PLANS ET RESUMES DE COURS --- Robert GARY-BOBO
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PLANS ET RESUMES DE COURS --- Robert GARY-BOBO

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ENSAE --- POLYTECHNIQUE --- SCIENCES PO MASTER OF ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY Robert GARY-BOBO PUBLIC ECONOMICS COURSE OUTLINE 1. Some Important Results of General Equilibrium Theory. Competitive equilibrium. Pareto-Optimality. Price decentralization . Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. 2. Externalities. Inefficiency of equilibrium with externalities. Pigovian Taxes. Pollution rights markets. The Coasian approach and its limits. Theory of property rights 4. Public goods. Taxonomy of public goods. Optimal production. Samuelson’s condition and Lindahl prices. Inefficiency of voluntary contribution mechanisms. Revelation of preferences. Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Notions of Mechanism Design. 5. Local Public Goods. Tiebout’s theory. Free-mobility equilibria. Land prices and capitalization. Theory of clubs. General equilibrium with club goods. 6. The Proper Scope of Government. Public procurement and auctions. Privatization and public-private partnerships. Application of the theory of incomplete contracts. 7. Economics of Police and Crime. Gary Becker’s Economics of Crime (revisited). Debates on the efficiency of prisons and police. Relational contracts approach to illegal modes of governance. 8. Road Pricing and Urban Congestion. Models of urban congestion: economics of “bottlenecks”. Principles of road pricing. The city of London as an example. 9. Education. Private and public returns to education. Debate on ...

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Nombre de lectures 148
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ENSAE --- POLYTECHNIQUE --- SCIENCES PO
MASTER OF ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Robert GARY-BOBO
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
COURSE OUTLINE
1.
Some Important Results of General Equilibrium Theory
.
Competitive equilibrium. Pareto-Optimality. Price decentralization . Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics.
2.
Externalities
.
Inefficiency of equilibrium with externalities. Pigovian Taxes. Pollution rights markets. The Coasian
approach and its limits. Theory of property rights
4.
Public goods.
Taxonomy of public goods. Optimal production. Samuelson’s condition and Lindahl prices. Inefficiency
of voluntary contribution mechanisms. Revelation of preferences. Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Notions of
Mechanism Design.
5.
Local Public Goods
.
Tiebout’s theory. Free-mobility equilibria. Land prices and capitalization. Theory of clubs. General
equilibrium with club goods.
6.
The Proper Scope of Government
.
Public procurement and auctions. Privatization and public-private partnerships. Application of the theory
of incomplete contracts.
7.
Economics of Police and Crime
.
Gary Becker’s Economics of Crime (revisited). Debates on the efficiency of prisons and police.
Relational contracts approach to illegal modes of governance.
8.
Road Pricing and Urban Congestion
.
Models of urban congestion: economics of “bottlenecks”. Principles of road pricing. The city of London
as an example.
9.
Education
.
Private and public returns to education. Debate on education as a signal. Education as a local public good.
Classroom economics. The class-size debate. School competition. Education and economic justice.
10.
Health
.
The industrial organization of health markets. Medical Insurance and Incentives. Yardstick competition.
Hospital regulation and pricing problems.
11
. Exhaustible Ressources and Environment
.
Optimal exploitation of exhaustible resources. The contingent valuation debate: the Exxon Valdez case.
The global warming problem. Fish and water.
REFERENCES
Jean-Jacques Laffont (1988),
Cours de Microéconomie, vol 1. Fondements de l’économie publique
,
Economica, Collection esa, Paris, traduction anglaise :
Fundamentals of Public Economics
, MIT Press.
Suzanne Scotchmer (2002), “Local Public Goods and Clubs”, chap. 29 in: Auerbach and Feldstein, eds,
Handbook of Public Economics
, vol. 4, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Bryan Ellickson, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer and William Zame (1999), “Clubs and the Market”,
Econometrica
, 67, 1185-1217.
John D. Donahue (1991),
The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means
, Basic Books, Perseus
Books Group, New York.
Oliver D. Hart, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997), “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory
and Application to Prisons”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 112, 1127-1161.
David Dranove and Mark Satterthwaite (2000), The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets,
Chap. 20 in: Culyer and Newhouse eds.,
Handbook of Health Economics
, vol. 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Andrei Shleifer (1985), A Theory of Yardstick Competition,
RAND Journal of Economics
, 16, 319-327.
Avinash Dixit (2004),
Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance
, Princeton
University Press.
Denis Fougère, Francis Kramarz and Julien Pouget (2008), “Youth Unemployment and Crime in France”,
Journal of European Economic Association
, forthcoming.
Richard Arnott, André de Palma and Robin Lindsey (1993), “A Structural Model of Peak-Period
Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand”,
American Economic Review
, 83, 161-179.
Geoffrey M. Heal (1993), “The Optimal Use of Exhaustible Resources”, Chapter 18 in Kneese and
Sweeney eds.,
Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics
, vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
6 empirical economics papers for exercise sessions:
6 articles d’économie empirique à traiter en travaux dirigés
:
Sandra E. Black (1999), “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 114, 577-599.
Joshua D. Angrist and Victor Lavy (1999), “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class Size
on Scholastic Achievement”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 114, 533-575.
David Dranove, Daniel Kessler, Mark McClellan and Mark Satterthwaite (2003), “Is More Information
Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers”,
Journal of Political Economy
, 111,
555-588.
Steven D. Levitt (1997), “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime”,
American Economic Review
, 87, 270-290.
Georgina Santos and Gordon Fraser (2006), “Road Pricing: Lessons from London”,
Economic Policy
,
April, 263-310.
Richard T. Carson, Robert C. Mitchell, Michael Hanemann, Raymond J. Kopp, Stanley Presser and Paul
A. Ruud (2003), “Contingent Valuation and Lost of Passive Use in Damages from the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill”,
Environmental and Resource Economics
, 25, 257-286.
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