenous entrepreneurs is the unfair economic leverage exerted by a vigo
rous Chinese business community. Indonesia's corporate world is viewed as
split into two unbalanced parts, indigenous and Chinese, with the former being
handicapped by the latter' s dynamism as well as by their own reputed short
comings. As an indication, the Chinese control three quarters of private con
glomerates, which shows a real disproportion as they only account for 4%
of the total population.
Various factors are usually mentioned to explain the Chinese edge over
the pribumi : They have a sense of thrift and a migrant mentality; their his
torical specialization in trade is amplified by discrimination. For non pribumi,
there is no other way out but business, as they are excluded from other pro
fessions (civil service, agriculture). Because of exclusion, they strengthen their
Southeast Asian network, based on the old Fujian or Guangdong connection,
and develop a kongsi mentality, that is, a taste for partnerships, and business
acumen. In older times, some Chinese acted as «fighting entrepreneurs» when
they were smuggling for the Republicans. But in their case, sacrifice to a cause
has not been a handicap, and has even become an asset.
In foreign circles, a cliché still pervasive is the idea that «the best partner
is Chinese». It actually has some grounds, as historically Chinese business peo
ple enjoyed more opportunities (facilities), and had a better chance to improve
their skills. The trust they enjoy has enhanced their position in a field where
trust is one of the main factors. As a minority ethnic group, the Chinese have
acquired a proficient command of cross-cultural accommodation, which ena
bles them to better succeed in business, especially in triangular relationships
where they associate with foreigners and pribumi. Among the latter, many
also prefer to do business with the Chinese because they rely on their skills,
and do not feel reluctant to enter into arrangements that would not be accep
table to fellow pribumi. The Chinese of course prefer doing business with fe
llow Chinese because of mutual trust: Loyalty is valued over skills, according
to Liem Sioe Liong, whose practice it is to be loyal to business associates and
employees, supportive of friends and discreet to the point of near invisibility.
Economic nationalism in action: Breeding local capitalism
In this context and since its inception, the Indonesian republican State has
strived to foster a capitalist group as a means to step up economic develop
ment. Strong government intervention to achieve such an aim is not unex
pected, as it is a rare thing to have spontaneous development of capitalism
without State mediation. Thus it is not precisely fair to regard Indonesian
business people as ersatz or kabir capitalists on the grounds that, at one stage
or the other, many - but not all - of them have enjoyed State facilities and
protection. After a few erratic attempts, a business group has eventually emer
ged that has proved more resilient than is often thought. However, being
«infant capitalists», they still tend to maintain a close, umbilical relationship
with the government, while they demonstrate growing initiative and capital 93
accumulation capability.
Economie engineering
After the failure of the Benteng program in the 1950s and the decline of
the «national bourgeoisie» under Sukarno's Guided Economy, Suharto's New
Order introduced a first deregulation drive (1967-1973) meant to put the house
in order. When the economy was stabilized, the new regime embarked on an
active import substitution policy that stimulated the rise of local industrialists.
Until then, trade had been the prevalent pattern among business people
who seemed to prefer moving and trading goods rather than making them.
The economy was dominated by commodity flows, and most of manufactur
ing activity was limited to processing primary products or producing a few
light goods. Resisting the long-ingrained merchant attitude and the easy way
to make money, the government urged traders to become industrialists, and
was able to impose its will thanks to the windfall oil income in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. By means of regulation as well as financial incentives, busi
ness people were compelled to invest in manufacturing, and to enter new indust
ries. Use and abuse of protection enabled national entrepreneurs to develop
and thrive, but at the same time lowered the competitiveness of the Indones
ian economy: Production would grow at higher costs behind tariff and non
tariff barriers. Due to the oil price drop from 1983, the government had to
launch a vigorous non oil export drive in order to offset declining foreign
income. To encourage exporters (mostly the private sector), wide-ranging dere
gulation policies were introduced in 1984. New capitalists who had been able
to develop under state protection, had to harden when they were exposed to
international competition, as is now the case.
Under the state umbrella
Capital accumulation and private initiative have been encouraged by the
government through affirmative and protective policies. Cheap money was
made available to entrepreneurs in such a way that they would even get «paid»
through negative loan interests. In the 1970s, when inflation was often as
high as 20%, interest on some investment loans was as low as 12%, while
working capital loans would not be charged more than 18%. All of this was
financed by savings derived from oil exports and foreign aid. Small-scale entre
preneurs enjoyed even cheaper loans from the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI)
such as small investment credits (KIK, 8%), etc.
Since 1974, indigenous entrepreneurs have been allotted special medium
and long term credits, mandatory equities, positions in executive and trustee
boards; government orders of a certain value have been reserved for indige
nous businessmen (presidential decision n° 10/1980), as well as construction
works for contractors in regions (Keppres n° 14 A and 18). Infant industries
were given high protection through import bans, tariffs, etc. These policies
and others that cannot be reviewed here have been endorsed and implement
ed with a great zeal by the higher ranks of the civil service.
Civil servants: The people in charge
For decades - especially when the private sector was almost non extant 94
- the government technostructure has exerted a virtual command over the
whole economy. Most of them (general directors, directors, bureau heads, engi
neers and project managers) share an ingrained economic nationalism.
Among the numerous government bodies that define and control econo
mic state policies, several agencies have played a specific role in assisting natio
nal entrepreneurs through their regulatory powers and their procurement
practice (the government is the largest buyer in Indonesia). The powerful State
Secretariat (SetNeg) controlled most of large government contracts from 1980
to 1988, with a systematic preference given to local entrepreneurs; every three
years until 1989, BKPM, the Investment Coordinating Board, set a long prio
rity list of investment fields protected or reserved for national investors; since
1978, BPPT, the Agency for Technology Development and Assessment, has
screened foreign technologies and promoted national interest in industriali
zation policies; the ministry of industry has long been one of the main sour
ces of nationalist regulation and protection. Even before the industrialization
drive, Pertamina under Ibnu Sutowo (until 1975) had already enabled new
comers to enter a business activity as suppliers to the state firm. Sutowo was
using oil money to offer contracts and orders to pribumi entrepreneurs -
some did not even have that position yet. Despite misuse of funds, several
current big businessmen were born in Sutowo's heydays.
As a result of past and present economic nationalism, a large state-owned
economic sector is still maintained today. Led by «state managers of capital»
who show a real entrepreneurial spirit, government firms and conglomerat
es still form the major part of the corporate economy.
Apart from Pertamina (oil-related companies), the main public groups are Berdi-
kari (trade, agribusiness, shipping, insurance), Elnusa (electronics, computers, che
micals, telephone, engineering), Garuda (air transport, catering, hotels), Kraka-
tau Steel (steel and tin industry, engineering), Mega Eltra (manufacturing, con
crete products, electrical equipment), Pantja Niaga (export-import, car dealing,
construction, rattan, shipping), Rajawali (the former Oei Tiong Ham concern: Ship
ping, pharmacy, plantations, export-import, distribution), Semen Gresik (cement,
computers and data processing), and the group of strategic industries under the
BPIS agency (Warta Ekonomi, July 31, 1989, p. 78).
Companies that are not properly managed are now compelled to make drast
ic reforms. «We must reduce red tape», says Nasrudin Sumintapura, junior
minister of finance. Various solutions are being contemplated to improve
BUMN (state firms) management, and make them more responsive to mar
ket conditions, through management contracts with private experts, mergers,
use of the stockmarket, and joint ventures. Under the influence of the gra
dually more assertive corporate sector, civil servants' ideology and mental
ity evolve: Anwar Supriyadi, director of operations at PJKA (the railway
system), urges his colleagues to change their state of mind from that of
«government officials to that of civil servants with a business soul» in order
to make government assets more profitable.
In a deregulation ambiance accompanied by declining government finance,
trying to find extra funding has become legitimate for civil servants, if not
a must. In some ways, what used to be a komisi has virtually been replaced
with sponsoring. As sponsors' money is officially accepted and agreeable, 95
mixing private and government funds is no longer dubious; it is even the new
way for the civil service to seek additional finance for projects.
At the interface: The entrepreneurial priai
In this context, strong soul-searching is taking place among the pejabat
(high officials) on Javanese values and business. A seminar held in Yogya-
karta on this matter fortunately concluded that nothing in Javanese culture
prevents commercial success after all. It was always there. Officials and priai
had only been forbidden to do business by Sri Paku Buwono IV (1788-1830),
while the Dutch favored the Chinese. An agrarian culture is not an obstacle,
since the Chinese themselves first came from rural China. To have successful
Javanese business people, it is sufficient to go back to the earlier tradition,
and promote intermingling between the Chinese and the Javanese to improve
the latter's commercial performance («Cara berbisnis orang Jawa», Tempo,
Oct. 20, 1990, p. 103).
In actual fact, modern times already offered a legitimising - and not so
new - model, supporting priai who venture into business : That of the mer
chant prince, as embodied in its latest version by the late Sultan Hamengku
Buwono IX. Rated as one the 100 wealthier Indonesians, he owned a dozen
companies in sugar processing, travel, retail (PT Duta Merlin), banking,
tobacco, construction, shrimps and tuna, garments, films, etc. («Uang di balik
tahta», Swa, Nov. 1988). When the Sultan's Bank Dagang Nasional Indones
ia was in trouble in 1980, it was saved by Sjamsul Nursalim (Liem Tek Siong)
who injected fresh money (50% of the capital). The pioneering attitude of the
Sultan has been followed by most feudal families in Yogyakarta and Solo, who
have turned their landed fortunes into regular businesses.
Propelled by the involution of priai ethics, that is, by its return to tradi
tional behavior, officials have been more willing to take a new attitude towards
business. They can even act as private entrepreneurs, as they may control
private enterprise through share holding or as komisaris (trustees). Event
ually some of them either retire or resign to start business activities, as was
the case of Arnold Baramuli, a former chief public prosecutor who had been
appointed a governor of Celebes by Sukarno, then the youngest one in
Indonesia.
In 1973, he resigned from the civil service to take over his family's business, Poleko
Trading. Born in 1930 in Pinrang, he had studied law at Universitas Indonesia
and had been a student activist. He decided to expand Poleko, an agribusiness firm
(rice, oil and coconut flour milling) and moved its main office from Ujung Pandang
to Jakarta. There he started various large-scale business ventures: Synthetic cot
ton, timber (in Buru island, with Filipino experts and a loan from Marubeni),
plywood, glue for wood and paper (Surabaya), garments in Bekasi, rattan, furni
ture, shrimps, cold storage, an integrated cocoa nut mill, etc. Today, with a workf
orce of 8,000, Poleko comprises 14 companies, including 8 joint ventures with Japa
nese, British and Australian partners. Investments are financed by profits, or loans
from foreign partners. Baramuli owns 20% of Poleko's total investment (about
US$ 200 million). 60% of the equity is held by his family and the rest by his staff,
including 32 directors. A member of parliament and a Golkar official, he is one 96
of the vice-chairmen of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). Bara-
muli's avowed strategy is to follow government policies closely, as is clear from
the list of his various entreprises, which reflects early New Order priorities (food,
clothing and housing). He has created a foundation, Yayasan Baramuli, to pro
vide grants for his employees. He believes that «economic activity cannot be sepa
rated from politics». (V. Elisawati, «Arnold Baramuli berkiprah di dua dunia», Swa,
June 1989, pp. 74-77).
While officials can become business people, the reverse phenomenon is also
taking place: Private managers turn government company managers. Recrui
ting CEOs for state-owned firms among experienced private corporate lea
ders is now a new trend. Cacuk Soedaryanto is the epitome of the new-style
official: Once a private manager with IBM, in 1988 he was appointed as the
CEO of Perumtel, the state telephone utility.
An engineer from ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology, 1973), Soedaryanto, 41,
worked with IBM for 8 years, then with Indosat, the international telephone uti
lity. At Perumtel, where he heads 42,000 employees, he develops discipline among
his executives by jogging with them at 4 in the morning; then they attend a troo
ping the color ceremony (national and company's flags are hoisted). Staff memb
ers receive training in business, technology and cultural, social and defense pro
blems. Soedaryanto values skills, but character is very important. «Loyalty, disci
pline, initiative and motivation» are required qualities. Cacuk lives in Pondok Indah.
He gives lectures at the Officers School of the Armed Forces (SE SPA AD) and
at the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas), and is a KADIN leader. As a pro
blem solver, he likes to say that «an obstacle is another challenge» (Irmina Ira-
wati, «Cacuk Soedaryanto sebuah memo untuk pimpinan», Swa, Feb. 1989, pp.
70-73).
In the long run the swap of people between the corporate and government
worlds tends to reduce the gap between both sectors. The flow of people and
ideas can be both ways because the private sector has grown bigger as a result
of government action. The more balanced relationship improves their osmos
is and synergy.
Infant capitalists born from state travail
In the last two decades, thousands of private entrepreneurs were born,
small and big, in Jakarta and in the provinces. A large part of the currently
registered 700,000 firms are new ones, but their total number is still quite
low for a country the size of Indonesia. Among these commercial and indust
rial firms, quite a few have grown into full-fledged corporations, led by «capi
talists». For the time being, «capitalists» can be defined as people endowed
with entrepreneurial skills, and an ability to raise capital money and start or
develop a profitable business.
Old and new responses
Reactions of potential capitalists to government policies have varied in the
past. Despite the failure of the Benteng program that gave preferential import
licenses to pribumi business people (1949-1959), some of the older-generation
businessmen who emerged then have managed to survive under Sukarno's
Guided Economy into the New Order. While too many of the odd 5,000 who 97
Table
Indonesian private conglomerates: The biggest 40
Nb.
over assets Name of Group of Main owner Main activity
firms billion Rp
1 Salim (Waringin K.) 8 100 5 500 350 Multi purposes Soedono Salim (liem Sioe Liong)
2 Astra 2 200 1 450 260 Automotive Will. Soeryadjaya (Tjia Kian Liong)
1 800 3 Sinar Mas 760 150 Palm oil Eka Tjipta Widjaya (Oei Ek Tjhong)
4 Lippo 1 800 340 66 Mochtar Riady (Lie Mo Tie) Banking
1 305 Kretek 5 Gudang Garam 690 10 Rachman Halim (Tjoa To Hing) cs
6 Djarum 1 300 520 14 Kretek Robert Budi Hartono (Hwie Tjhong)
7 1 200 240 66 Batteries Sofjan Wanandi (Lim Bian Koen) cs Wanandi (Pakarti)
8 Panin (Pan Indonesia) 1 160 360 38 Mu'min Ali Gunawan (Lie Me Ming) Banking
Puri Setiabudi 1 120 490 Real Estate Jan Darmadi (Fuk Jo Jau) cs 9 50
10 Arya Upaya (Ongko) 1 060 360 60 Kaharuddin Ongko (Ong Ka Huat) Banking
1 1 980 200 31 Insurance Julius Tahija cs Tahija (Indrapura)
Bimantara 920 520 65 Oil, chemicals 12 Bambang Trihatmodjo
13 Bob Hasan/Pasopati 890 490 75 Plywood H Moh Hasan (The Kian Seng)
890 370 Soedarpo Sastrosatomo 14 Soedarpo/Samudra 32 Shipping
Damatex (Argo M.) 830 830 36 Textiles 15 The Ning King
16 Dharmala (DMT Corp) 800 800 60 Trade Soeh. Gondokusumo (Go Ka Him)
Roda Mas 730 410 34 Glass Tan Siong Kie cs 17
18 Pendawa Sempurna 645 210 80 Textiles, cars HM Joesoef
Bank Bali 630 360 21 Djaja Ramli (Lie Tong Tjing) 19 Banking
20 Bank Indonesia Raya 595 310 18 Atang Latief (Lauw Tjin Ho)
590 Kretek Samsi (Sie Twan Tjing) 21 Bentoel 196 3
22 Humpuss 550 195 33 Oil Hutomo Mandala Putra
Nusamba 550 110 15 Electronics Sigit Harjojudanto, Bob Hasan 23
Tyres Sjamsul Nursalim (Liem Tek Siong) 24 Gajah Tunggal 540 210 32
Barito Pasific 460 210 41 Plywood Praj. Pangestu (Phang Djun Phen) 25
26 Bakrie Brothers 442 198 35 Pipes, pepper Aburizal Bakrie & bros
27 Mantrust 420 240 32 Foodstuffs Tegoeh Soetantyo (Tan Kiong Liep)
400 240 Metal works J Purnama Sudarma (Ong Kie Hong) 28 Lion Metal Works 16
29 Tiga Raksa (Tira) 395 180 36 Johny Widjaja (Oey Kwie Gwan) cs Trading
Ometraco 380 320 45 Agribusiness Ferry T Santoso (Kam Som Thjiang) 30
Bumiputera 1912 380 230 17 Insurance Sutjipto S Amidarmo 31
Sukanto Tanoto (Lim Sui Hang) cs 32 Raja Garuda Mas 375 240 30 Pulp, paper
170 M Wiryawimarta (Poo Djie Thiong) 33 Cipta Cakra Murdaya 360 32 Manufacturing
Nugra Santana 340 340 32 Shipyards H Ibnu Sutowo 34
Samadikun Hartono (Ho Sioe Koen) 35 Modern Foto 340 92 21 Photograph
Hus. Djojonegoro (Chu Hok Seng) 36 ABC 320 180 23 Foodstuff
315 210 12 Foundations Yayasan Harapan Kita, Y. TriKoRa 37 Hanurata
38 Batik Keris 310 200 7 Batik Gaitini (Oeng Goe Tio Nio)
20 Press Jakob Oetama 39 Gramedia 305 165
Indoconsult 300 113 14 Soemitro Djojohadikusumo 40 Banking
Source: WARTA EKONOMI, 31 July 1989, p. 72 (1988 figures).