Les Découvertes après le crash de Jules Bianchi - CP de la FIA.

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Description

Les Découvertes après le crash de Jules Bianchi - CP de la FIA.
Accident Panel The following is a summary of the findings of the Accident Panel's examination of the circumstances surrounding Jules Bianchi's crash at the Japanese Grand Prix on 5 October, 2014 in Suzuka.
WED 03.12.14, 4:04PM
On lap 43 of the Japanese GP, Jules Bianchi lost control of his Marussia in Turn 7, and struck a mobile crane that was recovering Adrian Sutil’s Sauber, which had crashed the lap before. Bianchi suffered life-threatening injuries to his head, and was evacuated to hospital by ambulance.
The weather conditions at the time were rain and a deteriorating track condition, and the section of the track where the accident occurred was subject to double yellow flags, due to Sutil’s crash.
A review of all the evidence and other information about the events leading up to Bianchi’s accident has been carried out by the 10-man Accident Panel, appointed by the FIA. The Panel has issued a 396-page report on their findings with recommendations for improvements, many relevant to all of motorsport. This has been presented to the FIA World Motorsport Council.

Sujets

• Jules Bianchi
• Formule 1

Informations

• Publié par: Fil_Sport
• Publié le: 04 décembre 2014
• Nombre de lectures: 8 537
• Langue: English

Extrait

Accident Panel The following is a summary of the findings of the Accident Panel's examination of the circumstances surrounding Jules Bianchi's crash at the Ja anese Grand Prix on 5 October, 2014 in Suzuka.

WED 03.12.14, 4:04PM

On lap 43 of the Japanese GP, Jules Bianchi lost control of his Marussia in Turn 7, and struck a mobile crane that was recoverin Adrian Sutil’s Sauber, which had crashed the lap before. Bianchi suffered lifethreatening injuries to his head, and was evacuated to hospital by ambulance.

The weather conditions at the time were rain and a deterioratin track condition, and the sectio n of the track where the accident occurred was subject to double yellow flags, due to Sutil’s crash.

A review of all the evidence and other information about the events leadin up to Bianchi’s accident has been carried out b the 10man Accident Panel, appointed b the FIA. The Panel has issued a 396pa e report on their findin s with recommendations for improvements, man relevant to all of motorsport. This has been presented to the FIA World Motorsport Council.

Conclusions:

The review of the events leadinissuesup to Bianchi’s accident indicate that a number of ke occurred, which may have contributed to the accident, though none alone caused it:

1. The semidry racing line at T 7 was abruptly narrowed by water draining onto the track and flowing downhill along it. Both Sutil, and Bianchi one lap later, lost control at this point in T 7.

2.mobile crane when Bianchirecovered b Sutil’s car was in the process of bein approached Sectors 7 and 8, which include the part of T 7 where the recover was takin place. Sectors 7 and 8 were subject to double yellow flags.

3. Bianchi did not slow sufficientl Sutil.

to avoid losin

control at the same

oint on the track as

4. If drivers adhere to the re uirements of double ellow fla s, as set out in A Art. 2.4.5.1.b, then neither com etitors nor officials should be ut in immediate or h danger.

endix H, sical

5.Sutil’s accident were consistent with the re ulations, andThe actions taken followin their interpretation followin 384 incidents in the precedin 8 ears. Without the benefit of hindsi ht, there is no apparent reason wh the Safet Car should have been deplo ed either before or after Sutil’s accident.

6. Bianchi overcontrolled the oversteerin car, such that he left the track earlier than Sutil, and headed towards a point “upthe barrier. Unfortunatel , the mobile crane wasstream” alon in front of this part of the barrier, and he struck and underran the rear of it at high speed.

7. Durinthe 2 seconds Bianchi’s car was leavin the track and traversin the runoff area, he applied both throttle and brake to ether, usin both feet. The FailSafe al orithm is desi ned to override the throttle and cut the en ine, but was inhibited b the Torque Coordinator, which controls the rear Brakeb stem. Bianchi’s Marussia has a uniqueWire s design of BBW, which proved to be incompatible with the FailSafe settings.

8. The fact that the FailSafe did not disqualif the en ine torque requested b the driver ma have affected the impact velocit ; it has not been possible to reliabl quantif this. However, it ma be that Bianchi was distracted b what was happenin and the fact that his front wheels had locked, and been unable to steer the car such that it missed the crane.

9.Bianchi’s helmet struck the sloping underside of the crane. The magnitude of the blow and the lancin nature of it caused massive head deceleration and an ular acceleration, leading to his severe injuries.

10. All rescue and medical procedures were followed, and their expediency are considered to have contributed significantly to the saving of Bianchi’s life.

11.It is not feasible to mitigate the injuries Bianchi suffered by either enclosing the driver’s cockpit, or fitting skirts to the crane. Neither approach is practical due to the very large forces involved in the accident between a 700kg car striking a 6500kg crane at a speed of 126kph. There is simply insufficient impact structure on a F1 car to absorb the energy of such an impact without either destroying the driver’s survival cell, or generating nonsurvivable decelerations.

It is considered fundamentally wrong to try and make an impact between a racing car and a large and heavy vehicle survivable. It is imperative to prevent a car ever hitting the crane and/or the marshals working near it.

Recommendations:

A number of recommendations for im rovements have been motorsport. They include the following:

1. A new regulation for double yellow flags:

ro osed, relevant in man cases to all of

Proposed new Appendix H Article (possibly under 2.4.5.1 b):

The Clerk of the Course will impose a speed limit in any section of track where double yellow flags are being displayed.

It is ro osed that a Workin Grou , made u of FIA Race Directors and Stewards should meet and draw u detailed re ulations and uidelines for the a lication of this new re ulation, in time to apply it in 2015 across international circuit racing.

2. Safety critical software:

A review of safety critical software and measures to check its integrity will take place.

3. Track drainage:

Guidelines on circuit drainage will be reviewed, to include drainage off access roads.

4. 4hour Rule:

Article 5.3 of the F1 Sporting Regulations states that:

However, should the race be suspended (see Article 41) the length of the suspension will be added to this period up to a maximum total race time of four hours.

It is proposed that a re ulation or uideline be established such that the Start time of an event shall not be less than 4 hours before either sunset or dusk, except in the case of night races.

It is also recommended that the F1 Calendar is reviewed in order to avoid, where possible, races taking place during local rainy seasons.

5. Super Licence

It is proposed that drivers acquiring a Super Licence for the first time should undertake a course to familiarise themselves with the procedures used by F1 in running and ensuring the safety of an event.

It is also proposed that new licence holders pass a test to ensure that they are familiar with all the relevant regulations.

6. F1 risk review

Consideration will be given to a review of F1 risk, in order to ascertain whether there are an y significant holes in the safety defences, such that an unforeseen combination of circumstances could result in a serious accident.

7. Tyres

It is part of the challenge of a racing driver to drive his car as fast as possible given the track conditions combined with the characteristics of his tyres. Although the characteristics of the wet weather tyres provided by Pirelli did not influence Bianchi’s accident or its outcome in any significant way, it is recommended that provision is made for the tyr e supplier to develop and adequately test wet weather tyres between each F1 season, such that it is able to supply the latest developments to the first event.

Composition of the Accident Panel

Presidency

Peter Wright, President of the Safety Commission

Members

Ross Brawnand former Technical, former Team Principal of Mercedes F1 Team, Brawn Grand Prix Director of Scuderia Ferrari

Stefano Domenicali, former Team Principal of Scuderia Ferrari

Gerd Ennser, Chief Stewards’ representative

Emerson Fittipaldi, President of the FIA Drivers’ Commission, F1 Steward

Eduardo de Freitas, WEC Race Director

Roger Peart, President of the Circuits Commission, President of the ASN of Canada, F1 Steward

Antonio Rigozzi,Advocate, Judge at the International Court of Appeal of the FIA coopted by the teams

Gérard Saillant, President of the FIA Institute and President of the Medical Commission

Alex Wurz, President of the GPDA, drivers’ representative