//img.uscri.be/pth/c9353c5d732c0e9fe688e9c642c935ac5c085527
Cette publication ne fait pas partie de la bibliothèque YouScribe
Elle est disponible uniquement à l'achat (la librairie de YouScribe)
Achetez pour : 13,13 € Lire un extrait

Lecture en ligne (cet ouvrage ne se télécharge pas)

A la recherche de la politique étrangère européenne

De
205 pages
Le "système de relations extérieures européennes", par lequel l'Union et ses États membres produisent et gèrent leurs relations avec le reste du monde, apparaît à la fois original et complexe, faisant interagir des politiques nationales, des politiques communautaires, des politiques intergouvernementales... La notion de politique étrangère européenne demeure une catégorie énigmatique et, pour une très large majorité des européens, elle n'a pas atteint le seuil de visibilité nécessaire à une existence incontestable.
Voir plus Voir moins

A la recherche de la politique étrangère européenne

www.1ibrairieharmattan.com Harmattan 1@wanadoo.fr diffusion. harmattan @wanadoo.fr (Ç)L'Harmattan,2005 ISBN: 2-7475-9526-9 EAN:9782747595261

politique européenne
A la recherche de la politique étrangère européenne
Sous la direction de Bastien Irondelle et Franck Petiteville

n017, automne

2005

Revue publiée avec le concours du Centre national du livre et de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques

Politique européenne Centre européen de Sciences Po 117 Bd Saint Germain 75006 PARIS Tel: (+33 1) 45 49 83 37 Fax: (+33 1) 45 49 83 60 politique-europeenne@sciences-po.Er http://www.portedeurope.org/pole/index.htm

L'Harmattan 5-7, rue de l'Ecole-Polytechnique 75005 PARIS -France

L'Harmattan Hongrie Hargita u. 3
H-1026 BUDAPEST

L'Harmattan

Italia

Via Degli Aristidi, 15 1-10124 TORINO

DIRECTRICE DE LA REVUE: Sabine Saurugger, lEP de Grenoble
COMITE DE REDACTION:

Céline Belot, PACTE, lEP de Grenoble (responsable de la rubrique « Agenda») Didier Chabanet, INRETS, Paris Dorota Dakowska, lEP de Paris, Paris X Nanterre Frédéric Depétris, lEP de Paris - CEVIPOF Patrick Hassenteufel, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin en Yvelines (responsable rubrique" Recherches en cours ") Bastien Irondelle, CERI, lEP de Paris Sabine Saurugger, lEP de Grenoble Andy Smith, CERVL - lEP de Bordeaux Yves Surel, lEP de Paris (responsable rubrique" Lectures critiques ")
CONSEIL SCIENTIFIQUE:

Pierre Allan, Université de Genève Richard Balme, lEP Paris Stefano Bartolini, Institut universitaire européen, Florence Simon Bulmer, University of Manchester Renaud Dehousse, lEP Paris Guillaume Devin, lEP Paris Reinhard Heinisch, University of Pittsburgh Markus Jachtenfuchs, Internationale Universitat Bremen Jean Leca, lEP Paris Patrick Le Galès, CEVIPOF, CNRS Christian Lequesne, CERI, lEP Paris Paul Magnette, Université Libre de Bruxelles Anand Menon, University of Birmingham Yves Mény, Institut universitaire européen, Florence Pierre Muller, CEVIPOF, lEP Paris Claudio M. Radaelli, University of Exeter Ezra Suleiman, Princeton University

SOMMAIRE A LA RECHERCHE
DE LA

POLITIQUE ETRANGERE EUROPEENNE Bastien Irondelle et Franck Petiteville La politique étrangère européenne en débats Sten Rynning Return of the Jedi : Realism and the Study of the European Union. Britz et Arita Eriksson ESDP : A Fourth System of European Foreign Policy. I<.aren Smith Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Clara Portela Where and Why does the EU Impose Sanctions? Ozlem T erzi Europeanisation of Foreign Policy in EU Member and Candidate Countries. A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases? Cornelia Woll Vers des compétences externes: l'activisme de la Commission européenne en matière d'aviation civile. Jan. Orbie, Hendrik. Vos et Lisbeth. Taverniers EU Trade Polif)!and Social Clause: A Question of Competences?

5

11

35

63

83

113

137

159

SOMMAIRE

AGENDA

189

RECHERCHES

EN COURS

Malika Ghemmaz Une population invisible? Les attitudes et comportements des portugais en Europe. Comparaison France/Belgique/Luxembourg

politiques
191

Xabier Itçaina et Julien Weisbein La marée noire du Prestige au prisme des mobilisations de protestation en France et en Espagne. Une crise locale à focale européenne - et inversement? 196

AUTEURS

201

Bastien IRONDELLE Franck PETITEVILLE

LA POLITIQUE

ETRANGERE EUROPEENNE

EN DEBATS

A la recherche de la politique étrangère européenne. .. « Si vous la trouvez, surtout prévenez-nous! », ne manquerait pas de rétorquer, non sans raison, la majorité des praticiens et des observateurs de l'U nion européenne. Le « systèIlle de relations extérieures européennes », par lequell'U nion et ses Etats IlleIllbres produisent et gèrent leurs relations avec le reste du Illonde, apparaît, en effet, à la fois original et cotllplexe, faisant interagir des politiques nationales, des, politiques cotllmunautaires, des politiques intergouvernelllentales, allant de la Politique européenne de sécurité et défense à la protllotion des droits de l'hotllllle, l'exportation de normes sociales, les relations éconollliques et cotlllllerciales, qui transcendent de plus en plus la logique des piliers. La notion de politique étrangère européenne detlleure une catégorie énigtllatique. Pour une très large Illajorité de citoyens européens, la « politique étrangère européenne» n'a pas atteint le seuil de visibilité nécessaire à une existence incontestable. COIlltTIent pourrait-il en être autrement au vu de l'impuissance de l'UE face aux conflits de l'ex-Yougoslavie et plus réceIlltTIent de la désunion européenne face à la guerre en Irak? Plus problélTIatique peut-être, l'existence d'un objet «politique étrangère européenne» ne fait pas l'unanimité parmi la cotlltllunauté scientifique. Un spécialiste français des questions de politique étrangère peut encore aujourd'hui réSUITIer les choses en disant qu'« il n'y a pas véritablelllent de politique étrangère européenne» (Cohen, 2002, p. Le thètTIe de la ou des politique(s) étrangère(s) européenne(s) n'en a pas lTIoins fait l'objet d'un renouvelletTIent bibliographique assez riche et souvent passionnant ces deux dernières années, pour s'en tenir aux seuls ouvrages. Certains sont focalisés sur la Politique étrangère et de sécurité cotTIlllUne CotlllTIe processus d'institutionnalisation d'une diplomatie collective européenne (SITIith l\LE., 2004; Buchet de Neuilly, 2005; Terpan, 2(03); d'autres rendent cotTIpte de la « politique étrangère» de l'UE de ITIanière plus extensive en intégrant les politiques extérieures cotTItTIunautaires

Politique

européenne, n017, autOtllne 2005, p. 5-9

6
(Srnith 1(., 2003 ; Carslnaes, 2005) . Sjursen, \\lhite, 2004 ; Helly, Petiteville,

La notion de politique étrangère européenne pose de Inultiples défis tant à la .Forezgn J)oli~)' 4net/yJiJ qu'à la théorie des relations internationales (\Vhite, 1999). La théorie réaliste, d'abord, peine à reconnaître la notion de politique étrangère européenne comme pertinente: la politique étrangère est à ce point assunilée par les réalistes à la défense étatique de l'intérêt national que, comme le note Frédéric Charillon, « le concept de politique étrangère COlnmune (...) ne fait pas sens» (2005, p. 63). Il en résulte fréquelnment une double conséquence dOlnlnageable: les analystes «elnpiristes» de la PESC contournent d'autant plus aisélnent l'objection réaliste que les réalistes eux-lnêmes ont tendance à déserter un sujet auquel ils n'accordent qu'un crédit très relatif. C'est donc tout l'intérêt de la contribution de Sten Rynning dans ce nlunéro de Politique européenne que de réintroduire en quelque sorte la perspective réaliste dans l'étude de la politique étrangère européenne. La réhabilitation du progralnlne réaliste, affirmé avec la force de conviction et le zest de provocation propres à relancer le débat théorique, apparaît particulièrelnent salutaire dans le contexte français, oÙ le réalistne fait trop souvent l'épreuve d'un rejet etpriori. Un autre débat - ancien puisqu'il opposait en quelque sorte déjà François Duchêne (1973) à John Galtung (1973) porte sur la qualification de l'UE en termes de « puissance» : le prelnier lançait le concept de « puissance civile» ({ivilietnpOJveJ~prolnis à un long succès, tandis que le second repérait dans la Comlnunauté une « superpuissance» en devenir. Le débat, qui fut anÏtné dans les années 1980 (Bull, 1982; Pijpers, 1988), aurait pu s'estotnper. Il connaît néantnoins une nouvelle vigueur aujourd'hui dans le contexte du développetnent de la politic}ue européenne de sécurité et de défense (Irondelle, Vennesson, 2002). Malena Britz et .Lt\rita Eriksson proposent de relire le développelnent de la PESO à la lumière de la thèse des systèlnes de politique étrangère, proposé par Brian \Vhite, en prenant au sérieux la nature hybride la PESO comtne politique COlnlnune. Outre le panoralna précis de la PESO qu'il offre, l'article ouvre ainsi des perspectives riches sur la question de l'institutionnalisation et l'autonolnisation d'un chan1p propre à l'Europe de la défense, dont les interactions et les concurrences avec

7
celui de la PESC tnériteront, à n'en pas douter, l'attention des chercheurs dans les années à venir. Au-delà une question fondatnentale est de savoir si, en raison de sa « tnilitarisation », l'Union peut encore être considérée cotntne une puissance civile privilégiant des tnodes opératoires coopératifs sur le recours à la force (Stnith 1<'., 2000 ; Stavridis, 2001 ; Treacher, 2004). La notion de « puissance civile» se prêtant à une certaine confusion conceptuelle dans ces débats, il était particulièretnent opportun d'y revenir, cotntne le fait I<.aren Stnith qui anÏtne le débat théorique depuis plusieurs années sur ce sujet. Après avoir démontré, à partir d'une discussion serrée du concept, que l'Union européenne ne peut plus être considéré cotntne une puissance civile, I<.aren Stnith ouvre une voie pour dépasser le débat, désortnais stérile entre puissance civile ou non, en s'attachant à ce que fait et ce que devrait concrètetnent l'Union européenne sur la scène internationale. Elle s'inscrit ainsi pleinenient dans l'entreprise de réhabilitation de la réflexion nortnative dans l'analyse de la politique étrangère. Partni les instrutnents privilégiés par l'UE dans sa politique étrangère, et qui se situent à la charnière de la coopération et de la coercition, figurent les sanctions (de \Vilde d'Esttnael, 1998). L'article de Clara Portela se propose ici d'évaluer la consistance de cette politique, en cherchant à repérer l'existence d'un critère de différentiation géographique dans« l'allocation internationale» des sanctions européennes. La perspective de Clara Portela pertnet à la fois de renouveler la ques tion des sanctions et d'apporter une contribution intéressante sur les atnbitions et la portée géopolitiques des actions de l'Union européenne. Par ailleurs, la dynatnique étudiée dans ce nutnéro de l)olitique européenne ne se limite pas aux seules PESC et politiques extérieures cotntnunautaires stricto sensu. En politique étrangère COlntne dans pour d'autres politiques publiques, il faut aussi prendre en cotnpte l'unpact «dotnestique» de l'UE sur les Etats metnbres, soit l'européanisation des diplotnaties nationales (Tonra, 2001). L'intérêt de l'article d'Ozlem T erzi es t ici de chercher à évaluer en parallèle l'européanisation des diplotnaties d'un Etat tnelnbre relativetnent ancien (la Grèce) et d'un Etat candidat à l'adhésion (la Turquie), deux Etats caractérisés, on le sait, par des interactions géopolitiques aussi cotnplexes qu'intenses.

Enfin l'étude de la politique étrangère de l'UE serait liniitée si elle se cantonnait au dOlnaine balisé dit de la « politicJ». i\près tout,

8
c'est dans le dornaine éconolnique que l'UE concentre historiquelnent et juridiquement le noyau dur de sa politique étrangère (Slnith M., 1998). La question de la capacité de l'UE à s'Ünposer COlnlne acteur de la «régulation» de la globalisation éconotnique (petiteville, 2005) oblige dès lors à repousser les frontières de la notion de politique étrangère. C'est alors le lnérite des deux dernières contributions que d'investir cette frange trop souvent délaissée de la politique internationale de l'UE : celle de Cornelia \V'011 sur le rôle acquis de haute lutte par la COlnlnission européenne dans la « régulation» du secteur de l'aviation civile internationale, et celle de Jan Orbie Hendrik Vos et Liesbeth Taverniers sur la politique européenne visant à protnouvoir une «clause sociale» dans les échanges cOlntnerciaux internationaux. Au cœur de ces deux études de cas se trouve la problélnatique du développetnent, chaotique, des compétences de la COlnlnission et de son rôle croissant sur la scène internationale par le biais d'instrulnents ou de stratégies d'action, juridiques ou cognitives. Ce numéro de l)o/itique euroPéenne espère ainsi contribuer à la cotnpréhension des lnodalités variées et souven t inédites, par lesquelles l'Union européenne produit des effets internationaux et contribue, en dépit de ses auto-litnitations et de celles des Etatslnetnbres, à développer une action internationale et à peser sur le cours de la politique lnondiale. BIBLIOGRAPHIE Economica, Bucher De Neuilly Y. (2005), L'Europe de la politique Paris. Bull I-I. (1982), «Civilian Power Europe :L-\ Contradiction in Terms?», .Journal~lCommon j);larketStudieJ, 21 (1-2), p. 149-164 Carslnaes \V., Sjursen H., \Vhite B. (eds.) (2004), ContemporaryEuropean Poliry,Sage, London. Charillon F. (2005), « La PESC, une réinvention de la politique étrangère », in D. Helly, F. Petiteville (dir.), L'Union européenne,acteur international, L'Harmattan, Paris. danJ un monde chaotique, -\trement, CERI, Cohen S., LeJ diplomateJ. 2002. Duchêne F. (1973), "The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence" in \X'. I-Iager, l'vI. I(ohnstaml11 (eds), A natioll ~~/rit Large? Foreign Poli~yProblemJBdore the European CommuniÇy,l\/lacmillan, London. Galtung J. (1973), The European Community : ~-\Superpo'\ver in the lnalcing, .L\llen and Unwin, London.

9
Helly D. Et Petiteville F. (dir.) (2005), L'Union euroPéenne, cteur international, a L'Harmattan, Paris. Irondelle B. Et 'lennesson P. (dir.) (2002), « L'Europe de la défense: institutionnalisation, européanisation », Politique euroPéenne n08, automne. Petiteville F. (2005), « Quand l'Europe parle d'une seule VOiX: l'U nion européenne à l'Ol\/fC », in D. Helly, F. Petiteville (dir.), L'Union
européenne, acteur international, L'Harmattan, Paris

Pijpers (1988), « The T"velve out-of-.A.rea : .c-\Civilian Power in an Uncivil World? », in .AdPijpers, E. Regelsberger, \V. \Vessels (eds.), European Politit'al Cooperation in the 80 s : A Common Poli9' .For Europe ?, rvfartinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht. U;7orld, Politji Press, Slnith 1<'.(2003), European Union ln a Cambridge. Smith 1<'.(2000), « The end of Civilian Power EU : a \Velcome Deluise or a Cause for Concern? », The InternationalSpectator,~~'X\T (2), p. 11-28. Smith rvf. (1998), "Does the Flag follo\v Trade? 'Politicisation' and the Emergence of a European Foreign Policy" in J. Peterson, H. Sjursen (eds), A Common Polif:)l.for urope?, Routledge, London. E Smith 1\/1.E.(2004), Foreign and S et'uri{yPoli~y.The Institutionalization ~l Cooperation,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Stavridis S. (2001), "i'vlilitarising the EU : the Concept of Civilian Po\ver Revisited", The internationalSpectator,L~'X\TI (4), p. 43-50. Terpan F. (2003), La politique étrangère de sét'uritét'Olnmune l'Union européenne, et de Bruylant, Bruxelles. Tonra B. (2001), The Europeanization ~l I\Tational Polif:)l:Dutth, DaniJh and IrÙh Poli~J1 the in Union, .c-lldershot, -,--lshgate. Treacher .c-l. (2004), "Froiu Civilian Po\ver to ?vfilitary ..-lctor: the EU's resistible Transformation", RelJielJJ, (1), p. 499 66. White Brian (1999), « The European Challenge to Foreign Policy .c-lnalysis», EuropeanJournal oj'InternationalRelations, l, p. 37-66. Wilde d'Estmael T. de (1998), LI dimenJionpolitique des relations ét'onomiques
ex:térieureJ de la Communauté européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles.

Sten RYNNING

RETURN OF THE JEDI: REALISM AND THE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION1

Many observers of European Union affairs discard the theory of &alism in the belief that this "crude" theory of sovereignry and conflict cannot grasp the "sophisticated" politics of dialogue and compromise in the EU. However, this rejection is based more on a false stereorypical view of &alism than on the insights generated by real &alism. In consequence, the purpose of this article is twofold: to debunk the stereotYpe, and to outline strengths and weaknesses in the &alist research agenda.

Many observers of European Union affairs discard the theory of Realism2. Surely, the argument goes, a theory premised on states as jealous guardians of national sovereignty and relative gains cannot account for the trajectory of European cooperation, which has come to encompass high as well as low politics issues. Indeed, high politics is no longer purely a national preserve: the EU entered this domain in 1992 with the Treaty on European Union and, though threatened by the political shock of the Iraq war in 2003, staged a comeback that led to the development of a Security Strategy - the first ever - and a Constitutional Treaty whose fate is uncertain but whose provisions reflect of collective view of the type of institutional mechanisms needed to carry out foreign policy. These observers have yet to come to terms with the "power of the empire," however, by which we should understand notably foreign policy analysts and the Realist stereotype they have construed to extend their intellectual domain. Observers, in other words, tend to be deluded by critics of Realism. To advance the unraveling of this
empire and prepare the return of the

J edi

- real Realism - this article

1 The author

is grateful

to an anonymous

reviewer

as well as the editors

of Politique (i.e.,

euroPéenne for very valuable criticism. 2 Throughout this article I capitalize the theory (i.e., Realism) and its branches Offensive Realism). See section I of the article for specific references to these observers.

Politique

européenne,

nOl?, automne 2005, p. 11-34

12 sets out to demonstrate the ways in which Realism enhance our understanding of EU affairs. The flrst section of the paper outlines how and why the stereotypical view of Realism developed, beginning in the 1960s, and it explores its impact on studies of EU foreign policy making, which is significant still today. The second section enters into one branch of the Realist family, Structural Realism. This branch developed not least as a reaction to the stereotype and criticism and seeks to place regional phenomena such as the EU within a greater global context. The third and final section enters into another branch, Classical Realism, which seeks to step back from the strong focus on structure and place it on par with local politics - a primary source of foreign policy ambition, according to Classical Realists. The purpose of the exercise is twofold: to debunk the stereotypical image of Realism; and to outline strengths as well as weaknesses in the Realist research agenda.

Stereotypical Realism

Critics of Realism, writing in the 1960s after the heyday of Classical Realism, were quick to connect the Realist view of balanceof-power rationality to the presumption of rationality in the making of foreign policy. Their argument was that if Realism is right, then foreign policy-making processes must reveal themselves to be instances of rational and deliberate calculation. When the critics then went on to demonstrate that foreign policy making is a messy affair more often characterized by happenstance than rational calculation, they naturally concluded that Realism was wrong. Apparently, the future lay with a new framework for understanding foreign policy analysis - that gave due respect to the many internal determinants of policy. Several key figures took part in this stereotyping of and onslaught on Realism. The move began with the general desire to link two distinct levels of analysis - the international and the national - and to connect domestic sources of policy with systemic ones, and the desire gave birth to a type of systems analysis typical of the behavioral age (see Neustadt 1961, Snyder et. al. 1962, Rosenau 1966). Thus was born the idea that foreign policy analysis is a distinct field of inquiry. Foreign policy, these people contended, is not merely an appendix to

13 Realism; it is the unique product created at the domestic-international boundary. This set the stage for Graham Allison's contrasted assessment of a "Rational Policy Paradigm" (model I of Allison's three models) related to Realism and the models of Organizational Processes and Bureaucratic Politics (models II and III). Model I was defmed as "rational choice" and involved four distinct steps (1969, 694):3 Decision-makers defme national interests (policy goals);

They define a spectrum of policy options; They evaluate the likely consequences benefit); They make a decision. Unsurprisingly, the model failed to convince Allison who concluded that his other two models "can permit significant improvements in explanation and prediction" (1969, 716). The conclusion was foregone in the sense that Allison, as a proselyte of the new field of foreign policy analysis, was bound to justify the new field by rejecting the model that was derived from the field of international relations, but still his conclusions had wide impact. Most Realists in fact never contended that foreign policy making by defmition was rational. Hans Morgenthau (1993, 7) had thus argued that "It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course." Still critics - then as well as now - used the idea of rationality to argue that Realists fail to apprehend reality, that Realists in fact are normative, and that Realism must be replaced by new frameworks of analysis (see particularly Vasquez 1983 and 1998 but also l<.eohane 1986). This criticism marks also the study of the European Union: in this sense Allison is still with us. An overview of how critics contribute to the stereotype's vitality follows. First, the foreign policy turn produced a concern with the decision-makers themselves. Some analysts argued that these decisionmakers made up a distinct elite, a type of political class united in outlook and commitment to a certain idea of the state and its of each option (cost-

3 The discussion here draws on Allison's original piece in the American REview. This article appeared two years prior to his book (Allison 1971).

Political Science

14 interests. Such an elite might support Realism, but the point is that it is simply an outlook and not a true theory of world politics. At a European level, this point can have both positive and negative connotations for the EU. A positive view is provided by Jolyon Howorth (2000 and 2004) who fmds that "supranational intergovernmentalism" is emerging in Brussels, a type of common understanding encompassing national as well as EU policy-makers who meet almost on a daily basis in the EU capital. At issue is the sociology of interaction, a source of integration that can be traced back to the precursor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP - beginning in 1992), namely European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the "concertation reflex" generated by it (Ifestos 1987; see also Smith 2000). The true test of this "supranational intergovernmental" outlook is whether it can be broadened to include a wider public of opinion makers and public analysts (see for instance Wallace 2003), and also whether it can be applied fairly smoothly to the many new EU member states (see Lippert, Umbach, and Wessels, 2001) . A negative spin is provided by neo-Marxist analysts and critics of liberalism. As can be expected, neo-Marxists predominantly focus on economic integration and derive observations on foreign policy making from here. Neo-Marxists such as Carchedi (2001) and Stephen Gill (2001) argue that the EU may be a market place of ideas and bargaining but that most policies ultimately must satisfy the oligarchs of capitalism. This is also how we should view the common currency and the European Central Bank - institutions created to embed a capitalist-monetarist policy and de-politicize financial decisions. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (2002) fmds the roots of regional developments beyond Europe, in the movements of global capitalism, an argument that dovetails with Johan Galtung's (2004) assessment that EU security policy is a mirror reflection of American policy. Viewed through these lenses, EU foreign policy, like other EU policies, conforms to the exigencies of economic interests, and policymaking elites are the transmission belt between these interests and policy. This type of argument has found support predominantly among the left-wing opponents of the Constitutional Treaty (rejected in May-June 2005 by French and Dutch voters), who contend that the new Treaty would usher in an era of radicalliberalism. Second, the foreign policy turn also led analysts to investigate organizations as distinct sources of policy. Allegedly, standard-

15 operating-procedures (SOPs) and organizational interests turn governments into "a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations" (Allison 1969, 698). Organizations' programmed responses, the desire to control and preserve rather than analyze, and the way in which human minds process information make up Steinbruner's "cybernetic paradigm," which is an extension of Allison's model II (Steinbruner 2002 - originally 1974). The effect of this approach to foreign policy making can be traced today in
assessments organization of notably the European Commission - the supranational par excellence - but also the Council staff.

News reporters regularly emphasize the struggles for power and influence within the EU bureaucracy that involve the Commission's
general quest to gain influence where it has almost none

-

in CFSP

and ESDP matters and the sometimes contentious relationship between the Commissioner for External Relations and the Council's High Representative for the CFSP (Chris Patten and Javier Solana). Since the creation of the post of High Representative - following from the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and actually created in 1999 - the two-headed organization of EU external relations, a typical example of "the complexity of the EU," has made the rivalry between Patten and Solana "Brussels' worst-kept secret" (The Guardian, April19, 2001). When first the Convention and then the Intergovermental Conference addressed this problem, the Commission's president, Romano Prodi, sought to exploit the scope for change and enhance the role of the Commission at the expense of the Council. Unsurprisingly, the press uncovered that the proposal generated "anger" with member states and "unease" within the Commission itself (The Guardian, May 23, 2002; Financial Times, November 30, 2002). The Constitutional Treaty ended up with a compromise: the Council is supposed to gain a new presidency, permanent for up to five years, while a new Union Minister of Foreign Affairs will combine the posts of Patten and Solana. Of course, this compromise may whither along with the treaty itself but the idea of a new and powerful foreign ministry establishment in Brussels has opened new fault lines that give food for thought: one observer thus noted that henceforth a "ruthless bureaucratic turf war" will be fought between the European and national foreign ministries (Merritt, 2004). Other analyses of the same phenomenon, typically found in greater-length articles published in journals or as policy papers, reflect a similar concern about the impact of organizations but they

16 simultaneously suggest ways of rationalizing the process. Fraser Cameron (2002) finds that the "CFSP machinery... has always been overly bureaucratic" - and he then outlines a menu for change. Brian Crowe (2003 and 2005) - a former Council official - is more focused in his argument that what needs f1Xing is not so much the SolanaPatten relationship but the Solana-member states relationship because, formally speaking, Solana is merely to "assist" foreign ministers, but these repeatedly fail to provide leadership and support for Solana. Philippe de Schouteete (2004) strikes an optimistic note as he believes that the EU can find a third way - an organization that balances the communitarian and the intergovernmental. Typical for these analyses is that they combine Realism and Allison: Allison's world of powerful and sometimes dysfunctional organizations is how the world works; Realism's world of rational calculation is how it ought to work. We may be sympathetic toward the goal of these observers but we should also note the way in which they reinforce the Allison view that Realism's rational model is removed from reality. Third and finally, the foreign policy turn led to the conceptualization of policy making as a complex process of political bargaining, not among organizations but among "players" who take their clue from "where they sit" (positions) as well as their personal "baggage" and who play policy games in pre-ordered "actionchannels" that favor some players and penalize others (see Allison 1969, 708 ff). This is a broad research agenda, and its complexity accounts for the fact that Allison has yet to produce the foreign policy theory he initially hoped to develop. In EU matters, this bureaucratic politics model often overlaps with the organizational model: depictions of Brussels bouts refer to both players and organizations. Still, the bureaucratic politics view of a host of players and action channels has affinities with a distinct perspective on CFSP policymaking emerging from the literature on multi-level governance and the idea that EU policies are made in ways that directly contrast with a so-called "state centric" view that is traced back to a motley crew of Realists and Intergovernmentalists (see Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996). Multi-level governance is "actor-centered" - focusing on particular actors in the policy process (i.e., players) - and concerned with a "multi-level polity" inhabited by national leaders as well as "numerous subnational and supranational actors" (1996, 348 and 371). The link to the CFSP is made by Michael Smith (2004) who contends that CFSP policy is one policy "space." By implication, state centered

17 perspectives are "problematic" and "inappropriate" (2004, 741). As for Allison, the world of complex political bargaining impresses these analysts, so much so that they find Realism - state-centered theory all too simplistic. The fact that they generally fail to tell us what typically happens, which was also Allison's problem, does not disturb them. Realists, like also organizational and elite theorists least seek to move beyond the complex description reality and identify the essence of politics. The challenging ambition is insight, and we therefore now theory as developed by Realists and not its critics. (see above), at of a complex virtue of this turn to Realist

Structural Realism

The initial Realist response to critics was one of retreating into the international domain and cultivating the balance-of-power perspective. This happened notably with I<.enneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics,published in 1979. The date of publication is not coincidental: it follows from the height of foreign policy analysis and also the emergence of the school of interdependence. Waltz argued that we lose sight of durable patterns of events if we delve into domestic politics; we should instead focus on the structural conditions that explain these patterns. As is well-known, Waltz explains war and peace with reference to anarchy and the desire of states to survive. If we follow Waltz, Structural Realism should fmd no place in this discussion of (European) foreign policy because the theory deals with typical and thus general patterns of international behavior and not policies, foreign or otherwise. Waltz's retreat from the domesticinternational debate that so inspired foreign policy analysts is thus complete, but it has not stuck. Various Structural Realists have claimed that the theory does have implications for foreign policy analysis, although Waltz has made clear his criticism of this point of view (see Elman 1996a, 1996b; Waltz 1996). Below we shall consider the foreign policy implications for Europe of Structural Realism. Structural Realism has fragmented into two competing schools of thought: Defensive and Offensive Realism. The former is predicated on the assumption that states in general seek to survive, and thus that states are fairly benevolent; the latter that states will grab for power if

18 possible, and thus that states are expansionist. Waltz did not make a strong claim in one or the other direction: states "are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination" (1986, 117). The children of Waltz's thinking have parted company, however, emphasizing either the minimum or the maximum scenario. Defensive Realists (e.g., Van Evera 2001) bolster their "defensive" oudook with reference to the state of military affairs, which is an amalgam of military technology, geography, and strategic beliefs, and which is referred to as the "offense-defense balance" Gervis 1978). In general, theyargue, this balance favors defensive strategies. Offensive Realists (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001) believe too that states want to survive - and in principle, the world could be one of defensive realism. However, in practice, the world is dangerous because expansion actually pays off: Offensive Realists f111din "the historical record" a 600/0 success rate for offensive strategies (Mearsheimer 2001, 38). This is to say that the "offense-defense balance" so heralded by Defensive Realists in fact undermines the goal of survival. Attack is not a question of whether but when, and even defensive states must ponder an uncomfortable choice: be offensive, or be attacked. These positions yielded contrasting arguments about Europe in the immediate post-Cold War era. Jack Snyder (1990) and Stephen Van Evera (1990/91) sought comfort in factors that could help bolster defensive advantages in the offense-defense balance, notably European institutions and moderate strategic beliefs; Barry Posen (1993) saw threats to Europe's stability emerging from its peripheries where new states, preoccupied by survival, lived in an environment where defensive strategies were not always favored by the "offensedefense balance" - specifically in the Balkans. In contrast, John Mearsheimer (1990) argued that a new "multipolar" Europe would be prone to "major crises" - a likelihood that could best be reduced by a "well-managed" process of "nuclear weapons proliferation" (1990, 8). This provoked the reply that Mearsheimer "ought to learn more about the European Community" (Hoffmann in Hoffmann, I<.eohane, and Mearsheimer, 1990, 192). The nature of the debate has not changed significantly to this day. Mearsheimer is a fitting illustration: his 2001 assessment of Europe's future deals with multipolarity, Germany's power, nuclear