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Diplomacy Games

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In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems?
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Contents
Introduction:FormalModelsof,in,andforInternationalNegotiations Rudolf Avenhaus, I. William Zartman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
Part I
General Evaluations
Game Models of Peace and War: Some Recent Themes Barry O’Neill � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Formal Models of Intervention: A Stocktaking and Analysis of the Implications for Policy David Carment, Dane Rowlands � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Rationality of Choice versus Rationality of Knowledge Andrzej P. Wierzbicki � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Negotiation Models and Applications Daniel Druckman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
Part II
Models of International Negotiations
A Dynamical Systems Model of Small Group Decision Making Michael Gabbay � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � FormalMethodsforForecastingOutcomesofNegotiationsonInterstate Conicts Rudolf Avenhaus, Thomas Krieger � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Bridging Games and Diplomacy Michel Rudnianski, Hélène Bestougeff � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
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Contents
GreekTurkish Territorial Waters Game Serdar S¸. Güner � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
Part III
Models in International Negotiations
SomeLessonsfromtheUseoftheRAINSModelinInternational Negotiations Markus Amann � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ConvertingCompetitiontoCollaboration:CreativeApplicationsof Models in the Law of the Sea Negotiations Caitlyn L. Antrim � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
Part IV
Models for International Negotiations
International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Noncooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol Akira Okada � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a Tool for Negotiators D. Marc Kilgour � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Adjusted Winner (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David AccordsValuable Tools for Negotiators? Rudolf Schüssler � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution Matthias G. Raith � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Conclusion: Lessons for Theory and Practice I. William Zartman, Rudolf Avenhaus � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
Index
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http://www.springer.com/978-3-540-68303-2