Corporate governance in family firms: Effects of family control on firm value and corporate financial decisions

Puerto Requejo, Ignacio

Description

Colecciones : TD. Ciencias socialesDAEE. Tesis del Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa
Fecha de publicación : 18-nov-2010
[ES] Dada la relevancia y el predominio de las empresas familiares en la mayoría de las economías del mundo, el objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es investigar, desde el punto de vista de las finanzas y el gobierno corporativo, los efectos del control familiar en el valor de mercado, y en las políticas de inversión, financiación y dividendos de las compañías. En los análisis llevados a cabo, se ha empleado una muestra de empresas cotizadas familiares y no familiares de diferentes países de Europa occidental. El método de estimación utilizado, el método generalizado de los momentos, que comprende una serie de estimadores de datos de panel, hace posible considerar la heterogeneidad inobservable en las regresiones y controlar el problema de la endogeneidad, lo cual supone una importante contribución metodológica.
La evidencia empírica ofrecida pone de manifiesto que, en general, las empresas familiares europeas disfrutan de un valor de mercado superior al de sus homólogas no familiares. Los resultados relativos a las peculiaridades de las corporaciones familiares en lo referente a sus políticas financieras explican sus mayores valoraciones bursátiles. En concreto, el control familiar reduce los problemas de infra- y sobreinversión, permitiendo a las compañías familiares alcanzar unos niveles de inversión más próximos al óptimo. Además, este tipo de empresa depende en menor medida de los fondos generados internamente y accede a la financiación mediante deuda con menores dificultades. Por último, las compañías familiares distribuyen unos dividendos superiores con el fin de mitigar los problemas de expropiación vinculados al control familiar.
Este trabajo contribuye a la literatura financiera al poner de manifiesto que las especificidades del control familiar, como los horizontes inversores de largo plazo y la preocupación por la reputación de los propietarios familiares, influyen de un modo significativo en importantes aspectos corporativos.[EN] Given the importance and prevalence of family enterprises in most economies, the objective of this thesis is to investigate, from the point of view of finance and corporate governance, the impact of family control in the value of market and investment policies, financing and dividends from the companies. In the analysis carried out, we have used a sample of listed companies and outside the family in different countries of Western Europe. The estimation method used, the generalized method of moments, which comprises a series of panel data estimators makes it possible to consider unobserved heterogeneity in regression and control the problem of endogeneity, which is an important methodological contribution.
The empirical evidence provided shows that, in general, European family companies enjoy a market value larger than their nonfamily counterparts. The results for the peculiarities of family corporations regarding their financial policies explain their higher stock valuations. In particular, family control reduces problems of under-and overinvestment, enabling companies to achieve family investment levels closer to optimal. In addition, this type of company depends less on internally generated funds and access to debt financing at lower difficulties. Finally, family-owned companies distribute higher dividend payments to mitigate the problems of expropriation related to family control.
This work contributes to the financial literature by highlighting that the specifics of family control, such as long-term investment horizon and concern for the reputation of the family owners, have a significant influence on major corporate issues.

Informations

• Publié par: Salamanca
• Publié le: 18 novembre 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 19
• Licence : En savoir +
  Paternité, pas d'utilisation commerciale, partage des conditions initiales à l'identique
• Langue: Español
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA
Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa

Doctoral Thesis
Corporate Governance in Family Firms.
Effects of Family Control on Firm Value
and Corporate Financial Decisions
Author
D. Ignacio Requejo Puerto
Supervisors
Dr. Julio Pindado García & Dra. Chabela de la Torre Olvera
Salamanca, 2010

UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA
Departamento de Administración y Campus “Miguel de Unamuno”
Economía de la Empresa 37007 SALAMANCA (SPAIN)
Tel.: [phone] Ext. 3506
Fax: [phone]




D. Julio Pindado García, Catedrático de Economía Financiera, y Dª Chabela de la Torre
Olvera, Profesora Titular de Economía Financiera

CERTIFICAN

Que la presente tesis doctoral, que lleva por título “Corporate Governance in Family Firms.
Effects of Family Control on Firm Value and Corporate Financial Decisions” y que presenta
D. Ignacio Requejo Puerto para optar al grado de Doctor por la Universidad de Salamanca, ha
sido realizada bajo su dirección en el Departamento de Administración y Economía de la
Empresa de la Universidad de Salamanca y que cumple todos los requisitos necesarios para
proceder a su defensa pública.

Y para que así conste y surta los efectos oportunos, se expide el presente certificado en
Salamanca a 14 de septiembre de 2010.







Dr. Julio Pindado García Dra. Chabela de la Torre Olvera
Universidad de Salamanca Universidad de Salamanca

To my family and my supervisors



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Acknowledgements


There are many people to whom I am indebted for helping and supporting me during my
doctoral studies. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Julio Pindado and
Chabela de la Torre, who have always been available whenever I needed them. They have
provided me with the skills and knowledge necessary to work in academia, and taught me how
to face the difficulties and hard times that lie in the road ahead. I am very grateful to them for
their guidance and advice, and especially for putting their trust in me during these years of hard
and endless work.
I would like to pay special thanks to Colin Mayer and Julian Franks for giving me the
opportunity to spend some time as a visiting doctoral student at Saïd Business School
(University of Oxford) and London Business School (University of London), respectively. They
were incredibly kind hosts and the conversations I had with them greatly contributed to
improving the thesis. The months I spent and the experience I acquired in these institutions
have been vital for my doctoral formation.
In the UK, I also owe a debt of gratitude to David Hillier and Kevin Keasey for inviting
me to Leeds University Business School (University of Leeds), where I presented part of the
dissertation. More importantly, during our meetings they have shown me that the academic
profession is more than just a job; it is a way of life. Thus, to succeed both as an academic and
iii

in a more general sense, it is of paramount importance to build one’s own network of
colleagues and friends.
As a doctoral student, I have had the opportunity to make some good friends and learn
from other students enrolled in the doctorate programs in Salamanca, Oxford, and London. At
the Prato Symposia, in Italy, which I have attended since the first time it was held, I have been
very fortunate to meet many pleasant scholars and PhD students from different universities
from all over the world. All of these people have contributed in one way or another to this
project. For this reason, here I express my most sincere thanks to them.
Similarly, I must acknowledge the support and encouragement received from the faculty
members at the Departamento de Administración y Economía de la Empresa, Universidad de
Salamanca. My first contact with most of them took place during my undergraduate degree
and, therefore, they have played a significant part in my formation in the Business Economics
field. In addition, prior to and during the doctorate program they provided me with valuable
advice for my career as an academic.
Last but not least, I would like to mention my sister and my brother for their love and
support; and I wish to thank my parents for listening to my concerns and encouraging me to
keep on working at all stages of the thesis. I owe immense gratitude to my family for
everything.
Finally, I am grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (Ministerio de
Educación y Ciencia) for providing me with financial support throughout the doctoral studies
and for financing my two research stays abroad (under the program for the training of the
university teaching staff—Formación del Profesorado Universitario, FPU—). I greatly
appreciate this support.

Ignacio Requejo
Salamanca (Spain), September 2010
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Table of Contents


CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1
I.1. The prevalence and uniqueness of family-controlled corporations .................. 4
I.2. Do family firms differ from their non-family counterparts in their
corporate performance? 7
I.3. Does family control play a moderating role in the investment–cash flow
sensitivity? ....................................................................................................... 11
I.4. Are financing and dividend decisions affected by family control of
corporations? ................................................................................................... 15
I.5. Objectives and formulation of the thesis ......................................................... 20

CHAPTER II – THE EFFECT OF FAMILY CONTROL ON CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE .................................................................................... 23
II.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 25
II.2. Theory, hypotheses, and empirical models ..................................................... 30
II.2.1. Do family firms perform differently as compared to
non-family ones? ................................................................................. 30
II.2.2. Is the performance difference of family firms moderated by
firm-level characteristics? .................................................................. 36

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TABLE OF C ONTENTS
II.2.3. Does family control substitute for the lack of legal protection for
minority shareholders? ....................................................................... 41
II.2.4. Do family firms continue to outperform when accounting for
nonlinearities? .................................................................................... 44
II.3. Data, family firm definition, and the estimation method ................................ 50
II.3.1. Data .................................................................................................... 50
II.3.2. Family firm definition ......................................................................... 52
II.3.3. Estimation method .............................................................................. 58
II.4. Results ............................................................................................................. 59
II.4.1. Summary statistics 60
II.4.2. Descriptive analysis ............................................................................ 61
II.4.3. Regression results ............................................................................... 66
II.4.3.1. Do family firms perform differently as compared to
non-family ones? .................................................................... 66
II.4.3.2. Is the performance difference of family firms moderated by
firm-level characteristics? ...................................................... 69
II.4.3.3. Does family control substitute for the lack of legal protection for
72 minority shareholders? ...........................................................
II.4.3.4. Do family firms continue to outperform when accounting for
nonlinearities? ......................................................................... 74
II.5. Robustness checks ........................................................................................... 78
II.6. Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 86
APPENDIX II.A. Definition of performance variables ....................................... 89
APPENDIX II.B. Definition of ownershi