The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the French as reflected in his internal correspondance (1844 - 1847) - article ; n°1 ; vol.36, pg 41-50

Raphaël Danziger

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Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée - Année 1983 - Volume 36 - Numéro 1 - Pages 41-50
10 pages
Source : Persée ; Ministère de la jeunesse, de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l’enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation.

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• Publié par: REVUE_DE_L-OCCIDENT_MUSULMAN_ET_DE_LA_MEDITERRANEE
• Publié le: 01 janvier 1983
• Nombre de lectures: 18
• Langue: English

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Raphaël Danziger
The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the
French as reflected in his internal correspondance (1844 - 1847)
In: Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée, N°36, 1983. pp. 41-50.
Citer ce document / Cite this document :
Danziger Raphaël. The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the French as reflected in his internal
correspondance (1844 - 1847). In: Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée, N°36, 1983. pp. 41-50.
doi : 10.3406/remmm.1983.1998
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0035-1474_1983_num_36_1_199836, 1983-2 R.O.M.M.,
THE ATTITUDE OF MOROCCO'S SULTAN ABD AL-RAHMAN
TOWARDS THE FRENCH AS REFLECTED
IN HIS INTERNAL CORRESPONDANCE (1844-1847)*
par
Raphael DANZIGER
-I-
When the French army occupied Algiers in July 1830, it started the first long-
term occupation of any Arab country by a European power in modern history. It is,
therefore, of particular interest to examine the impact of the French penetration into
Algeria on the affected indigenous leaders. In Algeria itself, the Turkish rule over that
country was instantly broken and the Turks exiled ; the indigenous Algerian resistance
to the French led by Abd al-Qadir has been studied elsewhere (1). Among Algeria's
two principal neighbors — Tunisia and Morocco — the reaction of the Tunisian Bey has
also been adequately studied (2). The case of Morocco, whose Sultan was the only
indigenous ruler in North Africa combining temporal and religious legitimacy, is an
exception : while Moroccos foreign relations and domestic conditions have been
amply treated (3), no attempt has been made so far to examine the impact of Algeria's
occupation by the French on Sultan Abd al-Rahman's (1822-1859) conception of
them and attitude towards them. The purpose of this article is to fill this lacuna.
The principal documentation on which this study is based consists of Abd al-
Rahman's internal correspondence, mainly letters he sent to his eldest son Muhammad
(later Sultan Muhammad IV, 1859-1873). Many of these letters were discovered by the
French in Muhammad's camp on August 14, 1884, at the end of the Battle of Isly (4)
(about which see below), while most of the others were acquired in 1920 by the
library of the French Protectorate in Morocco (5). While it is true that this correspon
dence cannot always be taken at face value, there is little doubt that letters from father
to son are a more reliable guide to his intimate thoughts and feelings than are a sultan's
dispatches to and conversations with representatives of foreign powers — the sources
generally used so far. Although the sample utilized is modest, it constitutes a sufficient
body of evidence to merit consideration. Among the twenty-three available letters,
fifteen are from the Sultan to his son Muhammad ; six are from Abd al-Rahman to
other indigenous personalities ; and two are from Muhammad to his father Abd al-
Rahman.
The entire correspondence dates from the period 1844-1847, which was one of
great importance in Morocco's history. In 1844, the crisis in Franco-Moroccan rela
tions, following Abd al-Qadir 's establishment of a sanctuary in Morocco, led to the
Battle of Isly, in which the French army completely routed the Moroccans (6) ; since
Abd al-Rahman's available letters date from both before and after this important
event, it will be possible to assess the battle's impact on Abd al-Rahman's attitude 42 R.DANZIGER
towards the French. At the end of 1847, a critical epoch came to a close with the
surrender of Abd al-Qadir to the French (7), which removed the principal irritant
from Franco-Moroccan relations.
By 1844, the Sultan had acquired considerable experience in dealings with the
French. Having attempted to take over western Algeria immediately after the French
occupation of Algiers, he was forced, in April 1832, to withdraw his troops from that
country following the arrival of a special envoy from France backed by a French
warship (8). When Abd al-Rahman tried to help dislodge the French from Algeria by
providing massive aid to Abd al-Qadir, the French made him, in 1836, sign a commit
ment to stop it (9). But the aid continued to flow and, from 1837 to 1843, the
French applied heavy pressure on the Sultan — through frequent notes transmitted by
the French Consul in Tangier, sometimes with the backing of French warships sailing
along the Moroccan shores — to cease all aid to Abd al-Qadir (10). Following the
French occupation of Tlemcen (on the Moroccan border) in January 1842, Franco-
Moroccan tension increased, and in March 1843 Algerian forces, aided by Moroccan
tribesmen, attacked a French unit commanded by General Bedeau (11). France's
pressure on the Sultan intensified even more after Abd al-Qadir had found refuge in
Morocco in November 1843 and began using its territory to stage operations against
the French (12).
In other words, Franco-Moroccan relations from 1830 to 1843 were characteri
zed by the Sultan's continuous efforts to eliminate the dangerous French presence in
Algeria — first with his own forces and later through Abd al-Qadir — and by heavy
French pressures, reinforced by the powerful French navy, to thwart the Sultan's
policy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the relations between France and Mo
rocco during the first half of 1844 were marked by profound mutual antagonism — as
indeed indicated in all the historical accounts of this period (13).
-II-
In concentrating on the deterioration of Franco-Moroccan relations in 1844,
spurred by Abd al-Qadir 's presence in Morocco and by the energetic counter-measures
taken by the French against Morocco, the historical accounts have painted an essen
tially correct picture of the situation. What they have failed to do is to expose Abd al-
Rahman's religious notion of the French « infidels » , « which was fed by far deeper
layers of his conception than merely his political differences with the French. It
reflected age-old Islamic attitudes towards Christian invaders, dating back to the
times of the Crusades and to later Moroccan reactions to Spanish and Portuguese
invasions. This substratum, as it were, of Abd al-Rahman's policy towards the French
is clearly revealed in his internal correspondence.
During the first seven months of 1844, Sultan Abd al-Rahman routinely used
abusive religious terms in his references to the French : « infidels » (kuffar, kafi-
run) (14) ; « enemies of God » (a da Allah) (15) ; « enemies of the religion » (a da'
al-din) (16) ; « polytheists » (mushrikun) (17) ; and « idol worshippers » ( abid al-
asnam) (18). These references were amplified by statements such as « ... the French
man is more than all the other Christian nations deceitful, malevolent, and wily... »
(19), and « We should not trust even one of [ the infidels ] » (20). That these refe
rences and statements were entirely of the traditional mold, not influenced at all by
Abd al-Rahman's long experience with the French, is proved by his use of the exact
same formulae fourteen years earlier, barely three months after the French occupation
of Algiers (21). attitude of Abd el-Rahman 43 The
Not surprisingly, these phrases were followed by pious appeals to God to punish
the French « infidels » for their religious adverseness. By far the most frequently
expressed wish Abd al-Rahman made with regard to the French was, « May God exter
minate them » (dammarahum Allah) (22). Somewhat milder supplications were, « May
God divide [ the French ] and destroy their power » (23) ; « May God overwhelm
[ the French ] with misery » (24) ; « May God surround [ the French ] with cala
mities » (25) ; « May God destroy [ the Frenchmen's ] power and turn their wile
against them » (26) ; « May God make everything go wrong for [ the French ] » (27) ;
« May God abase and humiliate [ the French ] » (28) ; « May God confound [ the
French ] » (29) ; and « May God reverse [ the French ] » (30).
When the Sultan allowed himself to be persuaded by his son Muhammad that
the Moroccan forces were capable of defeating the French (31), he officially procla
imed the jihad, presumably in order that his own forces might become God's instr
ument in fulfilling these wishes : « 0 Believers, combat the infidels and exterminate
them, until they request peace (aman) and pay blood money (diya) » (32). Abd al-
Rahman then expressed his confidence that « ... if all Muslims are in agreement, and
if they are all determined to sacrifice their possessions and lives for the sake of the
jihad and the defense of the religion, what will happen will be calamitous to the
Christians » (33).
This is not to say that Abd al-Rahman 's vision was so curtailed by his religious
blinders as to fail to perceive reality. The Sultan demonstrated, at times, a thoroughly
realistic conception of French power. This was nowhere more clearly expressed than in
the following warning to his son Muhammad, which he made after