Endogenous institution choice in social dilemmas [Elektronische Ressource] / Özgür Gürerk

Guererk

Sujets

• Soziologie

Informations

• Publié par: universitat_erfurt
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2007
• Nombre de lectures: 28
• Langue: Deutsch

Extrait

Endogenous Institution Choice
in Social Dilemmas




Özgür Gürerk

2007



DISSERTATION
zur Erlangung des Grads eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaft
(Dr. rer. pol.) der
Universität Erfurt
Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Bettina Rockenbach
Prof. Dr. Manfred Königstein
Datum der Disputation: 14.11.2007

urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-200701153
[http://nbn-resolving.de/200701153]


2Zusammenfassung
Die ökonomische Theorie kann viele Facetten des kooperativen Verhaltens, die durch einen
Konflikt zwischen Individual- und Gemeinschaftsinteressen gekennzeichnet sind, wie z.B.
Kooperation in sozialen Dilemmasituationen, nicht umfassend erklären. Empirische Evidenz
aus experimentellen Untersuchungen zeigt, dass sogar elementare institutionelle
Rahmenbedingungen wie einfache Belohnungs- oder Bestrafungsmechanismen Kooperation
fördern können, falls diese in einer Gesellschaft von Außen (exogen) „installiert“ werden. Die
Frage, ob diese Sanktionsmechanismen von Individuen selbst (endogen) gewählt und einen
Wettbewerb mit alternativen Institutionen „überleben“ würden, ist noch nicht ausreichend
beantwortet worden. Diese Dissertation trägt zur Kooperationsforschung bei, indem sie die
endogene Wahl von Institutionen wie Bestrafungs- und Belohnungsmechanismen und deren
Auswirkungen auf Kooperationsverhalten in sozialen Dilemmasituationen untersucht.
Schlagworte: endogen, Institution, Wahl, soziales Dilemma, Experiment, Bestrafung,
Belohnung

Abstract
Standard economic theory fails to explain many facets of cooperative behavior, e.g.,
cooperation in social dilemma situations which are characterized by the conflict between
individual and collective interests. There is empirical evidence from experimental studies
showing that even elementary institutional arrangements such as simple reward or punishment
mechanisms can foster cooperation when these mechanisms are exogenously “installed” in a
community. The question of whether these sanctioning mechanisms would be endogenously
chosen by individuals and “survive” a competition with alternative institutions is not yet
satisfactorily answered. This thesis contributes to the literature on cooperation by
investigating the endogenous choice of institutions with punishment and reward mechanisms,
and by exploring their effects on cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations.
Keywords: endogenous, institution, choice, social dilemma, experiment, punishment, rewards
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To my beloved mother Serap Gürerk
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Acknowledgements

First of all, I am greatly indebted to my advisor, Bettina Rockenbach, for her continuous
support and for the provision of an excellent working atmosphere.

I would like also thank my co-author Bernd Irlenbusch for many inspiring discussions.

I also thank my current and former colleagues at the University of Erfurt; Kai Ahlborn, Pierre
Gericke, Stefan Große, Mario Gruppe, Sebastian Händschke, Mareike Hoffmann, Vahidin
Jeleskovic, Manfred Königstein, Thomas Lauer, Mark Meyer, Mark Peacock, Christiane Pilz,
Elke Renner, Arne Weiß, Tim Wenniges, and Irenaeus Wolff, for their valuable comments
and help.

My very special thanks go to Andrea Bäcker.

Most of all I am very grateful for the everlasting support, encouragement, and love that I
received from my parents, Serap Gürerk and Alim Gürerk, and my brother Barı ş Can Gürerk.

5CONTENTS
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ...................................................................................................................................... 3
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................................................. 5
OVERVIEW................................... 7
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................................... 10
1. THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS 11
1.1. INTRODUCTION.... 11
1.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ..................................................................................................................... 12
1.3. RESULTS.............. 12
1.4. CONCLUSIONS...... 16
1.5. REFERENCES........ 18
2. COMMUNITY CHOICE IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS – A “VOTING WITH ONE’S FEET”
APPROACH........................................................................................................................................................ 20
2.1. INTRODUCTION.... 20
2.2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF COMMUNITY CHOICE .......................................................................................... 22
2.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................... 24
2.4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 40
2.5. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................. 41
2.6. CONCLUSION....... 51
2.7. REFERENCES........ 54
3. SOCIAL HISTORY AND THE COMMUNITY CHOICE IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS ...................... 57
3.1. INTRODUCTION.... 57
3.2. THE BASIC MODEL AND THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN........................................................................ 58
3.3. RESULTS.............. 58
3.4. CONCLUSIONS...... 60
3.5. REFERENCES........ 61
4. MOTIVATING TEAMMATES: THE LEADER’S CHOICE OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
INCENTIVES...................................................................................................................................................... 62
4.1. INTRODUCTION.... 62
4.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 64
4.3. WHICH INCENTIVE SCHEME WILL A LEADER CHOOSE? ........................................................................ 65
4.4. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................. 66
4.5. CONCLUSION....... 73
4.6. REFERENCES........ 75
APPENDIX.......................................................................................................................................................... 78
APPENDIX 1.1. MATERIALS AND METHODS.................................................................................................. 78
APPENDIX 1.2. SUPPORTING FIGURES AND TABLES...................................................................................... 80
REFERENCES TO APPENDIX 1.2. ........................................................................................................................ 81
APPENDIX 1.3. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EXPERIMENT..................................................................................... 82
A 2.1. I EXPERIMENT PUN TREATMENT........................................................ 84
APPENDIX 2.2. COROLLARIES, PROOFS AND CALCULATIONS ........................................................................ 86
A 3.1. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EXPERIMENT 93
APPENDIX 3.2. REPORT SHEET FOR THE EXPERIMENT................................................................................... 95
A 4.1. INSTRUCTI EXPERIMENT 96
APPENDIX 4.2. SUPPORTING FIGURES........................................................................................................... 98
CURRICULUM VITAE................................................................................................................................... 100




6Overview
The phenomenon of human cooperation is object of the study in many research disciplines.
While evolutionary models based on kinship (Hamilton, 1964) and direct reciprocity (Trivers,
1971) explain cooperation among relatives and in direct relationships, the emergence and
evolution of cooperation in large groups is still not fully understood. Standard economic
theory fails in explaining many facets of cooperative behavior, e.g., cooperation in social
dilemma situations which are characterized by the conflict between individual and collective
interests. In contrast to theoretical predictions, experimental evidence shows the existence of
cooperation even in social dilemma situations (see e.g. Ledyard, 1995 or Camerer, 2003).
However, if institutional rules are absent, cooperation is highly fragile.
Institutions can be broadly defined as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms
of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005). The institutional framework defines
“the rules of the game” on which the monetary and non-monetary consequences of
individuals’ actions depend. It is obvious that institutional arrangements influence the
behavior of the interacting individuals in social dilemma situations. For thi