Audit of Police Oversight Bodies in the East African Region

Julie Berg

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• Publié par: Shuwyor
• Nombre de lectures: 93
• Langue: English

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AUDIT OF POLICE OVERSIGHT IN THE EAST AFRICAN REGION Julie Berg Institute of Criminology University of Cape Town June 2005 Prepared for the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF)  

                                Funded by: Open Society Foundation (OSF) Open Society Justice Initiative (OSI)

CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 BURUNDI .......................................................................................................................... 3 DJIBOUTI........................................................................................................................... 6 ERITREA............................................................................................................................ 8 ETHIOPIA ........................................................................................................................ 10 KENYA............................................................................................................................. 12 MADAGASCAR .............................................................................................................. 15 MAURITIUS .................................................................................................................... 17 RWANDA......................................................................................................................... 19 SEYCHELLES ................................................................................................................. 22 SOMALIA ........................................................................................................................ 24 SUDAN............................................................................................................................. 25 TANZANIA ...................................................................................................................... 27 UGANDA ......................................................................................................................... 30 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................... 345 CONTACT DETAILS OF HUMAN RIGHTS / OVERSIGHT AGENCIES.................. 37 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 49

INTRODUCTION This report is based on a desktop audit of oversight mechanisms in a number of Eastern African countries including Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. A review of each country is made in order to document the oversight mechanisms that have been created and the oversight practices and policies that have been adopted in these countries. Therefore, what is included is a range of mechanisms that have some oversight powers over the police – including for instance, traditional bodies of oversight such as human rights commissions, police complaints bodies and the ombudsman as well as bodies which have broader duties but which may entail overseeing the police such as international human rights organisations and the media. Also, included in the audit, is the national legislation which has been adopted to ensure the upliftment of human rights and freedoms, as well as the restrictions in place to prevent abuse of police powers and use of force. Any policies or reform attempts or agreements which have impacted on police accountability are also included. No discussion on policing is complete without some form of contextualisation therefore each country will include a brief country background (that is political history) and brief remark on the structure of the state police operating in that country.   From this audit a number of common problems have been identified in terms of oversight over the police. Of the countries where legislation was available (directly or indirectly through a secondary source), it was found that, at times, statutes were outdated and / or had gaps in terms of making provision for police complaints bodies. There also seemed to be a delay or complete lack of implementation of provisions in the constitution especially in terms of oversight bodies. Where oversight bodies had been created very often their powers are limited in that they can only provide recommendations to the government or offending party and may rely on the body being investigated to assist in their investigations. Even those which seem to be empowered to investigate independently and thoroughly may often be restricted in other ways such as not being able to investigate certain incidences, people or institutions. Many countries do not seem to making use of Parliament as an effective oversight tool, since, although annual reports of various oversight bodies are submitted to Parliament it is not always the case that action will be taken by Parliament to deal with incidences of police abuse of power, corruption and human rights violations. Some countries have many more non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups engaged with holding the police accountable than others. However, admittedly some countries with a number of civil society groups still had many incidences of police torture and abuse of power. It therefore depends on the strength and nature of activities of these groups whether they will have any marked impact on police accountability strategies in the country. The police in many countries seem to be used as political tools for those in power and therefore may be used to quell certain ethnic groups, harass critical media outlets or individual journalists, and / or limit the functioning of any groups seen as contrary to the government in power (in some countries this may also include local and international human rights organisations). Even in countries where police are generally respectful of democratic principles against torture, a general problem that persists in many of the countries is corruption within the police. Where key offenders have been identified by

 

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oversight bodies or human rights organisations prosecutions may not take place due to various reasons, such as lack of resources or corruption within the judiciary. It was similarly found that where police complaints mechanisms exist they are usually internal mechanisms, therefore not necessarily ensuring that complaints are dealt with objectively. In general then, there are a number of issues, of which these are only a few, hampering effective police oversight in East Africa, and for that matter in much of Africa. As Nigerian sociologist Alemika puts it:   “African police forces are in dire need of reform to enable them [to] become effective instrument[s] of security, safety, justice and human rights.” 1   Yet, notwithstanding these problems and even though attempts have been made to ensure that the information is up-to-date, reform developments are taking place rapidly in many of these countries. It must be noted in light of this critique, that many have recently experienced war or conflict, are in transitional phases of development and therefore have only recently focussed attention on the issue of police oversight. Consequently, the various governmental structures responsible for oversight may still be in a state of disarray or not yet operational due to lack of political will, lack of resources and so forth. Many countries are also experiencing the continual threat of genocide, rebel conflicts and war within their borders and / or with neighbouring countries. 2  factors must be These taken into account when evaluating the state of police oversight in these countries.   Methodology Due to the dearth of information on many of these countries, the paper suffers from an over-reliance on limited sources of information. For instance, the police legislation for the majority of these countries was not available despite attempts to retrieve them for the purposes of evaluation. The author engaged in extensive Internet searches for electronic sources of information. In light of this over-reliance on the Internet much of the information may have been omitted simply due to many countries not using the Internet as a tool for the dissemination of information. Also due to the fact that many international human rights organisations and institutions do have a clear presence on the Internet much information was extracted from these sites – such as Amnesty International, the US Department of State and the like. Their interpretation of events in the Eastern African region may not be objective and certain situations or contexts may be misinterpreted by them. Therefore because of reliance on their observations this paper may itself suffer from lack of objectivity in terms of describing events and practices in the countries. The paper would have been best informed by the inhabitants of the countries themselves rather than by accounts most likely skewed by First World contexts. Even though a surprising amount of material was found from a regional context, for instance from the Institute of Security Studies, the government websites of many of these countries and a few academic authors writing from within the context of the region, there remains a large amount of unknown information as an analysis of a piece of legislation,                                                   1  delivered at the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum PaperAlemika, E. (2004) Police Reform and Oversight. (APCOF) Steering Committee Meeting onPolice Reform and Oversightin Africa, 4-5 November, p. 2. 2 The desire to convert East Africa into a single federal structure by January 2010 will also impact greatly on police oversight as the type of government in place – democratic or authoritarian for instance – will determine the way in  which the police is held accountable. (Africa Research Bulletin (2005) ‘East African Federation: Political Battles Ahead’,Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, 42(1):16055-94.)

 

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for instance, does not reveal the manner in which the legislation is interpreted and applied.   BURUNDI Country Background Burundi has been in a state of conflict since 1972. Numerous human rights abuses have been, and are, still taking place in this country and numerous citizens have been displaced by fighting. 3 2001 saw the inauguration of a new transitional government, November under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, following years of conflict after the overthrow of the democratic government in 1993. 4  However, the Arusha Agreement was not signed by the two main rebel opposition groups – the FDD (Forces for the Defence of Democracy) and the FNL (National Liberation Front). 5  In October 2003 an agreement with the “largest rebel faction”– the FDD – was made in that the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing was signed. This included the signing of a forces technical agreement (FTA) between the transitional government and the FDD and also culminated in the creation of a provisional Constitution in October 2004 (resulting in an improvement of the security situation). 6  The transitional government will remain in power until a referendum on a new Constitution is held. 7  At the time of writing this referendum had not taken place. The new Constitution, however, does contain provisions, which if accepted and applied, will contribute to the development of a human rights culture as it includes articles stipulating that persons have the right to life and have the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 8 further article of the Constitution makes provision for the A training of security and defence personnel in international humanitarian law and the Constitution. 9      Burundi Police The Burundi police force falls under the Ministry of Community Development and Regional Administration. In terms of the forces technical agreement in October 2003, the police are subject to “the laws and regulations of the country”; “at the disposal of the government, subordinate to its authority and accountable before the law”; they must be “non-partisan”; and are “under the supervision of the competent civil authorities” as well as “under the direct command and control of the Director General of Police” 1 . 0  Due to                                                   3 Institute for Security Studies (2005)Burundi: Security Situation.   http://www.iss.org.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/SecInfo.html    [18/03/2005]   4 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2005)Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi. U.S. Department of State. 5 Op Cit n(3)   6 Op Cit n(4) http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/by.html[18/03/2005] Institute for Security Studies (2003) ‘Africa Watch: Security Brief,’African Security Review, 12(4):37-38.   7 Op Cit n(4) 8 Amnesty International (2005) ‘Rights Provisions in New Constitution aBurundi: Government Should Make Human Reality’Public Statement:AI Index: AFR 16/003/2005, 1 March. 9 Ibid 10 Sections 3.3 and 3.4, Forces Technical Agreement (FTA) Between the Transitional Government of the Republic of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy –Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD – FDD), 2003. http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/fta.pdf   [18/03/2005]  

 

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the United Nations Security Council adopting a resolution in mid-2004 calling for the deployment of a UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) the police force has, as part of ONUB’s mandate, been subject to training and monitoring so as to ensure that they are democratic and respectful of human rights and freedoms. 11   Oversight Mechanisms The Arusha Agreement makes provision for an Ombudsman, whose responsibilities include investigating complaints “submitted to it by citizens of violations of their rights by agents of the state” 1 . 2  The Ombudsman may make recommendations on findings and is required to submit an annual report to the National Assembly and for public perusal. 13    Despite these provisions it is not clear whether the Office of the Ombudsman is currently in operation and if so, whether the duties are being performed efficiently and effectively in terms of, in particular, holding the police accountable (through for instance responding to citizen complaints of police mistreatment, abuse and so forth).   Burundi has an Auditor General (Inspection Generale des Finances) who is elected by the Head of State (that is, not by parliament or provided for under the Constitution) and whose jurisdiction covers a number of areas including, for instance, “audit[s] of receipt of Government”, including publicagencies providing a public service. In terms of power the Auditor General does have powers of search and seizure but these and other powers are offset by for instance not having the power to “take punitive action and / or impose surcharges”. However, in theory it seems to be the case that the Auditor General is equipped to monitor the financial accountability of government departments including the police force. 14   Burundi also has an Attorney General and according to a report by the Danish Immigration Service in 1999 “unlawful arrests and lengthy periods of unlawful detention” have decreased since the appointment of the Attorney General, despite limited resources and low capacity. 15  The report considers the Attorney General “to be sound and trustworthy” and despiteit being “an uphill struggle getting him appointed” it is noteworthy that a Hutu was appointed to this post in the face of a Tutsi dominated system and considering the country’s perpetual problem with ethnic conflict. 16       In terms of newspaper reports reference has also been made to the Burundi Parliament’s human rights commission / committee which has investigated deaths (of civilians) related to armed conflict in 2000 and 2002, through amongst other things visiting the site under investigation. In one instance this commission (or committee) was set into action through the recommendation of a senior parliamentarian calling for an official inquiry. Therefore                                                      11 Boshoff, H. (2004) ‘The United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB): Overview’African Security Review, 13(3). 12 Amnesty International (2001)Burundi: An Opportunity to Confront Torture and Impunity: Memorandum to the Transitional Government of Burundi and to the International Community Index: AFR 16/043/2001, 1 December. AI 2001.   3 1 Ibid 14 Information obtained from:http://www.intosaiitaudit.org/mandates/writeups/burandi.htm[26/5/2005] See this site for information on the power and limitations of Burundi’s auditor general. 15 The Danish Immigration Service (1999)Report on the Roving Attaché Mission to Bujumbura, Burundi   22 April to 4 May 1999. Copenhagen: Danish Immigration Service.   16 Ibid

 

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it is unclear whether this mechanism serves an ad hoc function and also whether it would investigate routine instances of police misconduct. However, the fact that it has investigated the conduct of the military implies that its activities may extend to other security forces. 17      Other mechanisms geared towards promoting transparency and accountability include the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC) established in December 2004 and the Ministry of Good Governance. The former is responsible for investigating crimes since Burundi’s independence in 1962 and the latter was created to fight corruption.   Other accountability mechanisms in place (created by the transitional Constitution and other laws) which may directly and indirectly hold the police accountable include Burundi’s Supreme and Constitutional Courts and its criminal code which prevents arbitrary arrest and detenti 18 The media, NGOs and human rights groups (such as on. Burundi’s League Iteka and APRODH - L’Association Burundaise pour la protection des droits humais or Burundian association for the protection of human rights and detainees), international humanitarian organisations and relief workers all have a role to play in ensuring democratic accountability of the police force. 19       The Transitional Government itself can be regarded as an oversight mechanism, particularly in light of comments made by the Minister of Institutional Reforms, Human Rights and Relations with the Parliament of Burundi in a submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2002. The Minister: “…underlined that the objective of the Tr ansitional Government was to establish a true state of law and promote and raise awareness among the population of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this regard, the Transitional Constitution accorded primary importance to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognizing that every person was sacred and inviolable. It also stipulated that every person had the right to life, security, physical integrity, development, fulfilment, education, culture and ownership. The Government was also committed to the fight against impunity and to increasing the representation of women throughout the national structure.” 20    However, despite the existence of these oversight policies, mechanisms and good intentions, the reality of the situation is that human rights abuses continue. Despite the transitional Constitution there are many gaps in the legislation. For instance there is no                                                   17 SAPA - ANC Daily News Briefing (2002) Burundi Unrest, Bujumbura, 20 September http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/2002/news0923.txt[26/5/2005] Amnesty International (2000) ‘Burundi: Further information on Fear of ill-treatment and new concern: Fear of “Disappearance”’ AFR 16/12/00 See newspaper headlines from the Global News Monitor for September 2002 http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/news-monitor/2002sept.htm [26/5/2005]   18 Op Cit n(4) http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/by.html[Last accessed 18 March 2005] 19 Op Cit n(4) 20 United Nations Press Release (2002) ‘High-Level Government Officials of Bulgaria and Burundi Speak before Commission on Human Rights, 58 th Session, 28 March 2002. http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/21B795D3A841B19AC1256B8F00350A0D?opendocument[26/5/2005]  

 

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legislation in place promoting access to government information and provisions enabling the media to invoke the right to publicise information on national defence, state security and secret judicial inquiries. Contrary to the stipulations of the forces technical agreement, the transitional Constitution and the criminal code, there is no effective control of the security forces by civilian authorities. Security forces (including the police) continue to commit human rights violations through the arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals (despite laws specifying the need for a warrant); the holding of detainees for long periods of time without charge, often incommunicado; the torturing and general mistreatment of detainees and, the lack of co-operation with prosecutors and magistrates. The court system, rather than being an avenue for the exposure of human rights violations has been unable to guarantee due process and fairness. This is especially due to the general lack of co-operation of security forces in keeping to legal stipulations, the prevalence of widespread corruption and lack of independence from the executive (through domination by a certain ethnic community). 21       The media, in many other countries, is used as a means to expose human rights violations, and Burundi’s transitional Constitution ensures freedom of speech and of the press. Yet, at times, the transitional government restricted these freedoms. This took place through the suspension of operations of an Internet news group and the issuing of warnings to other media groups as well as the restriction of movement into rural areas where many criminal activities were taking place. This effectively limited media coverage. The transitional government also owns much of the major media, such as the daily newspaper, Burundi’s only television station and two radio stations. 22   “Impunity for those who committed serious human rights violations, and the continuing lack of accountability for those who committed past abuses, remained key factors in the country's continuing instability.” 23   Lack of stability in particular parts of the country has resulted in the deaths of a large number of civilians. And although the transitional government has in general allowed the unrestricted operation of international and local human rights groups and NGOs, and provided them with limited information and resources, at times, these organisations were prevented from observing conditions in some parts of the country considered to be unstable. Recommendations made by local NGOs, such as the human rights group League Iteka, are often not carried out by the transitional government despite active advocacy and lobbying. 24       DJIBOUTI Country background Despite various destabilising incidences taking place in Djibouti since its independence in 1977, such as Gulf War activities inciting “Islamic passions”, and conflict between factions, currently its government has been described as “relatively stable” after an attempted police coup failed in 2000. 25  faction Also, in 2000, the ‘New FRUD (the ’                                                   21 Op Cit n(4) 22 Ibid 23 Ibid 24 Ibid 25 Institute for Security StudiesDjibouti Fact File: Security Information   http://www.iss.org.za/AF/profiles/Congo/Djibouti/djibouti1.html#sec_info_Anchor[2/6/2005]  

 

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original Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – FRUD – had experienceda schism in 1994) and the government signed a peace accord in 2000 bringing a relative end to faction fighting. 26  Currently, based on 2002 elections, the People’s Rally for Progress (RPP) is the ruling party coalition in Djibouti. 27   Djibouti Police Djibouti has a National Police Force.   Oversight Mechanisms A referendum in Djibouti in September 1992 resulted in the approval of a multiparty Constitution. The Constitution outlines the human rights and freedoms that should be protected by the state such as equality before the law, the right to life, freedom, safety and integrity and the right to just treatment before the law 28 , as well as the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 29  Article 16 of the Constitution contains the provision that no one should be subjected to torture, maltreatment, inhuman, cruel, degrading or humiliating treatment. It further stipulates that individuals, government officials and / or any public authority guilty of such acts either through his / her own volition or through instruction from a superior is liable to punishment.   Djiboutian human rights groups, such as the Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) and NGOs conduct their investigations with generally little restriction from the government. Their recommendations, however, are usually not taken up by the government. Djibouti has a National Human Rights Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights but this committee has remained inactive over the past year. 30 attempt to improve human rights legislation by The government also made an holding a national forum. Opposition parties and the LDDH refused, however, to participate due to the government’s failure to respond to human rights and the lack of international human rights groups’ involvement in the forum. 31   Djibouti also has an Office of the Ombudsman or Mediator of the Republic, as it is known, which generally aims to “better guarantee the transparency [of] public services” 32 , receives complaints related to the functioning of public services including the police and armed forces, and makes proposals with regards to legislative reforms. 33  The Mediator, as the name suggests, generally performs a mediatory role in instances of conflict between the public and public administration after which recommendations can be made to the administration being investigated or to the Minister concerned. 34                                                      26 Ibid     27   Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2005)Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Djibouti.   U.S. Department of State.   28 Constitution of Djibouti, 1992, Article 10. 29 Constitution of Djibouti, 1992, Article 15. 30 Op Cit n(27) 31 Ibid 32 Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement:http://www.un.org.dj/UNDP/propos.html [11/5/2005] 33 Republique De Djibouti (2001) Le Mediateur De La Republique: Rapport Annuel Au President De La Republique Et Au Parlement Annee. From:http://www.mediateur.dj/modesaisine.htm[11/05/2005] 34 Missions of the Mediatorhttp://www.mediateur.dj/modesaisine.htm[11/05/2005]

 

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However, it has been reported that the Mediator, who is also responsible for mediating between the government and NGOs, has not successfully been able to mediate between the two entities at the time of writing. 35   Notwithstanding constitutional stipulations and other laws aimed at ensuring the accountability of the National Police Force (FNP), in practice, even though there is some measure of control by civilian authorities of the police, there have reportedly been many instances of human rights violations by the government and security forces, including the police. 36  Such violations include the arbitrary and lengthy detention of individuals as well as mistreatment of detainees, restriction of key oversight mechanisms such as the media 37 , street-level police corruption and failure to prosecute those who had committed human rights violations partly due to the lack of independence of the judiciary. 38       ERITREA Country Background Eritrea, with its history of annexation, struggle for independence and border disputes with Ethiopia, only achieved independence in 1993. The Transitional Government ratified its Constitution in May 1997. Implementation, however, had not taken place at the time of writing. 39  Historical differences and border disputes, amongst other things, led to a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from May 1998 to June 2000, culminating in the signing of a final peace agreement – the Algiers Peace Accord – in December 2000. 40  Through the Peace Accord, an investigation was undertaken to determine the factors leading up to the war and two commissions were established – the Border Commission and the Claims Commission. The former, as the title suggests, devoted to demarcating the border between the two countries and the latter responsible for the consideration of claims for damages submitted by both countries. Despite the signing of the Peace Accord, since then, both countries have failed to engage in dialogue and there exists what has been described as a ‘Cold Peace’ between the two countries. 41   Eritrean Police Based on the findings of the Claims Commission it was found that Eritrean police (as well as military officials) had been involved in a number of cases of torture and violence against Ethiopians during the conflict. The Eritrean government was found guilty of “detaining Ethiopians in Eritrean police stations, prisons and jails without justification and without minimum procedural rights, including the detention of several thousand

                                                  5 3 Op Cit n(27) 36 Ibid   37 As with the case in Burundi, the government owns the radio and television stations and the main newspaper. 38 Op Cit n(27) 39 CIA World Factbook: http://www.geoplace.com/hottopics/CIAwfb/factbook/fields/2063.html[29/03/2005]   40 Eritrea Fact File, Institute for Security Studies: http://www.iss.org.za/AF/profiles/Eritrea/eritrea1.html#[23/03/2005]   41 Dersso, S.A. (2004)Situation Report: Ethiopian-Eritrean Relations: Reading the Balance Sheet.Institute for Security Studies.http://www.iss.org.za/AF/current/etheritjan04.pdf[2/6/2005]     IRIN News (2003) peace”urges AnnanEritrea-Ethiopia: End “ cold   http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36488&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&sel[2/6/2005]

 

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Ethiopian civilians during and after May 2000 without legal justification” 4 . 2  Based on these accusations it remains to be seen how effectively the police force respond to democratic principles of accountability. Also, in 2003, the reorganisation and the placing of military officers in charge of police divisions has led to the granting of powers of arrest to the military thereby subsequently resulting in the (semi) militarisation of the police force and the further control of security forces under the one-party government. 43       Oversight Mechanisms Eritrea’s Constitution makes provision for the protection of a number of rights 44 and stipulates that defence and security forces are subject and accountable to the law and are expected to be competent, productive and respectful of the populace. 45  Article 14 of the Constitution protects the equality of individuals and article 16 contains provisions protecting the dignity of individuals and the right not to be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 17 is particularly pertinent as it protects the rights of detained persons stipulating that they be informed of the reasons for their arrest and be brought before the court within forty-eight hours failing which the detainee must be released.   However, due to the Constitution not being implemented yet, these provisions are not enforced. For instance, despite the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion, it seems to be the case that the police are largely preoccupied with the enforcement of compulsory military conscription. Many religious groups (such as Jehovah’s Witnesses) are arrested and allegedly mistreated / tortured / detained incommunicado and / or punished for praying, singing hymns and so forth, because of their beliefs against military service and thereby refusal to enlist. 46       The state of conflict and disruption of the country and, as stated, the failure to implement the Constitution has resulted in the disregarding of its provisions and the continued violations of fundamental human rights. This has included the banning of private media (a key oversight mechanism of the police force), lack of law reform, continued arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful killing and torture of detainees (despite the Penal Code prohibiting this practice), the prohibition of criticism against the government and the prohibition of the operations of international and local human rights groups within the borders. 47                                                        42 Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of EthiopiaLegal Affairs General Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign (2004)Press Release: Claims Commission Finds Eritrea Liable for Persistent, Widespread, and Serious Violations of International Law for its Mistreatment of Ethiopians in Eritrea During the War,December 20.   http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/pr122804.shtml[30/5/2005]   43 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2005)Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eritrea.U.S. Department of State. 44 Eritrean Constitution, 1996, article 7. 45 Op Cit n(44), article 12. 46 Fears for Eritrean Jehovah's Witnesses, February 20Afrol News (2005) Torture    http://www.afrol.com/articles/11334[30/5/2005]   47 Amnesty International (2004)Amnesty International Report 2004. Oxford: The Alden Press. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2005)Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eritrea.U.S. Department of State.

 

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