The explanatory gap problem [Elektronische Ressource] : how neuroscience might contribute to its solution / Daniel Kostic. Gutachter: Michael Pauen ; David Papineau

Daniel Kostic

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Naturwissenschaften

Informations

• Publié par: humboldt-universitat_zu_berlin
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 42
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

The  explanatory  gap  problem:  how  neuroscience  
might  contribute  to  its  solution  
 
D  i  s  s  e  r  t  a  t  i  o  n  
zur  Erlangung  des  akademischen  Gra  des
 
Dor  poct e  (aihposolih Dr.  p.)lih  
Eingereicht  an  der  Philophsioschen  Fakultät  I  
der  Humbold-­‐tUniversität  zu  Berl  in
von  Daniel  Kostić  ,  Dip-­‐Phl.il.  
Der  Präsident  der  Humbol-­‐dUtniversität  zu  Berlin  Prof.  Dr.  Dr.  h.c.  Christop  h  Markschies
Der  Dekan  der  Philosophischen  Fakultät  I  Prof.  Dr.  Michae  l  Seadle
Guer:tchat  
1.    Prof.  Dr.  Michael    Pauen
2.P  rof.  Dr.  David  Papi  neau
Datum  der  Promotion:  12.07.  2011
 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
©  2010  Daniel  Kosti  ć
 
 
 
Dedicated  to  the  memory  of  the  late  professor  Nikola  Grahek,  who  sparked  my  interest  in  
philosophy  of  min  d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Table  of  Contents  
Dednoitcai ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 3  
Abstract ............................. 7  
Acknowledgements ........... 8  
Intr ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 10  
CHAPTER  1 ........................ 23  
1.1   Arguments  against  physicalism ......................... 23  
1.2   Nagel’s  Account ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 24  
1.3   The  knowledge  argument .29  
1.4   Kripke’s  modal  argument .34  
1.5   The  argument  from  supervenience  for  the  ontological  gap ................................ ............... 39  
1.5.  1The  zombie  argument......................................40  
1.5.  2Structure  of  the  zombie  argument  notandions    of  supervenience  and  necess...........ity 44  
1.5.  3The  supervenience  argument..........................................................51  
1.6   The  2 -­‐D  argument ............. 52  
2.   CHAPTER  2................................ ................. 60  
2.1   The  explanatory   gap  account ................................ ............................ 60  
2.2   Thick  and  thin  concepts  and  modes  of  presentations ................................ ........................ 61  
2.3   Ascriptive  and  non -­‐ascriptive  modes  of  presentation  and  apriority  and  necessity ............ 63  
2.4   Thick  and  thin  conceivability ................................ ............................ 66  
2.5   Gappy  and  non -­‐gappy  identities ................................ ....................... 68  
4
oduction2.6   Intelligibility  of  explanations ................................ ................................ ............................ 69  
2.7   Intelligibility  of  explanations  and  causal  efficacy .............................. 73  
3.   CHAPTER  3 ................................ ................. 76  
3.1   Phenomenal  concept  strategy ................................ ................................ .......................... 76  
3.2   Loar’s  account  of  the  recognitional  phenomenal  concepts ................ 77  
3.3   Tye’s  account  of  the  phenomenal  concept ................................ ........ 84  
3.4   Indexical -­‐quotation al  and  perceptual  accounts  of  the  phenomenal  concept ..................... 87  
3.5   The  inconsistency  objection  and  the  phenomenal  concept  strategy ..95  
3.6   Some  issues  with  the  phenomenal  concept  strategy ................................ ......................... 98  
3.6.  1The  Max  Black’s  infamous  objection  and  modes  of  presentation ...98  
3.6.  2Explanatory  adequacy  of  the  phenomenal  concept  str................................ategy .........100  
4.   CHAPTER  4 ................................ ................................ ............... 108  
4.1   The  intuition  of  distinctness:  how  to  resolve  a  brute  disagreement 108  
4.2   The  ontological  gap ........ 111  
4.3   The  underlying  intuitions ................................ ................................ ................................ 113  
4.4   The  intelligibility  of  explanations  in  the  new  light ........................... 115  
4.5   The  brute  disagreement .119  
4.6   The  tacit  assumptions ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 120  
4.7   A  priori  derivation  and  the  inteligibility  of  explanations ................ 125  
5.   CHAPTER  5 ................................ ............... 135  
5.1   Intuitions  of  distinctness  and  quality  space ................................ ................................ .... 135  
5 5.2   The  vagueness  of  phenomenal  concepts  as  a  constraint  for  studying  phenomenal  
consciousness  empirically ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 135  
5.3   The  intuition  of  distinctness  and  the  vagueness  constraint ............. 139  
5.4   Clark’s  model  of  quality  space ........................ 142  
5.5   Rosenthal’s  account  of  the  quality  space  model ................................ ............................. 144  
5.6   The  quality  space  for  pain ................................ ............................... 150  
References: ................................ ..................... 164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Abstract  
This  thesis  evaluates  several  powerful  arguments  that  not  only  deny  that  brain  states  
and  conscious  states  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  but  also  claim  that  such  an  identity  is  
unintelligible.  I  argue  that  these  accounts  do  not  undermine  physicalithsme  yb  edcoaun’st  e  
provide   any   direct   or   independent   justification   for   their   tacit   assumptions   about   a   link  
between  modes  of  presentation  and  explanation.  In  my  view  intelligibility  of  psychophysical  
identity  should  not  be  based  exclusively  on  the  analysisi  ngo.f  mTehean  main  concern  then  
should  be  why  expect  that  fully  intelligible  explanation  must  be  based  on  the  descriptions  of  
the   causal   roles   as   modes   of   presentation.   To   this   effect   I   propose   that   we   examine  
"psychological  concepts".  The &#