Experimental studies on cross-cultural Behaviour between Germans and Chinese [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von Hong Geng

Hong Geng

Informations

• Publié par: rheinische_friedrich-wilhelms-universitat_bonn
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 9
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Experimental Studies on
cross-cultural Behaviour
between Germans and Chinese








Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftswissenschaften
durch die
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität
Bonn





vorgelegt von

Hong Geng

aus Chengdu, China








Bonn, 2010 
  













Dekan: Prof. Dr. Christian Hillgruber
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Reinhard Selten
Zweitreferent: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Kube
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 08.02.2010

Diese Dissertation ist auf dem Hochschulschriftenserver der ULB Bonn unter
http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/diss_online elektronisch publiziert.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all those people and financial supporters who gave me the possibility to
complete this dissertation.
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Dr. mult. h.c.
Reinhard Selten for the continuous support of my PhD study and research, for his patience,
motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. This thesis would not have been possible
without his encouragement and effort. One simply could not wish for a better supervisor.
My sincere thanks are due to Dr. Heike Hennig-Schmidt: for her great interest in Chinese
culture and initiating the Sino-German project, as well as detailed review, constructive
criticism and excellent advice during the preparation of this thesis.
I owe my most sincere gratitude to my collaborators Professor Dr. Bettina Rockenbach and
Arne Weiss, who gave me the opportunity to work with them and untiring help during my
work.
I thank my fellow lab mates in BonnEconLab: Gari Walkowitz, Sebastian Goerg, Johannes
Kaiser, Patricia Fridrich, Chaoliang Yang and Daniel Wiesen: for their friendship which gave
me a great time in the last five years in the laboratory.
I am indebted to my many of Chinese colleagues Fu Hao, Cheng Peng, Ding Jieyao, Dong
Zhankui, Zheng Dong, Zong Jichuan: for their support in organizing and running experiments
in China.
I would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (HE 2790/1-2 and SE 137/31-2),
Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (10.06.1.18), Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
University of Bonn, University of Erfurt and Southwest Jiaotong University in Chengdu,
China which have financially supported me during my years of research.
I cannot end without thanking my husband Yuli, on whose constant encouragement and love I
have relied throughout my study. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents, for
giving birth to me at the first place and supporting me spiritually throughout my life.

 
   Contents 


Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter I
When Power Meets Relations – Competitive and Strategic Power in Incomplete
Contracts Market ..................................................................................................................... 9
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 9
2. Experimental design and procedure ................................................................................ 13
2.1 Treatments ................................................................................................................ 13
2.2 Payoffs ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.3 Defining “relational contracting” .............................................................................. 16
2.4 Procedure .................................................................................................................. 16
3. Market equilibria and behavioural hypotheses ............................................................... 17
3.1 Analyses of market equilibria ................................................................................... 17
3.1.1 Predictions for strategic power ....................................................................... 18
3.1.2 Predictions for competitive power .................................................................. 18
3.2 Behavioural hypotheses ............................................................................................ 18
3.2.1 Hypotheses for strategic power ...................................................................... 20
3.2.2 Hypotheses for competitive power ................................................................. 21
3.2.3 Hypotheses for the interaction between strategic and competitive power ..... 23
3.2.4 Hypotheses for the interaction of strategic power and competitive power with
relational contracting ..................................................................................... 23
4. Results of the German sessions ...................................................................................... 24
4.1 The role of strategic power ....................................................................................... 24
4.2 The role of competitive power .................................................................................. 28
4.3 The interaction between competitive and strategic power ....................................... 31
5. The role of relational contracting ................................................................................... 33
5.1 Treatment differences mainly driven by trades outside relations ............................. 33
5.2 Are the treatment effects dependent on the subjects‘ reliance on relational
contracting?............................................................................................................... 35
6. Cross-cultural hypotheses ............................................................................................... 37
7. Results of the Chinese sessions ...................................................................................... 38
7.1 Relational contracting 38
7.2 Cooperation and efficiency ....................................................................................... 39
7.3 When relations meet strategic power ........................................................................ 40
7.4 Wheet competitive power .................................................................. 44
7.5 Relational contracting and the interaction between strategic and competitive power
........................................................................................................................................ 45
8. The nature of relational contracting ................................................................................ 47
8.1 The cross-cultural characteristics of relational contracting ...................................... 47
8.2 The determinants of relational contracting ............................................................... 49
8.2.1 Relational contracting – causality or correlation? .......................................... 49
8.2.2 When power meets relations ........................................................................... 50
8.2.3 When culture m.......................................................................... 53 
9. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 55
10. Discussion and outlook ................................................................................................... 57
Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 60

Chapter II
The Limited Power of Voting to Limit Power – A Stress-test in China and Germany
........................................................................................................................................ 67
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 67
2. Experimental design and procedure ................................................................................ 70
2.1 Experimental implementation ................................................................................... 70
2.2 Experimental design in more details......................................................................... 73
2.2.1 Framed text and separated roles ..................................................................... 73
2.2.2 Statements of candidates ................................................................................. 73
2.2.3 Payoff for non-selected candidate .................................................................. 74
2.2.4 Belief and hypothetical decision ..................................................................... 74 
2.3 Procedure ............................................................