Religious or Policy Justification for Violence?: A Quantitative ...

Radwan Masmoudi

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Religious or Policy Justification for Violence?: A Quantitative Content Analysis of Bin Ladin’s Statements

Alejandro J. Beutel Junior Fellow, Minaret of Freedom Institute MPP Candidate, University of Maryland—College Park, School of Public Policy & Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Ph.D President, Minaret of Freedom Institute

Presented at the CSID 10th Annual Conference (May 5, 2009)

Abstract:   The potential of   the new American Presidential administration   to usher in a repaired relationship with Muslim communities around the world has met with skepticism by some analysts given the context   of armed struggle between the American government and Al-Qaeda and its allies.   Better relations with Muslim-majority communities will require an awareness among policymakers and opinion-shapers as to how the public statements of the   figurehead of militant transnational opposition to the United States, Osama Bin Ladin, has been calculated to affect public opinion among the Muslims h seeks to motivate. Although   polls demonstrate that Bin Ladin’s extremist ideology and indiscriminate violence against civilians   are rejected by an overwhelming majority   of Muslims,   the   political grievances he articulates against   current and past policies by Western   nations,   especially the   United States,   are shared by a much wider audience. Misunderstanding, or misrepresenting, Bin Ladin's pitch as religious rather than political   can be costly in terms of its

consequences in both the fight against terrorists and the promotion of American   values in the Muslim world.     In a   preliminary   study of 10 statements from 2001-2006,   we found that   Bin Ladin referenced historical and current policy grievances to justify his   belligerency 45% of the time, but employed religious arguments only   10% of the time.   In this paper, we seek to expand the scope of that quantitative analysis to   include   all publicly available statements   from 1996 to 2009.   We provide an analysis of those findings and discuss their policy implications.

Section I. – Introduction   The potential of   the new American Presidential administration   to usher in a new relationship with Muslim communities around the world has met with skepticism by some analysts given the context   of armed struggles between the American government and Al-Qaeda and its allies. 1   Among other things, better relations with Muslim-majority communities will require policymakers and opinion-shapers to   pay attention to the public statements of the   figurehead of militant transnational opposition to the United States, Osama Bin Ladin.     Last year in February 2008, Newsweek magazine interviewed former 22-year CIA analyst and Bin Ladin Unit chief, Michael Scheuer. In the interview, Scheuer noted a new generation of middle class, well- educated Muslims were joining Al-Qaeda’s call to arms. In addition, he noted the main reason America is unable to defeat Al-Qaeda is due to the US government refusal to acknowledge—and tell the American people—it and other Western countries’ policies toward Muslim-majority states are the root of the problem.

1 For instance see: Lee Keath, “Obama Wins Praise from Many Muslims.”Associated Press, (April 8, 2009). Available online:t/aseedlid/mldor://www.bhttp/mensww/soot.noc articles/2009/04/08/obama_wins_praise_in_muslim_world/?page=full. Last accessed 4.26/09; Genevive Abdo, “More Than Words.”Foreign Policy, (January 2009). Available online at:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story id=4650. Last accessed _ 4/26/09.