The impact of China's foreign policy think tanks
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The impact of China's foreign policy think tanks
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| Publié par | elysonev |
| Nombre de lectures | 34 |
| Langue | Français |
| Poids de l'ouvrage | 1 Mo |
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Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner The impact of China s foreign policy think tanks
Executive summary - Chinese international relations experts are crisscrossing the world and became prominent voices in academic and policy debates about international affairs. But we still know very little about the Chinese think tank world. By 2010, China had 428 think tanks, which placed it on a number two position behind the US. Given Chinas grow ing presence on the international scene, think tanks have indeed been consulted more frequently by administrations and senior leaders. Every important institution dealing with diplomacy can now rely on large think tanks for support . Some recent diplomatic concepts like peaceful development were conceived in consultations between the top-leadership and prominent advisors. Think tanks are becoming increasingly topic-specific and a division of labour seems to be developing among different institutes. The quality of research has increased gradually thanks to the experience abroad of many experts, growing competition between experts and more opportunities for open debate. Much of the interaction between think tankers and the policy makers is still built on a complex system of guanxi and seniority . Study trips abroad and consultation meetings with officials are rewarding activities for researchers who seek influence. The pishi system evaluates the quality and importance experts reports. Besides delivering expertise, think tanks are also expected to convey the governments viewpoint to audiences abroad. Experts have become an important part of Chinas public diplomacy . Chinese experts tend to be unimpressed with the expert dialogues with the European Union , which they find weak in terms of content and the impact on EU-China cooperation. Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner are associated fellows at BICCS.
The impact of Chinas foreign policy think tanks Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner
Abstract. This paper explains the increasing importance of think tanks in Chinas foreign policy. First it clarifies the historical transition of these think tanks and the governments motivations in setting up these institutes. The next section elaborates on the organization and capacity of these actors and their linkages with official bodies. This is followed by a discussion of the Policy Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lastly, this paper sheds a light on what kind of channels think tanks have developed to influence the Chinese leadership. Key words: foreign policy, think tanks and public diplomacy. 1. Introduction By any standard, China has become a pivotal player in international politics. But beyond the countless articles and reports on the economic and political rise of China, there have been few attempts to understand the intellectual revolution unfolding in parallel. Since the opening up of the country in the 1980s and the end of Maoism as a political model, China has rediscovered its intellectual tradition and is now buzzing with new ways of thinking. With expanding numbers of graduates, it is hardly surprising to see that bright, well-travelled and polyglot young analysts join the ranks of Chinese research institutes and think tanks, thereby bringing new blood and new working methods to their host institutions. 1 Few people inside and outside China have realized the extent to which informal diplomacy and think tanks permeate the Chinese diplomatic structures. The image of a mammoth monolithic state structure is increasingly further from the truth as Beijing tries to accommodate the mounting complexity of issues now faced by the country, and the tremendous speed with which this process is taking place. One director of a Chinese think tank foresees that we are only
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at the very beginning of this process as the concept of scientific development ( kexue fazhan ) put forward by Hu Jintao at the Seventeenth Party Congress gradually takes root in Chinese society. Already visible in the attention given to knowledge-intensive fields such as cyber security or industrial R&D, the reliance on scientists and policy experts is planned to increase during the forthcoming Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-15). 2 The respected figure of the scholar and by extension of the professor goes back to the Confucian times. Without dwelling on the specifics of Chinese culture, there is little denying that the importance of guanxi (personal connections) and mianzi (face) matter a great deal when it comes to the place and role of policy experts within Chinese society. Much of the interaction between think tankers and the rest of society is built on a complex system of personal guanxi , seniority privileges and favours. Taking part in study trips abroad or taking part in a consultation meeting with officials are among the most face-giving activities for researchers, who seek influence and recognition. While this observation also applies to some extent to many of their Western counterparts, there is a distinctive social component to the functioning of the Chinese policy community. A professor for instance confirmed that the recent high-level EU-China expert forum held in Beijing last November made waves among the Chinese experts in European affairs because many of them had not been invited to take part in the meeting with Wen Jiabao. 3 Western diplomats are constantly faced with the difficulty of dealing with the intricate subtleties of symbolism and face-giving mechanisms in Chinese diplomacy but this also applies to the policy community. The face aspect of Chinas foreign-policy decision-making process cannot be underestimated and should be kept in mind when broaching the issue. 4 There would be much to say about the development of think tanks in China, notably about those dealing with economic and financial issues. But this paper focuses specifically on the community of foreign policy think tanks that contributed to the spectacular transformation of Chinas diplomacy in recent years. What is most remarkable besides the economic and military power acquired by China is the fascination it exerts on the rest of the world. In 2006, half of the worlds leaders paid a visit to Beijing. 5 The
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Chinese capital has become a global diplomatic hub and it is therefore legitimate to try to discover what lies behind the Great Wall of political institutions in terms of ways of thinking and new ideas. In order to place this transformation into context, we first offer an historical overview of the development of international relations think tanks in China. Subsequently we present different attempts to establish a typology of Chinese think tanks. Thirdly we discuss the role and importance of the Policy Planning Department, the new think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fourthly, we provide some new insights into the different channels through which think tanks exert their influence nowadays. These last two parts are based on extensive interviews with Chinese and Western experts and diplomats. 2. A historical perspective on Chinese IR think tanks Think tanks ( zhiku or sixiangku ) have existed in China for along time. Some authors point out that expert groups and think groups were already around at the time of Confucius. The latter and his disciples indeed called themselves counsellors of the prince. 6 At the end of the nineteenth century study societies ( xuehui ) started to emerge as important gatherings of scholars under the patronage of high-ranking civil servants. Those xuehui fostered the rise of the modernist school of thought, the first constitutional movement and of training centers like the Chinese Institute of International Studies, created in 1897. 7 In the Mao Zedong era (1949-1979), research institutions created by the state and linked to relevant ministries were gradually set up. The Chinese Peoples Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), for example, was formed as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1949. In the field of international relations, one of the first attempts to set up a think tank goes back to 1956. In the context of the events in Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Chairman Mao ordered the establishment of the Institute of International Relations ( Guoji Guanxi Yanjiusuo ) under the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Closed during the Cultural Revolution, it was reopened in 1973 and later renamed the Chinese Institute for International Studies ( Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiu , CIIS). 8 George
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Washington Universitys David Shambaugh argued that, until then, this institute had had a minor role in the formulation of foreign policy. The influence of CICIR (see infra), created after CIIS, had historically been more important, notably during the Sino-American rapprochement under the Nixon administration. However, the influence of CICIR started to decline somewhat to the benefit of CIIS. The absorption in 1998 by CIIS of the China Centre for International Studies ( Zhongguo Guoji wenti yanjiu zhongxin , CCIS) did considerably strengthen it. Shambaugh places CIIS on par with the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) or the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo, the biggest Asian think tank. 9 In 2010, CIIS had about forty researchers and its leaders are among some of the most recognized scholars and former diplomats. This is for instance the case of its current president, Qu Xing, who was posted to the Embassy in Paris between 2006 and 2009. CIIS has eight departments: global strategy, information and prospective analysis, American studies, Asia-Pacific security & cooperation, EU studies, developing countries studies, Shanghai Cooperation Organization studies, world economy and development studies; as well as six specific research centres: EU, Middle East, South Pacific, energy security, border security, world economy and security. Its flagship journal Guoji wenti yanjiu , has been also published in English as China International Studies since 2005. CIIS ranked fifth of the ten most important think tanks in China according to the ranking published in August 2009 by Global Times. 10 In this official ranking, it also appears as the second most important foreign policy think tank (see infra) after the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). In the up-and-coming Global Think Tank Index published annually by the University of Pennyslvania, CIIS ranks fourteenth and behind CICIR for Asian think tanks. 11 After this first initiatives in the 1950s, the field of international relations think tanks in China started to expand with the establishment of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies ( Shanghai guoji wenti yanjiu yuan , SIIS) in 1960 by the then mayor of Shanghai, Jin Zhonghua. The Institute has since kept close links with the Shanghai municipality. David Shambaugh reported that the relations between SIIS and the MFA turned sour in the 1980s. But according to a SIIS expert, it seems that the current
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president Yang Jiemian, who also happens to be the younger brother of the Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, has strived to close the influence gap with Beijing-based institutes by producing sharper and punchier policy reports, apparently with success. 12 The quality of the institutes researchers and of the analyses it produces is recognized at the highest level both domestically and abroad. 13 Jiang Zemin often consulted the Institute during his tenure as Mayor and Party Secretary of Shanghai and then as Secretary-General of the CCP and PRC President. In 2010, SIIS employed eighty researchers, many of them recruited from Fudan University in Shanghai as well as from prestigious foreign universities. SIIS is organized into twelve research departments: American Studies, Asia-Pacific Studies, European Studies, Japanese Studies, Russia and Central Asia studies, South Asia studies, Taiwan/HK/Macao studies, World Economy studies, West Asia and Africa studies, International Law and International Organisations studies, Womens studies, Ethnic groups/religions/cultures studies. Among its many academic publications, one can mention the Global Review in English. In 2009, SIIS ranked last in the top-ten ranking of the PRCs most important think tanks. 14 In terms of foreign policy influence, it ranks fifth behind CASS, CIIS, CICIR and the CNCPEC (see infra). On the Global Think Tank Index, it ranks 34 th among the worlds fifty most important think tanks outside the US. 15 In the context of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s and the ensuing competition to woo developing countries, an Africa-Asia research institute ( Ya Fei Yanjiusuo ) was set up in 1961 at the behest of President Mao. It was linked to the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP ( Zhonggong zhongyan duiwai lianluo bu ) and split in 1964 into two parts: a research institute on West Asia and Africa ( Xi Ya Feizhou Yanjiusuo , IWAAS) and a research institute on Southeast Asia ( Dong Nan Ya Yanjiusuo ), both linked the ILD of the CCP and to the philosophy and social sciences department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences ( Zhongguo kexue yuan zhexue shehui kexuebu , CAS), a department based on the Soviet model. After the Cultural Revolution, the Institute on West Asia and Africa (IWAAS) resumed its work and was placed under the authority of the new Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1981. 16 Created in 1977,
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CASS is the direct successor of the philosophy and social sciences department of CAS. 17 It is worth mentioning that CASS is the administrative equivalent of a Ministry and is placed under the direct authority of the State Council ( Guowuyuan ). Again on Maos orders research institutes were created on Latin America ( Lading Meizhou Yanjiusuo , ILAS 18 ) and on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ( Sulian Dong Ou Yanjiusuo , today Eluosi Dong Ou Zhong Ya Yanjiusuo ). Both were integrated in CASS in 1981. On top of these new institutes, the MFA established a research institute on India in 1963 following the bilateral border war of 1962. In 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai instructed the establishment of several colleges and departments on international relations studies in the Beijing, Fudan, Renmin, (later in Qinghua, Nanjing and Nankai) universities as well as in the China Foreign Affairs university. 19 Some of these specialized research centres are now considered as think tanks and enjoy a considerable influence on the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. 20 This is especially true for those who exploit the presence of internationally acclaimed scholars such as Wang Jisi who heads the school of International Studies at Beijing University or Shen Dingli at the Centre of American Studies at Fudan University. Some local and less prestigious universities have also established specialized institutes, like the Southeast Asia Studies Institute at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou or the Taiwan Studies Institute set up at Xiamen University in 1980. 21 In 1965, the research division of the ILD of the CCP was elevated to the rank of institute and became the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations ( Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiusuo , CICIR). It was the only institute that continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution. It reports both to the Foreign Affairs Work Leading Small Group, the PRCs top foreign policy decision-making body and to the Ministry of State Security. In 1982, it was allowed to establish links with foreigners. Ever since, it has expanded its network of international contacts. In 2010, it counted 150 researchers. CICIR is composed of eleven institutes for Russia, America, Latin America, Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Western Asia and Africa, information and social development, security and disarmament, world politics and world economy. There are
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also research divisions on Central Asia and Korean Peninsula, as well as eight research centres on HK/Macao, Taiwan, Ethnic and religious issues, globalization, counter-terrorism studies, crisis management, security and maritime strategy. 22 Besides numerous publications in Chinese, the Institute publishes the English-language journal Contemporary International Relations ( Xiandai Guoji Guanxi ). CICIR was ranked sixth in the top-ten of the Global Times and third in terms of foreign policy influence, behind CASS and CIIS. James Mc Gann ranks it at the fifth rank of the most important think tanks in Asia in his Global Think Tank Index 23 . Rk Name Est. Location 1 *Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 1977 Beijing 2 Development Research Centre of the State Council (DRC) 1981 Beijing 3 Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 1949 Beijing 4 Chinese Academy of Military Sciences 1958 Beijing 5 *China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 1956 Beijing 6 *China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 1980 Beijing 7 *China National Committee for Pacific Economic 1986 Beijing Cooperation Council 8 China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) 1958 Beijing 9 China Institute for International Strategic Studies 1979 Beijing 10 *Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) 1960 Shanghai Table. Top tink tanks in China. Source : Zhang, Yuchen (August 10, 2009), Think tank scholar has more fresh ideas than old shoes, Global Times .. * Think tanks focus on the study of foreign policy Military decision-making think tanks A new wave of think tank creation coincided with the policy of opening-up of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. After the creation of CASS in 1977, several institutes specialized by region were: the Institute of American Studies, the Institute of Japan Studies and an Institute of Western European Studies. The Institute of Taiwan Studies, created in 1984, was placed directly under the authority of the Taiwanese Affairs Bureau at the State Council and under the Taiwan Leading Group of the Central Committee. It is reported to have played a key role in the preparation of the White Book
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on Taiwan in 2000. 24 In 1988, the research Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies was founded with six research centres: the Centre for APEC & East Asian Cooperation, the Centre for South Asian Studies, the Centre for Australian, New Zealand and South Pacific Studies, the Centre for Regional Security Studies, the Centre for East Asia Studies and the Centre for Southeast Asia Studies. The IAPS also oversees the work of two national research associations: the China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies and the China Association of South Asian Studies. Today, CASS counts 31 research institutes and 45 research centres, dealing with over three hundred topics. It employs over 3,200 researchers, which enables it to publish over hundred academic journals. CASS also has regional sections in provinces and municipalities directly controlled by the State Council. This mammoth of a think tank ranks first in the Global Times top-ten ranking, second in Asia behind the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and fifteenth 25 worldwide outside the US. Besides all these institutes linked to CASS, one should also mention the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation Council ( Zhongguo Taipingyang Jingji Hezuo Quanguo Weiyuanhui , CNCPEC) . This institution is in fact the Chinese national committee of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) tasked with promoting economic cooperation in the region. According to its statutes, members are selected from government officials, scholars and entrepreneurs based on their specific skills. Its president since 1994, Yang Chengxu, was Ambassador of China in Austria and director of the Policy Research Bureau of the MFA as well as president of CIIS between 1993 and 2002. The CNPEC shares its premises with that of CIIS. Global Times ranked the CNPEC seventh behind the other Beijing semi-governmental think tanks but ahead of the SIIS. 26 Despite the creation of all these institutions it seems that Deng Xiaoping seldom used the expertise of these diverse groups in foreign policy decision-making. Cheng Li reports that towards the end of his life, Deng preferred to rely on his daughters gossips rather than the opinion of policy experts. 27 This lack of interest from Deng did not necessarily mean a lack of influence of think tanks throughout the 1980s, especially when it came to economic issues. Four important research centres were set up at
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that time by the State Council: the Economic Research Centre (ERC), the Technical-Economic Research Centre (TERC), the Price Research Centre (PRC) and the Rural Development Research Centre (RDRC). These would later be integrated into the Development Research Centre, the most important think tank of the Peoples Republic after CASS. 28 Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and others have also surrounded themselves with intellectuals who were closely affiliated with government research centres or those within the CCP structures. In the wake of the 1989 turmoil, some think tanks were closed down and some of the leaders of those institutes had to find refuge abroad. But the existence of think tanks as such was not questioned and their expansion resumed from 1992 onwards. In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji often consulted think tank experts. Jiang Zemin for instance frequently sought the advice of Shanghai-based pundits at Fudan, the SIIS or the SASS. Some experts worked very closely with him in some specific sectors such as strategic planning, Taiwan affairs for example. Wang Huning, the former dean of the law faculty at Fudan became his personal advisor. The theory of the Three Represents, which characterized the Jiang era was reported one of Wangs ideas. As former head of the Central Party School, Hu Jintao himself has been seeking the advice of experts. Cheng Li cites the example of Wang Jisi or Zheng Bijian in the development of the peaceful development doctrine in the early 2000s. Since the turn of the 21 st century, think tanks have grown both in terms of numbers, their professionalism and internationalization. By In 2010, China had 428 think tanks, which would place the country in second position in number of think tanks behind the US, but ahead of the UK and India. A Chinese expert, Lili Wang, even reported that some Chinese academic studies counted up to one thousand think tanks existing throughout the country. Most of them are governmental and only five percent are considered independent. The latter are usually small structures, with maximum twenty staff and with an annual budget of around 450,000 USD. 29 New think tanks are becoming increasingly topic-specific, often with an economic, environmental or social focus. One should stress however that none of these recent additions to the Chinese think tank scene have yet made it into the ranking established by Global Times . In terms of foreign
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policy, the most prominent think tanks are those created before the Cultural Revolution and immediately after it. 3. Typologies of Chinese think tanks There is no standard definition of a think tank. A study by Stephen Boucher in 2004 formulated nine criteria that think tanks should fulfil: to be permanent organizations, to specialize in providing policy solutions, to possess a full-time research staff, to provide some original thinking and analyses, to aim at communicating its output to the government and to the public opinion (notably through their websites), not to be tasked with governmental missions, to strive for independence from private interests and to keep a liberty in their research agenda, not to have as main function to provide trainings nor grant degrees, and last but not least to aim at the public good through their work. The authors rightly stress that this classification should be used flexibly to fit to the reality on the ground. Most Chinese research institutes and think tanks that we have mentioned only partially fulfil this list of criteria. However, one should not conclude that Chinese think tanks are not real think tanks. Indeed, in spite of certain differences, which we will discuss later, many institutions are actually relatively close to their Western counterparts when we take a close look at the criteria listed above. In general they are permanent, policy-oriented structures with their own research staff who regularly publish and communicate the results of their studies to officials and to the public, albeit to a lesser extent than their Western counterparts. They all strive to achieve greater freedom of research and to contribute to the public good, although these orientations are of course bound by the red lines set by the government and by the need to respect the primacy of the CCP in their policy solutions. As to whether they represent private interests, it is hard to know for sure given the opacity surrounding the budgets and the functioning of most of these institutions. Finally, none or very few of these think tanks provide academic training or grant diplomas.
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Evidently, despite the similarities, Chinese think tanks, and especially those focussed on international relations for our purpose, are different from their Western counterparts but not to the extent where they would be denied the denomination of think tank. According to Liao Xuanli, it is difficult for researchers in IR think tanks to conduct real independent research on sensitive political topics, but they also have a certain margin of manoeuvre depending on the topic and the people involved. 30 The diversity of opinions within those think tanks is not comparable to what can be found in Western think tanks, where a wide array of political and social views among the staff is common. Another difference is their proximity to the government, which could give Chinese think tanks a bigger influence on decision makers than most of their Western and particularly European counterparts. Since completely private and specialized IR think tanks are virtually non-existent in China, there are just a few dozen dedicated IR institutions, many of them functioning in area studies. Chinese leaders have thus little choice of whom to consult but also little incentive to seek experts outside their traditional institutions of reference. 31 The influence of think tanks on the decision-making process in terms of foreign policy is to a large part dependent on the place their leaders and key people occupy on the political landscape. Liao reports that the competition between IR institutes is very limited because they all have their niches but we will see a bit later that this is increasingly less true as the IR community expands rapidly. Unlike Western IR think tanks that influence the policy process through informal lobbying and policy recommendations, their Chinese counterparts use two main channels to influence decision-makers. On the one hand they convey their views via the formal bureaucratic channel: each government think tank has its own channel to submit internal research reports to leaders via personal assistants or through the Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee. On the other hand, there are informal contacts and personal guanxi . According to Liao, this very flexible mode of influence allows think tankers to circumvent the bureaucratic channels. Think tank directors or some prestigious researchers can have personal and direct relations with the highest state leaders. Informality is thus a
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significant factor, which affects the efficiency of a think tank but makes it very difficult for an outside observer to measure and weigh the position of a particular foreign policy institute among its peers. Finally, in terms of funding, Chinese think tanks have understandably less leeway than their Western peers. Until recently, all think tanks were wholly funded by the government and this is still the case for the overwhelming majority of IR 32 think tanks. To get a clearer picture of the heterogeneous world of Chinese think tanks, some authors have tried to set up a typology to classify them. Liao Xuanli sees three categories: government think tanks, specialized academic think tanks and think tanks affiliated with universities. Her first category of government think tanks are those linked to the State Council or to the different departments and ministries of the government. Some of the think tanks in this category are among the most prominent in the field, like CICIR or CIIS. These research institutes are subordinated and exclusively funded by the central government and their researchers have the same wages and ranks as average civil servants, but they have no administrative power. Their main mission is to provide expertise to high-level decision-makers. Those think tanks diverge from the Western pattern in that they are non-private organizations but they also break from the canon of Chinese tradition where advisors were government officials. According to Liao Xuanli, government think tanks enjoy considerable privileges over their colleagues in the two other categories. Their osition in the hierarchical structure allows In the 1990s, the IR tphem to consult more confidential materials. institutes under the aegis of Being close to the centre of decision, they CASS have gradually seen their influence grow. also have more channels through which they can circulate their policy recommendations up to ministerial level and higher. The semi-official status of researchers in these institutes often allows them to present the official Chinese position in international conferences for instance. For all these reasons, Liao Xuanli stresses that governmental think tanks remain the most influential institutions on the Chinese think tank scene.
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The second category is composed of specialized academic think tanks, mainly the numerous IR institutes placed under the supervision of CASS. Placed under the authority of the State Council, CASS is academic and not fully focussed on policy research per se . Unlike their peers in government think tanks, CASS researchers only occasionally engage in research with immediate policy implications. Due to the academic nature of their research, these institutes exert less influence. Their more theoretical and long-term research is less immediately applicable for decision-makers who very often have little time to devote to reading. In terms of access to information, CASS institutes are somewhat outside the government channels where sensitive and classified information is circulated, which evidently curtails their research capabilities. Even though they benefit from regular access to high-level policy-makers through the official bureaucratic channels, CASS researchers themselves admit to a low level of actual interaction with government officials. 33 Liao Xuanli notes nonetheless that thanks to the development of a regular consultation process on foreign policy in the 1990s, the IR institutes under the aegis of CASS have gradually seen their influence grow, notably because they were able to put forward their links with foreign research institutes, which enhanced their credibility. The latter indeed serve as bridges between the Chinese government and diplomatic missions in Beijing, especially in times of crisis. The third category, university-affiliated think tanks, are the least influential due to their marginal geographical situation away from the decision making centres and because of the academic nature of their research. Liao nuances this vision and remarks that some think tanks in the third category have more influence than others due to their special bureaucratic ties, such as the academic think tanks linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much like their CASS counterparts, their impact on policy decisions has become gradually more important. This state of affairs is largely due to the fact that they have been able to tap the expertise of their increasingly wide network of foreign partners to strengthen their position within the Chinese system. As we have seen, the increasing complexity of international issues compels Chinese leaders to seek insights and expertise from an ever-wider array of sources, including foreign experts. As we will
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see below, some of the researchers in these university-affiliated think tanks have found a specific niche in which their expertise is widely recognized, even at the highest level and who therefore benefit from a privileged access to decision-makers. Another, more recent, typology was developed by two Chinese researchers, Zhu Xufeng and Xue Lan. These include semi-official public institutes and civilian think tanks, i.e research institutes linked to companies, universities or those non-profit foundations. 34 Semi-official think tanks include the most important elements of the research and policy consultation system outside governmental structures. They are not completely independent from the government, but are managed in more autonomous ways than the official research institutes. Their leaders are nominated by the government and they are financed by public funds due to their regular research duties for government administrations. They also enjoy more freedom insofar as they are allowed to accept research projects with foreign partners and even funds from foreign government institutions or international organizations. These institutes mainly appeared in the late 1970s. Zhu and Xue give the example of the China Centre for Information Industry Development (CCID) set up by the Ministry of Information in 2000 and the China Development Institute (CDI) as a think tank aimed at providing research and policy advice. It received the approval of the State Council and has been engaged in economic policy research for all levels of the government as well as for some companies. It maintains links with the CCP especially through the members of its board. Because of its close ties with government structures and party members, this think tank is a hybrid of the two categories of semi-official think tanks and civilian think tanks. 35 The second category is made up of civilian think tanks. According to Zhu and Xue, their overall relation with the government is les intensive. Civilian think tanks receive funding from different of sources, mainly companies or foreign foundations. These think tanks are often modest in size, but they are able to attract renowned academic figures that often do not hesitate to criticize the governments economic policy. China now also counts wholly private think tanks, mainly created at the initiative of economists, entrepreneurs or social activists and funded by
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companies or private foundations. Their focus is mainly on economics or environment. That is for example the case of the private non-profit Unirule Institute of Economics ( Tianze Jingji Yanjiusuo ) founded in July 1993 by five economists. It receives no financial help whatsoever from the Chinese government and depends on private donations and ad hoc subsidies for projects carried out on behalf of Chinese or foreign institutions, especially research projects or training schemes. It organizes regular seminars, annual conferences and publishes no less than seven magazines. In the field of environment, we can cite the example of Friends of the Nature ( Ziran Zhiyou ) founded in 1994. It is the oldest environmental NGO in China and it has done an important task of raising environmental awareness in Beijing but also throughout China. It deals with issues such as recycling, energy efficiency and it has carried out a successful lobbying with governmental officials to pass legislation banning the poaching of endangered species. Its most recent efforts are aimed at fostering training on environmental issues and at creating a domestic network of environmental NGOs. According to Cheng Li, those private think tanks have remained till now marginal in terms of actual policy influence or impact on the public opinion. 36 While a trend towards more independent think tanks in politically less sensitive areas like economics or environment might be observed, this has not been the case of foreign policy think tanks. One pioneer in this regard is the little-known China Think Tank ( Zhongguo zhiku ), established in 2006. It is among the three or four IR think tanks in China with very little control from the government, but a considerable level of influence. It gathers around two hundred high-level experts who contribute voluntarily to the research of the platform, mostly on security, defence and strategic issues since about half of its contributors have military experience. It is funded partly from ad hoc government subsidies for specific projects but by hosting seminars and training sessions for large Chinese companies. The key to independence is, from the point of view of one of its leaders, the ability to provide expert policy support for the government while maintaining a benevolent critical distance from the latter. 37
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4. The Policy Planning Department Chinas two top decision-making bodies on foreign policy issues are placed under the State Council itself, these are: the Foreign Affairs Work Small Leading Group ( Waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu ) and the National Security Work Leading Small Group ( Guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu ) created in 2000. Although both are chaired by Hu Jintao, the work is actually coordinated by Dai Bingguo who heads the secretariat of both bodies. Some scholars and experts interviewed for this article have underlined the lack of a national security concept in China and the absence of a national security council. As it is common in China, non-Party structures have less power than Party organs and it is therefore widely recognized that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only decides on second and third-rank matters. 38 Neither does it come as a surprise that all four previous foreign ministers were career diplomats and that they have been carefully following the party line. The irony of the situation is that top decision-makers in foreign policy matters now find the MFA too conservative and try to tap other resources to carry out efficient policymaking. 39 Dai Bingguo and his staff rely thus considerably on the system of senior consultations with experts and think tanks. The problem of this approach is that the Small Leading Groups are no permanent bodies. They deal with issues on an ad hoc basis and most often in emergency situations. This imbalance in foreign policy-making structures might have prompted decision-makers to raise the profile of the Policy Planning Department (PPD) of the MFA, a recent upgrade that has not gone unnoticed in Chinese policy circles. One of the main features of PPD staff is that they report to party structures and not only to geographical divisions within the MFA, which substantially increases their level of access to decision makers. The PPD is tasked with supporting the work of the Minister with reports and briefing papers but, more importantly, it also provides direct input to top leadership and prepares their speeches and visits. 40 Interestingly, the head of the PPD, Le Yucheng, was present at the last EU-China summit in Nanjing. 41 According to one PPD official, the work of the Office has also become more influential since it reoriented the focus
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of its work to take domestic expectations into concern for addressing international issues. 42 The rise in importance of the PPD is epitomized in the recent change of name of this body from Policy Research Department ( zhengce yanjiu si ) to Policy Planning Department ( zhengce guihua si ), with emphasis on its role in planning. 43 In recognition of the work carried out by Ma Chaoxu between 2006 and 2009 to raise the profile of the PPD, the latter was promoted last year to take the head of the highly strategic Information Department. 44 Whereas a traditional diplomatic career to the higher echelons of the MFA usually involved a stint at the North American Affairs department or in crisis management there are signs that public diplomacy and analytical positions at the Ministry might be the new way up. This would logically reflect the stress recently put by Chinese leaders on scientific development and, more importantly, on the need to beef up Chinas public diplomacy in order to polish its image of responsible stakeholder on the world stage. 45 Policy planning departments at most Ministries of Foreign Affairs are often regarded as the official foreign policy think tanks of the government and their added value compared to the political analyses delivered by geographical departments is to provide top officials with perspectives on future developments. Given the semi-governmental nature of the policy institutes in China, the PPD is still the natural interlocutor for think tanks. The level of interaction between the PPD and think tanks appears to be increasing even though the latter seem to prefer dealing directly with geographical divisions at the MFA. It can also be noted that a program of regular consultations between PPD officials and experts has been expanded over the past few years to include most think tanks, even those not located in Beijing, like the SIIS. 46 5. Channels of influence Most Chinese government think tanks enjoy a privileged channel of influence to the high leadership through one or more of their key figures. Ma Zhengang from CIIS, Zhou Hong from CASS or Yang Jiemian from the
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SIIS are reported to have been invited on a regular basis by state counsellor Dai Bingguo for senior consultations, either with other selected policy experts and officials, or at meetings of small leading groups. 47 Besides this direct personal influence at the higher echelons, the influence of think tank experts in the policy process is closely linked with their output in times of tensions and crises. This is especially reflected in the evaluation system ( pishi ) where senior officials and leaders rate the interest and importance of a given report sent by the lower echelons. Since the reports and their accompanying pishi are circulated among concerned ministries and agencies somewhat similar to diplomatic telegrams in the West a good high-level pishi is an essential element for the career of a policy expert since it influences their reputation among peers and officials in their policy field. 48 Unlike in the United States, there is no revolving door phenomenon between think tanks and officials. But there is still some level of interaction, which is facilitated by the semi-governmental nature of Chinese institutions. Many think tank directors are former ambassadors and most researchers at CICIR and CIIS have occupied diplomatic positions. According to one CIIS official, these postings are known as jie diao, meaning itnhat exbpaesrstise sl enwt hteor te het hMeyF Aw iblly tnhiont kc toanndkus ctw otrhke On top of their y peicmal tasks of diplomats but rather advise the advisory tasks, scholars-t diplomats act as soft-Ambassador on policy matters. At these two power buffers and think tanks closest to the government, CIIS for convey the Chinese the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CICIR for the views in a different way Ministry of State Security, a sizeable proportion to local audiences. of the research staff has been posted in a diplomatic missions at some point of their career. 49 It is increasingly rare that experts from outside the governmental structures enjoy this privilege. People from CASS for instance could traditionally not serve abroad but it appears that the Chinese government has recently reconsidered its approach towards the jie diao system and decided to extend the diplomatic field beyond the traditional sources of recruitment. The most important example of this new approach can be seen in the experiment to post two Fudan University Professors to the Chinese mission to the EU 50 On top of .
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the advisory tasks, these scholars-diplomats act as soft-power buffers and convey the Chinese views in a different way to local audiences. The bulk of their work involved participation in think tank seminars, informal dialogues with institutions and preparing the Ambassadors public interventions. 51 We can certainly expect the Chinese government to build on the large pool of IR experts in China over five thousand according to a Fudan professor to keep on diversifying the staff of its diplomatic missions abroad. 52 At the moment, these jie diao diplomats can be personally handpicked by the Ambassador or selected through formal applications. Considering the close relations between Chinese think tanks and the government, there is an overall dissatisfaction among think tankers about the level of interaction with officials. Besides the top-level senior consultations between think tank directors and Chinese leaders, it seems that it is indeed more often a one-way process. Government officials often come in delegations to be briefed by think tank experts. 53 It seems on the other hand that the government expects more and more from think tanks and tries to tap as much into their expertise as possible, following the millennia-old Chinese method of gathering The interaction between Chinese think tanks and the myriad bits of information about the situation media is becoming more tion stcarnecaet,e thaant aollv etrhailnl k ptiacntukrs e.w eItr e atpaspkeeards , wfitohr intensive and analyses published in the media are filing a report to the State Council directly prior now more nuanced. to President Obamas state visit last November, each think tank trying to catch the good graces of the leaders by advising the right approach or foreseeing future developments. Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei reportedly debriefed scholars at CIIS after President Obamas visit, but this seemed to be a rather infrequent event. Because officials are too busy, complains one CIIS scholar. An expert on European affairs latter reported that she had to insist to get feedback from officials after the EU-China summit. 54 This is bound to change gradually as the Chinese government seems increasingly likely to take think tanks into consideration in the policy-making process. The scientific development concept launched in by Hu Jintao at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 is making its way through
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all layers of Chinese government. As early as 2002, Western analysts underlined that a more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policy-making process increased the opportunities for research institutes to affect foreign policy. 55 Second, however technocratic the different Ministries have become, there is still a serious lack of government capacity on some of the more important and complex foreign policy issues. For instance, a large part of the Chinese official delegation to the December 2009 Copenhagen climate summit was made up of think tank experts. 56 While other national delegations had some non-government experts in their team the fact that the Chinese had more than any other is telling. While not entirely rid of the shackles of official propaganda, the interaction between Chinese think tanks and the media is becoming more intensive and analyses published in the media are now more nuanced than they have ever been in the history of the Peoples Republic. According to a Western diplomat, there has been a breakthrough last year in the treatment of foreign policy issues in the media and in the place given to think tankers opinions 57 The coverage of the North Korean nuclear test in May 2009 was . more frank than ever and outspoken experts of the Korean peninsula such as Shi Yinhong from Renmin University were allowed to launch a debate on whether to change official policy towards Pyongyang. Coverage on the upcoming review process of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has also been more open. Foreign policy commentators in the media are now seen as the third power in Chinese foreign policy after government think tanks and universities. This is made possible by the fact that the Chinese public is now more educated and more interested in external relations thanks to the Internet where the debate is rich and often rife on hot foreign policy topics ranging from Sarkozy-bashing to Obama-mania or military involvement in the Gulf of Aden. While this is not the topic of this article, there is little denying that the Internet and the countless foreign policy blogs and forums are a vibrant and fast emerging non-state actor in the foreign policy process in China 58 . Contradictory debates in the media are still rare, even though think tank experts are more often called in to provide intellectual backing to
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