Introduction OEKE Assumptions The proof Conclusion

Bruno Blanchet

Description

Introduction OEKE Assumptions The proof Conclusion Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key Exchange Bruno Blanchet Joint work with David Pointcheval Ecole Normale Superieure, CNRS, INRIA, Paris December 2010 Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval OEKE in CryptoVerif December 2010 1 / 29

• exact security


• cryptographic primitives


• proofs can


• protocol


• key encryption


• produced proofs

Sujets

• Blanchet
• Protocol

Informations

• Publié par: pefav
• Nombre de lectures: 12
• Langue: English

Extrait

nI B t r or u d n u o ct lB oi a n cneht EOEKsAsmutpoisnhTerpoof AutomaticallyVerifiedMechanizedProofof One-EncryptionKeyExchange nadDvadioPnit BrunoBlanchet [e-mail] JointworkwithDavidPointcheval E ´ coleNormaleSupe´rieure,CNRS,INRIA,Paris cehavl December2010 EOEKniCyrtpoeVirfDecebmer2010 Cocnul 1 soi / n 29

nItorudctoin Motivation rBnuolB EOEKsAsmutpoisnhTerpoofCocnulsoi EKE(EncryptedKeyExchange): Apassword-basedkeyexchangeprotocol. Anon-trivialprotocol. Ittooksometimebeforegettingapropercomputationalproofofthis protocol. Ourgoal: Mechanize,andautomateasfaraspossible,itsproofusingthe computationalprotocolverifierCryptoVerif. ThisisanopportunityforseveralinterestingextensionsofCryptoVerif. nacehtnadDvadioPnitcehavlEOEKniCyrtpoeVirfDecebmer20102/ n 29

nItorudctoinEOEK ThegoalofCryptoVerif sAsmutpoisnhTerpoofC Twomodelsforsecurityprotocols: Computationalmodel: messagesarebitstrings cryptographicprimitivesarefunctionsfrombitstringstobitstrings theadversaryisaprobabilisticpolynomial-timeTuringmachine Proofsaremostoftendonemanually. Formalmodel(so-called“Dolev-Yaomodel”): cryptographicprimitivesareidealblackboxes messagesaretermsbuiltfromthecryptographicprimitives theadversaryisrestrictedtouseonlytheprimitives Proofscanbedoneautomatically. CryptoVerifachievesmechanizedprovabilityundertherealistic computationalassumptions. rBnuolBnacehtnadDvadioPnitcehavlEOEKniCyrtpoeVirfDecebmer2010 ocnul 3 soi / n 29