Niveau: Supérieur, Doctorat, Bac+8
The College Choice Mechanism Design Litsa Alexandra?and Maguet Jean-Franc¸ois† February 22, 2012 Abstract A crucial issue in the problem of school choice is that students can have a ‘de- gree' of priorities when faced with the choice of schools. However, according to the existing literature, the mechanisms behind this issue consider strict preferences for students and priorities for schools. In this paper, we assume that students have also their own priorities to which is associated some ‘degree' that designates the preference of an individual (resp. college) for a college relative to parameters that characterize the latter one (resp. individual). Thus, we talk about fuzzy priorities. Our purpose is to analyze this missing problem in the literature and to propose a mechanism which takes into account the priorities and their respective degree for both students and colleges. KEYWORDS: Education, Priorities, Fuzzy, Preferences, Mechanism, Matching. mllJEL Codes: C78, D80, I20, I31. 1 Introduction As printed out by Roth: ‘Matching is one of the important functions of markets. Who gets which job, which school places, who marries whom, these help shape lives and careers'. (Roth, 2008) Gale and Shapley (1962) were the first to introduce matching models based on mar- riage and college admission problems. Their required objective was to assign a type of agent to another: In their case, the question was to make correspond a man to a woman or a student at a college.
- has higher priority
- school choice
- agent
- mechanism
- pareto efficient
- priorities
- such
- top cycles
- cycles mecha- nism