Religion as a seed crystal for altruistic cooperation [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von Wolfgang Pfeuffer
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Religion as a seed crystal for altruistic cooperation [Elektronische Ressource] / vorgelegt von Wolfgang Pfeuffer

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104 pages
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Publié le 01 janvier 2006
Nombre de lectures 15
Langue English
Poids de l'ouvrage 1 Mo

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ReligionasaSeedCrystal
forAltruisticCooperation
Inaugural Dissertation
zurErlangungdesGrades
Doctoroeconomiaepublicae(Dr.oec.publ.)
anderLudwig Maximilians UniversitätMünchen
2006
vorgelegtvon
WolfgangPfeuffer
Referent: Prof. Dr. EkkehartSchlicht
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. GerhardIlling
DatumdermündlichenPrüfung: 24.Juli2006
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 26.Juli2006Acknowledgements
Thisdoctoraldissertationabouttheevolutionofaltruismispartoftheresultsfrommy
affiliationasateachingassistantwiththeInstitutionalEconomicsGroupatUniversity
of Munich. In its preparation I have been lucky to benefit from the real life altruism
extendedbymanypeople,whoenabledmetobeginandcompletethispieceofworkand
havecontributedtomakingthepastfourandahalfyearsahighlyrewardingexperience.
ProfessorEkkehartSchlicht,wholeadstheInstitutionalEconomicsGroup,servedasmy
thesissupervisorandintroducedmetotheexcitingfieldofinstitutionalanalysis. Iwould
liketothankhimforhisconstantencouragementandinvaluableadvice,andformaking
hisgroupahighlyinspiringplaceofenormousscientificdiversitywherereal worldprob-
lemsareaddressedbycombiningthebestofeconomicsanditsneighboringdisciplines.
The excellent atmosphere at our chair is also due to my fellow TAs Oliver Nikutowski
andFlorianSchwimmer,bothofwhomprovidednumerousinsightfulcommentsand
suggestionsconcerningmywork,asdidseminarandconferenceparticipantsinMunich,
BarcelonaandTutzing. ThesameholdstrueformyformercolleaguesThorstenGliniars
andStefanSchubertandforoneof“my”formerstudents,MartinLeroch. Ourchairsecre
taryMariaMorgenrothkeptmybackclearofmanyadministrativeissueswhichwould
otherwisehaveimpededtheprogressofthiswork. Currentandformerstudenthelpers,
includingNicoleFröhlichandRobertoCruccolini,providedsupportbygettingmeall
sorts of digital and analog documents and, as far as the latter are concerned, dealing
withlibrarydeadlines. ProfessorsGerhardIllingandSvenRadykindlyagreedtojointhe
dissertationcommittee.
Mythanksgoouttoalloftheabove,andtomyMunich basedfriendsMaximilianGrasl,
MatthiasHellandTilmannRave,forallyourhelpandformakingthoseyearsoneofthe
besttimesofmylife.
Writingaboutaltruismandatthesametimeenjoyingitsblessingsfinallyleadsmeto
dedicatethispieceofworktomymother,themostaltruisticpersonIhaveevermet.
August2006 WolfgangPfeufferContents
1 Introduction 1
2 GameTheoryandtheProblemofCollectiveAction 5
2.1 TrustGame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Prisoners’Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 CooperativeEquilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 CoordinationProblems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 TheAxelrodTournamentsandEvolutionaryGameTheory . . . . . . 15
2.3.4 IteratedPrisoners’DilemmainEvolvingArtificial’Societies’. . . . . . 18
2.4 EmpiricalSalienceandTheoreticalAlternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 SummaryandDiscussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 EvolutionaryBiology,GroupSelection,andAltruism 28
3.1 TheEvolutionofCooperationandWithin GroupAltruism . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 SelfishGenes,InclusiveFitness,andtheGroupSelectionDebate . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Multi LevelSelection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 ModelingGroupSelection: IslandsandHaystacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
v3.5 SummaryandDiscussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Assortation,Signals,andReligion 43
4.1 MoralSentiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 MoralSentiments,CognitiveMisers,andEmbeddedness . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3 MaxWeber’s’ProtestantSects’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 ReligiousSignalingandtheCostly-to FakePrinciple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5 SummaryandDiscussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5 ReligionasaSeedCrystalforAltruism:AnEcologicalModel 57
5.1 TheIndirectEvolutionaryApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2 TheModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.2 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.3 EarningsofIndividuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.4 Opportunists’Within GenerationDynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.5 NaturalSelection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3 SimulationStudies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 ExploringtheModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.1 EquilibriumProperties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.2 ModelRobustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5 SummaryandDiscussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6 Epilogue 83
viListofFigures
2.1 BasicTrustGame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Prisoners’Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 PresentValueMatrixofPayoffFlowsinanIteratedPrisoners’Dilemma . . . 13
2.4 SetofFeasibleandIndividuallyRationalPer PeriodEarningsintheIPD . . 14
5.1 DualTimeAxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2 Opportunists’Within GenerationDynamics(“Long”Generation) . . . . . . 65
5.3 Opportunists’Within GenerationDynamics(“Short”Generation) . . . . . . 65
5.4 Opportunists’Within GenerationDynamics(“Lack”ofBelievers) . . . . . . 66
5.5 T=13,R=11,P=3,S=1,N =50,α=0.025,δ=0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.6 IrrelevanceofInitialConditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.7 Opportunists’InflowintoReligiousCommunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.8 T=13,R=11,P=3,S=1,N =60,α=0.025,δ=0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.9 T=13,R=11,P=3,S=1,N =50,α=0.04,δ=0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
c R5.10 =0.2,N=50,α=0.025,δ=0.01asin’Benchmark’CasebutHigher . . 73b P
R 11 c5.11 = ,N=50,α=0.025,δ=0.01asin’Benchmark’CasebutLower . . . 74P 3 b
vii5.12 ’Benchmark’CaseasinFigures5.5and5.6butp =0 . . . . . . . . . . 753,g=1,...
5.13 PhaseDiagramfor’Benchmark’Case(p =0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763,g=1,...
5.14 Per-PeriodEarningsofTypes,p =0.3,p =0.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 771 2
5.15 Per-PeriodEarningsofTypes,p =0.5,p =0.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781 2
5.16 Per-PeriodEarningsofTypes,p =0.7,p =0.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781 2
5.17 PhaseDiagramforAlternativeSpecification(p =0) . . . . . . . . . . . 803,g=1,...
5.18 Ill informedOpportunists(ParametersasinFigure 5.8) . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
viiiChapter1
Introduction
1“Thenecessityforcollectiverationalityisnoguaranteethatitwillobtain.” Infact,social
andespeciallyeconomiclifewouldbemucheasierifproblemsofcollectiveactiondid
notabound. Underprovisionofpublicgoods,overuseofcommonpoolresources,and
agencycostsarewell knownexamplesofeconomists’discomfortwhenitcomestothe
conflict of individual and collective rationality. Unlike in realms where Adam Smith’s
InvisibleHandcanoperatesmoothly,thetemptationforeachindividualtoopportunisti
callypursueone’sownadvantageattheexpenseofothersisinsufficientlykeptincheck
by market forces in these instances. In response, an important fraction of output in
modernindustrializedeconomiesisexpendedyearafteryeartoenforcetaxes,secure
propertyrightsandmonitorbehaviorattheworkplace. Theassociatedcostrepresents
aconsiderabledeadweightloss:Resourcescouldbesavedandchannelledtowardgen
uinelyproductiveusesifagentscouldeffectivelyrefrainfromopportunismandcredibly
committhemselvestocooperativebehavior. Everyoneinvolvedwouldthenbebetter
off. Notwithstandingthesignificanceofthistypeof’transactioncosts’(astheymightbe
termed)inadvancedeconomies,peopleindysfunctionalsocietieswherecorruptionand
1Macy(1998),§1.1,hisitalics
11. Introduction 2
nepotismreignmarvelatthe’socialcapital’thatalleviatesproblemsofcollectiveaction
andfacilitatessuperioroutcomesatleasttoacertainextentinsuccessfuleconomies. In
otherwords, institutions(understoodinaninformalsensewhichincludese. g. good
citizenship, therespectforpropertyandthehonoringofcontractualagreements)are
naturalcandidateswhenitcomestothedeterminantsofeconomicperformanceand
growth.
Empiricaleconomistshaveofcoursetakenupthetaskandconfirmedthepositivecorrela
tionbetweeneconomicperformanceofsocietyandinstitutionsofsocialcapital. Among
thedifferentdimensionsofsocialcapital,manystudieshighlighttheroleofpersonality
2traitswhichenableindividualstotrustoneanotherinbusinessdealings. Thesignifi
canceoftrustintheeconomicsphereresidesinagents’willingnesstomakethemselves
vulnerable to the opportunism of their partners: Trusting individuals in a world that
dispenseswithorcannotaffordresource consumingsafeguardsrunthedangerofbeing
cheated and exploited by untrustworthy partners — at least near the end of business
relationships. Theprecariousnatureoftrustaswellasitsefficiencyimplicationshave

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