Security cooperation as a way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons?: nuclear nonproliferation policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968 [Elektronische Ressource] / Makreeta Lahti

Makreeta Lahti

Informations

• Publié par: universitat_potsdam
• Publié le: 01 janvier 2008
• Nombre de lectures: 20
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 2 Mo

Extrait

Makreeta Lahti
PhD dissertation
University of Potsdam
Department of Economics
and Social Science
Submitted 19 Dec 2007
Accepted 4 Jul 2008







Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policies of the United
States towards the Federal Republic of
Germany and Israel, 1945-1968











































Published online at the
Institutional Repository of the University of Potsdam:
http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3145/
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-31459
[http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-31459]



To my parents, Marja Hirvisalo-Lahti and Tapio Lahti














































I am thankful for the financial support I received for this study from
the German Academic Exchange Service, the L. B. Johnson
Foundation, and the J. F. Kennedy Library Foundation; for getting
access to the collections of the US National Archives, the L. B.
Johnson Archives, the J. F. Kennedy Archives, the US Library of
Congress Manuscript Collection, and the Political Archive of the
Federal Foreign Office of Germany; to Francis Gavin for his
willingness to be a examiner of this dissertation; and for supervision
of this dissertation, and invaluable advice, to Otto Keck. Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Mehdologyand materials 7
3 Theoretical framework: using insights of Structural Realism and Rational Institutionalism 9
3.1 Security-seeking under anarchy 9
3.2 Prospects of international cooperation and how to improve them 15
3.2.1 Institutions as ways to promote cooperation among states 16
3.2.2 International security cooperation in practice 20
3.2.2.1 Forms of international agreements 22
3.2.2.2 Institutionalization of security cooperation 24
3.2.2.3 Costs, benefits, and risks of security cooperation 25
3.3 Bargaining between states 28
4 Research hypotheses 35
5 Nuclear weapons and international relations 39
5.1 Nuclear deterrence and the path to achieving it 40
5.2 Nuclear proliferation: security threat or stabilizer? 44
5.3 Why do (only) some states pursue nuclear weapons? 47
5.3.1 National security explanations 47
5.3.2 Competing and complementary explanations 49
5.4 Nonproliferation policies 53
5.4.1 Policy options 53
5.4.2 Choice of policy 58
6 President Truman – 1945-53 61
6.1 Israel’s first steps in the nuclear field 62
6.2 The creation of the Western European security system 63
6.3 Plans for West Germany’s rearmament and a European Defence Community 65
6.3.1 Western agreement on a need for West Germany’s rearmament 66
6.3.2 Control of West German armament production 71
6.3.3 Security guarantees for West Germany 75
6.3.4 Treaty on the EuropeanDefence Community 76
6.4 Conclusions regarding the Truman era 77
7 President Eisenhower – 1953-61 79
7.1 Atoms for Peace 79
7.2 West Germany’s entry into NATO and its integrated structures and strategy 82
7.2.1 West Germany joins NATO and the Western European Union 83
7.2.1.1 Agreement on West Germany’s rearmament and Adenauer’s non-nuclear pledge 83
7.2.1.2 US and British security guarantees and promises to keep troops in continental Europe 89
7.2.1.3 The legal status of Adenauer’s non-nuclear promise 90
7.2.1.4 NATO as an increasingly institutionalized alliance 91
7.2.2 Tactical nuclear weapons and the credibility of the extended US deterrent 93
7.3 Proliferation estimates and arms control ideas 100
7.3.1 Concern about nuclear weapon proliferation 101
7.3.2 Agreement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation? 103
7.3.3 Preventing independent nuclear weapon efforts through cooperation in NATO? 106
7.4 Nuclear development in West Germany and European nuclear cooperation 110
7.4.1 Western European integration in the nuclear field 112
7.4.2 Concern about potential West German nuclear weapon ambitions 117
7.4.3 Plans for European advanced armament production 119
7.5 A joint nuclear force forNATO? 126
7.6 Israeli efforts to ensure security while the US keeps distance 130
7.6.1 Eisenhower’s Middle East policy and Ben-Gurion’s efforts in security and nuclear fields 130
7.6.2 The Dimona revelation 137
7.7 Conclusions regarding the Eisenhower era 146
8 President Kennedy – 1961-63 149
8.1 Kennedy and the Israeli nuclear issue – the first years 153
8.1.1 Views and expectations of the Kennedy administration 155
8.1.2 The short-term solution: US visit to Dimona 157
8.1.3 The Dimona issue in Israel and among Arabs 162 8.1.4 Arms limitation and the Hawk sale 164
8.2 Germany’s nuclear status and nuclear weapon cooperation in NATO 168
8.2.1 The new US defense strategy 169
8.2.2 Germany’s nuclear status and the Berlin crises 172
8.2.3 Nonproliferation cooperation with Moscow? 176
8.2.4 Kennedy and the nuclear organization of NATO– the first years 179
8.2.5 The Nassau agreement: a multinational or multilateral nuclear force? 189
8.2.6 De Gaulle’s challenge and US strategy for Europe 193
8.2.6.1 Renewed concern about French-German nuclear weapon cooperation 194
8.2.6.2 Re-evaluation of European strategy 195
8.2.6.3 NATO multilateral force as a remedy for de Gaulle? 199
8.3 Israel-US battle on security guarantees, visits to Dimona, and arms limitation 207
8.3.1 Exchanging security assurances to arms limitation? 208
8.3.2 The US effort for a scheme for regular visits to Dimona 210
8.3.3 The plan for nuclear and missile limitation 215
8.3.4 Arms limitation probe with Nasser 219
8.4 The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 220
8.4.1 Broad nonproliferation goals 2
8.4.2 West Germany and the test ban – a general European settlement? 227
8.5 Partial agreements on visits to Dimona and US-Israel security relations 234
8.5.1 The Dimona visit arrangement and a slow-down of the arms limitation plan 234
8.5.2 US support for Israel’s security – short of security assurances 239
8.6 Conclusions regarding the Kennedy era 242
9 President Johnson – 1963-69 245
9.1 Johnson, visits to Dimona, and missile limitation probes 247
9.1.1 Visits to Dimona – US hope to clarify Israel’s intentions? 248
9.1.2 Tanks for Israel and the missile limitation effort 250
9.2 Johnson, West Germany, and the NATO multilateral force 258
9.2.1 Growing pressure for a multilateral force 261
9.2.2 Opposition to a jointly owned nuclear force 265
9.2.3 Silent abandonment of the multilateral force 268
9.3 Broad nuclear development in West Germany 273
9.4 The Johnson administration’s general policy on safeguards and nonproliferation in 1964-65 274
9.4.1 Promotion of safeguards 275
9.4.2 Nonproliferation policy under development 277
9.5 Israel protects its nuclear freedom of action 285
9.5.1 Problems with the Dimona visit scheme 286
9.5.2 Attempt to buy Israeli nuclear restraint with guaranteed arms supply 288
9.5.3 Further indications of Israel’s nuclear weapon effort 295
9.5.4 US aircraft for Israel and inspection of the Dimona reactor 301
9.6 Nuclear sharing in NATO and the nonproliferation treaty 305
9.6.1 Towards a consultative nuclear sharing solution inNATO 306
9.6.2 US-Soviet agreement on nuclear sharing compatible with a nonproliferation treaty 321
9.7 West German views on a nonproliferation treaty and Bonn’s role in negotiations on it 331
9.7.1 US-German negotiations and West German debates 332
9.7.2 Safeguards, export controls, and the freedom of nuclear industry 338
9.7.3 The validity of the treaty and the exit option 343
9.8 Israel’s nuclear status, the 1967 war, and US arms supply 344
9.8.1 Israel’s nuclear capabilities 345
9.8.2 The Six-Day War 347
9.8.3 Growing pressure for USarms sales to Israel 354
9.9 Towards the nonproliferation treaty 359
9.9.1 Final negotiation rounds
9.9.2 Limitations of the treaty and the possibility of Israel joining it 362
9.9.3 Initial signing of the nonproliferation treaty and delays with further action 364
9.10 Sale of Phantom aircraft – a way to press Israel to join the nonproliferation treaty? 368
9.11 Conclusions regarding the Johnson era 376
10 Epilogue – durable solutions to German and Israeli nuclear statuses 379
10.1 Finalizing understandings on Israel’s and West Germany’s nuclear statuses 379
10.1.1 The FRG joins the nonproliferation treaty 380 10.1.2