Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games

Ecole Normale Supérieure, Bruno Blanchet And David Pointcheval Cnrs, Département D'Informatique

Description

Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval CNRS, Departement d'Informatique, Ecole Normale Superieure January 2008 Bruno Blanchet, David Pointcheval Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games

• computational assumptions


• message authentication


• security protocols


• cryptographic protocols


• property can


• automated security


• scheme


• signature


• produced proofs


• hash

Sujets

• Blanchet
• Cryptographic protocol
• Scheme
• Signature

Informations

• Publié par: pefav
• Nombre de lectures: 14
• Langue: English

Extrait

rBnu AutomatedSecurityProofs withSequencesofGames BrunoBlanchetandDavidPointcheval CNRS,De´partementd’Informatique, E ´ coleNormaleSupe´rieure olBnahcte,aDivdoPi January2008 tnhcvelauAotametdeSucirytrPofosiwhteSuqneecsfoaGems

rPofosforcpyotrgpaihcrptooocsl Therearetwomainframeworksforanalyzingsecurityprotocols: TheDolev-Yaomodel:aformal,abstractmodel. Thecryptographicprimitivesareidealblackboxes. Theadversaryusesonlythoseprimitives. Proofscanbedoneautomatically. Thecomputationalmodel:arealisticmodel. Thecryptographicprimitivesarefunctionsonbit-strings. Theadversaryisapolynomial-timeTuringmachine. Proofsaredonemanually. Ourgoal:achieveautomaticprovabilityundertherealistic computationalassumptions. rBnuolBnahcte,aDivdoPnictehavluAotametdeSucirytrPofosiwhteSuqneecsfoaGems

Anautomaticprover Wehaveimplementedanautomaticproversoundinthe computationalmodel: provessecrecypropertiesandthateventscanbeexecuted onlywithnegligibleprobability. handlesvariouscryptographicprimitives:MACs(message authenticationcodes),streamandblockciphers,public-key encryption,signatures,hashfunctions,... worksforNsessionswithanactiveadversary. givesaboundontheprobabilityofanattack (exactsecurity). rBnuolBnahcte,aDivdoPnictehavluAotametdeSucirytrPofosiwhteSuqneecsfoaGems