Introduction Computationally sound prover Computationally sound logic Modular approach Case studies Conclusion

Introduction Computationally sound prover Computationally sound logic Modular approach Case studies Conclusion

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Introduction Computationally sound prover Computationally sound logic Modular approach Case studies Conclusion FormaCrypt: Formal Computational Cryptography Bruno Blanchet1, David Pointcheval1 Jean Goubault-Larrecq2, Hubert Comon-Lundh2 Stephanie Delaune2, Steve Kremer2 Veronique Cortier3, Mathieu Turuani3 Martın Abadi4 1LIENS 2LSV 3LORIA 4UCSC & Microsoft Research November 2008 Bruno Blanchet et al FormaCrypt: Formal Computational Cryptography

  • modular approach

  • introduction computationally

  • security protocols

  • participants laboratoire d'informatique de l'ecole normale

  • formal computational

  • sound prover


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Publié par
Ajouté le 19 juin 2012
Nombre de lectures 10
Langue English
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FormaCrypt: Formal Computational Cryptography
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Bruno Blanchet1, David Pointcheval1 Jean Goubault-Larrecq2, Hubert Comon-Lundh2 StephanieDelaune2, Steve Kremer2 VeroniqueCortier3, Mathieu Turuani3 Martın Abadi4
November 2008
2LSV3LORIA4UCSC & Microsoft Research
1LIENS
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Introduction studies Case Conclusion Computationally sound logic Modular approachComputationally sound prover ARA SSIA FormaCrypt: participants LaboratoiredInformatiquedelEcoleNormaleSuperieure(LIENS) Bruno Blanchet David Monniaux (at VERIMAG since Sept. 1st, 2007) David Pointcheval LaboratoireSpecicationetVerication(LSV),ENSCachan Jean Goubault-Larrecq Mathieu Baudet (at DCSSI since July 1st, 2006) Hubert Comon-Lundh (from August 2007) StephanieDelaune(fromOctober2007) Steve Kremer LaurentMazare(October2006April2007) Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA) VeroniqueCortier StephanieDelaune(January2007September2007) HeinrichHordegen(PhdthesisdefendedinDecember2007) Mathieu Turuani Bogdan Warinschi (in Bristol since January 2007) Eugen Zalinescu (Phd thesis defended in December 2007) Scientific advisor: Martın Abadi Bruno Blanchet et al FormaCrypt: Formal Computational Cryptography
lCryptography
There are two main frameworks for analyzing security protocols: TheDolev-Yao model: a formal, abstract model. The cryptographic primitives areideal blackboxes. The adversary uses only those primitives. Proofs can be done automatically. Thecomputational model realistic model.: a The cryptographic primitives are functions on bit-strings. The adversary is a polynomial-time Turing machine. Proofs are done manually. Our goal:bridge the gap between these two frameworks.
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