Explanation and understanding through scientific models [Elektronische Ressource] : perspectives for a new approach to scientific explanation / vorgelegt von Richard David-Rus

Richard David-Rus

Sujets

• Wissenschaft
• Philosophie

Informations

• Publié par: ludwig-maximilians-universitat_munchen
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2010
• Nombre de lectures: 9
• Langue: English

Extrait

Explanation and Understanding
through Scientific Models

Perspectives for a New Approach
to Scientific Explanation



Richard David-Rus








Dissertation
an der Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und
Religionswissenschaft
der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
München



vorgelegt von
Richard David-Rus
aus Bukarest





München, 2010









































Referent: Prof. Dr. C. U. Moulines
Korreferent: Prof. B. Lauth
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 10. Juli 2009
ii








Dedicated to my parents and my wife
iii Acknowledgements




I would like to acknowledge my feelings of gratitude to several persons who have
assisted me in different manners during my research. First of all my deep thanks to Prof. Dr.
C.U. Moulines from the Seminar for Logic and Philosophy of Science at LMU for his constant
support and steadfast advice he so kindly gave me during the elaboration of the thesis. I had the
privilege to discuss with him some of the main ideas developed in my thesis during his
doctoral colloquia. It is also due to his financial and technical support that this work was made
possible.
My special thanks are also due to Prof. Dr. W. Vossenkuhl from the Department of
Philosophy at LMU, for his encouragement and guidance especially during the first stages of
my doctoral period and in the end for having accepted to be a member of the examination
commission. I would also like to extend my feelings of gratitude to Prof. Dr B. Lauth for
having accepted to be a member of the examination commission and for his kind and eloquent
suggestions.
Furthermore my special thanks to Prof. Dr. Ilie Parvu from the Department of
Philosophy of the University of Bucharest for his advice and guidance not only during the early
stages of my doctoral studies but also at some key moments in the elaboration of this work.
Some parts of this work were discussed and reconsidered following his suggestions.
I also want to express my sincere and special thanks to my parents and my wife for their
spiritual and emotional support and encouragement all along the years of my doctoral work. It
is to them that I dedicate this work.
iv Contents


Chapter 1
Approaching the too many approaches.................................................................................... 1

Global versus local approaches................................................................................................ 3
Static versus dynamic approaches............................................................................................ 7
Explanation as application versus explanation as construction ............................................... 9
Explanation in a theory-driven perspective versus in a non-theory driven one..................... 10

Chapter 2
Explanation and models – bringing the subjects together ................................................... 13

Explanation and models – stating the questions .................................................................... 15
An historical detour: models and their relation to explanation............................................. 17
Hempel’s explicit reflection on explanation through models and analogies ......................... 22
The bearers of explanation..................................................................................................... 24
First steps towards making the case for models – overcoming the prejudices ...................... 29
Explanation in the pragmatic approach to models ................................................................. 34
Enhancing the plausibility of an inquiry into explanation through models ........................... 39
Inhibitions still left? ............................................................................................................... 42

Chapter 3
Placing scientific understanding in the new frame of inquiry ............................................. 45

The chances of the traditional accounts on explanation......................................................... 47
Friedman’s and Kitcher’s concepts........................................................................................ 48
Salmon’s concept of understanding ....................................................................................... 50
Lambert-Schurz account on scientific understanding............................................................ 51
v De Regt-Dieks account on scientific understanding – a direct and pragmatic approach....... 54
Trout’s critique of the concept of scientific understanding or the naturalists returned ......... 60
On scientific understanding – for a more generous perspective ............................................ 63
Modelist approaches............................................................................................................... 67
Representational approach ..................................................................................................... 69
Hartmann-Frigg’s account - a more general proposal on explanation through models......... 72

Chapter 4:
Further means to implement the approach on explanatory models.................................... 80

Local unification .................................................................................................................... 84
A parenthesis: the discovery-justification distinction and the built-in aspect........................ 88
The purposes of models ......................................................................................................... 89
Interrogativism – a necessary ingredient................................................................................ 97

Final Remarks:
Wrapping up and restating the main morals ...................................................................... 109

References ............................................................................................................................... 119

vi
Chapter one

Approaching the too many approaches

Anyone who intends to deal with the problem of explanation at the end of the sixth decade of
1the debate may find himself in a rather uncomfortable position. By comparison to other topics he
encounters a reticence of today’s philosophers in addressing the topic in a direct way. This is due
2seemingly to a sort of fatigue or apparent exhaustion of the desire to deal with the subject. On the other
side, one can still find active working agendas concerning topics that integrate or make reference to
certain aspects in the explanation topic. One such kind of agenda addresses topics related to certain
philosophical aspects in particular areas of science and consequently touches on issues of explanation in
that area. To mention only in passing such topics (which will be discussed in a greater detail later) one
may recall: the causal mechanism type of explanation in biological sciences or the quest of explanatory
virtues of simulations in different subfields of science.
Besides this, anyone who dares to approach the explanation topic in a straight manner
nowadays is confronted with a spectrum of accounts comprising very different proposals that may lead
to confusion or even inhibition, when getting through the topic. This chapter originates in an attempt to
overcome this situation and to make the best out of it. In order to achieve this aim my strategy was to
achieve a bird’s-eye view of the multitude of proposals with the intention to extract some general
characteristics, which may account at least partially for the divergence of approaches. At the same time
I’ll be looking for some particular ways to determine certain modalities of approaching the problem in a
pertinent register. This procedure should allow me to evaluate further the strengths and weaknesses of
the different sorts of approaches for a viable working agenda. As a consequence, I think, this will
disclose the most plausible features that any future account would have. This endeavour could be also
seen as an attempt to delineate broadly a kind of minimal program for an explanation account, given the
actual context of the philosophy of science.
Nevertheless apart from the difficulties I mentioned in the beginning, there is optimism and
hope that may be exercised as well. There are also certain advantages to work on the explanation
problem in this period. In the meantime, the debate has cooled down considerably, and leading ideas
were crystallized for certain positions together with different variations pertaining to them. By
comparison to the previous decades, there is now a more generous offer of different perspectives to
approach the topic, and the offer extends even more in r