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L'Azerbaïdjan

285 pages
Pays essentiellement musulman frontalier de l'Iran et de la Russie, situé au bord de la Mer Caspienne, l'Azerbaïdjan a une situation géopolitique pour le moins stratégique. Ce dossier adopte une démarche prospective. Il vise à identifier les mécanismes économiques et politiques qui pourraient permettre à l'Azerbaïdjan de devenir le moteur de la région. Voici quelques clés sur un acteur qui mérite attention.
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~ur(D)rient

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ISBN: 978-2-296-06573-4 EAN : 9782296065734

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La loi du 11 Mars 1957 interdit les copies ou reproductions destinées à une utilisation collective. Toute représentation ou reproduction intégrale ou partielle faite par quelque procédé que ce soit, sans le consentement de l'auteur ou ses ayants droits, est illicite et constitue une contrefaçon sanctionnée par les articles 425 et suivants du Code pénaL

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Sous la direction

()1fi6n,t na 28

- 2008
et Laurent Vinatier

L'Azerbaïdjan Au centre d'enjeux globaux
de Michel Makinsky

Sommaire
Pré * sen ta ti 0 n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

* Elkhan Mehtiyev Someaspects of US-Azerbaijanrelations * Laurent Vinatier

9

La Russie en Azerbaïdjan:

Un échecdiplomatique

31

* Gilles Riaux Les relations entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Iran: Des représentations conflictuelles à l'apprentissage réalisme du ..53
* Mushfig Habilov et Azad Ismayil L'Azerbaïdjan et l'espace turcophone :géopolitique despipelines

73

* Michel Makinsky Azerbaïdjan - Israël: Des intérêtsbiencompris * Sofie Bedford Praying for change Islamic opposition in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
* Pierre Jolicoeur L'indépendance du Kosovo: Nagorno-Karabakh

97
131

Ses baseslégaleset ses conséquences pour le .157

* Thierry Coville L'Azerbaïdjan ou comment gérer la formidable hausse des revenus pétroliers? .177

* Bayram Balci La place de la « diaspora» azerbaïdjanaise dans la politique nationale de l'Azerbaïdjan post -soviétique: Esquisse d'anajyse .185

* Samuel Lussac L'Union Européenne dans la région de la Caspienne: Quellepolitiquede voisinage l'égard à del'Azerbaï4Jan ? .205 Annexes
* Ata Ayati I - Carte: Azerbaïdjan actueL .222

II - Une page de l'histoire de l'Azerbaïdjan

223

111- Carte: I<hanats azéris au début du XIXème siècle 226 IV - Lettre ouverte (inédite) de Lénine aux camarades communistes d'Azerbaïdjan, de Géorgie, d'Arménie, du Daghestan et de la République mon tagnard. 227 V- Rapport (inédit) de Jean Pages sur la situation à Bakou en 1920 230 VI- 11ission militaire française au Caucase: Exposé de la situation politique d'Azerbaïdjan en 1920. 240 VII- Propagande bolchéviste en Asie Mineure et aux Indes. 244 VIII- Le manifeste du clergé musulman de l'Azerbaïdjan en 1923 247 248 IX - Caractéristiques des ethnies en Azerbaïdjan, 2007. X - Répartitions des élèves enseignés dans leur langue ethnique dans les écoles de l'Azerbaïdj an. .250

XI
XII

-

Les hommes les plus riches d'Azerbaïdjan, 2007
Bibliographie indicative sur l'Azerbaïdjan.

251
252

. .

......... 255 Antoine Constant: L'Azerbaïdjan. . Turab Gurbanov: Le pétrole de la Caspienne et la politique extérieure de l'Azerbaïdjan. Frédéric Charillon et Bernard Rougie (S.d.):Afrique du Nord. MoyenOrient. Moyen-Orient: La triple impasse. .Thierry Coville: IRAN: La révolution invisible. . Valérie Pouzol: Clandestines de la paix. * Revue des revues . Cultures & Conflits,

* Revue des livre s.

n070, été 2008.

.

Revue

musulmans et de la Méditerranée, n0123, 2008-1. Confluences Méditerranée, n066, été 2008. . Le courrier des pays de l'Est. Septembre-octobre. nOl063, 2008.

.

des

.267 mondes

Présentation
L'Azerbaïdjan au cœur du Caucase? Défis et dynamiques de la république caucasienne.
e 14 novembre 2006 à Bruxelles, les trois Etats du Caucase Sud, l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, en signant chacun avec l'Union européenne (UE) un plan d'action dans le cadre de la politique de voisinage, donnent un nouvel élan à ce programme et à sa dimension caucasienne. Quelques jours plus tôt, le président azéri, Ilham Aliev, invité en Europe, formalise par un mémorandum la coopération énergétique de son pays avec l'UE. Il semble aujourd'hui que cette zone jusqu'alors délaissée et mal connue devienne un enjeu des relations extérieures de l'Union. Il pourrait s'avérer pertinent, dès lors, de la modeler ou d'orienter son évolution dans le sens des intérêts européens dans la région, à savoir l'avènement d'Etats économiquement et politiquement stables, indépendants de toute influence extérieure déterminante. L'Azerbaïdjan, sans aucun doute, aurait une place de choix dans une telle perspective initiée par l'UE. Pays en forte croissance, tirant profit de ses vastes ressources pétrolières et gazières, il paraît avoir acquis une certaine stabilité économique. Par ailleurs, pays essentiellement musulman, frontalier de l'Iran et de la Russie, situé au bord de la mer Caspienne, sa situation géopolitique est pour le moins stratégique; l'Azerbaïdjan pourrait prochainement passer au-devant de la scène mondiale. Enfm, Etat rajeuni depuis l'avènement d'Ilham Aliev à la présidence de la république, ce dernier tend à se débarrasser des déterminismes clientélistes existant autrefois, tout en parvenant à consolider son pouvoir. Son succès aux élections présidentielles d'octobre 2008, qu'il sait suivies avec attention par les Américains1 et les Européens, conforte encore sa domination.

L

1 Alman !vlir-Ismail "D.S.Azerbaijan Relations Go Through Alliance", Eurasia DailY Monitor, 16 mai 2008.

Tension Maintain Strategic

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Il ne faudrait pas sous-estimer cependant les progrès restant à accomplir en chacun de ces domaines. L'Azerbaïdjan a su se reconstruire à la suite de l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique; il lui faut également assurer son avenir et surmonter de multiples défis, tant au plan extérieur que sur la scène interne, aux niveaux politique, économique et social. Telle est la problématique principale à aborder prioritairement pour l'DE. En matière énergétique2 d'abord, les projections annoncent qu'en 2009, le pays atteindra le pic de sa production énergétique pétrolière. Il s'agit donc de prévoir économiquement « l'après-pétrole », de manière à préserver une croissance équilibrée et stable, au profit du plus grand nombre. Sur le plan diplomatique ensuite, la Russie, mécontente semblet-il, de la politique de balancier qu'exerce Bakou entre l'Occident et les anciens partenaires soviétiques regroupés au sein des diverses structures de la Communauté des Etats indépendants (CEl), exerce déjà un chantage énergétique sur les prix des fournitures de gaz. L'Azerbaïdjan ne peut pas échapper au jeu d'influence des grandes puissances dont le pays tente de tirer profit. C'est ainsi qu'il est amené à gérer de manière délicate ses relations avec le voisin iranien, tout en cherchant des équilibres complexes avec Washington et Israël. L'Azerbaïdjan poursuit de surcroît son insertion dans des structures ou problématiques régionales comme l'ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), le régime de la Caspienne, les réseaux de transports d'hydrocarbures. Le dossier proposé ici adopte une démarche prospective. Il n'entend pas se limiter au constat d'un Etat azerbaïdjanais dynamique quoique encore assez fragile. Il vise à identifier les mécanismes politiques et économiques qui pourraient permettre à l'Azerbaïdjan de devenir le moteur d'une région stratégique dont l'évolution ne saurait être contraire aux quelques intérêts européens identifiés très succinctement plus haut. Dans cet esprit, les premières contributions visent d'abord à situer le contexte régional d'un pays au cœur de problématiques stratégiques majeures. Ce cadre ainsi posé, les principaux enjeux internes sont analysés, chacun étant, selon des modalités diverses, influencé par ces facteurs extérieurs. Il y a donc une claire interaction entre la scène interne et la posture externe. Elkhan Mekhtiyev livre d'abord des réflexions personnelles (et engagées) sur la relation complexe entretenue avec Washington qui

2 Sur la position énergétique régionale de l'Azerbaïdjan, voir: Turab Gurbanov :Le Pétrole de la Caspienne et lapolitique extérieurede l'Azerbaïcfjan. (2 tomes), Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007.

considère Bakou de longue date3 comme un pilier de son influence face à l'Iran et à la Russie, ce qui met parfois les dirigeants américains en situation embarrassante lorsqu'ils doivent arbitrer entre leurs souhaits de développer une vie politique démocratique et le souci de conforter un allié important, ou lorsque l'Amérique est priée de choisir entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie dans le conflit qui les oppose. Laurent Vinatier décrit ensuite l'évolution et les limites des ambitions russes. Nul n'ignore que la Russie post-soviétique, avec Vladimir Poutine, ravive ses ambitions de reprendre le contrôle des exmarches de l'Empire4. Les grandes manœuvres sur le pétrole et le gaz en sont l'illustration. Si Moscou n'hésite pas à montrer sa force, pour autant tous les objectifs russes sont loin d'être atteints. En outre, les préférences russes pour l'Arménie ne facilitent pas le climat des relations russoazériess. La première visite du nouveau président Medvedev à Bakou au début juillet 2008 est marquée par des témoignages officiels de satisfaction réciproque: cinq documents signés, dont une déclaration d'amitié et de partenariat stratégique, tandis que la Russie promet de contribuer à la solution du conflit du Haut-l<arabagh. Le vrai sujet bilatéral cependant demeure le gaz; Gazprom a formulé une proposition de conditions d'achat qui se veut concurrente des marchés européens mais il n'est pas acquis que les dirigeants azéris, prudents, se laissent séduire6. L'ampleur prise par la crise russo-géorgienne au cours de l'été 2008 met en lumière la fragilité de la sécurité, notamment énergétique, azérie 7, mais contrarie aus si l'allié israélien 8de Bakou.
3 Leyla Shamchiyeva, "Azerbaijan in the U.S. Interests", Turkish WeeklY,21 mars 2008. 4 L'Azerbaïdjan souhaite que des organisations régionales comme GUAM permettent à la région de se prémunir des «appétits» russes.V oir Elhan Polukhov,« GUAM .A.s Seen From Azerbaijan» Central Asia and the Caucasus ]ournal,no3-4 (51-52),2008. 5 ~furat Gill, "Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 1989", Alternatives, vol. 7, n02&3, Summer & Fall 2008. 6 Alman j\1ir Ismail, "Russian president in Baku: did he get what he wanted?", Eurasia DailY Monitor, vol 5, n° 131, 10 juillet 2008. 7 Les menaces russes contre le pipeline Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (ETC) reflètent des enjeux géostratégiques plus amples au-delà du seul « cas », géorgien.V oir : Fariz Ismailzade,« The Georgian-Russian conflict through the Eyes of Baku », Eurasia Daily ~fonitor, vol.5,no54,12 août 2008 ; voir aussi: Elisabeth Studer,« Georgie: la Russie attaque la route du pétrole et du gaz », leblogfinance,1 0 août 2008. http://leblogfmance.com/2008 1081 gorgie-Ia-russi.html, consulté le 21/8/08. Les autorités azéries affichent une prudence mêlée d'inquiétude tandis que la Turquie (où un attentat a frappé le BTC avant le déclenchement des hostilités russes) multiplie les initiatives diplomatiques. Les remous causés par cette crise pourraient affecter l'équilibre régional, notamment via les « conflits gelés ».Voir : B.Pannier, » Russia-Georgia Conflict

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Autre exemple de prudence azerbaïdjanaise: la gestion des relations avec le puissant voisin iranien, analysée par Gilles Riaux. Les deux capitales veillent soigneusement à conserver des relations étatiques pragmatiques et apaisées mais ne peuvent abandonner l'encouragement de solidarités communautaires, ce qui est générateur de tensions. De plus, Téhéran et Bakou divergent sur le statut de la Caspienne; l'Iran soutient par ailleurs la cause arménienne. Enfrn, la crise qui oppose les iraniens aux occidentaux sur le programme nucléaire de Téhéran 9 pourrait avoir des effets dévastateurs pour son voisin dûment prié de ne pas aider l'Amérique. A cela s'ajoute le «grand jeu» autour des pipelines, auquel se mêle le grand frère turc. Azad Ismayil et Mushfig Habilov nous en tracent les contours dans la perspective d'un nouvel «espace turc ». Mais c'est un « outsider» qu'il faut prendre en considération si l'on veut décrypter les rapports de force en cours dans cette zone. Israël n'est pas vraiment un intrus, en raison de l'implantation multiséculaire des «Mountain Jews ». Il n'en reste pas moins que l'étrange binôme entre et l'Etat hébreu et son partenaire azéri répond à des calculs stratégiques sophistiqués qui changent profondément la donne en conférant à l'Azerbaïdjan une dimension élargie au Moyen-Orient. :Michel Makinsky situe les enjeux en cause et détaille les ambitions et vulnérabilités de ces protagonistes qui, au nom d'un réalisme froid, conjuguent leurs forces, notamment auprès de Washington, alors que la Turquie, insérée dans ce dispositif, le transforme en trio lOqu'elle aimerait bien mener.
Raises Concerns About Caspian Energy Exports », RFE/RL, 13 août 2008 ; et» Turkish Premier In Baku Seeking Caucasus Stability Pact », RFE/RL, 20 août 2008. 8 Jérusalem, qui est aussi un important fournisseur d'armements à la Géorgie, a reçu un avertissement quand la Russie a abattu en Géorgie un drône fabriqué en Israël. L'Etat hébreu (qui a rapatrié ses instructeurs militaires) est contraint à un équilibre prudent entre Tbilissi et ~foscou avec qui il ne peut pas se brouiller. Sa stratégie caucasienne en sera-telle affectée? Le l\1onde, 13 août 2008.Voir aussi: Peter Hirschberg,"Georgia's Israeli arms point Russia to Iran", Asia Times Online, 14 août 2008. 9 En bloquant des cargaisons de matériel nucléaire russe destiné à l'Iran pour « vérifications de non violation des sanctions de l'Onu », l'Azerbaïdjan s'est invité dans la crise nucléaire, même si des informations fournies a posteriori par la Russie ont permis sa libération. On ne sait si ce blocage était une pression russe pour retarder la mise en service de la centrale de Bouchehr ou reflétait des démarches occidentales. " Azerbaijan Releases Russian Nuclear Shipment to Iran", VOA News 1er mai 2008. 10 Le domaine énergétique est le lieu privilégié mais pas exclusif de cet axe stratégique trilatéral.Voir l'analyse d'Alexander Murinson,» Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel Relations: The Energy Factor », ~ŒRIA, The ~fiddle East Review of International Affairs,vol.12, n03, septembre 2008.

Tous ces éléments affectent inégalement la sphère intérieure. Les dirigeants azéris, comme le montre Sofie Bedford, doivent traiter le dossier délicat de la résurgence islamique qui s'oppose à un Etat qui affiche, sans parler de laïcité, une volonté de contenir la religion 11dans le domaine privé, et s'oppose à toute construction d'un Etat islamique. Ce faisant, il trouve face à lui des mouvements islamistes qui se nourrissent de causes essentiellement endogènes: mécontentement social, inconfort politique, malaise face aux «solidarités» occidentales. Il peut y avoir également quelques ingérences iraniennes. Hautement sensible, le conflit du Haut-Karabagh, auquel plusieurs contributions font allusion, est traité ici spécifiquement par Pierre Jolicoeur. Ce drame empoisonne la vie régionale mais sert aussi de caisse de résonance interne. La nouvelle présidence arménienne fait naître de timides espoirs. Ainsi, au printemps 2008, la Turquie, qui n'a pas de revendication territoriale majeure, a entamé avec son voisin arménien de discrètes conversations sous le regard attentif et avec les encouragements de Washington. La rencontre historique, à Erivan, du président Abdullah Gül avec son homologue arménien Serge Sarkissian à l'occasion du match de football Arménie-Turquie, le 6 septembre suivant, reflète une volonté de dialogue même si les problèmes de fond demeurent. Le caractère passionnel de ce sujet interdit tout pronostic, mais il faut se demander si l'Azerbaïdjan, sous de discrètes pressions turques, ne sera pas contraint de rechercher l'apaisement. Celui-ci ne sera pas facile à promouvoir sur la scène politique intérieure azérie où la rhétorique « musclée» séduit davantage une certaine clientèle. Puissamment nourrie des recettes des hydrocarbures, avec un prix du baril stratosphérique, l'économie azérie connaît un développement spectaculaire que décrit Thierry Coville. Mais les pouvoirs publics, face à la manne pétrolière, ont de gros chantiers à traiter. L'utilisation de ces ressources appelle d'importants efforts de gouvernance quant à la gestion

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11Paradoxalement,
Azerbaïcjjan

le chiisme azéri se tient à distance du modèle iranien alors que par
: entre influences iraniennes et cfynamiques internes », in Sabrina Mervin

ailleurs le sunnisme « turc» développe son influence. V air: Bayram Balci, « Le chiismeen
post-soviétique

(dir.),«

Les Mondes

chiites et l'Iran », Paris/Beyrouth,

Karthala/IFPO,

2007,

p163

et s.

Aussi: Bayram Balci, « Islam et politique en Azerbaïtfjan » in : Bayram Balci et Raoul Morika (dir.), « &ligion et politique dans le Caucase post-soviétique », Paris, Maisonneuve et Larousse, 2007, p. 133 et s.

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des fonds, comme pour la mise en place d'une politique de redistribution, et de diversification. Les experts internationaux estiment que la maîtrise de l'inflation devrait aussi être une priorité. Enfin, il a semblé pertinent, à la croisée des enjeux internes et extérieurs, d'examiner le rôle et la portée de la «communauté diasporique azerbaïdjanaise» 12, moteur de mobilisation des intérêts de Bakou autant qu'outil de communication. Bayram Balci s'attache à tracer le profil de cet ensemble dont la défmition à géométrie variable sert les visées des dirigeants azerbaidjanais. Au cœur du nœud caucasien, objet de convoitises des voisins comme des grandes puissances, l'Azerbaïdjan a une dimension européenne, que nous rappelle en conclusion Samuel Lussac, ne fût-ce qu'au titre de la politique de voisinage de l'Union Européenne 13. L'enjeu des approvisionnements énergétiques est stratégique pour l'Europe, à un moment où le Moyen-Orient et le Golfe sont sous tension et la Russie assez imprévisible. Vue depuis Bakou, de la même façon, l'Europe peut servir de point d'appui. Il ne s'agit en aucun cas de dresser dans cet ensemble de contributions un panorama complet des différentes facettes d'un pays sur lequel peu de choses ont été écrites en langue française. L'ambition de ce travail est de donner quelques clés sur un acteur qui mérite une attention beaucoup plus soutenue des observateurs. Ces réflexions sont complétées par une série d'annexes comprenant des documents historiques (dont plusieurs inédits, provenant des Archives du Ministère des Affaires E trangères à Paris) et des données de base sur la société azerbaïdjanaise. Les co éditeurs de ce dossier le dédient à la mémoire de Semih Vaner (1945-2008), prématurément disparu, qui fut un infatigable promoteur des recherches sur le Caucase, le monde turc et iranien, et qui leur avait confié l'honneur de le constituer. Laurent Vinatier
Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris de

Michel Makinsky
Ecole SuPérieure de Commerce et de Management Poitiers

/

Université de Liège.

EurOrient,

Septembre

2008

12 Voir Alireza Asgharzadeh, "Azerbaijan: In search of ~1ultiple Identities", Global Politician, 11 décembre 2007, http://www.globalpolitician.com/print.asp?id=3860 [consulté le 25juillet 2008]. 13Le volet droits de l'homme fait l'objet d'un suivi attentif. Voir Jos Boonstra, "How serious is the EU about supporting democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan?", DemocraryWorking Papers, European Council on Foreign Relations, n02, mai 2008.

Some aspects of US-Azerbaijan relations1
Elkhan Mehtiyev
Director Peace and Conflict Resolution Center Baku, Azerbaijan
Abstract This paper isfocused to overview some aspects of US -Azerbaijani bilateral relations, the impediments for enhanced relations and current concerns between the two countries. The paper is going to address the securiry cooperation, role of United States in democrary building and Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict settlement. The US approach to recentpresidential and parliamentary elections has been detailed due to historic significance of those elections and the place of United States in formation of that history. Details of energy cooperation are not
provided, considering that the issue was widelY covered elsewere by numerous publications.

Résumé Cet article est consacré à l'examen de quelques aspects des relations bilatérales américano-azéries, aux obstacles qui s'opposent au renforcement de ces dernières, aux s1gets de préoccupation qui affectent les deuv"<qys. Il est ici question de la coopération en matière de p sécurité, du rôle des Etats-Unis dans l'édification de la démocratie et dans le règlement du conflit du Haut-Karabakh. L'attitude amén.caine à l'égard des élections présidentielles et parlementaires passées a été examinée en détail en raison de leur importance historique et de la place des Etats-Unis dans ceprocessus. Le thème de la coopération énergétique n'est pas traité dans leprésent texte car il a été abordé dans bien d'autres publications.

1 Note de la rédaction: Les opinions exprimées par l'auteur de cet article lui sont strictement personnelles, et ne sauraient refléter ni engager la Revue EurOrient ni aucune institution. Ce texte est écrit par un chercheur indépendant et relève plutôt de réflexions libres sans prétendre à un caractère strictement universitaire. This paper is strictly expressing the author's own views only and in no way reflects EurOrient's any opinion/orientation nor any organization's/institution's one. This is rather a set of free reflexions from an independent searcher, which do not claim to a due academic work status.

Azerbaijan-US

security cooperation

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he US-Azerbaijan security dialogue- cooperation emerged through the CFE Treaty Flank package discussions in Vienna in 1996, where Azerbaijan opposed to the NATO-Russian agreement on Flank issue, which could seriously impact the azeri security and contradict the previously agreed provisions of the Tashkent agreement. Azerbaijani opposition was also dictated by the alarms that Russia provided Armenia with billion cost weapons. After US assurances expressed in a joint US- Azerbaijan statement, Azerbaijan signed the Flank agreement, making nevertheless some reservations on issues concerning Azerbaijan's security2. A US-Azerbaijan statement released during President Aliyev's visit to Washington in August 1997 also said "both parties agreed to explore the opportunities of expanding security cooperation, including through the bilateral security dialog inaugurated in March 1997"3 The US government and Congress leaders have repeatedly expressed their interests in "boosting bilateral military cooperation through NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Azerbaijan's "geo-strategic importance in the region has repeatedly been emphasized as it possesses immense oil reserves and is a transit country playing the role of gateways between Europe and Asiav"4 However, US-Azerbaijan security relations were limited due to the US Congress's Section 907, which restricted government to government assistance to Azerbaijan and impeded bilateral military relations. However security consultations have taken periodic nature at the level of deputy foreign ministers discussing issues representing bilateral, regional and international interests. The United States expressed its support and interest in securing transportation of Caspian energy resources from the region and considered the security of the region as an important factor for economic development. Strengthening of political institutions and creating effective participatory governmental system was considered as prerequisite for security, stability and political independence of these nations. The security of energy resources and their safe transportation which are considered as vital element of Azerbaijan's overall security.

T

2

USIA European

files .1 August, 1997
on US-.Azerbaijan relations.

3 USIA, EURS06, 1August, 1997 Joint statement 4 Interfax news agency, l\tIoscow, 8 April 1998.

For enhancing security cooperation the US defense department and the Azerbaijan foreign ministry signed weapons security agreementS on September 28, 1999, pledging cooperation in counter-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and related materials. As a result of this agreement, the US defense department and customs service would train and equip the Azerbaijan border guards and customs officials in preventing and detecting mass destruction weapons at border checkpoints. The September 11 has dramatically changed the stance of America in the region creating an environment for closer security relationship with virtually all Caspian basin countries. Azerbaijani- US Cooperation focused on border, maritime security, upgrading air defense system and intelligence cooperation6. US has helped to build two radar stations with modern equipment in close areas to Russian and Iranian borders with the purpose to better control the air space of Azerbaijan7. US defense department donated patrol boats designed to improve Azerbaijani ability to secure its territorial waters in the Caspian area8 . Their missions are to work with the Azerbaijani navy and maritime forces so as to better enable them to deal with security threats9. Similar boats were donated as part of a cooperation program between Azerbaijan and USA before 9/111°. ''We have an initiative called Caspian Guard. ... It will be building monitoring capabilities for both air and sea in the Caspian Sea in conjunction with the Azerbaijanis" have been echoed by former US deputy Command in Europe General Charles Wald11 . The initiative was aimed at coordinating the activities to assure long stability of mineral resources and presumably for the purpose of surveillance of trafficking of illegal products in international waters of Caspian Sea. According to US officers, Caspian Guard initially focused on Azerbaijan and I<azakhstan aimed at securing "regional borders to
5 USIA. European file. 10 July, 1999. 6 'Azerbaijan, USA discuss military cooperation' Baku, Itar-Tass, 7 'United States is going to modernize two radar stations in Azerbaijan'

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2006, http:/ / www.day.az/news. 8 United States is going to deliver two new radar stations and three boats to Azerbaijan' 17 ' January.2006..http://www.day.az/news. 9 Vladimir Radukin,: 'U.S. ryeing biggerfoothold in the Caucasus?', The Hindu, 4 December, 2003. 10 Trend News agency. Baku. 1 June 2001. 11John T.Correl: 'European Command Looks South and East' Air Force Magazine Vol. 86, No. 12, December 2003.

9 January,

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terrorists and weapons and drugs smuggling in a region with significant U.S. political and business interests" and for these purposes Azerbaijani navy personnel on maritime interception of terrorists, drugs and weapons were trained 12. Security cooperation in this field is more successful and includes directing air and maritime security operations. US defense department has also provided some equipment in order to prevent and detect mass destruction weapons at border checkpoints13. Azerbaijan opened its air space and airports for use of US military and transport planes waging the war on terror in Afghanistan. US in its turn established Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at US Embassy in Baku to boost military- to military cooperation with the broad spectrum of U.S. Security Assistance and military contact programs such as Foreign 11ilitary Sales (F1v1F) of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. It also oversees several military-tomilitary programs, administers a Humanitarian Assistance program and represents Counter Narcoterrorism program14. According to ODC, Azerbaijan received over $19M in FMF grant funding aimed at increasing interoperability of Azerbaijan's forces deployed to NATO and coalition operations, defense reform, and modernization of air base facilities 15. Another ODC program Ooint Contact Team Program- ]CTP-) focused on military to military contacts intended to developing military professionalism and closer relationship with NATO. There are programs with Azerbaijani MOD and law enforcement authorities on crisis management, the role of military in disaster relief and as well as within counter - narcoterrorism program efforts to disrupt the activities of terrorist groups that use trafficking to raise funds and move resources. Azerbaijan-US military cooperation has paved the way for military cooperation with EU countries. Iraqi crisis and Azerbaijani support for US military actions in Iraq and readiness to join US led forces in Iraq and sending its military units to Afghanistan and Iraq have expanded the scope of cooperation. Pentagon officials have said they might consider asking for increased access to azerbaijani military bases and even permission to rotate american troops across its soil. The goal
12 United Press International 29 August, 2005. 13 SecuritY forces of United States are training Azerbaijani ' weapons of mass destructions' 7 June 2006. http://www.day.az/news/ politics/ S0404.html 14 http://baku.usembassy.gov / sect/ odc.html 15 See http://baku.usembassy.gov / sect/ odc.html

partners to fight against the spread oj

would be to guarantee speedy access to bases so that the American military could react faster than currently to any potential crisis. Troops could be small, rotating units taking use of upgraded Azerbaijani military
bases 16.

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During his December 3, 2003 visit to Baku, Mr. Rumsfeld said the United States would work with Azerbaijan to improve its ability to secure its territorial waters since "those waters had provided transit for unconventional weapons and narcotics" and US military and security services believe that Caspian Sea could be as "ungoverned waterway for America's adversaries" given azerbaijani location between Iran and Russia17. Other defence officials said the possible options for Azerbaijan ranged from use of azerbaijani territory for occasional training of U.S. troops to the permanent stationing in the country of equipment and small numbers of american military personnel18. Russia has expressed at different levels its opposition to any US military installation or NATO led objects in Azerbaijan or in the Caspian Basin19. Here, Iran and the Russian Federation are equally reluctant to maintaining azerbaijani military cooperation with the United States ,opposing any added american military components to the region. Russia considers the Caucasus to be its traditional military -security sphere of influence and is not ready to accept any foreign military deployment, not to mention the US one near its borders. Azerbaijan's will for closer cooperation with NATO is not seen with sympathy by Iran since it considers NATO as a US dominated alliance, and expansion of NATO is perceived within that context. Iran is in fear of regime change US policy and any US implantation close to their borders is being considered as a threat to the regime. Iranian side has repeatedly expressed its opposition to involvement of non-coastal states in the Caspian basin including bilateral Azerbaijani-US security cooperation in Caspian Sea. The sensitivity of these two countries on NATO or United States issues is very high and 1. Aliyev is trying to be more cautious especially considering Russia's overly radical approach. In contrast to his father's positive statements regarding NATO

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16 Bradley Graham, 'Rumsfeld Discusses Tighter Military Ties With Azerbaijan, Washington Post Baku, Azerbaijan, 3 December (YEAR",,? . ..). 17 Tom Shanker" 'Seeking to Block TelTOnst Route, Rumsfeld Asks Help in Azerbaijan' NewYork Times, 4 December, 2003. 18 'US defense chief to visit strategic south Caucasus region '., - AFP, 2 December 2003. 19 US 'buildup' in Caspian alarms Russia', DAWN - International, 15 March 2006.

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membership20 1. Aliyev has changed this policy, through repeatedly stating that " NATO is not in the agenda of azerbaijani politics and Azerbaijan is not willing to host any foreign troops in Azerbaijan"21. Azerbaijan is cooperating within PFP and moved to the new stage called IP AP. \Vhile assessing the Azerbaijan-US security cooperation, it should be indicated that current links are not aimed at establishing or bringing any US bases or troops to the area in the short term. From azerbaijani perspective, this would bring a risk of deteriorated relationship with Russia and Iran and may cause tense politico-economic climate an option that Azerbaijan is not yet ready to initiate. Azerbaijani leadership has consistently denied any plans for hosting foreign troopS22. In any case, deployment of such troops or contingents requires radical changes in the region or it could be reinforced in case of either military escalation or peacekeeping activities in the region within the process of peaceful settlement. Azerbaijan has repeatedly advocated for the removal of all foreign bases from the Caucasus and establishment of a security pact among caucasian countries23. Azerbaijan is interested in training its officers in US military schools, cooperating in anti-terrorism and drug trafficking drives in the region, which could be done through bilateral cooperation or within PEP and ODC programs as requested by azerbaijani officials. Azerbaijani-US security cooperation is not limited with military to military cooperation and according to US State Departments annual terror reports Azerbaijan is exchanging information on anti terror cooperation and law enforcement agencies are cooperating with related US agencies. The cooperation includes identifying of sources of terrorist organization and individuals, weapons smuggling, false documents, border violations. It is reported that azeri agencies have arrested around 16 members of a caucasian group linked to Al IZaida24 However, Azerbaijan did not get complete understanding from Washington on its security concerns regarding billion dollars worth of arms transfer to Armenia in mid 90s and on continued sophisticated
20 'AnalYsis: A time 6 August 2003. of changefor Azerbaijan', UPI International, 21 llham Aliyev 'Vopros voennogo pnsutstvrya inostrannix sosudarstv na Azerbqydzanskoy v po vestke dnya ne stoit', Day.Az/Interfax, 4 June 2006. 22 'No plans to allow US military base in Azerbaijan': Moscow, www.crunaview. 23 Azernews- Azerkhabar.Baku, 24 November 1999. 24 "Yeni Musavat"? Baku, 2 May 2007. 24 August 2005,

temtoni

Xinhuanet

arms delivery and as well as transfer of military hardware from Russian bases in Georgia to Armenia 2S. In its statement, the US State Department referred to "some pieces of Russian equipment" transferred to Armenia from Russia's Georgian bases, which included dozens of tanks and heavy artillery units continued up until now26. In addition to NATO framework Azerbaijan has been cooperating with United States within GUUAM - a regional organization trying to create close economic, political relationship and increasing military cooperation among themselves and attract more international attention and cooperation with EU and United States27 Efforts for non-proliferation, blocking narcotics traffic, ftghting ethnic and religious extremism and closer cooperation with EuroAtlantic structures had attracted more attention from US government which has announced allocation of $45 million for GUUAM development28. Said funding has been made according to US Senate's Defense and Security Assistance Act which contains the section dealing with GUAM and providing 8.5 million in the FY 2001 and 37 million in the FY200229. The meeting of GUAM foreign ministers with the US State Secretary and GUUAM-US dialog have been initiated. Formation of peacekeeping units of GUUAM countries would be reliable guarantee for securing transportation of energy resources from the emerging market in Caspian zone but functioning of GUAM as a regional organization or initiatives of GUAM on peacekeeping forces is highly vulnerable due to US-Russia understanding Foreign policy development From the very beginning of azerbaijani independence, azeri opposition has been the major proponent of pro- western and pro -US policy with the aim to distance Azerbaijan from the legacy of the Soviet Union These opponents consider the ruling forces in Azerbaijan as remnants of past political system which had been culturally, politically

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PanArmenian. N et,24 January 2006. 26Jean- Christophe Peuch, 'Georgia: Russia Pledges To Complete Military Pullout On Schedule' Prague,RFE:RL 31, 1vlarch 2006. 27 GUUAM seminar at US Congress. Washington 17 May, 2000. DC." 2000. RFE/RL, 28 A.ssa -Irada Agency, 1 October, 2000. 29 'Remarks by Amb. H. Pashaev at the Harvard GUUAlvI seminar. Mqy 31,2001 " Azerbaijan News distribution list "Habarlar" 1 June 2001.

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and economically tied with Russia, together with "soviet -style" thinking and reflecting anti western stereotypes. Azerbaijani popular front viewed close relations with US and Europe as a guarantee for azeri independence and support for Azerbaijan's sovereignty which was seen as under the threat of armenian territorial claims and the ongoing development in the former soviet space. In the given environment, Popular Front government rejected Russia dominated CIS structures in 1992, preferring instead establishing good bilateral relations with all countries, including Russia. The prevailing perception was that being outside the CIS structures would bring Azerbaijan more closely to western democracies and the perception was partially affected by the legacy of cold war projections. However in the first days of Popular Front government the US Congress adopted "anti azerbaijani "amendment made by the co-chair of Armenian Caucus in the Congress J. Porter (known as Porter amendment or amendment 907 ) the essence of which caused only deep aversion as it was accusing Azerbaijan to be involved "in military offensive against Armenia and NI<" while Azerbaijan was subject of Armenian attacks and NI< was remaining under "Armenian occupation". The wording of this amendment was equivalent to the resolution that US Congress could adopt as accusing Bosnian Muslims for "their offensive against Serbia and Bosnian Serbs" and imposing sanctions against Bosnia. Consequently the law encouraged armenian side for further offensive and military gains into the deep areas of Azerbaijan. This amendment adopted by uninformed legislators had been signed by President Bush and it created every impediment in the process of US-azerbaijani relations up to 2002. 907 amendment was just waived within the context of September 11 events in order to allow r the United States to cooperate with azeri governmental agencies in the war against terror. The 907 has not only slowed bilateral relationship but it had placed US in a disadvantaged situation in NI< mediation efforts and diminished confidence from Azerbaijani society. Actually if to follow the US governments' five guiding principles laid out in 1991 for recognition of former soviet republics where second principle required "respect existing borders, both internal and externaPO, Armenia would have to be sanctioned because this was the single country that did not

30

M. Halperin

and David

J. Scheffer

1'e!f-determination in the new world order'

: Carnegie

Endowment

for International

Peace. Washington,

DC 1992.

recognize Azerbaijan and adopted parliamentary resolution still in 1989 about incorporation of part of Azerbaijan NIZ into Armenia. But Armenia was one of the first countries recognized by United States in late 1991. Obvious effect of 907 was it prevented US government from cooperating with the f1rst democratically elected government of Azerbaijan which was rejected by Russia for azeri refusal to join CIS. After the overthrow of A. Elchibey's government in 1993, the new leader H. Aliyev acted traditionally, changing the course towards Moscow thanks to meeting with Russian president and defense :M1nister to get their support in an effort to push armenian forces out of the occupied lands. For that reason he joined CIS structures but further development showed that Aliyev's reliance on Russia did not yield any result and, on the contrary, Russia tried to block Aliyev's initiatives to discuss Armenian aggression within CIS structures. Russia was insisting on cease f1re regime and dispatching Russian forces as separating forces in the contact line, which was later resisted by H. Aliyev who understood likely consequences for azeri sovereignty. In light of deteriorated atmosphere with Russia due to its imminent support for Armenia, H. Aliyev was desperately seeking for alternative ways but any alternative's involvement in the region in comparison with Russia was very limited and sometimes partially coordinated with Russia. The policy shift started by establishing relations with NATO and United States. Visiting NATO headquarters, H. Aliyev signed PtP program with NATO in May 1994 and later in June flew to Istanbul to meet US Secretary of State W. Christopher, f1rst high level meeting with US officials which was apparently organized by Turkish side at the sidelines of June 1994 NATO foreign :M1nisters. At he same time he appointed his son as the oil company's vice president and sent to the United States for negotiations over oil contract which was signed in September 1994 with Consortium of oil companies representingmainly western companies - including Turkey and Iran. These moves opened opportunities for his meeting with US president B. Clinton on the sidelines of UN General Assembly. Mjor topic, of course, was NIZ issue for which United States promised to promote a peaceful settlement. President Clinton and his administration expressed their opposition to the 907amendment, trying to show american willingness to foster bilateral relations. And in reality it opened high level periodic meetings with vice president Al Gore, UN representative Madeline Albright, and national security officials at different forums in Baku and abroad.

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From this perspective, Azerbaijan, a rare exception, later sided with Clinton administration's anti Iranian campaign excluding iranian companies from the Consortium of Oil Companies. This has affected negatively azerbaijani- iranian relations. That has been part of H.Aliyev's strategic choice within his foreign policy orientations. In parallel, Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington headed by relative of H. Aliyev has been active in terms of persuading US establishment on Aliyev's sincere relationship with United States who has been instrumental in recruiting lobby organizations to push forward azeri cause in Washington. \Vhat was the driving force for closer relationship with the United States? Was this opposition's role? Was that the results of relations with Russia or was that Turkey's advice? Was that NI< issue or regime survival policy? These questions have always been raised by local and external analysts, considering Aliyev's nature, style of thinking and behavior as "a former communist leader with I<GB background". There is no immediate answer but the policy was a mixture of above mentioned arguments where each of them had their own place in formulating the policy .However despite the visual contradiction based on past experience, both sides have truly moved towards each other so as to establish cordial relations. Although both parties interests may differ, each one tried to use the opposite's weak position for its own advantages. The option for closer relations (from azerbaijani side) had been dictated by various factors .Main ones were: getting support for azerbaijani peace initiatives within OSCE :Minsk Group and urging United State's active involvement in the settlement process in order to avoid unilateral mediation. At the time when the policy shift was made,Azerbaijan was under increasing pressure from Russia to deploy Russian troops as peacekeeping forces to the contact line within OSCE mandate and azerbaijani leadership "keeping in mind past experience and considerable Russian support for Armenian military campaign, was resisting unilateral deployment of one country's forces. Consequently OSCE Budapest summit adopted the resolution documenting multilateral peacekeeping forces where any country cannot have one third of the total forces. Russian- Chechen war which started in early December 1994 has weakened Russia and its ailing President, and consequently prompted former soviet republics to distance from Russia's orbit aligning the non russian republics in the structures like GUUAM. In the course of the war, closure of russian-azerbaijani border has also served for diminishing

russian influence and intervention and prompted Azerbaijan to seek alternative political and economic ties. Energy cooperation has been a driving force for more encounters with both high level officials and veteran politicians who had great influence over the administration. It also served as a kind of bridge in linking azerbaijani leadership with influential Republican Party veterans, including several former secretaries of state and national security advisers, who had been visiting Baku as consultants to different energy companies. High level contacts regarding Baku -Ceyhan oil pipeline and President Clinton's personal involvement in supporting transportation of Caspian energy resources bypassing Russia to western markets, have in fact served for the american policy formulation in the region and for closer partnership with Azerbaijan. Permanent campaign and pressure from opposition forces, accompanied by rallies and political demonstrations against Russia's alleged intentions to send troops into Azerbaijan and their suspicions regarding H. Aliyev's true intentions with Russia (proceeding from his past background being as a I<GB General and soviet Politburo Member), have also been used as influencing mechanism in his relations with Russia and the United States. As the US administration set out its policy guidelines for the region, it emphasized a key precondition to development of the Caucasus: the creation of a stable and secure environment in the region and as part of a multilateral approach, it outlined security within the Caucasus via regional cooperation among the three states31. This policy was especially dominant in late 90s, pressing Azerbaijan for cooperation with Armenia for what US State Department appointed a special representative who at the same time was heading joint Task forces between United States and all three Caucasus nations. The policy was strongly opposed by president H. Aliyev who underlined that Azerbaijan cannot contemplate any regional cooperation involving Armenia unless the occupied areas are freed. The energy policy aimed at isolating Iran and Russia from major transportation links served to ensure integrating these nations into Euro Atlantic structures and securing their economic independence which was part of US strategy in the region. Although it was not economically vibrant to run pipeline through the vast territory from Baku to Ceyhan, as many economists and analysts argued, but obviously there was a
USIA, EUR408: 'Herbst
diplomatic

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31

7/30 House testimony on US policy in Caucasus
efforts in region),8 January 1996.

(Outlines

U.S. economic,

political decision to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of Caucasian republics, namely Georgia and Azerbaijan. The US policy that was branded some ten years ago in promoting the bilateral relations remains unaltered and includes following issues: - supporting democracy, market economy, political reforms, human rights - integration into international political and economic institutions, as well as in European security structures.
IX)

earlyresolution of conflictswith international mediation

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- promoting american business interests. This policy expanded after 9/11, forging a bilateral military, security and economic cooperation. Azerbaijan -US working group established in 1994, expanded its focus on a wide variety of issues including macroeconomic environment, fiscal and monetary policy, budgeting, managing oil revenues, azeri contemplated \XlTO membership money laundering, anti-corruption governmental strategy 32. United States regional approach was based on a policy seeking Iran's isolation and encouraging normal good relations with Turkey and Russia33. Obviously, Turkey was a key component in this policy and close US- azerbaijanigeorgian -turkish relations have triggered traditional Turkey's enemies and rivals to focus on more active and detennined Iran-Armenia -Russia axis which has had negative consequences for azerbaijani security rather than to United States' interests in the region. Armenian hostile attitude towards Turkey is taking root from this ill-intended axis as well and Iranian support for Armenia is being argued as part of joint Iranian-Russian strategy aimed at weakening turkish-american influence in this area. From this perspective, US supporting Armenia, paradoxically, is being concerted with those efforts and contributing to weaken azerbaijani posture. With regards to azerbaijani-iranian relations, the US factor played its role but not the major one. Washington has always discouraged close relations with Iran and had pressed Azerbaijan to avoid any military ties with Iran whilecautioning Azerbaijan "of the danger of close ties with Iran which continues to promote terrorism and flouts other internationally

32 'Azerbaijan -US working group to meet in Washington, DC' Press service of Azerbaijan Finance Ministry, 28 November 2005. 33 USIA, EUR408 'Herbst 7/30 House testim0'!Y on US poliçy in Caucasus (Outlines U.S. economic, diplomatic e.fforlsin region), 8 January 1996.USIA , EUR408 'Herbst 7/30 House testimo'!) on US poliçy in Caucasus (Outlines U.S. economic, diplomatic e.fforlsin region), 8 January 1996.

recognized standards of behavior" 34. In response Iran has developed closed ties with Russia where Armenia is serving as linkage. Azerbaijani-Iran inter-state problems are mostly generated by iranian economic support to Armenia and the dispute around Caspian Sea status. The nature of Iranian regime, existing stereotypes and claims fom each side on Southern Azerbaijan (although this is kept at nongovernmental level in Azerbaijan) have also been frequent source for tension35. Azerbaijani leadership did not restrict anti- Iranian and antiRussian propaganda on opposition and pro-democracy newspapers and on regime controlled TV s. Islamic party members were arrested in charge of spying for Iran but authorities never publicly accused Iran for any wrongdoing. Democracy building expectations

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Although 907 has restricted the government to government cooperation, US government initiated programs on democracy building and civil society development for NGOs and political parties including pro-governmental parties. Exchange programs for students and scholars and the variety of groups to the United States have helped enormously for self confidence within NGOs, experts, scholars and promoted international contacts and expertise. US Embassy in Baku has been very supportive for free press, civil society development and developing political parties ,particularly in 1993-1996 when the top azerbaijani leadership was ready in any moment to close political parties and independent press if no international pressure being able to deter from such a step .Support for democracy, market economy, political reforms, respect for human rights has been part of announced US policy towards Caucasus, and Azerbaijani pro democracy forces have always tried to urge the US administration to apply those elements as dominant principles in its relations with Azerbaijani ruling regime. H. Aliyev also declared those principles as valid in the new Constitution which allowed him to build on the development of democracy in Azerbaijan before international organizations and the United States, a policy which opened the space for bilateral development although the democracy agenda was not the top issue in bilateral relations.
34

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USIA, EUR408

: 'Herbst 7/30 House testimony on US poliry in Caucasus (Outlines U.S.
Azerbaijan Amid Nuclear Standoff '

economic, diplomatic effOrts in region)'.8 January 1996. 35 Jean-Christophe Peuch,' Iran Defense Chief Visits PRAGUE, RFE/RL 19 April 2006.

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As H. Aliyev's second term of presidency was approaching in 2003 these principles could play particular importance for radical changes from the old political system towards more democracy and transparency. In pre-election debates ,pro-democracy forces believed that US administration would not ally itself with the remnants of the past system, considering that both Clinton and Bush administrations unambiguously characterized H. Aliyev's arrival to power as a result of coup against democratically elected president A. Elchibey in 199336. The language had great significance for them, who have always questioned H. Aliyev's legitimacy. In an effort to push democratic change in the country, these forces used every opportunity to educate Washingtonbased think tanks, institutions, Congressmen and the administration officials in the necessity of free elections in Azerbaijan. The purpose was: getting support to free and transparent elections in Azerbaijan, based on normal pre- election environment where electoral commissions are composed on parity basis and all candidates could have equal access to TV, media and the public. The question in the agenda was whether US administration would support free elections or side with ruling regime's principles. Either US administration will pursue the policy which was performed in the Ivliddle East for the past century, vis à vis oil rich regimes or a new approach will take place. Azeri oil rich, muslim country, with a soviet legacy, was facing a dilemma: democratic development with transparent open society or installation of dynastic rule based on a "traditional" system. This was the test for democracy both for inside and outside forces if no short lived interests would have prevailed. For smoothly transfer of power and legitimacy, azerbaijani regime needed support from both Russia and the United States. Support from Russian side was not expected for pro-democracy forces since Russia's perception of democratic forces in Azerbaijan was as prowestern and anti Russian. They had only one ally which could be European Institutions or United States but due to Europe's diverse approach and interests in the region, more emphasis was made on the United States since the disparity of US engagement with pro-democracy forces was very huge in comparison with EU or Council of Europe. In the given circumstances 1. Aliyev was appointed PM by the alleged degree of his ill father37 who was placed in an Ankara military
36 http://www.state.gov / g/ cirl/ rls/hrrpt/ 37RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report, 8 August

2003.