Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's. Troubled Experience with Democracy (1999-2001) - article ; n°1 ; vol.64, pg 117-144

Andrée Feillard

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Archipel - Année 2002 - Volume 64 - Numéro 1 - Pages 117-144
Andrée Feillard
Le premier président élu démocratiquement en Indonésie est issu des rangs de l'élite musulmane traditionaliste, le Nahdlatul Ulama. Derrière l'union de circonstance avec l'Islam réformiste se cachent de profondes divisions, et surtout des interrogations fondamentales sur la démocratie. L'article montre l'existence chez les oulémas du Nahdlatul Ulama de fortes réticences à la présidence d'Abdurrahman Wahid, petit-fils du fondateur du mouvement. Par ses nombreuses faiblesses face à une critique généralisée, la présidence de Wahid a provoqué de nouvelles tensions entre loyalistes, décidés à utiliser les moyens extra-parlementaires pour sauver l'honneur du président et celui du Nahdlatul Ulama, les oulémas cherchant dans Icfiqh (jurisprudence islamique) des réponses sages pour répondre à la dissidence politique. Cet article présente le regard de la plus grande organisation musulmane sur elle-même durant cette période clé, et son impact direct sur le contexte politico-religieux aujourd'hui.
28 pages
Source : Persée ; Ministère de la jeunesse, de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l’enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation.

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• Publié par: ARCHIPEL0
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2002
• Nombre de lectures: 56
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

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Andrée Feillard
Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's. Troubled Experience with
Democracy (1999-2001)
In: Archipel. Volume 64, 2002. pp. 117-144.
Résumé
Andrée Feillard
Le premier président élu démocratiquement en Indonésie est issu des rangs de l'élite musulmane traditionaliste, le Nahdlatul
Ulama. Derrière l'union de circonstance avec l'Islam réformiste se cachent de profondes divisions, et surtout des interrogations
fondamentales sur la démocratie. L'article montre l'existence chez les oulémas du Nahdlatul Ulama de fortes réticences à la
présidence d'Abdurrahman Wahid, petit-fils du fondateur du mouvement. Par ses nombreuses faiblesses face à une critique
généralisée, la présidence de Wahid a provoqué de nouvelles tensions entre loyalistes, décidés à utiliser les moyens extra-
parlementaires pour sauver l'honneur du président et celui du Nahdlatul Ulama, les oulémas cherchant dans Icfiqh (jurisprudence
islamique) des réponses sages pour répondre à la dissidence politique. Cet article présente le regard de la plus grande
organisation musulmane sur elle-même durant cette période clé, et son impact direct sur le contexte politico-religieux aujourd'hui.
Citer ce document / Cite this document :
Feillard Andrée. Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's. Troubled Experience with Democracy (1999-2001). In: Archipel. Volume 64,
2002. pp. 117-144.
doi : 10.3406/arch.2002.3728
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/arch_0044-8613_2002_num_64_1_3728Andrée Feillard
Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's
Troubled Experience with Democracy (1999-2001)^)
Ten days before the fall of Suharto, on May 11th, about twenty leading
ulama (religious scholars) of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, literally the
Awakening of the Ulama), Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, were
invited to reflect on the chaotic situation in Jakarta. Meeting in a Qur'anic
school at Langitan, the kiais (title of an ulama in Java) were asked by the
host, Kiai Abdullah Faqih, to report the divine message they had respectively
received in their religious meditation (istikarah). One by one, they came to
" " (sangat mende- the conclusion that the situation was already very pressing
sak) and that a change of leadership was unavoidable. To convey this dra
matic conclusion, the kiais asked for a meeting with President Suharto, who
agreed to receive them on May 21st at 9 a.m. That meeting however never
took place. The kiais stepped off the train in Jakarta in the early morning
hours of that day, the very morning when President Suharto announced that
he was resigning in favour of his vice-president, B.J. Habibie. (2)
The kiais had arrived too late to have any political impact, although their authori
ty rested on a 35-million strong constituency representing traditionalist Islam. (3)
1. This is a modified version of a paper presented at the International Conference on
Discourses on Political Reform and Democratization in East and Southeast Asia in the Light
of New Processes of Regional Community-Building, Duisburg, Germany, May 22-24, 2002.
I would like to thank Martin van Bruinessen, Greg Fealy, Robert Hefner & Marcus Mietzner
for their precious comments on this version.
2. Interview with Kiai Muchith Muzadi, 26 March 2002, Jakarta.
3. This estimate is based on the stability of NU's electorate, which both in 1955 and in 1971
made up about 18 percent of the vote. Today, Indonesia's population is about 210 million.
Archipel 64, Paris, 2002, pp. 117-144 118 Andrée Feillard
As for the NU chief, Abdurrahman Wahid (also called Gus Dur)(4), he
had been quasi-absent during the violent May 1998 transition : having had a
stroke in January 1998, he was laying in bed during most of this crucial time.
After having been a major political force in the 1980s and 1990s, the
Nahdlatul Ulama was not a decisive factor in the 1998 political change.
Reformasi was the work of students, including NU-linked students, and its
main hero was Amien Rais, a vocal politician from NU's rival organization,
the more puritan and rationalist Muhammadiyah.
In October of the following year, with Abdurrahman Wahid's election to
the presidency - the first democratically elected leader in Indonesia (5) - the
Nahdlatul Ulama gained a leading role in the transition process. His presi
dency, however, did not last long. He was impeached over charges of incom
petence and corruption in July 2001, by the same Consultative Assembly
(MPR) that had elected him and that has now chosen Megawati
Soekarnoputri as president.
This paper will not try to analyse the multiple reasons for Wahid's fall,
which are still a subject of controversy, but will present reactions and inter
nal debates within the Nahdlatul Ulama before and during Wahid's 22-month
presidency, and its immediate impact.
It must be remembered that the fall of Suharto comes after a period of
great debate on the role of religion in the moralisation of political life, a
debate that echoes the current debate in China on economics and morality.
The role of Islam was strengthened in 1990 by Suharto's sponsoring of ICMI
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia), an organisation of Muslim intel
lectuals, which had a two-fold impact : moderate Islam gave a new dynamism
to old demands for a clean government and social justice, while radical
Islamic groups introduced a religious sectarianism, new to Indonesia. When
Suharto fell, his vice-president and successor, B.J. Habibie, inherited these
high expectations of Muslim politics, which were then placed on the shoulders
of Abdurrahman Wahid and sit now on those of Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Habibie's period as president was marked by the first democratic elections in
Indonesia since 1955, but ended with charges of continued corruption, obvi
ous protection of President Suharto's family, and political violence by new
militias acting in the name of Islam. Wahid's presidency ended with similar
charges, but the militias were this time acting against the President.
I will argue that the Wahid presidency occurred despite the recommendat
ions of the kiai's, who were "forced" into this new phase of Nahdatul
4. Gus is the title given to children of kiais, whereas Dur is the abbreviation of Abdurrahman.
5. Soekarno had been proclaimed president when Indonesia reached independence in 1945,
Suharto had been elected by an assembly with numerous appointed members, and Habibie
had been handed over power by Suharto in May 1999.
Archipel 64, Paris, 2002 Indonesian Traditionalist Islam 's 119
Ulama' history against their own instincts. During the presidency, faced with
an intensifying wave of criticism and political manoeuvres by Wahid's oppon
ents, the president's loyalists chose to use extra-parliamentary methods, while
the embarrassed kiais looked to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) for solutions to an
increasingly chaotic situation. Tensions increased between those leaving the
defense of the president to "God", and those loyalists who had decided to use
every means to defend him. In the end, by July 2001, the kiais were dragged
into an emotional defence of Wahid, formally asking the president to disband
the Parliament (DPR) and the Consultative Assembly (MPR).
The kiais1 world has been shaken by these dramatic developments, and
their authority openly put to the test. With Wahid's determination to take
over the presidency, the Nahdlatul Ulama was precipated into the very heart
of politics, only twenty years after avoiding it, out of disillusion. Now, a new
course seems set for the Ulama. Wahid's failure has not discour
aged activists away from politics but introduced a leaching of politics into
the organisation, in part out of a feeling of challenge - or revenge - to be
taken up.
The Nahdlatul Ulama enters this new era with a tarnished image, and,
unfortunately, this period also has had an impact beyond the NU, weakening
the image of moderate Islam in general, and shaking the spirit of reformasi
itself. But new challenges stemming from radical Islam are already forcing
NU to look in another direction.
Ill-feelings : the kiais' unsuccessful resistance
Abdurrahman Wahid's rise to power in October 1999 was the result of an
alliance of Islamic parties that chose to ignore the old differences that had
divided Indonesian Islam since the start of the 20th century : Wahid, as the
chief of Nahdlatul Ulama, represented traditionalist Islam, as opposed to
reformist Islam, which rejected traditional saint worship and the ulama's sole
authority in interpreting the sacred texts, and which asked for a religious
practice closer to the puritan Wahhabi model. The alliance of reformist and
traditionalist Islam in favour of Wahid was initiated by Amien Rais after the
June 1999 legislative elections. (6)
Megawati had been the winner in the presidential race after her party's
huge victory in these elections : the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) obtained 34 percent of