Control Agenda

J. Ambrose Matthew

Description

The Control Agenda is a sweeping account of the history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and beyond.Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S. decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure, and direction of their nuclear arsenals.Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines. The Control Agenda makes clear that verification and compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet Union. Through SALT's many twists and turns, accusations and countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the specter of nuclear conflict loomed large.

Sujets

• Histoire
• Nuclear weapon
• History of the Americas

Informations

• Publié par: Cornell University Press
• Date de parution: 15 avril 2018
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781501709371
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

THECONTROLAGENDA

THECONTROL AGENDA AHistoryoftheStrategicArms Limitation Talks

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

MatthewJ.Ambrose

ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 2018 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2018 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Names: Ambrose, Matthew J., author. Title: The control agenda : a history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks / Matthew J. Ambrose. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017028026 (print) | LCCN 2017031400 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501712012 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501709371 (pdf) ISBN 9781501713743 (cloth : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—History. | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II—History. | Nuclear arms control—United States—History. | Nuclear arms control—Soviet Union—History. | United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. | Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States. Classification: LCC JZ5665 (ebook) | LCC JZ5665 .A63 2018 (print) | DDC 327.1/747—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017028026

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Cover photograph: U.S. president Gerald R. Ford and Soviet general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev sign a joint communiqué following talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms in Vladivostok, USSR, in 1974. Photograph by David Hume Kennerly and courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Library.

For Jillian

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction:ThePromiseofControl 1. Arms Control: Context and Precedents 2. Negotiation: A New Dimension in Strategic Competition 3. Aftermath and Adaptation: The Origins of SALT II 4. “In Good Faith”: Carter’s Gambit 5. “Thinking Out Loud”: The Struggle with Sprawl 6. “Summary—Bleak”: The Unraveling of Detente 7. INF: The Last Gasp of SALT Conclusion:TheConsequencesofControl

Notes Bibliography Index

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Acknowledgments

Iamindebtedtoanumberofindividualsandinstitutionsthathelpedshapethis book. The Harry and Lynde Bradley Foundation and The Ohio State Univer sity both provided generous support at critical junctures for research and travel expenses; without this help, this project might never have been completed. I am also grateful to the staffs of the National Archives at College Park, MD, and the Reagan, Carter, and Ford Presidential Libraries for assisting a relative newcomer to archival research. I am also grateful to the family of Paul A. Nitze for grant ing me permission to access Mr. Nitze’s papers and to the staff of the Library of Congress for helping me navigate them. Myeditor,MichaelMcGandy,deservesspecialmentionforbeingwillingto engage so thoroughly with my initial proposal and manuscript. Mr. McGandy’s incisive comments and suggestions did a great deal help me improve my initial efforts and his belief in the value of the work helped inspire me to finish it. Ihavebenefitedfromexcellentmentorsthroughoutmytimeinacademe.At Vassar College, Prof. Robert Brigham provided my first real to exposure to the history of U.S. foreign relations. He taught me many of the critical elements of historical thinking and supported my interests in arms control and intelligence studies. At Ohio State, Prof. Robert McMahon helped me hone these skills and pushed me to make bold arguments where the evidence demanded it. Also at Ohio State, Prof. Peter Hahn provided a model of professional and academic integrity; he encouraged me to strive for the highest standards of rigor and clarity. Numerouscolleagueshavehelpedshapemythinkingandargumentsabout many aspects of this work. I am especially grateful to Prof. David Stebenne and Prof. Jennifer Siegel of The Ohio State University; Dr. David Hadley; and Dr. Ronald Granieri, Dr. Ted Keefer, Dr. Glen Asner, and Dr. Erin Mahan of the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The views expressed in this book are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government Accountability Office or the United States government.

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