The relation of the executive power to legislation
208 pages
English
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The relation of the executive power to legislation

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208 pages
English

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:aD :ir> !ir> ICD ICO ~^Ht^ CO Pol.Sci THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO LEGISLATION BY HENRY CAMPBELL LL.D.BLACK, EDITOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PRESSPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRINCETON MILFORDLONDON : HUMPHREY OXFORD PRESS 1919 Copyright, 1919, by Princeton University Press N.Princeton, J. 1919Published, Printed in the United States of America CONTENTS I. The Growth of Executive Power i 11. Executive Initiative in Legislation; Abroad 41 III. Executive inInitiative In the;Legislation United States 55 IV. The Cabinet in Congress 79 V. The Selective or Partial Veto loi VI. Executive Orders and Decrees 116 VII. Power in the States 149 VIII. and Conclusion 181Summary PREFACE The framers of the Constitution of the United States and of the state constitutionscontemporary believed that the of re- firmly preservation liberty a careful and delimitation ofquired separation pow- ers between the three branches orgreat departments of and made Ingovernment, provision accordingly. one at their have been frus-respect, least, expectations trated their have For aand surveyplans gone awry. of of de-the course our and of thepolitical history of forces and methods shows that,velopment political as between the executive and theauthority legislative the balance intended to be main-power, originally both in the the beentained Union andhas, states, very ofdisturbed.

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Langue English
Poids de l'ouvrage 10 Mo

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ICD
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~^Ht^
COPol.Sci
THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
POWER TO LEGISLATION
BY
HENRY CAMPBELL LL.D.BLACK,
EDITOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
PRESSPRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PRINCETON
MILFORDLONDON : HUMPHREY
OXFORD PRESS
1919Copyright, 1919, by
Princeton University Press
N.Princeton, J.
1919Published,
Printed in the United States of AmericaCONTENTS
I. The Growth of Executive Power i
11. Executive Initiative in
Legislation;
Abroad 41
III. Executive inInitiative In the;Legislation
United States 55
IV. The Cabinet in Congress 79
V. The Selective or Partial Veto loi
VI. Executive Orders and Decrees 116
VII. Power in the States 149
VIII. and Conclusion 181SummaryPREFACE
The framers of the Constitution of the United
States and of the state constitutionscontemporary
believed that the of re-
firmly preservation liberty
a careful and delimitation ofquired separation pow-
ers between the three branches orgreat departments
of and made Ingovernment, provision accordingly.
one at their have been frus-respect, least, expectations
trated their have For aand surveyplans gone awry.
of of de-the course our and of thepolitical history
of forces and methods shows that,velopment political
as between the executive and theauthority legislative
the balance intended to be main-power, originally
both in the the beentained Union andhas, states, very
ofdisturbed. The President the United Statesgravely
has into a of influencegrown position overmastering
over the of thelegislative department government.
He and the enactment of such meas-presents procures
ures as he and the of thosedesires, prevents passage
which hishe is subservient todisapproves. Congress
will its is in On the other; hand,independence eclipse.
of the state are ineffec-many governments working
and the states are theirtively, losing rightful jurisdic-
tion and influence in our federated government, chiefly
because muchhave their ofthey stripped governors
of the which their toauthority publicresponsibility
and demands.political opinion properlyvi PREFACE
There are those who tell us that the political philos-
of the founders of the is unsuited to aophy Republic
that what as aworld,twentieth-century they regarded
self-evident truth is now to fetish. Ifseen be aonly
we are not to the of theprepared reject theory separa-
tion of we should endeavor all means to re-powers, by
store the lost and to the ancient
equipoise, regain paths
of ordered under
liberty representative government.
ifBut the new view is or if it is true that ex-correct,
ecutive of is the result of forcesarrogation power
in the life of the or theoperating irresistibly nation,
outcome of an which cannot nowprocessevolutionary
be then it becomes us askto ourselves whatreversed,
we mean to do with our new form of government.
In this we but little from the in-dilemma, get light
stitutions of other countries. An examination of the
so-called or shows"cabinet"''parliamentary" system
it to be to the of aentirely unadapted government
whose constitution its executive withcountry provides
a fixed tenure of office. But the fact is thatpatent
has aiound the Constitutionthere insensibly grown up
a of and which isconventions,system usages only par-
within its and which istially cognizance, very largely
a matter of make-believe. The isquestion propounded
in these whether we cannot take this systempages (if
itsindeed continuance is and it whereinevitable) put

it within the four corners of thebelongs squarely
Constitution. are offered in that behalf.Suggestions
It is not that furnish the ideal solutionpretended they
of a serious difficult But leastand atvery problem.
would that which is at best extra-consti-they legalize
deliver the law of the land from atutional, supreme