Industrial Property rights In China

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• Publié par: ijalazuv
• Nombre de lectures: 61
• Langue: Français

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Industrial Property rights In China : incentives to innovate or to invest ?

Blandine Laperche MCF-HDR (assistant professor) Laboratoire de Recherche sur l’Industrie et l’Innovation Université du Littoral Côte d’Opale 21, quai de la Citadelle 59140 Dunkerque France http://rii.univ-littoral.fr

Dear Organizers of the EPIP Conference, The paper I would like to propose for the EPIP conference is for the moment in French. I would be able to write an English version of it during the summer, in the case you find it interesting for the conference. Please accept my apologies for the inconvenience caused. With many thanks. Best regards, Blandine Laperche

Abstract: The market-oriented policy implemented by Deng Xiaoping since the end of the 1970s has led to the definition of laws ruling the scientific and technical creation, i.e intellectual property rules. During the 1980s and 1990s, China has developed a legal framework of intellectual property rights (IPR) in accordance with international standards. Our aim in this paper is to discuss the consequences of the implementation of this legal framework. In particular, what are the impacts on Chinese innovation? Is it a way to boost, as expected by the Chinese government

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but also as often stressed in the literature on innovation, domestic investment and hence

endogenous innovation? Or is the implementation of these international rules favouring first

and foremost foreign investment in China, as also expected by the Chinese government?

After presenting the main characteristics of the Chinese legal framework of intellectual

property rights (second part of the paper), we study the consequences on innovation-as

measured by patents applications and grants- in China (third part of the paper).

WIPO and Chinese figures show the sharp increase in patents applications and grants during

the period 1985-2005. However, innovations capacities appear to be differentiated: local inventors tend to concentrate on low tech patents – design, utility models – and invention patents are mostly granted to foreign investors.

The first conclusion that we can draw from this result is that the legal framework of intellectual property rights gave incentives for local inventors, but for a low level of

innovative activity. Moreover, according to us these results cannot only be explained by the legal framework of intellectual property rights but must take account of the characteristics of

the Chinese system of innovation and the changes occurred in its organisation during the studied period. Finally, will the implementation of a legal system of IPR based on the model

of industrial countries only have positive results in a newly-market based innovation system? We raise this issue at the end of this part of the paper.

The second argument studied in the paper is the relation between the implementation of an IPR legal framework and the increase in foreign investment (fourth part of the paper). A rapid

analysis may show a positive correlation between them. But a more qualitative analysis show that during the period, foreign investment was mostly concentrated on banal technology

sectors, which could account for the argument according to which the legal framework of

intellectual property rights has not created a secure climate for high tech foreign investment.

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