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Leviathan

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304 pages
“Leviathan” is a work of political philosophy. Written by Thomas Hobbes during a time of civil war, it argues that sovereign rule is the most stable form of government. An early proponent of social contract theory, Hobbes’ observations regarding the dangers of unrestrained individual freedom have influenced generations of thinkers.
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Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan
INTRODUCTION
THE FIRST PART: OF MAN
Table of Contents
CHAPTER1 — OFSENSE CHAPTER2 — OFIMAGINATION CHAPTER3 — OFTHECONSEQUENCEORTRAINOFIMAGINATIONS CHAPTER4 — OFSPEECH CHAPTER5 — OFREASONANDSCIENCE CHAPTER6 — OFTHEINTERIORBEGINNINGSOFVOLUNTARYMOTIONS, COMMONLYCALLEDTHEPASSIONS;ANDTHESPEECHESBYWHICHTHEYAREEXPRESSED CHAPTER7 — OFTHEENDSORRESOLUTIONSOFDISCOURSE CHAPTER8 — OFTHEVIRTUESCOMMONLYCALLEDINTELLECTUAL;ANDTHEIRCONTRARYDEFECTS CHAPTER9 — OFTHESEVERALSUBJECTOFKNOWLEDGE CHAPTER10 — OFPOWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOURANDWORTHINESS CHAPTER11 — OFTHEDIFFERENCEOFMANNERS CHAPTER12 — OFRELIGION CHAPTER13 — OFTHENATURALCONDITIONOFMANKINDASCONCERNINGTHEIRFELICITYANDMISERY CHAPTER14 — OFTHEFIRSTANDSECONDNATURALLAWS,ANDOFCONTRACTS CHAPTER15 — OFOTHERLAWSOFNATURE CHAPTER16 — OFPERSONS, AUTHORS,ANDTHINGSPERSONATED
THE SECOND PART: OF COMMONWEALTH
CHAPTER17 — OFTHECAUSES, GENERATION,ANDDEFINITIONOFACOMMONWEALTH CHAPTER18 — OFTHERIGHTSOFSOVEREIGNSBYINSTITUTION CHAPTER19 — OFTHESEVERALKINDSOFCOMMONWEALTHBYINSTITUTION,ANDOFSUCCESSIONTOTHESOVEREIGNPOWER CHAPTER20 — OFDOMINIONPATERNALANDDESPOTICAL CHAPTER21 — OFTHELIBERTYOFSUBJECTS CHAPTER22 — OFSYSTEMSSUBJECTPOLITICALANDPRIVATE CHAPTER23 — OFTHEPUBLICMINISTERSOFSOVEREIGNPOWER CHAPTER24 — OFTHENUTRITIONANDPROCREATIONOFACOMMONWEALTH CHAPTER25 — OFCOUNSEL CHAPTER26 — OFCIVILLAWS CHAPTER27 — OFCRIMES, EXCUSES,ANDEXTENUATIONS CHAPTER28 — OFPUNISHMENTSANDREWARDS CHAPTER29 — OFTHOSETHINGSTHATWEAKENORTENDTOTHEDISSOLUTIONOFACOMMONWEALTH CHAPTER30 — OFTHEOFFICEOFTHESOVEREIGNREPRESENTATIVE CHAPTER31 — OFTHEKINGDOMOFGODBYNATURE
THE THIRD PART: OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH
CHAPTER32 — OFTHEPRINCIPLESOFCHRISTIANPOLITICS CHAPTER33 — OFTHENUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,ANDINTERPRETERSOFTHEBOOKSOFHOLYSCRIPTURE CHAPTER34 — OFTHESIGNIFICATIONOFSPIRIT, ANGEL,ANDINSPIRATIONINTHEBOOKSOFHOLYSCRIPTURE CHAPTER35 — OFTHESIGNIFICATIONINSCRIPTUREOFKINGDOMOFGOD,OFHOLY, SACRED,ANDSACRAMENT CHAPTER36 — OFTHEWORDOFGOD,ANDOFPROPHETS
CHAPTER37 — OFMIRACLESANDTHEIRUSE CHAPTER38 — OFTHESIGNIFICATIONINSCRIPTUREOFETERNALLIFE, HELL, SALVATION,THEWORLDTOCOME,ANDREDEMPTION CHAPTER39 — OFTHESIGNIFICATIONINSCRIPTUREOFTHEWORDCHURCH CHAPTER40 — OFTHERIGHTSOFTHEKINGDOMOFGOD,INABRAHAM, MOSES,THEHIGHPRIESTS, ANDTHEKINGSOFJUDAH CHAPTER41 — OFTHEOFFICEOFOURBLESSEDSAVIOUR CHAPTER42 — OFPOWERECCLESIASTICAL CHAPTER43 — OFWHATISNECESSARYFORAMANSRECEPTIONINTOTHEKINGDOMOFHEAVEN
THE FOURTH PART: OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS
CHAPTER44 — OFSPIRITUALDARKNESSFROMMISINTERPRETATIONOFSCRIPTURE CHAPTER45 — OFDEMONOLOGYANDOTHERRELICSOFTHERELIGIONOFTHEGENTILES CHAPTER46 — OFDARKNESSFROMVAINPHILOSOPHYANDFABULOUSTRADITIONS CHAPTER47 — OFTHEBENEFITTHATPROCEEDETHFROMSUCHDARKNESS,ANDTOWHOMITACCRUETH
A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people’s safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation. To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man. Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it. Thirdly, what is a Christian Commonwealth. Lastly, what is the Kingdom of Darkness. Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books, but of men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thyself: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to a saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men,- desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc.: for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men’s actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be
for the most part deceived, by too much trust or by too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man. But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will be only to consider if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.
The First Part: Of Man
Chapter 1 — Of Sense
Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consiber them first singly, anb afterwarbs in train or bepenbence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality, or other accibent of a Boby without us, which is commonly calleb an oBject. Which oBject worketh on the eyes, ears, anb other parts of man’s Boby, anb By biversity of working probuceth biversity of appearances. The original of them all is that which we call sense, (for there is no conception in a man’s minb which hath not at first, totally or By parts, Been Begotten upon the organs of sense). The rest are beriveb from that original. To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the Business now in hanb; anb I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present methob, I will Briefly beliver the same in this place. The cause of sense is the external Boby, or oBject, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immebiately, as in the taste anb touch; or mebiately, as in seeing, hearing, anb smelling: which pressure, By the mebiation of nerves anb other strings anb memBranes of the Boby, continueb inwarbs to the Brain anb heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or enbeavour of the heart to beliver itself: which enbeavour, Because outwarb, seemeth to Be some matter without. Anb this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; anb consisteth, as to the eye, in a light, or colour figureb; to the ear, in a sounb; to the nostril, in an obour; to the tongue anb palate, in a savour; anb to the rest of the Boby, in heat, colb, harbness, softness, anb such other qualities as we biscern By feeling. All which qualities calleb sensiBle are in the oBject that causeth them But so many several motions of the matter, By which it presseth our organs biversely. Neither in us that are presseb are they anything else But biverse motions (for motion probuceth nothing But motion). ut their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking that breaming. Anb as pressing, ruBBing, or striking the eye makes us fancy a light, anb pressing the ear probuceth a bin; so bo the Bobies also we see, or hear, probuce the same By their strong, though unoBserveb action. For if those colours anb sounbs were in the Bobies or oBjects that cause them, they coulb not Be severeb from them, as By glasses anb in echoes By reflection we see they are: where we know the thing we see is in one place; the appearance, in another. Anb though at some certain bistance the real anb very oBject seem investeb with the fancy it Begets in us; yet still the oBject is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else But original fancy causeb (as I have saib) By the pressure that is, By the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, anb other organs, thereunto orbaineb. ut the philosophy schools, through all the universities of Christenbom, grounbeb upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another boctrine; anb say, for the cause of vision, that the thing seen senbeth forth on every sibe a visiBle species, (in English) a visiBle show, apparition, or aspect, or a Being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye is seeing. Anb for the cause of hearing, that the thing hearb senbeth forth an aubiBle species, that is, an aubiBle aspect, or aubiBle Being seen; which, entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of unberstanbing also, they say the thing unberstoob senbeth forth an intelligiBle species, that is, an intelligiBle Being seen; which, coming into the unberstanbing, makes us unberstanb. I say not this, as bisapproving the use of universities: But Because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions By the way what things woulb Be amenbeb in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.
Chapter 2 — Of Imagination
That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man bouBts of. ut that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally Be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason Be the same (namely, that nothing can change itself), is not so easily assenteb to. For men measure, not only other men, But all other things, By themselves: anb Because they finb themselves suBject after motion to pain anb lassitube, think everything else grows weary of motion, anb seeks repose of its own accorb; little consibering whether it Be not some other motion wherein that besire of rest they finb in themselves consisteth. From hence it is that the schools say, heavy Bobies fall bownwarbs out of an appetite to rest, anb to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascriBing appetite, anb knowlebge of what is goob for their conservation (which is more than man has), to things inanimate, aBsurbly. When a Boby is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinber it) eternally; anb whatsoever hinbreth it, cannot in an instant, But in time, anb By begrees, quite extinguish it: anb as we see in the water, though the winb cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion which is mabe in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, breams, etc. For after the oBject is removeb, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more oBscure than when we see it. Anb this is it the Latins call imagination, from the image mabe in seeing, anb apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. ut the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, anb is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing But becaying sense; anb is founb in men anb many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking. The becay of sense in men waking is not the becay of the motion mabe in sense, But an oBscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun oBscureth the light of the stars; which stars bo no less exercise their virtue By which they are visiBle in the bay than in the night. ut Because amongst many strokes which our eyes, ears, anb other organs receive from external Bobies, the prebominant only is sensiBle; therefore the light of the sun Being prebominant, we are not affecteb with the action of the stars. Anb any oBject Being removeb from our eyes, though the impression it mabe in us remain, yet other oBjects more present succeebing, anb working on us, the imagination of the past is oBscureb anb mabe weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the bay. From whence it followeth that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any oBject, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man’s Boby bestroys in time the parts which in sense were moveb: so that bistance of time, anb of place, hath one anb the same effect in us. For as at a great bistance of place that which we look at appears bim, anb without bistinction of the smaller parts, anb as voices grow weak anb inarticulate: so also after great bistance of time our imagination of the past is weak; anb we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets; anb of actions, many particular circumstances. This becaying sense, when we woulb express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself), we call imagination, as I saib Before. ut when we woulb express the becay, anb signify that the sense is fabing, olb, anb past, it is calleb memory. So that imagination anb memory are But one thing, which for biverse consiberations hath biverse names. Much memory, or memory of many things, is calleb experience. Again, imagination Being only of those things which have Been formerly perceiveb By sense, either all at once, or By parts at several times; the former (which is the imagining the whole oBject, as it was presenteb to the sense) is simple imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen Before. The other is compounbeb, when from the sight of a man at one time, anb of a horse at another, we conceive in our minb a centaur. So when a man compounbeth