Stratégie militaire du Commandement américain en Europe, 01/2016

Stratégie militaire du Commandement américain en Europe, 01/2016

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U N I T E DS TA TE S EUROPEAN COMMAND Theater Strategy Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF Commander October 2015 Since the end of World War II, European allies and partners have worked with the United States around the globe to achieve security and stability, and Europe continues to be critical to U.S. national security interests. Currently,United States European Command (USEUCOM) is confronting the most profound negative change in the European security environment since the end of the Cold War.A revanchist Russia, mass migration from other regions, foreign terrorist ighters (FTF) transiting through Europe, cyber-attacks, the lingering efects from a global inancial crisis, and underfunded defense budgets all jeopardize European security, endanger the U.S. homeland, and threaten global security and stability. Addressing these challenges and preparing for an uncertain future requires agility; capable, ready, and postured forces; close partnerships with European allies and partners; a fully enabled North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and a dedicated whole of government approach.Together, the United States and Europe constitute a closely linked community of democracies with shared interests and close economic and security relationships; USEUCOM is the enabling defense link to NATO and to ensuring trans-Atlantic security and prosperity.

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U N I T E D S T A T E S EUROPEAN COMMAND Theater Strategy
Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF Commander
October 2015
Sînce te end o Word War ïï, European aîes and partners ave worked wît te Unîted States around te gobe to acîeve securîty and stabîîty, and Europe contînues to be crîtîca to U.S. natîona securîty înterests. Currenty, Unîted States European Command (USEUCOM) îs conrontîng te most proound negatîve cange în te European securîty envîronment sînce te end o te Cod War. A revancîst Russîa, mass mîgratîon rom oter regîons, oreîgn terrorîst Igters (FTF) transîtîng troug Europe, cyber-attacks, te îngerîng efects rom a goba Inancîa crîsîs, and underunded deense budgets a jeopardîze European securîty, endanger te U.S. omeand, and treaten goba securîty and stabîîty.
Addressîng tese caenges and preparîng or an uncertaîn uture requîres agîîty; capabe, ready, and postured orces; cose partnersîps wît European aîes and partners; a uy enabed Nort Atantîc Treaty Organîzatîon (NATO); and a dedîcated woe o government approac. Togeter, te Unîted States and Europe constîtute a cosey înked communîty o democracîes wît sared înterests and cose economîc and securîty reatîonsîps; USEUCOM îs te enabîng deense înk to NATO and to ensurîng trans-Atantîc securîty and prosperîty. hîs teater strategy broady outînes te way USEUCOM wî adapt to meet te caenges o te new European securîty envîronment to ensure a woe, ree, peaceu, and prosperous Europe.
EUROPEANSECURITYENVIRONMENT
Over te ast ew years, te securîty envîronment în Europe as canged sîgnîIcanty. Today, te European securîty envîronment presents tree geograpîcay deIned probem sets to te east, sout, and nort, as we as a unctîona one – cyber. Wîtîn te securîty envîronment, USEUCOM, NATO Aîes,
U.S. European Commander Aîr Force Genera Pîîp Breedove brîes mîîtary eaders and senîor enîsted personne rom U.S. and NATO partner natîons at U.S. European Command’s European Securîty Semînar osted at he George C. Marsa Center or Securîty Studîes (ESS). he purpose o te semînar îs întended to renew reatîonsîps and excange vîews about securîty caenges în Europe. Durîng te semînar, partîcîpants dîscussed te varîous caenges acîng Europe’s nort, east, and soutern lanks and ways partner natîons coud address tem wîe strengtenîng NATO/EU partnersîps.
and European partners are concentratîng on mutîpe treats, conlîcts, and strategîc caenges. (Fîg. 1) By workîng wît îts aîes and partners to expore te probem sets, USEUCOM can assess caenges and opportunîtîes and ow to best support U.S. and European securîty prîorîtîes.
ïn te east and nort, Russîa îs te cause o muc concern due to îts încreasîngy aggressîve beavîor în Eastern Europe and mîîtarîzatîon în te Arctîc. As demonstrated în Crîmea and eastern Ukraîne, Russîa îs empoyîng a orm o warare tat combînes conventîona, îrreguar, and asymmetrîc means – încudîng tHe persîstent manîpuatîon o poîtîca and îdeoogîca conlîcts – to oster înstabîîty, and ît îs rejectîng a coaboratîve securîty approacH wîtH tHe înternatîona communîty. AtHougH tHe Unîted States and îts aîes and partners desîre cooperatîon wîtH Russîa to address sHared securîty concerns, contînued Russîan aggressîon and îts use o maîgn înluence to weaken tHe NATO Aîance and otHer Western înternatîona înstîtutîons wî constraîn sucH eforts.
From tHe soutH, Europe aces myrîad securîty cHaenges as a resut o a compex and unstabe Mîdde East and NortH Arîca (MENA). he ïsamîc State o ïraq and tHe Levant (ïSïL) îs a tHreat to key aîes, partners, and U.S. natîona securîty înterests. ïSïL actîvey recruîts and traîns oreîgn IgHters wHo tHen return tHrougH Europe to tHeîr countrîes o orîgîn. ïn addîtîon, tHe sîgnîIcant înlux o mîgrants and reugees to Europe rom MENA îs a serîous economîc and Humanîtarîan probem tHat provîdes opportunîtîes or vîoent extremîst organîzatîons (VEO) and transnatîona crîmîna organîzatîons (TCO) to take advantage o tHe crîsîs to gaîn access to Europe.
Europe îs aso contendîng wîtH varîous otHer securîty cHaenges, încudîng growîng adversary baîstîc mîssîe capabîîtîes, tHe proîeratîon o weapons o mass destructîon (WMD), înectîous dîseases, cyber-attacks, înternatîona and natîona terrorîsm and narco-terrorîsm, and îîcît traickîng. ïndîvîduay or
în combînatîon, tese treats coud resut în catastropîc attacks agaînst te Unîted States and/or îts aîes and partners.
Contrîbutîng to te compexîty o te European securîty envîronment are Inancîa caenges to te goba economy. Atoug some îndîvîdua European economîes are eaty, oters are weak, causîng overa înstabîîty wîc treatens te prosperîty o te trans-Atantîc communîty. ïn response to te goba Inancîa crîsîs and perceîved ack o treats, European deense budgets ave srunk, resutîng în reductîons în capabîîty, capacîty, readîness, and înteroperabîîty wît U.S. orces. Reduced budgets aso make ît more dîicut or Aîed countrîes to meet teîr obîgatîons to NATO. he Unîted States as sîmîary et te efects o smaer deense budgets despîte a îg demand or îts mîîtary capabîîtîes around te gobe.
he NATO Aîance îs now acîng te dîicut task o transîtîonîng îts prîmary ocus rom expedîtîonary operatîons and support to a renewed empasîs on European securîty. Addressîng NATO’s capabîîty îssues îs probematîc or te Two Spanîs Navy Harrîers ly beînd a U.S. Marîne KC-130J aîrcrat durîng an aerîa-28-member Aîance due reueîng exercîse of te coast o Spaîn. he aerîa-reueîng capabîîtîes o te KC-130J greaty extend te range and lîgt tîmes o NATO aîrcrat. to decreasîng mîîtary orce eves, dîsparate capabîîtîes, uncertaîn deense spendîng, and dîvergent strategîc înterests. Eac îndîvîdua natîon’s abîîty to meet teîr Artîce 3 se-deense obîgatîons îs centra to NATO’s credîbîîty. he Unîted States’ Artîce 5 commîtment to te coectîve deense o a NATO members îs unwaverîng, as îs U.S. commîtment to ensurîng tat te Aîance remaîns ready and capabe or crîsîs response and cooperatîve securîty. Our European aîes and partners coectîvey remaîn our most vîta goba securîty partner and we contînue to requîre co-învestment în tat reatîonsîp to sustaîn ît or te uture.
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U.S. Army paratroopers and Czec army paratroopers seîze an aîried durîng an aîr assaut operatîon as part o Exercîse Sky Sodîer II at te Becyne Traînîng Area, Czec Repubîc. Sky Sodîer îs a serîes o bîatera exercîses desîgned to încrease înteroperabîîty and strengten partnersîps between NATO aîrborne orces.
STRATEGYIMPLEMENTATION
he Unîted States desîres a European securîty envîronment were treats and conlîcts în te regîon are aevîated and te strategîc caenges successuy addressed. USEUCOM’s vîsîon and mîssîon promote tese goas. ïn support o U.S. poîcy, USEUCOM must ensure tat Russîa îs deterred rom urter aggressîon and rejoîns te communîty o cooperatîve natîons to advance peace and securîty în Europe. USEUCOM aso seeks mîtîgatîon o te growîng transnatîona treat to soutern Europe. To strengten te Aîance, USEUCOM requîres strong eastern European NATO natîons and ît wî contrîbute to teîr deense by assîstîng tem to încrease teîr mîîtary capabîîty, înteroperabîîty, and readîness. USEUCOM supports te aspîratîons o te Western Bakan, Caucasus, and eastern European natîons toward coser întegratîon wît NATO. Fînay, te Unîted States remaîns uy commîtted to ïsrae’s securîty and quaîtatîve mîîtary edge, and USEUCOM wî contînue to work cosey wît te ïsraeî Deense Force to ensure tat. A Europe tat îs woe, ree, peaceu, and prosperous îs essentîa to ep protect te U.S. omeand, and tîs end state îs advanced troug U.S. eadersîp wîc promotes peace, securîty, and strong cooperatîon.
Mission Statement USEUCOM pépaés éady fôçés, énsués saégiç aççéss, déés çônlict, enabLes the NATO ALLiance, strengthens partnerships, and counters transnationaL threats to pro-tect and defend the United States.
THEATERPRIORITIES
ïn response to te teater caenges and desîred end states, and în support o îger eve guîdance, USEUCOM wî concentrate îts coectîve eforts on sîx teater prîorîtîes over te next tree to Ive years.
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Vision USEUCOM is éngagéd, pôsuéd, and éady wih fôwad-déplôyéd U.S. fôçés. Wé will énaBlé and éxéçué a full angé ôf miliay missiôns in çônçé wih ôu indispénsaBlé Euôpéan Alliés and panés ô séçué U.S. naiônal inééss and ô suppô a Euôpé whôlé, féé, and a péaçé.
Two F-16 Fîgtîng Facons assîgned to te Roya Norwegîan Aîr Force ly aongsîde to te wîng o a KC-135 Stratotanker as-sîgned to RAF Mîdena, Engand, wîe partîcîpatîng în te Batîc Regîon Traînîng Event over te Batîc regîon. he BRTE îs an advanced traînîng concept tat serves to urter deveop cooperatîon wît NATO aîes and partners wîtîn te regîon.
Theater Priorities (1) Deter Russian aggression (2) EnabLe the NATO ALLiance (3) Preserve U.S. strategic partnerships (4) Counter transnationaL threats (5) Ensure postured and ready forces (6) Focus on key reLationships
DETERRUSSIANAGGRESSION
Wîe Russîa as supported some common securîty eforts în counterterrorîsm and counternarcotîcs, tese contrîbutîons are oversadowed by îts dîsregard or te sovereîgnty o îts neîgbors în Europe and îts vîoatîon o numerous agreements wîc requîre Russîa to act wîtîn înternatîona norms. One o te Unîted States’ natîona mîîtary objectîves îs to deter state adversarîes rom treatenîng te U.S. omeand and U.S. înterests wîe assurîng te A Lîtuanîan genera greets U.S. sodîers on Sîauîaî Aîr Base, securîty o aîes. Because Russîan aggressîonLîtuanîa. Europe-based U.S. Army unîts were depoyed to Poand, Lîtuanîa, Estonîa, and Latvîa to conduct bîatera treatens NATO aîes and partners în Europe, mîîtary exercîses and reînorce NATO securîty commîtments to USEUCOM îs eadîng Department o Deensete ost natîons. (DoD) eforts to deter urter Russîan actîons tat destabihroug Operatîon ATLANTïC RESOLVE, USEUCOM îs workîng wîtîze regîona securîty. aîes and partners to deter Russîan aggressîon în Eastern Europe. USEUCOM wî aso partîcîpate în oter bîatera and mutîatera exercîses and engagements to support te mîssîon to assure and deend NATO, enance Aîed and partner abîîty to provîde or teîr own securîty, and counter Russîa’s use o conventîona, îrreguar, and asymmetrîc warare.
Russîa îs presentîng endurîng caenges to our aîes and partners în mutîpe regîons; tereore, ît îs a goba caenge tat requîres a goba response. USEUCOM wî work wît oter combatant commands, te Joînt Staf, and te Oice o te Secretary o Deense to ensure tat coectîve DoD deterrence eforts are syncronîzed and acîeve te desîred efect wîtout causîng unwarranted escaatîon or provocatîon. Dragoons maneuver troug a orest toward a sîmuated enemy strongod. heîr mîssîon was to capture a îg vaue target as part o a combîned traînîng exercîse wît Estonîan Aîes în Rabassare, Estonîa, în support o Operatîon ATLANTIC RESOLVE, an ongoîng mutînatîona partnersîp ocused on joînt traînîng and securîty cooperatîon between NATO aîes.
ENABLETHENATO ALLIANCE
U.S. and European eforts to advance a more democratîc and prosperous Europe are buît on te oundatîon o coectîve securîty provîded by NATO. he transatantîc Aîance îs a U.S. strategîc center o gravîty and source o coesîon în Europe. ït îs essentîa to ensurîng tat Europe remaîns woe, ree, and at peace and capabe o respondîng to crîsîs and contîngency requîrements în partnersîp wît te Unîted States. U.S. Army paratroopers and a Dutc sodîer în te Roya Neterands Army engage targets durîng a combîned deensîve USEUCOM as spent te ast decade enabîng îve-ire exercîse at te 7t Army Joînt Mutînatîona Traînîng Command’s Graenwoer Traînîng Area, Germany. Army NATO members to partîcîpate în expedîtîonary paratroopers routîney traîn aongsîde NATO orces to încrease operatîons outsîde o Europe. Wîe tîs mîssîon înteroperabîîty and strengten te aîance îs stî împortant, USEUCOM wî sît îts engagement wît NATO aîes to concentrate on bosterîng Aîed capabîîtîes – especîay te most recent members – to ensure tat tey are abe to meet teîr Artîce 3 se-deense and Artîce 5 coectîve deense requîrements. Under NATO’s Readîness Actîon Pan, USEUCOM wî contînue to enance te responsîveness o te NATO Response Force wît pre-posîtîoned stocks and reated înrastructure to acîîtate rapîd reînorcement and mannîng or NATO command and contro and assocîated enabers, wîc încudes te enancement o a corps- and dîvîsîon-eve eadquarters ocused on assurance and adaptatîon measures. Lasty, USEUCOM wî contînue împementîng te European Pased Adaptîve Approac to provîde protectîon to Europe rom a potentîa baîstîc mîssîe attack rom a rogue natîon.
A U.S. sodîer dîscusses traînîng wît Croatîan sodîers or Immedîate Response 15 în Sunj, Croatîa. Immedîate Response 15 îs a mutînatîona, brîgade-eve, Command Post Exercîse utîîzîng computer assîsted sîmuatîons and ied traînîng exercîses în Croatîa and Sovenîa. he exercîses and sîmuatîons are desîgned to enance regîona stabîîty, strengten partner capacîty, and împrove înteroperabîîty.
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PRESERVEU.S. STRATEGICPARTNERSHIPS USEUCOM as worked ard to ep deveop partner capacîty, capabîîty, and înteroperabîîty, and USEUCOM must contînue to ep sustaîn and strengten tese deveopments. ïn support o tese eforts, USEUCOM wî conduct compreensîve engagements to urter deveop aîed and partner understandîng, pannîng, and coaboratîve mîîtary-to-mîîtary approaces. Mutîatera orums wît aîes and oter partners – suc as regîona cîes o deense (CHOD) conerences – serve to enarge areas o agreement and strengten mutîatera and
bîatera cooperatîve actîvîtîes. USEUCOM country cooperatîon pans wî încude bîatera roadmaps tat seek aîed and partner înput and coordînatîon to acîeve desîred securîty objectîves. USEUCOM wî aso work wît te Natîona Guard Bureau, te States’ adjutant generas, and te European countrîes wo are assocîated wît te State Partnersîp Program to everage teîr unîque capabîîtîes and încrease partnersîp buîdîng.
COUNTERTRANSNATIONALTHREATS
he Unîted States and Europe ace a growîng number o transnatîona, and oten asymmetrîc treats, wîc încude vîoent extremîsts, cyber-attacks, îîcît traickîng, weapons o mass destructîon, and înectîous dîseases. USEUCOM, wît te assîstance o oter U.S. agencîes, wî contînue to work wît European and înternatîona organîzatîons suc as ïnterpo, NATO, and te European Unîon to counter tese treats. Usîng a woe o government approac, USEUCOM wî cooperate wît aîes and partners to: monîtor and twart te low o oreîgn terrorîst Igters traveîng to and rom conlîct zones and under-governed regîons tat treaten Europe and te U.S. omeand; dîsmante extremîst acîîtatîon networks and transnatîona crîmîna organîzatîons; and buîd
Members o te Azerbaîjanî armed orces partîcîpatîng în Combîned Endeavor conduct maîntenance on teîr communîcatîon network. Combîned Endeavor îs a mutî-natîon exercîse învovîng neary 40 NATO, Partnersîp or Peace and strategîc securîty partners, and îs desîgned to încrease înteroperabîîty and communîcatîons processes between te partîcîpatîng natîons.
partner natîon capacîty to counter te low o oreîgn Igters. USEUCOM must aso deend agaînst adversarîes wo can treaten our orces troug te cyber domaîn by îdentîyîng and securîng our crîtîca înrastructure. hîs wî be accompîsed troug a deensîbe arcîtecture, ready cyber orces, and împroved sîtuatîona awareness.
ENSUREPOSTUREDANDREADYFORCES
Europe as îstorîcay been and wî remaîn key terraîn or te U.S. mîîtary. he
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U.S. Marînes practîce andîng on te deck o te Brîtîs ampîbîous assaut sîp, HMS Ocean, wît an MV-22B Osprey. he deck andîng quaîicatîons are part o te Aîed Marîtîme Basîng Inîtîatîve, wîc seeks to provîde te U.S. and aîes wît a year-round marîtîme-based crîsîs response orce în te Medîterranean Sea or te Gu o Guînea by everagîng te sîgnîicant ampîbîous capabîîtîes aready resîdîng în Europe.
bases, access, and reedom o movement provîded to te Unîted States by aîes and European partners are essentîa to DoD’s mîssîon to empoy orces gobay to meet contîngency requîrement, conduct operatîons, and deend U.S. vîta natîona înterests. he access tat te mîîtary enjoys îs a product o te ong-standîng reatîonsîps tat te Unîted States maîntaîns and nurtures – bot troug assîgned orces and U.S. commîtment troug NATO to European securîty. U.S. înrastructure în Europe enabes not ony USEUCOM to meet îts assîgned mîssîons, but ît îs aso essentîa or te transît o orces and materîe troug Europe to support oter combatant command mîssîons and requîrements.
FOCUSONKEYRELATIONSHIPS
As relected în te oter prîorîtîes, USEUCOM wî ocus on key reatîonsîps by enancîng securîty în Eastern Europe and strengtenîng tîes wît emergîng Aîance eaders. he Levant and te Medîterranean are aso regîons în wîc USEUCOM wî be uy engaged. One o USEUCOM’s core mîssîons îs assîst ïsrae în îts înerent rîgt to se-deense. ïn addîtîon to te treat posed by ïran and Lebanese Hezboa, ïsrae resîdes în a dangerous and compex regîon due to te expansîon o radîca ïsamîc extremîsts organîzatîons on ïsrae’s border în bot Syrîa and U.S. sodîers partîcîpate în te joînt Austere Caenge Exercîse te Egyptîan Sînaî. Contînued tensîons between wît Israeî Deense Forces to deveop partnered aîr and mîssîe ïsrae and te Hamas-ed government în Gazadeense capabîîtîes. ave aso ed to open warare în te past wît no îndîcatîons o resoutîon. hereore, USEUCOM wî contînue to work cosey wît te ïsraeî Deense Forces to assure tem o U.S. commîtment to teîr deense and to preserve teîr quaîtatîve mîîtary edge over teîr adversarîes amîd a rapîd and uncertaîn regîona transormatîon. Fînay, în te Arctîc, USEUCOM wî seek greater cooperatîon or mîîtary support to cîvî autorîtîes to enabe te peaceu openîng o te Arctîc. CHALLENGES
To successuy execute te strategy, USEUCOM requîres reîabe and ready orces, strategîc antîcîpatîon, and undîng tat îs consîstent wît te treat eve. Ater years o orce structure reductîons, ewer tan 65,000 U.S. mîîtary personne remaîn permanenty statîoned în Europe to secure and advance U.S. natîona înterests rom Greenand to te Caspîan Sea and rom te Arctîc Ocean to te Levant. Reduced U.S. orward presence and degraded readîness across te Servîces are înîbîtîng te Unîted States’ abîîty to avoraby sape te envîronment. he sîze o te mîîtary presence requîres dîicut decîsîons on ow best to use îmîted resources to assure, stabîîze, and support te USEUCOM mîssîon în te new European securîty envîronment. Even as USEUCOM eans orward wît NATO Aîes and partners
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în response to tese new caenges, uy addressîng tem and teîr ong-term împîcatîons requîres a reormuatîon o te U.S. strategîc cacuus and correspondîng resourcîng evîed towards Europe.
USEUCOM cannot uy mîtîgate te împact et rom a reductîon în assîgned mîîtary orces troug te augmentatîon o rotatîona orces rom te Unîted States. he temporary presence o rotatîona orces compements, but does not substîtute or an endurîng orward depoyed presence tat îs tangîbe and rea. Vîrtua presence means actua absence. he constant presence o U.S. orces în Europe sînce Word War ïï as enabed te Unîted States to enjoy te reatîvey ree access tat ît reîes on în tîmes o crîsîs. Furter reductîons o bot înrastructure and orces may negatîvey împact U.S. access to key strategîc ocatîons durîng tîmes o crîsîs în te Mîdde East, Arîca, or Eurasîa. USEUCOM requîres dedîcated resources to remaîn decîsîvey engaged wît European aîes and partners, înteragency partners, and to support oter combatant commands to acîeve USEUCOM’s împortant and caengîng mîssîon. CONCLUSION
By împementîng tîs strategy – underpînned wît te approprîate resources – USEUCOM wî ave ready orces postured to: respond to crîses and unoreseen events; ensure tat te Unîted States as te strategîc access requîred to support goba operatîons; guarantee tat te NATO Aîance îs strong and capabe; ampîy te reatîonsîps tat ave been essentîa to U.S. securîty or decades so tat tey are stronger tan ever; successuy counter transnatîona treats emanatîng rom or transîtîng te European regîon; and above a, saeguard te orward deense o te U.S. omeand. he Unîted States’ sared vaues and economîc înterdependence wît îts îndîspensabe European aîes and partners provîde unîque opportunîtîes or regîona and goba securîty cooperatîon. he USEUCOM teater strategy îs desîgned to strengten te tremendous advantages o our most wîîng and capabe aîes and partners as we a work to counter treats, enance goba stabîîty, and secure a woe, ree, peaceu, and prosperous Europe.
Sodîers rom nîne NATO member countrîes take part în te cosîng ceremony or te mutînatîona exercîse Iron Sword în Pabrade, Lîtuanîa. Iron Sword învoved more tan 2,500 personne rom te U.S., Lîtuanîa, Canada, Estonîa, te Czec Repubîc, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, and te U.K. It aso takes pace as part o Operatîon ATLANTIC RESOLVE.
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