Cavalry in Future Wars

Friedrich Von Bernhardi

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• Publié par: lufeb
• Publié le: 08 décembre 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 17
• Langue: English

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Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: Cavalry in Future Wars Author: Frederick von Bernhardi Translator: Charles Sydney Goldman Release Date: March 9, 2009 [EBook #28298] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS *** Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Christine P. Travers and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa' Editor of 'The Empire and the Century' With an Introduction by LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O. LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1909 First Edition, October, 1906 Second Edition, April, 1909 PREFACE I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day of Cavalry is far indeed from being past. In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the right material in men, which the South African War has shown we possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation. Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any hitherto attained. The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of Cavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer for writing on these special subjects. As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I could to the formation of the Cavalry Journal , in the hope that it may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our Service is peculiarly deficient. It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare. Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely increased. The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the following pages with the object of making it more generally known in this country. Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign. General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning, and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form, as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson. His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred. In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be exacted from this Arm. Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success. Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit of a defeated Army. He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a high fighting efficiency. In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock, and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when serving an offensive or defensive purpose. At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision, and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the application respectively of shock and fire action. The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency. Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough training. The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who, drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge, can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur. It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the occupation of Bloemfontein. All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is that, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, during short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses. Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War. From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive tactical result was obtained. If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction. It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers to fight a pitched battle or to surrender. If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true rôle was rarely assigned to them. That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective. Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our ranks. Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a character unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessons which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the sudden outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force and so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy in the first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict a crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tend to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces. The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War. To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British reverse into a decis