The book interrogates the European Union (EU) - Zimbabwe Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, covering trade in goods, trade-related rules and development cooperation. The negotiations coincided with EU’s motives as the dominant development partner, and Zimbabwe’s state-stakeholder fault-lines, creating dilemmas in the pursuit of a fair EPA outcome. As a result, the economically weak Zimbabwe signed and ratified an asymmetrical interim EPA (iEPA) with an economically powerful EU in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Meanwhile, direct bilateral re-engagement which eluded the Government of National Unity (GNU), became real following ZANU-PF landslide victory on 31 July 2013, that sufficiently altered the power balance to trigger the process between the former nemesis in support of iEPA domestication, and social and economic development. ZANU-PF government stopped blaming the EU and other western nations for the country’s continued economic under-performance, signaling a softening approach on its part. Similarly, the EU and its member states softened its perception on ZANU-PF leadership leading to resumption and intensification of re-engagement despite failure to implement the Global Political Agreement-related constitutional and democratic reforms, agreed by GNU. This re-engagement was firmly endorsed when the EU and Zimbabwe signed an agreement in July 2015 to normalise bilateral relations and start cooperation.
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From Antagonism to Re-engagement: Zimbabwe’s Trade Negotiations with the European Union, 2000-2016Richard Kamidza
L a ng a a R esea rch & P u blishing CIG Mankon, Bamenda
Acknowledgements…………………………………………… vii List of acronyms and abbreviations…………………………… ix List of Boxes, Diagram, Figures, Graph and Tables……………xiii Chapter One: Where Trade Negotiations Competition Begins……….………………………………………….…….1Chapter Two: The Basis of Negotiations………….…….… 21 Chapter Three: Bilateral Trade Relations………………..…43 Introduction……………………………………..….………… 43 The crisis period, 1997 – 2008…………………………………47 The manufacturing sector………………………..…………… 49 Agriculture……………………………………….…………… 53 The transitional period, 2009 – 2013…………………...………59 Europe’s dominance in the EPA process……………...……… 66 EU’s influence in the EPA process………………………….…82 EPA technical and ideological issues………………...…………95 Conclusion……………………………………………….…… 100 Chapter Four: State of Play in Negotiations……….……… 103 Introduction………………………………………...………… 103 National development trade policy forum…………………..… 109 Regional negotiation forum…………………………………… 116 Other negotiation institutions and structures………..………… 118 The EPA process and the ‘guerrilla’ approach to negotiations…….…………………………………………... 123 Zimbabwe’s formulation of negotiating positions and offers……………………………………………138 Interim EPA outcome, ratification and implementation process………………………………………..147 Conclusion……………………………………………………. 160 iii
Chapter Five: Zimbabwe’s State Shortcomings and Civil Society Advocacy………………… 163 Introduction………………………..……………………….… 163 COMESA and SADC secretariats and civil society activism…………………………………...……… 164 State-stakeholder relationship and civil society advocacy……… 175 Donor funding and civil society advocacy………………..…… 186 Emerging concerns and implications for the future: trade and industrial policies……………………..………...……191 Emerging concerns and implications for the future: industrial production and export competitiveness………...……196 Emerging concerns and implications for the future: supply-side constraints…………………………………...…… 201 Emerging concerns and implications for the future: disruptions of national and regional markets…...………………206 Conclusion……………………………….…………………… 217 Chapter Six: Bilateral Re-Engagement and Interim EPA Implementation…………..………..………… 221 Introduction and context of re-engagement…………...……… 221 Trade flows and brief outline of iEPA features……..………… 231 Re-engagement milestones and macroeconomic policies……… 237 How can Zimbabwe reap the greatest benefit from iEPA?.......... 247 Conclusion………………………….………………………… 255 Chapter Seven: Conclusion………………………….………257 Theory versus practice in bilateral trade relations……....……… 257 Lessons for future studies…………………………….…..……260 Policy recommendations……………………………………… 264 The future and new lines of enquiry……………….…...………270 Can Zimbabwe make social and economic progress? ………….272 References…………………………………………………… 275 Appendix………………………………………..…………… 297 Questionnaire to government officials and/or negotiators……. 297
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Questionnaire to the representative of civil society organisations…………………………………...……… 299
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Acknowledgements I owe a debt of gratitude to many individuals and institutions that provided financial, intellectual, and moral support during the research that has resulted in this book. My special thanks go to KwaZulu-Natal University for providing a supportive environment, the freedom to explore critical ideas and fieldwork assistance in the form of a bursary and funding. Special thanks go to Prof Patrick Bond, who has long been my supervisor and role model for decades. Further, I will always be indebted to organisations and institutions, especially the Economic Justice Network of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa, the Hub and Spokes project and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat for intellectual Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) engagement that culminated in series of publications; facilitation of internal SADC EPA and joint European Union-SADC EPA negotiations; capacity building dialogue sessions with regional trade officials and activists; and exposure to contextualised EPA related politics, dynamics and complexities within the configurations, and between Europe and its former colonies, a mirror of the EU-Zimbabwe trade power relationship. It would have been impossible to complete the book without the support of many close friends and loved ones: my wife (Agnes Kamidza), mother (Edna Gwenzi) and children (Kudakwashe, Rumbidzai, Chiedza, Tariro, Panashe and Ruvimbo) for their unwavering support throughout the research process and its financial challenges. I am specifically indebted to Anne Derges who meticulously edited the book for publication, benefitting significantly from her extensive experience and expertise. Finally, I would like to thank the publisher, Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group, for their unwavering support and commitment throughout the entire process of producing this book. I dedicate this book to the Lord God Almighty!
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ACP = African-Caribbean-Pacific AfDB = African Development Bank ANSA = Alternative to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa ATN = Africa Trade Network AU = African Union BOP = Balance of Payment CAP = Common Agriculture Policy CARIFORUM = Caribbean Forum CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CRs = Committee Rooms CSOs = Civil Society Organisations CTA = Chief Technical Advisor CTAs = Chief Technical Advisors CZI = Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries DFQF = Duty-Free and Quota-Free DG = Director General EBA = Everything-but-Arms EC = European Commission ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States EDF = European Development Fund EEC = European Economic Commission EIB = European Investment Bank EPA = Economic Partnership Agreement EPAs = Economic Partnership Agreements ESA = Eastern and Southern Africa EU = European Union FA = Fisheries Agreements FAO = Food and Agricultural Organisation ix