Metaontological skepticism [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von Walter Swetly

Swetly, Russ Walter

Sujets

• Philosophie

Informations

• Publié par: ludwig-maximilians-universitat_munchen
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2009
• Nombre de lectures: 31
• Langue: English

Extrait

Metaontological Skepticism


Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Philosophie an der Ludwigs-Maximilians-Universität
München









vorgelegt von

Walter Swetly






Referent: Prof. Godehard Link


Korreferent: Professor Karl-Georg Niebergall


Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 20.07.2009




























Edward Hopper, Gas, Museum of Modern Art, New York























Den Eltern zum Dank
























Acknowledgments


This will be short and sweet. For their help by some means or other, I thank Anthony Everett,
Andreas Foldenauer, Stasys Hiob, Thomas Hofweber, Herbert Huber, Hannes Leitgeb,
Carlos-Ullisses Moulines, Odin Mühlenbein, Jakob Steinbrenner (and, of course, his wife),
Brian Weatherson, André Wenzel and Tobias Wilsch.

Special thanks go to Karl-Georg Niebergall, influence and nominalist extraordinaire, and
Alexander Soutschek, who ran the long course, reading late drafts and participating in whole
day meetings.

I owe, however, the most and deepest depts to Godehard Link, ∅ystein Linnebo, and
Alexander Oldemeier. Especially ∅ystein, and Alex had so much patience and guidance.
They were there when work got difficult.

Thanks, to my parents, my two sisters, my grandma and my grandpa, who sadly passed too
early to see this, and my uncle Rainer and his wife, my aunt Gundi, for their support and love.

Finally, thanks to my lovely girlfriend Anna for enduring me for 5 years. Keep on fighting,
cinnamon!









Contents
________________________________________________________


Chapter 1 Introduction S. 1

1.1 Worrying Questions S. 1
1.2 Metaontology S. 2
1.3 Skepticism . 3
1.4 Metaontological Skepticism S. 7
1.5 Overview S. 9


Chapter 2 Quantifier Variance S. 11

2.1 Overview S. 11
2.2 An Attempt to Specify the Theory S. 14
2.3 The Metatheoretical Commitment to
Unique Quantifier Meanings. 21
2.4 The Collapse of Quantifier Variance in Ordinary
Ontological Positions S. 22
2.5 Conclusion S. 24

Chapter 3 Carnap’s Skepticism S. 26

3.1 Overview . 26
3.2 The History of Carnap’s Skepticism S. 27
3.3 Examples of Skeptical Metametaphysics S. 32
3.4 “Logical Syntax” and “Testability and Meaning” S. 39
3.5 “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” S. 43
3.6 Frameworks S. 44
3.7 Carnap and Quantifier Variance S. 50
3.8 Conclusion S. 51
Chapter 4 The Self-Defeater Argument S. 52

4.1 Overview S. 52
4.2 A First Argument S. 54
4.3 A Revealing Response S. 57
4.4 A Better Argument . 61
4.5 Conclusion S. 63


Chapter 5 Schaffer’s Stroke S. 64

5.1 Overview S. 65
5.2 Permissivism and Two Kinds of Existence Questions S. 67
5.2.1 Permissivism and Grounding S. 67
5.2.2 Schaffer’s Diagnosis S. 69
5.3 The Problem S. 69
5.4 A Non-trivial Classical Existence Question Per Se S. 71
5.5 Traditional Existence Questions ≠ Existence
Questions Per Se S. 74
5.5.1 The Epistemological-Descriptivist Case S. 76
5.5.2 The Metaphysical Case S. 80
5.6 Conclusion S. 87




Chapter 6 Direct Reference and Platonism S. 88

6.1 Overview S. 88
6.2 Direct Reference, Structured Propositions and Rigid
Designation S. 90
6.3 Knowing Meaning and Semantic Externalism S. 102
6.4 Compositionality S. 106 6.5 Numerals as Quantifiers? S. 115
6.6 Some Related problems S. 117
6.7 Conclusion S. 123


Chapter 7 Ontology and Models S. 124

7.1 Taking Stock S. 125
7.2 Sketches of a New Account S. 126


Appendix: Triviality S. 134

A.1 Overview S. 134 .2 Triviality and Philosophy S. 135
A.3 The Role and Irreducibility of Triviality S. 138 .4 Dilemma S. 141
A.4.1 One Side . 141 .4.2 The Other Side S. 142
A.5 The Explication S. 143
A.6 A Formal Model for Triviality S. 147 .7 Objections S. 151