Early Childhood Public School Teacher Licensure for the Fifty States ...

Eric Filiol

Description

Ar kansas Soy b ean Per for mance Tests A R K A N S A S A G R I C U L T U R A L E X P E R I M E N T S T A T I O N Division of Agriculture University of Arkansas December 2002 Research Series 500 D.G. Dombek D.K. Ahrent R.D. Bond I.L. Eldridge 2002

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Sujets

• Weller
• Branson
• Gordon
• Becton
• Robbins
• Cingolani
• Kennedy

Informations

• Publié par: omkue
• Nombre de lectures: 35
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Dynamic Cryptographic Backdoors Part II
Taking Control over the TOR Network
Eric Filiol (speaker) - Oluwaseun Remi-Omosowon (speaker)
- Leonard Mutembei
[e-mail], [e-mail]
http://sites.google.com/site/ericfiliol
https://sites.google.com/site/esieanismaster/
ESIEA - Laval
Operational Cryptology and Virology Lab (C + V )⁰

28C3 2011 - Berlin
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 1 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Outline
Introduction

Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors
• Introduction
• OS level dynamic trapdoors
• Algorithm level dynamic trapdoor

Taking Over the Tor network
• Tor network description
• Cryptography and security in Tor network
• Taking control over the Tor network

Conclusion
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 2 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Cryptanalysis reality
• What does “to break cryptography” mean?
• Use the “armoured door on a paper/cardboard wall“ syndrome?
• The environment (O.S, user, network architecture...) is the
significant dimension.
• Make sure that everyone uses the standards/norms/tools you want
to impose (one standard to tie up them all).
• Standardization of mind and cryptographic designs/implementation.
• Can we subcontract security stuff to official organizations (GOs or
NGOs)?
• Think in a different way and far from the official cryptographic
thought.
• To break a system means actually and quickly access the plaintext
whatever may be the method.
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 3 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Dynamic Cryptographic Backdoors Part 1 Content
• Presented at CanSecWest 2011 (sequel of H2HC 2010 and Black Europe
2010).
• We have shown how to
• Bypass IPSec-based encrypted networks (with or without Tempest
hardening).
• Break operationally unknown, weakly implemented stream ciphers or
block ciphers in stream cipher mode.
• Application to IP encryptors.
• All techniques tested and validated in real conditions/environments.
• Let us now present how to use all of this to take control over the TOR
network in a dynamic way.
• Our working operational scenario:
• a non-democratic country which wants to monitor all its political
opponents (outside and inside the country).
• any small/medium size group of bad guys.
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 4 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Malware
• We all know what a malware is
• Electronic Frontier Foundation ( https://ssd.eff.org/tech/malware )
 “The risk that any given computer is infected with malware is
therefore quite high unless skilled computer security specialists are
putting a substantial amount of effort into securing the system.”
 “It is unlikely that U.S. government agencies would use malware
except as part of significant and expensive investigations”
• Problem:
 We think attackers are one step behind
 Will governments bother with traffic confirmation if they have no
access to the destination server?
 Military == Coordinated significant attacks
 Operational fact:
 Accessing 1% of plaintext is already a cryptanalysis success!

(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 5 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Summary of the talk
Introduction

Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors
Recall of previous chapters (CanSecWest 2011 mostly)



Taking Over the Tor network
Tor network description
Cryptography and security in Tor network
Taking control over the Tor network

Conclusion
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 6 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Outline
Introduction

Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors
• Recall of previous chapters (CanSecWest 2011 mostly)


Taking Over the Tor network
• Tor network description
• Cryptography and security in Tor network
• Taking control over the Tor network

Conclusion
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 7 /56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Recap: Dynamic Cryptographic trapdoor
 We examine how a simple malware can be used for coordinated attack
 Many encryption algorithms rely on the operating system primitives to
generate the IVs and secret keys (e.g. Microsoft cryptographic API).
 Hook the API function
 Cryptographic algorithms can be modified in memory: mode/design
 No modification on the hard disk (no static forensics evidence).
 Turn CBC/ECB modes into OFB/CFB/CTR mode
 The trapdoor has a limited period of time and can be replayed more than
once. Dynamic periods of time with weak encryption.
 The attacker has just to intercept the ciphertext and perform the
cryptanalysis in polynomial time.
 The “static (mathematical) security” remains unquestioned!
 Same approach for other equivalent resources (network infrastructure, key
infrastructure, network-based key management...)
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 8/56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Recap: Hooking the CryptGenRandom function
• A malicious DLL is injected in some (suitable) processes. This DLL hooks the
CryptGenRandom function (included in Microsoft's Cryptographic Application
Programming Interface).





• A timing function checks whether we are in the time window given as
parameter sTime(12; 00; 14; 00)[ …]. will hook the CryptGenRandom function
between noon and 2 pm only.
• CryptGenRandom return value is modified by the function
HookedCryptGenRandom (fixed value).
• On Bob's side, the cipher text can still be deciphered.
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 9/56 Introduction Dynamic cryptographic trapdoors The TOR Attack Conclusion

Recap: Hooking the CryptGenRandom function (2)
(ESIEA - (C + V )⁰ lab) The Tor Attack 28C3 2011 10/56