CIA : Conseils donnés à ses agents pour passer les frontières - Doc 1
15 pages
English

CIA : Conseils donnés à ses agents pour passer les frontières - Doc 1

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15 pages
English
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Tout savoir sur nos offres

Description

Document révélé par Wikileaks - Ne pas avoir l'air débraillé et ne pas payer en liquide: ce sont quelques uns des conseils donnés à ses espions par la CIA pour passer les frontières, publiés dimanche par WikiLeaks.

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Publié par
Publié le 22 décembre 2014
Nombre de lectures 2 141
Langue English

Extrait

CIA Assessment on Surviving Secondary
Screening at Airports While Maintaining Cover
WikiLeaks release: December 21, 2014
Keywords: CIA, airport, screening, passport, visa, Schengen, EU, customs,
security, border, Hungary, Bahrain, Mauritius, Bulgaria, Japan, Russia,
Chile, Czech, Zambia, Pakistan, South Africa, Venezuela, Mexico,
Kurdish, Turkish, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria
Restraint: SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN (originator controlled)/(no foreign
nationals)
Title: Surviving Secondary: An Identity Threat Assessment of Secondary
Screening Procedures at International Airports
Date: September 2011
Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Author: CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program, from the
Identity Intelligence Center (i2c) within the Directorate of Science and
Technology
Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-travel
Pages: 14
Description
This is a secret document produced by the CIA's CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program
to explain and advise CIA operatives on how to deal with secondary screening at airports, as they travel
to and from covert CIA operations using false ID, including into and out of Europe. The document details
specific examples of operatives being stopped under secondary screening at various ariports around the
world; how and why the person was and offers advice on how to deal with such circumstances
and minimise the risks if stopped to continue maintaining cover. The document was created for
distribution within the organisation and other officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive
Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government. The document's overarching predominant advice
is to maintain cover, "no matter what". SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
CL BY: 2313665
CL REASON: 1.4(c), (d)
DECL ON: 20360926
DRV FROM: LIA s-06, Multiple Sources
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNSECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
Secondary
2
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNSECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
Secondary
Introduction (U)
Secondary screening—a potentially lengthy and detailed look by airport offcials at
passengers not passing initial scrutiny—can signifcantly stress the identities of
operational travelers. Border-control offcers at international airports use primary screening
to quickly evaluate arriving passengers and identify those that may not be admissible, such as
illegal immigrants, narcotics traffckers and other criminals, terrorists, or intelligence offcers.
For countries with authoritarian regimes, airport offcials may also want to deny entry to
foreign political activists or nongovernmental organization (NGO) offcials. Security or customs
inspectors can refer travelers to secondary when they fnd weapons, drugs, or other contraband
on their persons or in their baggage. (C//NF)
Referral to secondary screening can occur if irregularities or questions arise during
any stage of airport processing—immigration, customs, or security—and regardless
of whether the traveler is arriving, in transit, or departing. Offcials may also randomly
select travelers. The resulting secondary screening can involve in-depth and lengthy
questioning, intrusive searches of personal belongings, cross-checks against external
databases, and collection of biometrics—all of which focus signifcant scrutiny on an operational
traveler. (S//NF)
This study examines triggers for secondary selection used at various international airports, the
range of subsequent scrutiny of identity, and traveler responses that are most likely to pass
secondary inspection with cover intact. For the study, CHECKPOINT researched available
all-source intelligence reporting but also incorporated a number of secondary screening
experiences from operational travelers. The information cut-off date is 31 May 2010. (S//NF)
NOTE: Although the information available is suffcient to provide general insights into the
secondary screening criteria and procedures that travelers may experience at foreign airports,
it is insuffciently detailed, comprehensive, and timely to provide tactical intelligence
for operational travelers using nonoffcial cover. Moreover, the examples cited in the study
illustrate the range of potential experiences but do not evaluate specifc airports. (S//NF)
This fnished intelligence product contains reporting that carries the ORCON dissemination
control but has been pre-approved by the originator for distribution to offcials who hold
appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government.
Sharing this product with other Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government
does not require contacting CHECKPOINT or reporting originators before dissemination.
Recipients must obtain originator approval prior to written or verbal communication of any portion
of this product to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities and for all other uses not pre-approved
by the originator. (U//FOUO)
3
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNSECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
Secondary
4
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNSECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
Secondary
Pre-Arrival Screening information. Countries requiring advance
passenger information include Australia, Although selection for secondary
Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, India, screening frequently occurs while
Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, travelers are at the airport answering
Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the
questions from immigration offcers,
United Kingdom, and the United States. PNR authorities may also preselect passengers
information comes from airline reservation because of some fags in their visa
systems and contains personal information applications or airline records. Many
such as credit card number, e-mail address, countries issue visas upon arrival, however,
and seating preference. (U)
nearly 50 countries require US
touristpassport holders to submit visa applications Security services lacking APIS or PNR
before travel. For holders of US diplomatic information may have other arrangements to
or offcial passports, the number of countries receive passenger manifests ahead of time.
requiring visas before arrival rises to over For example, the Airport Police Intelligence
120. Security and intelligence services Brigade (BIPA) of the Chilean Investigative
participating in vetting visa applications, either Police does not routinely obtain advance
comprehensively or on an ad hoc basis, passenger manifests but can request the
include those of Georgia, Libya, Pakistan, information from airlines on an ad hoc basis
Russia, Syria, and Uzbekistan. (S//OC/NF) to search for targets of interest. Strict privacy
laws covering Danish citizens extend to all
Available reporting does not detail the
passengers traveling through Copenhagen criteria with which security services
airport such that the Danish Police screen visa applications, but confrmed
Intelligence Service (PET) cannot legally or suspected government or military
obtain routine access to fight manifests. affliation almost certainly raises the
However, if one of PET’s four cooperative
traveler’s profle. Applications can be
airline contacts is on duty, the service can extensive to assist with the vetting process for
unoffcially request a search on a specifc immigration authorities and the intelligence
name, according to August 2007 liaison and security services. For example, Russia’s
reporting. (S//OC/NF)visa application form requires employer name,
address, telephone number, supervisor’s Airport Primary Screening
full name, and applicant’s position for the
current and past two places of employment. In primary inspections, immigration inspectors
The application also requires military dates examine passports and visas, if visas are
of service, rank, occupation, specialized required, for validity and authenticity and to
skills; experience with nuclear, biological, or verify individuals’ identities. They frequently
chemical activities; and all professional, civil, query watch lists or other databases for
and charitable organizations of which the immigration violations, criminal records, or
applicant is or was a member, contributed to, national security concerns and ask basic
or worked with. (S//OC/NF) questions pertinent to admissibility. The entire
process usually lasts no more than a few
Immigration offcials may also receive minutes to enable airports to keep up with the
advance information on arriving passengers fow of incoming travelers. If there is a
watchfrom airlines through an advance passenger list match or inspectors decide that travel
information system (APIS) or passenger documents are suspect or have some reason
name records (PNRs). APIS information, to doubt a passenger’s stated reason for
which enables an advance check against travel, they refer the passenger to secondary
watch lists, includes passenger name, date screening. Offcials at US airports on average
of birth, sex, passport details, and contact
5
SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNSECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
Secondary
send about one in 30 foreign tourists and Watch-list Hit
business travelers to secondary although Border-control offcials in many countries
particular airports may impose higher use watch lists—national, regional, and
percentages for certain groups. For example, i

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