3-D Interconnects Using Cu Wafer Bonding : Technology and Applications

Description

• mémoire
• mémoire - matière potentielle : devices

3-D Interconnects Using Cu Wafer Bonding : Technology and Applications Rafael Reif, Chuan Seng Tan, Andy Fan, Kuan-Neng Chen, Shamik Das, and Nisha Checka Microsystems Technology Laboratories, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 60 Vassar St., 39-625, Cambridge MA 02139, USA. () Abstract 3-D interconnects hold tremendous potential to reduce global interconnect latency and power dissipation.

• device layers
• k.n.chen
• k.c.saraswat
• chemical wet etch
• handle wafer
• chemical attack
• bonding
• r.
• cu

Sujets

• Mémoire
• Device
• Kleiner
• Engelhardt
• Cheka
• Georgia Institute of Technology
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• Chemical substance
• Bonding
• Coupling

Informations

• Publié par: vyan0
• Nombre de lectures: 29
• Langue: English

Extrait

Authority and Inequality under Capitalism
and Socialism
BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
Delivered at
Brasenose College, Oxford University
May 16, 17, 23, and 24, 1985 BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., has been a permanent mem-
ber of the faculty at Harvard University since 1951,
serving as Lecturer in Sociology and as Senior Research
Fellow at the Russian Research Center. He is now
Emeritus.
In addition to several essays, he is the author of the
following books: Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of
Power (1950), Terror and Progress: USSR (1954),
Political Power and Social Theory (1958), Social Ori-
gins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant
in the Making of the Modern World (1966), Reflec-
tions on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain
Proposals to Eliminate Them (1972), Injustice: The
Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (1978), and
Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984).
For Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Professor Moore received the Woodrow Wilson Foun-
dation Award for 1967 and the Macher Award for
1968. In 1973 Phi Beta Kappa gave him the Ralph
Waldo Emerson Award for Reflections on the Causes
of Human Misery. I. USA
These lectures will be an attempt to explain the major simi-
larities and differences in the systems of authority and inequality
in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. By focusing
on the developing character of bureaucracies in each of the three
societies we can make comparisons that bring out essential char-
acteristics in each case.
At the start it will be useful to give a very brief sketch of the
major historical factors that have determined the shape of au-
thority and social inequality in capitalist and socialist societies.
One is the body of doctrines, such as Thomas Jeffersonís synthesis
of Enlightenment theories, and their intellectual successors as they
crystallized in Marxism-Leninism. Such social theories present a
continuing diagnosis of social ills and a remedy for them. Though
the remedies seldom work, by providing a framework for under-
standing human society, the theories have an enormous influence
on the policies of rulers. A second set of factors is the require-
ments of industrialization, that is, (a) how to get the resources
to build machines; (b) how to put the machines together with
men and women to turn out huge numbers of new products; and
(c) , how to distribute these products among the general popula-
tion. A third set of factors, which I shall not discuss in any detail,
includes those that promote or prevent the emergence of a single
ruler in a police state. The last one, which it will also be neces-
sary to neglect, is the context of international relations. This con-
text can often be the main factor that determines whether or not
an historically new type of society can get started. Thus French
intervention was crucial in the American Revolution, while the
absence of powerful Western intervention was crucial to the suc-
cess of the Russian and Chinese Communist revolutions. The
[103]104 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
main point to emerge through these brief comments is that every
major country faces a very similar set of problems and issues in
the course of industrialization - including whether or not to in-
dustrialize. But the solutions differ. Prior traditions and social
institutions together with the international context largely deter-
mine the solutions.
Turning now to the United States and beginning with a look
at current doctrines, the first impression is likely to be the absence
of any single body of ideas that could channel political or more
general discussion about the character of this society. There is no
agreed-upon diagnosis and remedy for our ills, not even one that
could be widely attacked because it seems factually mistaken and
morally wrong. (Factual and moral errors do not necessarily have
anything to do with one another.) Instead one sees a rank pro-
fusion of incompatible ideas. They range from the most nonsensi-
cal forms of nativist or romantic anti-rationalism -which have
been on the increase lately - through pragmatic realism to highly
abstruse forms of rationalism and idealism. Yet this apparent con-
fusion may conceal significant recurring themes. To find out we
shall have to look more closely at patterns of social behavior as
well as ideas.
For a long time there has been a noticeable reluctance to accept
any kind of authority in the United States. No individual or office
is immune to criticism, sometimes quite savage criticism and abuse.
In the absence of an hereditary aristocracy Americans do not have
the habit of deference that has been ascribed to the British. Amer-
icans have heroes, mainly figures in sports and entertainment with
a scattering in space exploration and other dramatic areas of
science. But they lack comparable figures of authority. Well
below the level of national political leadership one finds the same
reluctance to accept authority. Some thirty years ago a distin-
guished anthropologist observed that bosses, politicians, teachers,
and ìbig shotsî were all accepted only at a discount in American [MOORE] Authority and Inequality under Capitalism and Socialism 105
1society insofar as their positions implied authority. More recently
there has appeared a substantial body of evidence from opinion
polls indicating a loss of confidence in political and economic
leadership since that time. The decline began during the war in
2Vietnam and has continued since the end of that war. Such a loss
of trust implies a further deterioration of authority, since authority
implies trust in those who command.
It is worthwhile to try to locate somewhat more precisely the
time when this loss of authority took place and the causes of this
failure. There are good reasons for holding that it derived from
the disintegration during the 1960s and 1970s of the New Deal
coalition forged by Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. Nearly forty years
ago Hans Morgenthau remarked that if one studied this coalition
in a seminar, one would conclude that it was an impossibility. The
coalition was put together with urban workers, recently enfran-
chised urban immigrants, and intellectuals - together the sources
of its liberal reformist wing - a broad spectrum of the then-rural
South with a substantial reactionary component, and other discon-
tented farmers in the Midwest, the whole topped off with a nu-
merically small but fairly influential set of business leaders who
saw no other way out of the Depression. The New Deal did not
put an end to the Depression. The boom of the Second World
War did that. Nevertheless the coalition was successful for a long
time, from 1932 to the 1960s and beyond. Its main policies were
economic growth, encouragement of unions, and social welfare
expenditures at home for the sake of equity and social peace.
Abroad its policies emphasized the support of preferably but not
necessarily liberal regimes as a bulwark against Communist ex-
pansion and in order to create a favorable climate for American
1
Cora Dubois, "The Dominant Value Profile of American Culture," in Paul
Hollander, ed., American and Soviet Society: A Render in Comparative Sociology
and Perception (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 26.
2
For a review of the evidence see Seymour Martin Lipset and William
Schneider, "The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions," Political Science
Quarteri) 98, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 379-402. 106 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
interests. American efforts to promote European recovery through
the Marshall Plan may have represented the high point in the suc-
cess of the coalitionís policies.
After that, difficulties set in gradually, each one intensifying
the others. It became apparent that perpetual economic growth
would not solve all social problems. Instead it created new ones,
such as the poisoning of the water and the atmosphere. Workers
rapidly became hostile to the environmentalists, whom they saw
as upper-class do-gooders cutting off their opportunities for fun,
money, and big cars just at the point when workers were starting
to make enough money to enter the consumer society. Welfare
expenditures grew without producing peace or social order. Blacks
rioted over long-standing grievances that suddenly seemed legiti-
mate to many middle-class whites, especially young ones. In the cities
crime increased and seemed to become more violent and vicious.
The most serious shock to the liberal establishment, however,
came from foreign affairs in the form of the war in Vietnam.
Many opponents of this conflict called it the Liberalís War. By
the middle 1960s there were no more dependable democratic allies
for the United States to support against a military and revolu-
tionary, as well as nationalist, Communist offensive. Before long
the government in Washington found itself fighting a war with-
out real prospect of victory and increasingly unpopular at home.
After a long search for a diplomatic fig leaf to cover its with-
dra