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Introduction to cryptographic protocols

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44 pages
Introduction to cryptographic protocols Bruno Blanchet CNRS, École Normale Supérieure, INRIA March 2009 (Slides by Stéphanie Delaune) Bruno Blanchet (CNRS) Introduction to cryptographic protocols March 2009 1 / 18

  • agent alice

  • later deny

  • really counted

  • voters can

  • outcome really

  • individual verifiability

  • having

  • alice initiates


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Introduction to cryptographic protocols
March 2009
CNRS, École Normale Supérieure, INRIA blanchet@di.ens.fr
/1810290rahc
(Slides by Stéphanie Delaune)
Bruno Blanchet
t(heRSCNoBunnclarBphicprotryptogratcoitncoI)tnorud
Cryptographic protocols small programs designed tosecure communication (various security goals) usecryptographic primitives(e.g. encryption, hash function,
Cryptographic protocols
18/29002hcraMsloco
SRNC(tehcnalBonuocntioctduront)IBr
Cryptographic protocols
81
Cryptographic protocols small programs designed tosecure communication (various security goals) usecryptographic primitives(e.g. encryption, hash function,
hpcirptoyrtpgoarch20092/ocolsMar
NC(tehcnalBonurBSRI)tnorudtcoitnocryptographicprcotoMslohcra9002183/
Non-repudiation:Alicesends a message toBob.Alicecannot later deny having sent this message.Bobcannot deny having received the message. ...
Fairness:AliceandBobwant to sign a contract.Aliceinitiates the protocol. MayBobobtain some advantage?
Security properties (1)
Authentication the agent: IsAlicereally talking toBob?
Secrecy an intruder learn some secret message between two: May honest participants?