Summary of Robert B. Stinnett's Day of Deceit

Everest Media

Description

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 Murrow was a CBS radio newsman who had just returned from a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House. He had heard the first news flashes about the Pearl Harbor raid. He and his wife, Janet, went to the White House for dinner.
#2 Roosevelt asked Murrow and Donovan whether they thought the attack was a clear case of a first Japanese move that would unite Americans behind a declaration of war against the Axis powers. They said yes, and Roosevelt decided to ask Congress to declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States.
#3 The question of whether or not FDR knew about the attack at Pearl Harbor is still up in the air, but there are many more direct pieces of evidence that prove he did. The United States had not cracked Japanese military codes prior to the attack, and the Japanese fleet maintained strict radio silence.

Sujets

• Histoire
• Segunda Guerra Mundial
• Military
• World War II
• History
• Seconde Guerre mondiale

Informations

• Publié par: Everest Media LLC
• Date de parution: 12 juin 2022
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9798822514645
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Insights on Robert B. Stinnett's Day of Deceit
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12 Insights from Chapter 13 Insights from Chapter 14 Insights from Chapter 15
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

Murrow was a CBS radio newsman who had just returned from a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the White House. He had heard the first news flashes about the Pearl Harbor raid. He and his wife, Janet, went to the White House for dinner.

#2

Roosevelt asked Murrow and Donovan whether they thought the attack was a clear case of a first Japanese move that would unite Americans behind a declaration of war against the Axis powers. They said yes, and Roosevelt decided to ask Congress to declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States.

#3

The question of whether or not FDR knew about the attack at Pearl Harbor is still up in the air, but there are many more direct pieces of evidence that prove he did. The United States had not cracked Japanese military codes prior to the attack, and the Japanese fleet maintained strict radio silence.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

In the summer of 1940, a poll showed that a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe’s wars. However, military and State Department leaders believed that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. They felt that Americans needed a call to action.

#2

Arthur McCollum, the director of the Far East Asia section of ONI, was in charge of routing communications intelligence to FDR from early 1940 to December 7, 1941. He felt that war with Japan was inevitable and that the United States should provoke it at a time that suited US interests.

#3

The paper trail of the McCollum memo ends with the Knox endorsement. The proposal was addressed to Anderson, but no specific record has been found by the author indicating whether Roosevelt or Anderson ever saw it.

#4

On October 8, 1940, the State Department told Americans to evacuate Far East countries as quickly as possible. President Roosevelt brought about Action F, which kept the United States Fleet based in Hawaiian waters.

#5

After the success of the December 7 attack, Richardson claimed that FDR turned his back on Stark. He said that Stark had been professionally negligent due to taking orders from above.

#6

Richardson’s removal on February 1, 1941, strengthened the position of McCollum. He saw the alliance with Japan as a golden opportunity to provoke Japan into committing an overt act of war against the United States, which would then trigger military responses from the other two signers of the Tripartite Pact.

#7

Arthur McCollum continued to have close ties to Japan. In 1928, the Navy sent him back to Tokyo to teach a Japanese language class, which included three other officers of about the same age. They were all destined to provide FDR with secret intelligence on Japanese war preparations during the 1940–41 prelude to Pearl Harbor.

#8

The Japanese intercepts provided valuable insights into Japanese foreign policy. Through the intercepts, FDR could follow Japan’s continued pressure on Portugal to supply her Empire with raw materials from Timor, its colony in the East Indies.

#9

The American fleet was kept in Hawaiian waters in 1940, despite the objections of Admiral Richardson. The admiral felt that the Europe First policy was flawed, and he listed five objections to the policy: lack of fundamental training facilities, lack of large-scale ammunition and fuel supplies, lack of support ships, morale problems for the men kept away from their families, and lack of overhaul facilities.

#10

The basing of the fleet in Hawaii was a disaster in the making. The rationale behind it was extremely weak, and the admiral in charge of the Pacific fleet, Adm. William Frederick Richardson, grew increasingly alarmed at using his ships and sailors in such a provocative scheme.

#11

Between July 1940 and April 1941, nearly 9,200,000 barrels of gasoline were licensed for export to Japan. approval for 2,000,000 additional barrels was pending late in April 1941. From October 1940 to December 1941, the Japanese tankers were under constant electronic surveillance by the Navy.

#12

The American cryptographers and intercept operators were able to crack the two principal Japanese government code systems: the Purple Code, used solely by the Japanese Foreign Ministry for encoding diplomatic messages, and the portions of the Kaigun Ango, a series of twenty-nine separate Japanese naval operational codes used for radio contact with warships, merchant vessels, naval bases, and personnel in overseas posts.

#13

The American government was able to solve and recover values from four different code systems used by Japan’s navy for radio messages in the pre–Pearl Harbor period. These systems were the Merchant Marine Code, radio call signs issued to every category of Japanese warships, units, individual officers, and vessels of the Japanese Merchant Marine, and Japan’s naval movement code.
Insights from Chapter 3

#1

In early September, Roosevelt sent America’s first peacetime Draft Act to Congress. The act called for conscripting men into military service and sought the authority to seize industrial plants for defense production.

#2

Roosevelt’s call for preparedness was to lend military supplies and goods to England. This was FDR using his finest communications skills, in a brilliant analogy: when your neighbor’s house is on fire, you lend him your garden hose.

#3

FDR’s hatred for the press baron Roy Howard was recorded on a secret microphone. He had been furnishing Willkie with a bitter assessment of Administration policies in the Far East. Roosevelt believed that American political opposition to his defense plans was directed from Germany, Italy, and Japan.

#4

As the first election results came in on November 5, it appeared that FDR had won a huge popular vote and his third landslide victory. However, the Republicans continued to control the isolationist agenda.

#5

In 1940, the Japanese military bases in the Central Pacific were totally inadequate for warfare.