Islamist party and democratic participation [Elektronische Ressource] : Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998 - 2006 / vorgelegt von Ahmad-Norma Permata

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POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIA 1998-2006 Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (Westf.) Vorgelegt von Ahmad-Norma Permata aus Kediri (Indonesien) Münster 2008 Tag der Mündlichen Prüfung : 2 September 2008 Dekan : Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wichard Woyke Referent : Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske Korreferent : Prof. Dr. J. D. M. Platenkamp 2ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Die vorliegende Studie untersucht das politische Verhalten einer indonesischen islamischen Partei, der Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Diese Partei erzielte öffentliches und wissenschaftliches Aufsehen, als sie ihre Wählerzahl im Jahr 2004 von 1,7 % auf 7,3 % versechsfachen konnte. Kritiker werfen der Partei vor, dass ihre Ideologie undemokratische Elemente enthalte, so etwa die Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Religion und Politik oder Fragen wie die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter und der religiöse Pluralismus. Die Beteiligung der PKS an demokratischen politischen Prozessen sei daher weder ernsthaft noch nachhaltig. Vielmehr werde die Partei entsprechend ihrer Zielsetzung letztendlich islamistische Politik machen, die mit Demokratie nicht kompatibel sei oder gar versuchen, die Demokratie durch ein islamisches System zu ersetzen.
Publié le : mardi 1 janvier 2008
Lecture(s) : 37
Source : MIAMI.UNI-MUENSTER.DE/SERVLETS/DERIVATESERVLET/DERIVATE-4766/DISS_PERMATA.PDF
Nombre de pages : 296
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POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT


ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION:
PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIA 1998-2006

Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Philosophischen Fakultät
der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (Westf.)
















Vorgelegt von
Ahmad-Norma Permata
aus Kediri (Indonesien)
Münster 2008


Tag der Mündlichen Prüfung : 2 September 2008
Dekan : Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wichard Woyke
Referent : Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske
Korreferent : Prof. Dr. J. D. M. Platenkamp

2ZUSAMMENFASSUNG


Die vorliegende Studie untersucht das politische Verhalten einer indonesischen islamischen
Partei, der Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Diese Partei erzielte öffentliches und
wissenschaftliches Aufsehen, als sie ihre Wählerzahl im Jahr 2004 von 1,7 % auf 7,3 %
versechsfachen konnte. Kritiker werfen der Partei vor, dass ihre Ideologie undemokratische
Elemente enthalte, so etwa die Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Religion und Politik oder
Fragen wie die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter und der religiöse Pluralismus. Die
Beteiligung der PKS an demokratischen politischen Prozessen sei daher weder ernsthaft noch
nachhaltig. Vielmehr werde die Partei entsprechend ihrer Zielsetzung letztendlich
islamistische Politik machen, die mit Demokratie nicht kompatibel sei oder gar versuchen, die
Demokratie durch ein islamisches System zu ersetzen.
Die vorliegende Studie folgt einem neo-institutionalistischen Theorieansatz nach
Douglas C. North, um den Einfluss der Ideologie auf das politische Verhalten der PKS
gegenüber den demokratischen politischen Institutionen in Indonesien zu untersuchen. Die
Hypothese der Arbeit lautet, dass Ideologie immer dann die dominante Richtlinie für das
politische Verhalten der Partei bildet, wenn die formellen Institutionen wirkungslos sind. Dies
ist weniger stark der Fall, wenn die formellen Spielregeln funktionieren.
Ein historischer Überblick zeigt, dass sich die Verhaltensmuster der PKS von
„heimlich“ zu „offen, aber ideologisch“ zu „programmatisch/pragmatisch“ gewandelt haben.
Diese sich wandelnden Muster verlaufen parallel zu den Veränderungen der politischen
Institutionen Indonesiens, die freier und demokratischer wurden. Die Demokratisierung
ermöglichte es muslimischen politischen Akteuren, sich rational und pragmatisch zu verhalten
– die PKS stellt hierfür ein dramatisches und wichtiges Fallbeispiel dar. Während der Wahlen
1999 versuchte die Partei, die politischen Präferenzen des konservativsten Teils der
muslimischen Gemeinschaft zu artikulieren. Daher wurde sie am rechten Rand des
ideologischen Spektrums in Indonesien eingeordnet. Im Zuge der zunehmenden Stabilität der
demokratischen politischen Institutionen wandelte sich die PKS jedoch von einer
konservativen zu einer pragmatischen Partei – ohne jedoch ihre konservative Ideologie
aufzugeben.
Die sich ändernde organisatorische Balance der PKS beeinflusste ihr Verhalten in
Wahlen. Während der Wahlen 1999 sah die Partei, die zudem nur schlecht organisiert und
vernetzt war, ihre Wahlaktivitäten lediglich als Bestandteil von religiösen Aktivitäten an. So
ermahnte PKS ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten während der Vorbereitung auf die Wahl immer
3wieder, ihre religiösen Pflichten zu intensivieren und warnte sogar davor, sich zu sehr mit der
Mobilisierung von Wählern zu beschäftigen. Dies änderte sich dramatisch anlässlich der
Wahlen 2004, die die Partei nicht länger als ein mögliches Mittel zum Zweck ansah, sondern
vielmehr als das Mittel, um ihre ideologischen Ziele zu erreichen. Im Ergebnis motivierten
ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten so viele Wähler wie möglich ohne sich darum zu sorgen, ob
die Wähler die Ziele der Partei verstanden hatten.
Die zunehmende Stabilität und Effektivität der demokratischen Institutionen als
Arenen des politischen Wettbewerbs haben auch das Verhalten der Partei als Regierungspartei
beeinflusst. Während des Zeitraums von 1999 bis 2004 verhielt sich die Partei ideologisch, in
dem sie ausschließlich mit anderen islamischen Parteien zusammenarbeitete und sich
gegenüber der säkularen Politik sehr zurückhaltend verhielt. Als die Partei nach den Wahlen
2004 in die Regierung eintrat, änderte sich ihr Verhalten maßgeblich. Mit Ausnahme ihrer
starken Unterstützung für den Gesetzesentwurf gegen Pornographie und pornographische
Handlungen (RUU-APP) lässt sich das politische Verhalten der PKS in der Regierung als
weitgehend pragmatisch und machtorientiert beschreiben.
Das sich wandelnde Verhalten der PKS ist ein Anzeichen für den Erfolg des
Demokratisierungsprozesses in Indonesien. Die politischen Institutionen waren in der Lage,
den politischen Akteuren, und hier besonders muslimischen Akteuren, ein gewisses Maß an
Sicherheit zu bieten, damit diese ihre Interaktionen, Transaktionen und Zusammenarbeit nach
formal kodifizierten Regeln durchführen konnten. Diese Sicherheit motivierte die politischen
Akteure dazu, rational zu handeln und ihre politischen Ziele kooperativ zu verfolgen. Noch
wichtiger ist die Tatsache, dass, soweit das Verhalten der PKS betroffen ist, das
demokratische System substanziell funktioniert: es ermöglicht politischen Wettbewerb, der
die Partei dazu bewegt, eine Plattform zu bilden und politische Programme nach den
Präferenzen ihrer Anhänger zu formulieren, aber auch Wahlversprechen einzuhalten. Der
Demokratisierungsprozess war in der Lage, die PKS davon zu überzeugen, dass
demokratisches Handeln und die Einhaltung von Regeln der einzige Weg ist, die eigenen
politischen Ziele zu verfolgen – selbst wenn dieser Weg manchmal mit den ideologischen
Grundlagen der Partei in Widerspruch steht.





4TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 3
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter I: Islamist Party and Democratic Dilemma: On Researching the Indonesian
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Chapter II: Islamist Politics in Indonesian History: Ideology, Institutional
Contexts, and Political Behaviors of Sarekat Islam (1912-1929)
and Masyumi (1946-1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter III: From Campuses to the Parliament: PKS Origin and History. . . . 84
Chapter IV: Between Internal Aspirations and External Regulations:
PKS Ideology and Institutional Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Chapter V: Between Ideals and Effectiveness: PKS Behaviors in Organizations . 158
Chapter VI: Between Moral Propagation and Political Propaganda:
PKS Behaviors in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Chapter VII: Between Office and Policy: PKS Behaviors in Government . . . 230
Chapter VIII: Summary and Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Curriculum Vitae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292










5CHAPTER I
ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA:
ON RESEARCHING THE INDONESIAN PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS)


1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the democratic participation of an Islamist political party in
Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). The focus of this
research is to assess the influence of ideology on the party’s behavior in democratic politics.
The PKS has been a great success, but has at the same time triggered controversies in
Indonesian politics, after it successfully increased its vote from 1.7% in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.
The controversy stems from perceptions—among observers as well as the public—that the
Islamist ideology of the PKS contains elements that are incompatible with democracy, and
that its participation in democracy is merely a pretext for its true objective of establishing an
Islamist political system. Utilizing theories of party studies, this research analyzes the impact
of ideology upon the behavior of the PKS in democratic politics, i.e. in its organization, its
participation in elections, and its role in government.

1.1. Islamist Parties: A Democratic Dilemma
In fact, suspicions about the participation of Islamist parties in democratic politics are by no
means a unique Indonesian problem. A scholar of Islamist parties calls it a “democratic
dilemma” in that, on the one hand, the parties adopt a strictly religious political ideology with
elements that are incompatible with democratic values—such as, for example, their
approaches to questions of gender equality and religious pluralism. Yet on the other hand,
Islamist parties are gaining popularity in many Muslim countries when they participate in
democratic politics and have a presence in elections (Jonasson, 2004). From the point of view
of political democratization, a process that is only in its initial phase in the Muslim world, this
is gives rise to a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, banning Islamist parties from
participation in democratic politics would obviously be an undemocratic option, as it would
disenfranchise significant Muslim groups. Yet on the other hand, letting parties with
undemocratic objectives compete and win elections, some would argue, is democratic suicide,
as it will risk giving such parties opportunities to turn the democratic system upside down and
establish their preferred undemocratic political systems.
6At an empirical level, it is true that the emergence and growing popularity of Islamist
parties is a widespread phenomenon in many Muslim countries, ranging from North Africa, to
the Middle East, to Central Asia, to South Asia and Southeast Asia. Even the manner of their
emergence is quite uniform: they started from small but militant Islamic groups that emerged
amidst widespread public resentment toward the existing political systems. Their moralist and
religious images were in contrast to the rampant corruptions among existing regimes, and
their care for the needy was in antithesis to the prevalent selfish politicians. When the groups
entered into the political arena, they became popular almost immediately. However, this rapid
popularity triggered counter-reactions from the political and military establishment that led to
political crises and even violence.
The first and perhaps the most notorious case was the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS). Growing from the Islamic movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the FIS emerged as the
most well-organized political organization in 1980s Algerian politics. This period was also
marked by the rise of oil prices that severely affected the country’s economy, with
unemployment reportedly reaching forty percent of the total force work. The economic crises
triggered mass riots in major cities in early October 1988, which demanded that the
government resign. The authorities suppressed the mobs with counter-violence, causing the
deaths of hundreds of people. Yet, the demonstrations were able to force the government to
carry out political reforms. At the end of the year the government passed bills that allowed
citizens to organize opposition parties and provided a legal framework for economic
liberalization, and by early 1989 no les than eighteen political parties were founded, including
the FIS, which was established in February 1989. Led by two figures – Abasi Madani, an
elderly professor from the University of Algiers who displayed a moderate political stance,
and a fiery young preacher Ali Belhaj, who staunchly promoted strict and radical Islamist
political views – the FIS attracted a wide spectrum of support from Muslim communities,
,especially in urban areas, amid high levels of disappointment with the existing regime.
The government organized the first multi-party elections for district and provincial
legislatures in June 1990, and the FIS won 54 percent of votes and collected 46 percent of
district and 55 percent of provincial legislatures. The Incumbent party reaped only 32 percent.
The first Gulf War reportedly galvanized the FIS’s popularity. Shocked by its defeat, the
government started to engineer the incoming national legislative election, by redrawing the
electoral districts. Rejecting the government Gerrymandering strategy, the FIS called for a
nation-wide strike, driving hundred of thousands of people to the streets. In June it agreed to
put an end to the protests after the government agreed to guarantee a fair election. Yet, the
7compromise sparked a split among the FIS’s leaders, and the prolonged show of people’s
power alarmed the military, which then arrested Madani and Belhaj. The party’s leadership
was handed down to Abdul Kader Hachani, in preparation for the election. In the first round
of elections held in December 1990, the FIS garnered 48 percent of the total votes, and won
188 out of 231 seats in parliament. Unfortunately, the army could not accept the prospect of
Islamist rule and in January 1992 it cancelled the electoral process, forced the government to
resign and declared a state of emergency and martial law. In March the military government
dissolved and banned the FIS, and in June it sentenced Madani and Belhaj to 12 years in
prison (Shahin, 1997: 112-161).
A similar story took place in Turkey, when Islamist parties repeatedly gained
successes but were repeatedly suppressed by secularist politicians and the military. The
history of Islamist parties in Turkish politics had been centred on its prominent figure,
Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926). In 1970 the industrialist Erbakan and his associates founded
The National Order Party (Mili Nizam Partisi or MNP) which differentiated itself from other
existing parties by its religious orientation. However, this party disbanded following military
intervention in Turkish politics in 1971. In the next year Erbakan founded another Islamist
party, the National Salvation Party (Mili Selamat Partisi or MSP) with a similar moral-
religious tone. This party enjoyed considerable success as a minor party and won 11.80
percent of the national vote in the 1973 elections, thereby achieving the 10 percent Electoral
Threshold which allowed the party to have seats in parliament, which saw it breifly join the
coalition Government during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Binnaz Toprak, a respected Turkish
political analyst, wrote that the MSP’s success in the election told the people and politicians
that religion played a significant role in structuring voters’ behavior. Although officially an
Islamic party was prohibited by the constitution, most of its constituents voted for it because
they perceived it to be Islamic party. In fact, the party’s platform was not specifically
religious or Islamist, but rather framed the country’s political problems from a moral point of
view. Its platform envisaged that the party struggled for:

A political system that would eliminate squander, bribery, and corruption through the
screening of both the politicians and the public administrators on the basis of their
moral character in addition to objective testing and qualification; and a nation which
has a historical consciousness, unity, and faith in common national goals (Toprak,
1990: 99).

8This deceptively non-religious statement used a rhetoric that enabled the party to touch upon
voters’ religious sentiments. Firstly, by evaluating the political and administrative
shortcomings of the government in moral terms, it implied that the solution—i.e. the party’s
platform—was a religious one. Secondly, by making historical consciousness one of its
objectives, the party also implicitly pointed to Islam as the major uniting factor in the history
of the Turkish nation.
Civil unrest in 1980 lured the military to intervene in national politics, dissolving
political parties and banning their leaders. Another Islamist party was founded by Erbakan’s
followers in 1983 – the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) – and when, in 1987, the new
constitution restored the political rights of the banned parties’ leaders, Erbakan took over the
Welfare Party’s leadership as it prepared to compete in the elections. Initial results were
lukewarm result, with the Welfare Party winning only 6.7 percent of votes in the 1987
election. Yet it steadily increased its appeal in subsequent elections. In 1991, in a temporary
coalition with the right-wing nationalist party, WP eventually won 17 percent of votes and
entered into the parliament. Finally, in the 1994 parliamentary election it managed to collect
21 percent of votes, which eventually enabled Erbakan to lead a government in 1996,
becoming the first ever Islamist prime minister. Although it enjoyed strong support at the
municipal level, the Erbakan administration suffered from various controversies and bouts of
ineffectiveness, which were partly due to a corrupt coalition partner and the narrow space for
political maneuvers that it was allowed by the military. Erkaban’s foreign policy showed an
Islamic inclination, with serial visits to Libya and Iran and participation in the formation of an
economic block of Muslim countries (D-8), triggering criticism from other parties and the
military. At the end of 1997, with his coalition partner allegedly involved in corruption
scandal, Erbakan was forced to publically defend the fragile coalition, which negatively
affected his popularity. Furthermore, WP’s policy of expanding Islamic elements in
educational and bureaucratic institutions, and of promoting religious symbols in public, led
the military to warn that the Refah government was trying to establish Islamic law, while also
giving rise to resistance from the business community, which saw the populist budget as
favoring Islamic cultural entrepreneurship. In February the military issued demands to the
government: these included the elimination of Islamist influence and symphatizers from the
state system, restrictions on religious civil organizations, the closure of hundreds of religious
schools, and tight controls over religious mystical orders and religious dress. These demands
eventually led to the collapse of the government, and in June 1997, Erbakan resigned. In
January 1998 the authorities declared Refah to be a banned party ‘because of evidence
9confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic’. Erbakan, together with
five of his deputies, were banned for five years from political leadership (Mecham, 2004:
339-358).
A similarly gloomy story concerning an Islamist party can be found in Egypt, where
the centrist Hisbul Wasath (or Central Party) was denied its right to participate in elections.
This began in 1995 when the authoritarian government escalated its repression of Islamist
politicians, especially those which belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. In early 1980’s the
regime conducted democratic experiment of multiparty system. In the 1984 election, in
coalition with the nationalist Wafd Party, politicians from Brotherhood managed to garner 15
percent of votes and 13 of percent seats, and in 1987 in another coalition with the Liberal
Party and the Labor Party, the Brotherhood won 17 percent of votes and 13 percent of seats.
Anticipating unhappy prospects, the regime stopped its multiparty experiment. As could
easily be predicted, the votes for non-government parties declined drastically; their vote
dropped to only 14 percent, from 28 percent in 1984 and 30 percent in 1987. in response,
opposition parties tried to strengthen their base by signing a ‘civic compact’ in 1995, a join
commitment to promote inclusive democratic participation, freedom of belief and women’s
rights. Initially the Brotherhood was enthusiastic to join the coalition in the hope of improving
its electoral prospects, but finally it withdrew from signing the compact when the document
did not declare the Sharia to be the sole basis of law. In that year many of its credible young
leaders of the Brotherhood were also arrested and charged with conducting illegal political
activities.
This political situation—i.e. the Brotherhood’s reluctance to join a reforming coalition
on the one hand, and the escalating oppression from the regime on the other—had frustrated
many of its activists and members, especially among professionals. Together with other
reform-minded professionals and politicians these activists established the Hisbul Wasath in
late 1995. The name Wasath or center implies its two fundamental objectives: firstly, it
marked a moderate political movement that sought a middle way, an alternative to the
deadlock of antagonism between the regime and the opposition; and secondly, the name
alludes to a key and popular Qur’anic term—‘Thus have We made you a justly balance
(wasath) community. That ye might be witness over the nations’ (Qur’an, 2: 143)— thereby
giving it Islamic credentials. The project thus represented a new moderate politics waged by
new generation of Islamist democrats. It is interesting to note that 64 out of 72 of the party’s
founders were Brotherhood activists. Surprisingly, the Brotherhood’s leadership reacted
swiftly and furiously toward the indication of independence among its young activists, and
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