Partisanship, Union Centralization and Mobility

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This book analyzes the relationship between the partisanship of governments and the corresponding levels of interindustry labor mobility (ILM). From a general equilibrium model, the book shows that high levels of ILM induce greater class solidarity among labor owners while weakening the solidarity among capital owners. The reverse holds for low levels of ILM […]. The book develops and tests a series of conditional hypotheses, and finds that Left governments will be associated with higher levels of ILM than Right governments when the level of domestic union centralization is low. It argues and shows that one mechanism through which partisan governments can cause the changes of interindustry labor mobility levels is the manipulation of certain labor market policies.
Publié le : dimanche 1 mai 2016
Lecture(s) : 1
EAN13 : 9782140008825
Nombre de pages : 244
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Partisanship, Union Centralization and Mobility
The Political Roots of Interindustry Labor Mobility
Qiang Zhou
Partisanship, Union Centralization and Mobility
Qiang ZHOU
Partisanship, Union Centralization and Mobility
The Political Roots of Interindustry Labor Mobility
© L’Harmattan, 2016 5-7, rue de l’Ecole-Polytechnique, 75005 Paris http://www.harmattan.fr diffusion.harmattan@wanadoo.fr ISBN : 978-2-343-09222-5 EAN : 9782343092225
Acknowledgements
It is my greatest pleasure to be able to thank the persons who have extended their intellectual support and friendship to me during the research, writing, and publication of this book. I began to get interested in this subject while taking a graduate seminar on Political Economy taught by Professor Helen Milner, who has been my adviser and chaired my dissertation committee until her departure for Princeton University. I have great gratitude to Helen; not only does she read, comment, and guide me through numerous drafts of the chapters, but also because she remains committed to her old student even after she left Columbia University. I am very grateful to Helen’s offer of a research fellowship at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance in Princeton University and a significant part of this research was written under the support of the fellowship. I was also fortunate enough to have Professor Pablo Pinto, who came to Columbia University in 2004, to chair my dissertation committee after Helen left. Pablo has been passionate about my research project and his thoughtful and incisive comments throughout the years decisively shaped my dissertation, which constitutes the basis for this book. I am extremely grateful to Lucy Goodhart, the other adviser of mine at Columbia University, who always provided me with constructive, thorough, and insightful comments as well as greatly helped me improve the empirical analysis. I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science at Columbia University for providing me the supportive learning environment. And this book would not materialize were it not for the urging of my research collaborator, Michel Prum, Professeur de classe exceptionnelle, at Paris Diderot University Paris 7. This book project is also supported by National Social Science Foundation of China (No.15BZZ027).
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Contents List of Figures and Tables Chapter one Introduction and Literature Review 1.1. Empirical discrepancy and the importance of interindustry factor mobility ..........................................................................17 1.2. Current literature on interindustry factor mobility ............20 1.3. Overview of my argument .................................................29 Chapter two A Theory of Partisan Preferences of Interindustry Labor Mobility 2.1. Partisan preferences on interindustry labor mobility.........31 2.1.1. Partisan governments and their constituencies ............32 2.1.2. How ILM levels can shape class solidarity? ................35 2.1.3. The preference of centralized labor unions on ILM levels ......................................................................................40 2.1.4. Partisan preference and union moderation of ILM ......43 2.2. Can government policies affect interindustry labor mobility?...................................................................................49 2.3. Conclusion .........................................................................52 Appendix to Chapter 2..............................................................54 Chapter three Measurement of Interindustry Labor Mobility 3.1. Current measures of ILM in the literature .........................65 3.1.1. Measuring ILM as observed interindustry labor movement...............................................................................65 3.1.2. Measuring ILM as interindustry wage differentials.....68 3.1.3. Measuring ILM as elasticity of labor supply to wage differentials ............................................................................71 3.1.4. Other measures of ILM ................................................74 3.2. Elasticity measure of ILM .................................................75 3.2.1. Calculated elasticity measure of ILM ..........................75 3.2.2. Estimated elasticity measure of ILM ...........................79 3.2.2.1. Caveats ...................................................................80
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