The postcommunist transitions produced two very different types of states. The "contractual" state is associated with the countries of Eastern Europe, which moved toward democratic regimes, consensual relations with society, and clear boundaries between political power and economic wealth. The "predatory" state is associated with the successors to the USSR, which instead developed authoritarian regimes, coercive relations with society, and poorly defined boundaries between the political and economic realms. In Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States, Gerald M. Easter shows how the cumulative result of the many battles between state coercion and societal capital over taxation gave rise to these distinctive transition outcomes. Easter's fiscal sociology of the postcommunist state highlights the interconnected paths that led from the fiscal crisis of the old regime through the revenue bargains of transitional tax regimes to the eventual reconfiguration of state-society relations. His focused comparison of Poland and Russia exemplifies postcommunism's divergent institutional forms. The Polish case shows how conflicts over taxation influenced the emergence of a rule-of-law contractual state, social-market capitalism, and civil society. The Russian case reveals how revenue imperatives reinforced the emergence of a rule-by-law predatory state, concessions-style capitalism, and dependent society.
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CAPITAL,COERCION,AND POSTCOMMUNIST STATES
Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States
GeraldM.Easter
CORNELLUNIVERSITYPRESSITHACA AND LONDON
CornellUniversityPressgratefullyacknowledgesreceiptofasubventionfromBoston College which helped in the publication of this book.
First published 2012 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2012 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Easter, Gerald, 1959– Capital, coercion, and postcommunist states / Gerald M. Easter. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9780801451195 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 9780801478246 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Finance, Public—Poland. 2. Finance, Public—Russia (Federation) 3. Fiscal policy—Poland. 4. Fiscal policy—Russia (Federation) 5. Postcommunism—Economic aspects—Poland. 6. Postcommunism— Economic aspects—Russia (Federation) 7. Poland—Economic conditions—1990– 8. Russia (Federation)—Economic conditions—1991– I. Title. HJ1213.E27 2012 339.5'209438—dc23 2012014475
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Contents
Preface
Introduction:Capital,Coercion,andPostcommunistStates1. Toward a Fiscal Sociology of the Postcommunist State 2. The Fiscal Crisis of the Old Regime 3of Tax Reform: Making (and Unmaking). Politics Revenue Bargains 4Meets Society in the Transitional Tax Regime. State 5Fiscal Capacity in Postcommunist States. Building 6. Taxation and the Reconfiguration of State and Society
Conclusions
Notes SelectedBibliographyIndex
vii
ix
1 8 23
51 86 124 152 187
197 233 235
Preface
The[Russian]governmentshouldassurethatinallpublicinstitutionstransparency and accountability prevail; debts are paid and arrears eliminated; the tax system is fair, simple and efficient, based on transparent laws and effective administration. Michel Camdessus (St. Petersburg, 1999)
Manwalksintoadoctor’sofficeandsays,“Doc,ithurtswhenIdothis.” Doctor replies, “Don’t do that.” Henny Youngman
WhyinvokethewordsofHennyYoungmanonthesubjectofthepostcommu nist state, when his main body of work was in the area of intrahousehold rela tions? Because they capture so well the gist of the advice on tax collection that capitalist custodians, such as IMF head Michel Camdessus, had for postcom munist governments, like Russia’s. Of course, Camdessus had a pretty good idea of what Russia was doing or, in the case of tax collection, not doing, and he had a clear image of what Russia should be doing. But what one does not get from his remarks is a sense of why Russia was doing what it was doing. His advice repeats the monotonous mantras, based on idealized depictions of capitalism and governance in the West, which an international brigade of economic advisers chanted to Eastern European public officials throughout the 1990s. Regarding public finance, in particular, policy expertise invariably rested on assumptions of public choice theory, a conceptual world of rational economic actors where political and cultural phenomena were unwelcome intruders. By contrast, fiscal sociology represented an alternative conceptual framework, where state finances are enmeshed in a larger sociopolitical context, promising a richer explanation of the fiscal fates of postcommunist states. But as the Russian state succumbed to financial collapse, transition technocrats for whom fiscal sociology was as remote