Politisk psykologi
160 pages
Danish

Vous pourrez modifier la taille du texte de cet ouvrage

Politisk psykologi , livre ebook

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus
160 pages
Danish

Vous pourrez modifier la taille du texte de cet ouvrage

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

Description

Vi er alle rationelle! Denne prAemis har siden Aristoteles vAeret bestemmende for, hvordan vi har forstaet bade individet og politiske handlinger. Men teorier om mennesket som et rationelt vAesen kan ikke forklare, hvorfor hutuer drAebte 800.000 tutsier i 1994, eller hvorfor al-Qaedas selvmordsterrorister den 11. september 2001 tvang to fly ind i Twin Towers og drAebte 2.993 mennesker. Disciplinen politisk psykologi skubber rationaliteten af tronen og formulerer en mere prAecis forstaelse af, hvordan vi faktisk tAenker og handler politisk i verden. Irrationaliteten fger sit helt eget mster, som denne antologis 14 bidrag beskriver i krydsfeltet mellem politik og psykologi. Teksterne er inddelt i fire blokke, som har hvert deres primAere fokus: informationsabsorbering, beslutningsprocesser, gruppedynamik og offentlig opinion. Bogen samler feltets centrale originaltekster, der alle er engelsksprogede. Dens danske indledning prAesenterer disciplinen overordnet og beskriver forskningshistorien, mens dens ligeledes danske afslutning tegner et detaljeret billede af forskningsfeltets samlede principper. Politisk psykologi kan lAeses fra A til A, vAere et fokuseret miniopslagsvAerk - eller fungere som en teoretisk slikpose, der behAendigt kan nippes et par bidder fra. Med denne antologi foreligger nu for forste gang i dansk sammenhAeng en indgang til politisk psykologi.

Sujets

Informations

Publié par
Date de parution 12 janvier 2010
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9788771246711
Langue Danish
Poids de l'ouvrage 1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0145€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Exrait

Redigeret af Sigge Winther Nielsen Thomas H genhaven Med introduktion af Brent A. Strathman
P OLITISK PSYKOLOGI
Fordi politik er personligt
FORORD
Denne bog handler om psykologi i politik. Bogen samler en r kke centrale historiske og nutidige bidrag, som skaber disciplinen politisk psykologi . Form let er at g re opm rksom p mulighederne ved politisk psykologi og derved ruske op i m derne, hvorp vi forst r og forklarer politik - at give nye redskaber til at ordne virkeligheden og indrette samfundet. Budskabet kan virke simpelt: Enhver studerende, forsker eller praktiker, der vil forst samfundet, m forst de individer, der udg r samfundet. Men reelt er det ikke nogen lille operation: Politisk psykologi giver l serens verdensbillede en karruseltur af dimensioner.
At udv lge og derved kanonisere tekster vil altid v re kontroversielt. Vi har ud fra det muliges kunst s gt at n s vidt omkring i den politiske psykologis emnefelt - fra individuel kognition til gruppedynamik. Vi har s gt at indkapsle nye som gamle bidrag - fra Walter Lippmann til Philip E. Tetlock. Endelig har vi s gt at medtage bidrag, der ikke blot giver en indsigt i mennesket og den politiske beslutning, men som indvirker p hele samfundet - fra krig til krise.
Det er hensigten med bogen, at den skal v re en dansk introduktion til politisk psykologi. Derfor har vi valgt at skrive det indledende og afsluttende kapitel p dansk. P denne m de kan den meget amerikansk dominerede disciplin politisk psykologi f et dansk sprog og udtryk. Samtidig har vi bevaret bidragydernes tekster p engelsk for at pr sentere bidragene i deres originalitet, men ogs fordi engelsk er et accepteret og dominerende sprog inden for statskundskaben. Bogen er inddelt i fire blokke med hver deres bidrag. Den kan l ses fra A til , men kan ogs fungere som en teoretisk slikpose, der beh ndigt nippes et par bidder fra. Eller v re et fokuseret miniopslagsv rk. Det er vores h b, at l seren lader sig guide rundt i bogen efter interesse. Bidragene refererer i stor udstr kning til hinanden, og derfor er der al mulig grund til at hoppe rundt mellem tid, sted og emneomr de for at stille sin akademiske sult. Det er faktisk meget menneskeligt.
At besk ftige sig med det psykologiske fundament for politik er ikke noget, der fylder meget i det danske forskningslandskab, selvom nye skud er vokset frem i de senere r. Vi s tter derfor stor pris p , at Aarhus Universitetsforlag har vist os tillid og interesse for projektet. Vi vil ogs gerne takke for de meget brugbare og konstruktive forslag, der blev bragt p bordet af bogens anonyme peer reviewer. Ligeledes skylder vi en stor tak til professor Brent A. Strathman fra Dartmouth College i USA. Vi st r begge i intellektuel g ld til hans ukrukkede udl gning af politisk psykologi. Uden ham havde vores lange akademiske ophold i det snekl dte New Hampshire f ltes meget l ngere. Vi nsker samtidig at p sk nne det flotte arbejde, vores studentermedhj lp, Martin Vin s Larsen, har udf rt. Is r i den sidste fase af bogens tilblivelse har han arbejdet utr tteligt og grundigt. Endvidere skylder vi Ida Agnete Balslev, Malene Baunsgaard, Camilla Wissing Bille og Anne-Kathrine Nielsen mange venlige ord for deres s rlige hj lp med bogen. Endelig en tak til familie og venner, som har udvist st tte og alt for stor forst else undervejs, n r vi fortabte os i den politiske psykologis karrusel.
K benhavn den 28. august 2009
Sigge Winther Nielsen og Thomas H genhaven
I NTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Brent A. Strathman
The study of politics is often tied to catastrophe or world-changing events. For example, the experience of World War I caused many continental thinkers to revisit their understanding of society. Before the war, Europeans joined widespread pacifist movements, principally motivated by Sir Ralph Angell s pamphlet, The Great Illusion. The extension of credit and the development of a system of finance made war futile, as capturing territory did not add to the wealth of a state. To Angell, war itself was made useless by commercialism. Peace would flourish, as competition between states took on an economic dimension.
Yet war did serve a purpose that pacifists ignored. According to Sigmund Freud, commercialism exacerbated the inherent contradictions of our psychology. Humans face a difficult balancing act if society is to survive. Individual desires - emerging from the id - must be tempered to maintain a functional society. Civilization, he wrote, obtains mastery over the individual s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city. Over time, this suppression of innate human desire builds, threatening the seams of civilization. This rising sense of guilt (caused by the inability to satisfy our most base desires) is the price we pay for our advance in civilization. The following decline in mental faculty leads to the possibility of neurotic civilizations; of cultures maladapted to the demands of society and the possibilities for violence. War provides direction for the expression of these violent urges.
Unfortunately, the experience of WWI did not satisfy continental bloodlust; nor did it solve the inherent dilemma of society. And during the interwar period, Freud foresaw the violence that was to follow. Hitler s rise to power alluded to a civilizational imbalance and a looming conflict on the continent. When Freud revisited Civilization and Its Discontents, he added a rhetorical question. He asks the reader to ponder the possibility of a balance between the demands of individuals to express their needs and the requirements of society to repress. Pessimistically, Freud ends his book by saying the balance was undecided and attempts to forge peace were up in the air, But who can foresee with what success and with what result?
After the war, many scholars attempted to refocus their study. Political theorists, economists, social scientists - each discipline realized their theories failed to predict that outbreak of war. Political psychology developed as a rival interdisciplinary approach, arguing that the discipline had strayed too far from human experience to make valid prediction. And like Angell and Freud, the history of political psychology followed the politics of the times. The experience of the Second World War motivated the first generation of scholars to explore the politics behind state behavior. And early theories followed Freudian thought, teasing out the connections between society and the citizen. The focus centered on how leaders convinced their populations to fight, via propaganda or nationalist myth. A second generation of scholarship added to this base by focusing more closely on the masses and their belief systems. Flush with new quantitative methods and new data (provided by opinion polling), scholarship tended to gauge the capacities of the democratic public, tracking the connection between the content of political beliefs and mass behavior, such as voting.
A third generation once again changed direction by focusing on the deviations from rationality. Rational choice theory dominated the study of political behavior in the second generation. But the failures of presidential leadership - Vietnam, Watergate, the Iran Hostage Crisis, for example - convinced scholars that decisions were often non-rational. Cognitive theories emerged as one possible answer behind these gaffes, integrating work on perceptions and misperceptions, information processing, heuristics and schema theory to international behavior. Works questioned the super-heroic assumptions of rational choice, developing a behavioral account of decision.
A developing fourth generation flipped the focus back to mass behavior. The genocides and civil wars of the 1990s spurred work on identity and identity politics. Scholars realized cognitive theories are too abstracted from political reality. Humans are social animals, driven to satisfy the demands of their peers. As a result, work re-integrated mass behavior into explanations of politics. Hot processes of cognition manifest motivated misperceptions, arising from emotion and attachment to a broader in-group.
This current generation of scholarship is particularly important for understanding the pressures and politics facing European states such as Denmark. International relations theory is particularly ill-suited for a world impacted by non-state actors and non-standard threats. For example, the war in Iraq, combined with the collapse of financial giants, weakened the American capacity to lead. The uncertainty of the international system grants more freedom of choice for Danish leaders. And to understand how current and future leaders will make sense of the world requires psychology. What motivates Danish security and economic strategy? What perceptions and motivations underlie state action? Scholars must examine the internal calculations and perceptions of those in power to understand how Denmark will make its way in a new international system.
Furthermore, political psychology enlightens a discussion of Danish regional politics. Where structural accounts attempt to understand the global constraints facing Danish leaders, the changing European identity provides another challenge. Members of the EU continue to face a dilemma. Benefits of economic and security integration are obvious on the continent and to compete in a future world requires a long-term readjustment of European relations via intergovernmental institutions. But this clashes with the need of states to retain their own individual sense of space, identity and national interest. Europeans, in general, laud and fear this dramatic redrawing of the continent. The Danish response to these widespread changes is tied to culture and social psychology. How will Denmark find a way to be distinct and similar at the same time? This balancing act will drive future Danish relations with the continent.
And finally, a psychological paradigm helps to explain the changing domestic environment. The recent backlash against unions represents a significant change in how Danes view the role of government. Dimensions of Danish political beliefs - from perceptions of fairness and equality, to understandings of identity and national myth, to evolving group identities -- have changed the internal political game. The tactics of government, of democratic competition and legislative logrolling, are connected to how Danes view the process. A perspective based around political psychology enlightens the effectiveness of strategies and tactics in a newly changed political environment.
Political psychology, as an academic and policy tool, is well-suited to provide answers for the future of Danish politics. Denmark is undergoing a transformation internationally, regionally and domestically. In these unique times, scholars must be reminded that social science is inherently the study of humans as political animals. As Heinz Eulau chides a political science that ignores man is necessarily a very incomplete science of politics . Our hypotheses are stronger and theories more robust, by exploring the innately human character of Danish politics.
INTRODUKTION
Sigge Winther Nielsen Thomas H genhaven
Vi er alle rationelle! Denne tilsyneladende uskyldige tiltro til mennesket har siden Aristoteles udgjort pr missen for vores forst else af verden og politiske handlinger. N r folk tillader sig at handle irrationelt, ved vi ikke l ngere, hvilket ben vi skal st p . For rationelle mennesker beg r ikke folkemord, rationelle mennesker bliver ikke terrorister eller religi se fanatikere. Teorier, der antager, at alle er rationelle, kan ikke forklare, hvorfor hutuer dr bte 800.000 tutsier i 1994, hvorfor al-Qaedas selvmordsterrorister den 11. september 2001 tvang to fly ind i Twin Towers og dr bte 2.993 mennesker, eller hvorfor Danmark blev lagt for had, da Jyllands-Posten i 2005 publicerede tegninger af profeten Muhammed. Mange af vor tids st rste udfordringer er skabt af folk, vi ikke kan forst , fordi de handler irrationelt, og det stiller nye krav til os. Den b rende tanke i denne bog er, at vi er tvunget til at s ge forklaringer andre steder og revurdere samfundets forventninger til rationalitet - og at politisk psykologi er en af de veje, vi kan f lge, hvis vi vil n en mere pr cis forst else af, hvordan mennesker agerer i verden. Denne antologi best r derfor af 14 bidrag, der belyser, hvordan mennesker rent faktisk t nker og handler, dels n r vi er alene, og dels n r vi er en del af en gruppe.
Studiet af politisk psykologi har i samfundsvidenskaben ofte v ret reduceret til kuri se indfald i debatten. Disse indfald gav anledning til megen morskab over ny viden om Adolf Hitlers og John F. Kennedys stofmisbrug, magtelitens ukuelige evne til at beg hybris og menneskets hang til at holde fast p en bestemt - forkert - opfattelse af verden. Men politisk psykologi er ikke blot en samling anekdoter. Tv rtimod. Politisk psykologi er en veludviklet disciplin, der er i stand til at forklare den m de, hvorp vi forst r hinanden, tr ffer beslutninger og indretter samfundet. Is r rettes fokus mod de uheldige konsekvenser, det har, at den menneskelige hjerne systematisk fejlvurderer situationer. N r eksempelvis politikerne udvikler politik og opbygger samfund ud fra, hvordan vi tror , mennesker er, i stedet for hvordan vi faktisk er - s opst r uholdbare institutioner og begivenheder, der har vidtr kkende konsekvenser for os alle. Krige, kriser og politisk ustabilitet har alle menneskelige ansigter. Det er bogens pr mis, at evnen til at begribe alt dette et langt stykke ad vejen kan forklares ved at forst menneskets natur og studere vores systematiske tilb jeligheder. Det er kernen i politisk psykologi.
Politisk psykologi udfordrer ideen om mennesket som et rationelt v sen og angriber s ledes selve det grundlag, samfundet er indrettet p : Politikere og politiske eksperter er oftest enige om, at politiske akt rer er form lsrationelle og nyttemaksimerende. Ud fra denne forst else antages det, at individer, organisationer og stater opstiller m l, indsamler information om forskellige valgmuligheder, beregner fordele og ulemper ved de forskellige m l og p baggrund heraf tr ffer den mest optimale, og dermed rationelle, beslutning. Den rationelle akt ropfattelse ligger ogs til grund for vores forst else af, at andre staters handlinger er rettet hen imod maksimering af magt, territorium og velstand, hvad enten det g lder milit re konflikter som den mellem Israel og Pal stina eller EU-forhandlinger om m lkekvoter. Politiske eksperter antager s ledes ogs , at politikeres handlinger altid er rettet mod maksimering af stemmer, hvad enten det handler om en politikers klipning af sit sk g - som da Mogens Lykketoft blev stylet i 2004 - eller fundamentale kovendinger. Konsekvensen af, at vi blindt opfatter alle som rationelle, er, at politiske og samfundsm ssige institutioner indrettes til det rationelle menneske i stedet for det rigtige menneske (Green og Shapiro 1994; Monroe og Maher 1995). Politisk psykologi fremf rer derimod et mere realistisk og nuanceret syn p de psykologiske kr fter, der styrer b de individer og grupper.
Antagelserne om form lsrationelle og nyttemaksimerende akt rer udspringer af rational choice-teorien og fungerer som grundlag for den m de, hvorp vi definerer b de politiske problemer og l sninger. N r alle akt rer ses som tro kopier af det rationelle menneske , bliver l sningen p et givent problem ofte at skabe et incitament til at handle hensigtsm ssigt ud fra en rationel betragtning. Hvis vi vil have f rre indbrud, h ver vi straffen for indbrud, s ledes at det ikke l ngere er rationelt at udf re s danne handlinger. Hvis vi vil have en diktator til at opf re sig ordentligt, p l gger vi ham og hans stat konomiske sanktioner for at ge omkostningerne ved hans adf rd og herigennem f ham til at handle anderledes. Disse incitamentsbaserede l sninger udf rdiges uden n rmere stillingtagen til, om akt ren handler ud fra andre bev ggrunde, s som hvad der f les rigtigt, hvad der opfattes som v rende passende i en given social kontekst, og/eller hvad der kan reducere kognitiv dissonans (Sears 1993; Westen 2007; Giddens 1991; Festinger et al. 1956; March og Olson 1998). P standen i denne bog er, at handlinger ikke altid foretages ud fra en form lsrationel handlingslogik, men lige s ofte har til form l at fastholde vores eksisterende virkelighedsopfattelse.
Som det uddybes senere i kapitlet, eksisterer politisk psykologi som en grundl ggende forklaringsvariabel stort set ikke i Danmark. Men frav ret af politisk psykologi i Danmark er problematisk p flere niveauer. P det forskningsm ssige plan kan vi blive bedre til at forst , forklare og forudsige politisk handling ved at forbedre mikrofundamentet i eksisterende teorier og benytte os af st rre metodologisk diversitet. P det praktiske plan kan vi blive bedre til at foreskrive, hvordan de politiske institutioner i samfundet b r indrettes, ved at tage h jde for, hvordan borgerne og politikerne faktisk agerer. Man kan eksempelvis s tte sp rgsm lstegn ved den m de, hvorp vi v lger vores regering. Hvis nu ikke alle borgere s tter sig ned og overvejer samtlige fordele og ulemper ved de opstillede kandidater, er vores forventning til det demokratiske udfald s rigtigt? Politisk psykologi peger her p , at det langtfra kun er politikernes meninger, der betyder noget, men i lige s h j grad t ller, hvordan disse meninger frames og primes . I valgkampen mellem Nixon og Kennedy viste meningsm linger eksempelvis, at radiolytterne mente, at Nixon vandt, mens tv-seerne var af den modsatte overbevisning (Jost og Sidanius 2004: 2). Har lyttere eller seere mest ret i deres vurdering af debatten? Diskrepansen illustrerer mere grundl ggende, at m den, hvorp vi f r information, har stor betydning for vores forst else af verden og handling i den. Menneskets systematiske afvigelser fra rationalitet betyder, at vi ikke handler p samme m de, som vi forventer bl.a. ud fra demokratiteorier. Det vil derfor v re oplagt at diskutere, i hvor h j grad vores demokratiske processer passer til samfundets borgere, og herigennem om vi v lger vores politiske ledere ud fra de rigtige kriterier. Dette introduktionskapitel skrider frem s ledes: F rst skitseres den nuv rende forst else af rationel adf rd i form af rational choice-teorien. En stor del af politisk psykologi er eksplicit og til tider implicit en kritik af denne teori, som s ledes er en n dvendig forst elsesramme. I den anden del af introduktionen udfoldes disciplinen politisk psykologi, hvor forskellige definitioner diskuteres. Derefter gennemg s politisk psykologis historie i tredje del. Den historiske gennemgang byder p mange internationale forskere, s rlig amerikanske, men bem rkelsesv rdigt nok kun en enkelt dansker. I introduktionens fjerde del unders ges, hvorfor politisk psykologi har trange k r i Danmark, og det p peges, hvad samfundsvidenskaben derved g r glip af. I femte og afsluttende del opstilles rammen for resten af antologien, idet disciplinen politisk psykologi klassificeres i fire grupper: kognition og bearbejdning af information, beslutninger, gruppedynamik og socialt pres, samt lederen og massen. Denne inddeling fungerer samtidig som strukturering af antologiens bidrag.
Rational choice-teorien
Da politisk psykologi prim rt er opst et som en negativ videnskab, m dens modpart, rational choice-teorien, betragtes som en foruds tning for at forst disciplinen. Rational choice-teorien blev introduceret af matematikeren John von Neumann og konomen Oskar Morgenstern i 1944 i Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Kahneman og Tversky 1984: 343). Der er tale om en teori med udgangspunkt i det behavioristiske ideal om objektiv og kvantificerbar forskning. Form let med rational choice-teorien var oprindelig foreskrivende, da forfatterne tilsigtede at opstille procedurer for, hvordan man tr ffer rationelle og efficiente beslutninger (Tversky 1975: 173; Schoemaker 1982: 539; Elster 2000: 1, 3). Det skal her bem rkes, at der ikke kun findes n rational choice-teori, eftersom den er formuleret i mange forskellige nuancer (Green og Shapiro 1994). I dette kapitel omtaler vi dog teorikomplekset som v rende n teori, eftersom alle rational choice-varianterne beror p den samme grundl ggende antagelse om rational man , om end han if res forskellige kl der af forskellige forfattere. Det er denne grundtanke, politisk psykologi reagerer p .
Rational choice-teorien i dens oprindelige, foreskrivende form er i det store og hele undtaget for kritik inden for politisk psykologi. De tekster, der udg r n rv rende antologi, er derimod rettet mod den udvikling, som rational choice-teorien har taget siden 1960 erne, hvor teorien er blevet langt mere ambiti s inden for andre grene end konomi. Udviklingen i teorien kan skitseres s ledes:
FIGUR 1 : Udviklingen af rational choice-teorien

Den f rste udvikling i rational choice-teorien er udvidelse af dens form l, hvor den g r fra at v re en individuel pr skriptiv teori til at v re en deskriptiv teori. Forandringen af teoriens form l betyder, at teorien ikke l ngere skal kortl gge optimal adf rd, men nu forklare og forudsige adf rd. Konsekvensen af transformationen er, at idealet om fuld information og nyttemaksimering konverteres til deskriptive antagelser om individet (Green og Shapiro 1994: 12). I stedet for at foreskrive, hvordan akt ren kan handle rationelt, s fremt han har en hjerne, der fungerer som en perfekt regnemaskine, antages det nu, at akt ren er en perfekt regnemaskine, der besidder fuld information (Schoemaker 1982: 530; Zuckert 1995: 184). Udviklingen er prim rt foranlediget af gruppen af konomer, der g r under betegnelsen Chicago-skolen. Denne konomiske skole rummer prominente teoretikere s som Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker og James Buchanan og har til form l at udbrede principper og tankegange fra det konomiske dom ne til det sociale og politiske (Miller 1962: 65; Lemke 2001: 197). Chicago-skolen har tendens til at s tte lighedstegn mellem det ideelle og det faktiske, s ledes at den virkelige verden ses som v rende en forholdsvis pr cis udgave af konomisk teori (Miller 1962: 65).
Den anden udvikling i rational choice-teorien omhandler ligeledes teoriens form l, men ogs dens genstandsfelt. Med udgangspunkt i den deskriptive version af teorien har Chicago-skolen og andre neoliberale hen ad vejen gjort teorien pr skriptiv igen. Dette er en f lge af, at teorien i dens deskriptive udgave bruges til at komme med normative synspunkter om, hvordan samfundet b r indrettes. Denne nye form for pr skriptiv teori adskiller sig fra den oprindelige individuelle pr skriptive teori, fordi den bygger videre p den deskriptive fortolkning af rational choice-antagelserne. Form let med denne tredje version af rational choice-teori er at forandre samfundets institutioner, hvorfor denne udgave af rational choice-teorien kan ben vnes politisk pr skriptiv.
Politisk pr skriptiv rational choice-teori indeb rer en anden central udvikling inden for rational choice-teorien i form af en udvidelse af dens genstandsfelt. I og med at teorien nu er politisk pr skriptiv, har teorien udviklet sig fra udelukkende at besk ftige sig med det konomiske marked til at inkludere b de konomiske, politisk-administrative og sociale dom ner (Green og Shapiro 1994). Det betyder, at b de problemer og l sninger i adskillige dom ner nu defineres ud fra de logikker og termer, der traditionelt kendetegner det konomiske dom ne (Lemke 2001: 197; Gordon 1991: 42). Der er her tale om, hvad mange rational choice-kritikere betegner som kolonisering af andre dom ner og livsverdener (Habermas 1984: 8ff; Habermas 1987: 164ff; Horkheimer og Adorno 2002: 11; Monroe og Maher 1995: 1; Scott 2000; Walt 1999: 5; Baynes 1998: 2). Det betyder, at disse dom ner, mest tydeligt politiske og sociale, nu indrettes ud fra samme pr misser, antagelser og logikker, som anvendes i den konomiske sf re.
I udvidelsen af teoriens dom ne ligger en implicit antagelse om, at alle relationer grundl ggende er identiske med dem, der eksisterer p markedet, hvorfor de samme rationaler er velegnede til at danne grundlag for institutioner i alle samfundets dom ner (Riker og Zavoina 1970: 50). If lge teoriens fortalere er det s ledes ikke kun k bere og s lgere p markedet, der fors ger at maksimere deres materielle velstand, men ogs bureaukrater, politikere, organisationer og stater. Sat p spidsen er der i denne konomiske logik ikke forskel p at k be en bil og beg et mord. Begge handlinger antages at blive beg et af en form lsrationel akt r, som mere eller mindre er en tro kopi af rational man . Akt ren opvejer omkostninger og fordele ved en given handling og k ber bilen eller beg r mordet, s fremt dette giver den st rste nytte. Det politiske svar p alverdens problemer er derfor at regulere sanktionerne for at beg et mord, hvorefter det forventes, at den rationelle akt r v lger en anden handling. Den konomiske logik adskiller sig derfor grundl ggende fra den politisk psykologiske forst else af menneskelig handling, som i langt h jere grad inddrager psykologiske og biologiske faktorer.
Konsekvenserne af udvidelsen af rational choice-teoriens form l og genstandsfelt har vist sig at v re omfangsrige, eftersom tankegangen dominerer store dele af den politiske sf re. Udvidelsen af form l og genstandsfelt har v ret st rkt medvirkende til fremkomsten og opblomstringen af disciplinen politisk psykologi, fordi den s tter sp rgsm lstegn ved de antagelser, som rational choice-teorien bygger p .
Disciplinen politisk psykologi
Som navnet politisk psykologi antyder, udspringer disciplinen af politologi og psykologi. Det er en interdisciplin r videnskab, som tager udgangspunkt i to forskellige discipliner med hver sit form l. Psykologi fokuserer normalt p individet, mens politologi fokuserer p summen af individer og det aggregerede udfald af deres organisering og handlen. I fors get p at kombinere styrkerne ved politologi og psykologi udg r rational choice-teorien et udgangspunkt, da der heri findes en kobling mellem mikro- og makroniveau. Politisk psykologi har s rligt fokus p de antagelser, der ligger bag de politiske analyser. Det er n dvendigt at have korrekte empiriske antagelser om individet, f rend man kan lave politiske analyser, eftersom individer og deres kognitive begr nsninger har stor betydning for det samlede udfald. Politisk psykologi arbejder p at bne og afkode de f nomener, rational choice-teorien betragter som en sort boks (McGraw 2000: 823). Politisk psykologi er reduktionistisk p samme m de som psykologi, i og med at det prim rt er individet, der unders ges. Tiltroen til reduktionisme beror yderligere p en forst else af, at det er mennesker, og ikke organisationer eller stater, der handler. Dog beror politisk psykologis anvendelighed og succes p evnen til at kunne belyse og forklare sp rgsm l p makroniveau, hvilket svarer til politologiens succeskriterium.
Som n vnt er politisk psykologi prim rt en negativ videnskab og tager dermed udgangspunkt i at kritisere rationalistiske forst elser og forklaringer (Sullivan, Rahn og Rudolph 2002a; Schildkraut 2004). Den kritiske tilgang skal ikke opfattes som destruktiv, men snarere som en analyse af, hvilke antagelser, kendte og skjulte, som vores tanker, handlinger og teorier hviler p . Politisk psykologi er alts et konstruktivt fors g p at forbedre vores politiske beslutninger og politiske institutioner ved at unders ge konsekvensen af, at disse er baseret p en sn ver og idealiseret forst else af individet. Kritikken af rational choice-teoriens rationalitetsbegreb skal ikke forst s som et argument for, at vi alle er irrationelle (Simon 1995: 46; Jervis 1993; Bell, Raiffa og Tversky 1988: 9; Grafstein 1995: 63). Derimod er p standen i politisk psykologi, at den forst else af rationalitet, som ligger i rational choice-teorien, er idealiseret og eksisterer p , hvad Green og Shapiro betegner som et usikkert empirisk fundament (Green og Shapiro 1994: 11). Den nuv rende paradigmatiske forst else i samfundsvidenskaben og politologien er ikke en universel og objektiv sandhed, men snarere en teori opfundet af en amerikansk matematiker og en tysk konom.
konomer og rational choice-fortalere kritiserer ofte den politiske psykologi for positionen som negativ videnskab (Riker 1995). Kritikken p peger, at politisk psykologi ikke form r at opstille et sammenh ngende alternativ til den rationelle akt rmodel, hvormed muligheden for at applicere fundene i politisk psykologi er st rkt begr nset. Denne diskussion afspejler en grundl ggende metodologisk strid mellem rational choice-fortalere og deres kritikere: Skal en teori v re parsimonisk eller realistisk (Kahneman 2003: 1449)? Denne metateoretiske diskussion udvikles til fulde i antologiens afsluttende kapitel. I l bet af de seneste 10 r er der dog opst et en stigende tendens til at bedrive mere positiv videnskab, der er i stand til at udfordre rational choice-teorien som fundament for vores forst else af politisk handling, processer og institutioner (McGraw 2000: 823). Der er s ledes tegn p , at disciplinen politisk psykologi er et vidensfelt i modning, ogs fordi der ud over udviklingen hen imod en positiv videnskab g res b de teoretiske, empiriske og metodologiske fremskridt (McGraw 2000).
Hvis der kan siges at v re et samlende form l for politisk psykologi, s er det at p vise, at den menneskelige kapacitet er begr nset, b de hvad ang r perception og bearbejdning af information (Tetlock 2005: 232; Kahneman 2003; Simon 1983: 294; 1999: 114; Jones et al. 2006: 39). Fokus i politisk psykologi er derfor b de p menneskelige succeser og fejl, omend der en tendens til at l gge mest v gt p det sidste (Marcus 2008: 324). Det tilsigtes at falsificere, modificere, supplere og/eller erstatte rational choice-teorien som mikrofundament i analyser. Det er i denne forbindelse, at politisk psykologi udpeger blinde vinkler og str ber efter at skabe en mere udt mmende forst else af individet, s de strukturelle teorier kan forbedres og baseres p et mere fyldestg rende grundlag (Bryder 1988). Heri ligger en st rk tiltro til metodologisk reduktionisme, hvor det antages, at handlinger kun kan forst s ved at studere individet. S ledes bliver individet den helt centrale byggesten i sociale f nomener og handling (Elster 2000: 7). Metodologisk reduktionisme betyder ikke , at alt kan reduceres til summen af individer, eftersom der opst r synergi-effekter, der skaber relationer og v rdier, som eksisterer intersubjektivt. Reduktionisme er snarere et opg r med den antropomorfe forst else af aggregerede enheder som handlende subjekter. L res tning nummer et er derfor: Individer tr ffer beslutninger, det g r organisationer og stater ikke .
Betydningen af et empirisk korrekt mikrofundament kan ikke overvurderes, da det danner grundlag for al videre forskning. Selv neorealismens fader, Kenneth Waltz, erkender n dvendigheden af et solidt mikrofundament som foruds tning for reel viden om de kr fter, der g r sig g ldende inden for de strukturelle rammer (Waltz 2001). Det st rste bidrag fra politisk psykologi i denne debat ligger formentligt i at dokumentere systematiske afvigelser fra teorierne om mennesket som perfekt rationel akt r (Kahneman 2003). Det er dog ikke alle, der betragter et velfunderet empirisk udgangspunkt som afg rende. Den vigtigste kritiker p dette omr de er Milton Friedman, som argumenterer for, at man ikke skal d mme en model ud fra dens empiriske validitet, men ud fra dens evne til at forudsige begivenheder. Hvis modellen kan forudsige, b r man sige, at folk handler, som de g r i modellen, ogs selvom modellen ikke er en tiln rmelsesvis pr cis beskrivelse af rigtige individer (Friedman 1953).
M let for politisk psykologi er med andre ord at opstille en akt rmodel, der er funderet p korrekte empiriske antagelser, da dette ses som en n dvendig foruds tning for en korrekt forst else og hensigtsm ssig indretning af verden. Jagten p at forst de mennesker, der tr ffer politiske beslutninger, medf rer en bred metodologisk tilgang. Dette indeb rer f rst og fremmest klassisk psykologisk metode, hvori eksperimenter og computermodeller er afg rende, samt b de velkendt politologisk metode g ende fra kvalitative casestudier til kvantitative analyser blandt andet baseret p surveys og opinionsunders gelser (McDermott 2004 21ff; McGraw 2000: 810; Deutsch og Kinvall 2002). Den vigtigste metode er eksperimentelle studier, der muligg r isolering af variable, s man kan se, hvordan mennesket reagerer under bestemte forhold. Isolering af variable muligg r pr cise iagttagelser af kausale relationer, hvilket m siges at v re politisk psykologis ubetinget st rste styrke, metodisk set (Kinder og Palfrey 1993; Smith 1991: 878). 1
Selvom st rstedelen af de politiske psykologer med en vis ret kan placeres i denne rationalitetsdebat, er disciplinen yderst fragmenteret (Stein 2008: 104). S ledes besk ftiger politisk psykologi sig med en bred vifte af f nomener omhandlende vidt forskellige enheder og analyseniveauer, s som politiske personligheder, offentlig opinion, politisk deltagelse, socialisering, massemedier, konflikter mellem grupper, beslutningstagning, lydh rhed, identitet, perception, bearbejdning af information og afvigelser fra rationalitet (Sears, Huddy og Jervis 2003: 3; Deutsch og Kinvall 2002). Politisk psykologi er derfor funderet p en flerhed af sm teorier snarere end p en parsimonisk teori. I bogens afsluttende kapitel opstilles imidlertid en r kke af feltets samlende elementer eller kerneantagelser, der kan ligge til grund for videre forskning i politisk psykologi.
Kombinationen af et bredt empirisk genstandsfelt og h j metodologisk diversitet betyder, at det er sv rt at definere politisk psykologi i konkrete og entydige termer. I de f lgende afsnit gennemg s en r kke definitioner af politisk psykologi, inden bogens bud pr senteres. Definitionen danner samtidig rammen for udv lgelsen af bidrag til antologien i den forstand, at de elementer, der ekskluderes fra definitionen, ogs naturligt ekskluderes fra antologien.
Selvom semantikken i navnet politisk psykologi antyder, at hovedv gten l gges p psykologi, g r det meste forskning det modsatte. Det betyder, at de fleste forskere anvender psykologisk teori til at forklare politiske f nomener (Krosnick og McGraw 2002; Iyengar 1993). P baggrund af denne v gtning definerer Sears, Huddy og Jervis politisk psykologi som an application of what is known about human psychology to the study of politics (Sears, Huddy og Jervis 2003: 3). En lignende definition giver hjemmesiden for institut for politisk psykologi ved Stanford University: Political psychologists attempt to understand the psychological underpinnings, roots and consequences of political behavior (Stanford 2008). P samme vis definerer James Kuklinski politisk psykologi som the study of mental processes that underlie political judgments and decision making (Kuklinski 2002: 2). Ved at anvende og udvikle psykologisk forskning i det politiske genstandsfelt er det muligt at belyse variable og elementer af politiske personer, processer og institutioner, der normalt bliver betragtet som eksogene variable i politiske analyser.
Ovenst ende definitioner af politisk psykologi fremh ver vigtige aspekter ved disciplinen. Vi mener i forl ngelse heraf, at disciplinen bedst defineres mere udt mmende: Politisk psykologi er en interdisciplin r forskningsgren, hvor individorienteret psykologisk teori anvendes inden for statskundskabens genstandsfelt med henblik p at nuancere og udbygge forst elsen af aggregerede politiske handlinger, processer og institutioner. Dette tilstr bes ved at kortl gge systematiske tilb jeligheder og begr nsninger indbygget i individet og spore effekterne af deres aggregering .
Med denne definition afgr nses b de bogens fokus og disciplinen politisk psykologi. Den vigtigste afgr nsning er, at politisk psykologi ses som anvendelsen af psykologi i statskundskabens genstandsfelt. Der er en stigende tendens til, at politologisk teori anvendes p psykologiens genstandsfelt (Lane 2002; Krosnick og McGraw 2002), men denne del af disciplinen udelades fra b de definitionen og bogen. Politisk psykologi har sin styrke og sit st rste potentiale som et redskab til at forbedre mikrofundamentet inden for statskundskab.
Disciplinens historie
Politisk psykologi opstod for alvor som akademisk disciplin i 1940 erne, men grundtanken i disciplinen str kker sig tilbage til i hvert fald 1700-tallet. I 1725 skrev Giambattista Vico s ledes: Governments must conform to the nature of men governed (Vico citeret i Stone 1981: 1). Den f rste akademiske interesse for politisk psykologi spirede frem i 1920 erne, og det var i denne periode, at Walter Lippman begyndte at unders ge perception og hvordan begr nsede koginitive ressourcer reducerer v lgernes evne til at tr ffe hensigtsm ssige politiske beslutninger. Samtidig hermed vakte Graham Wallas interesse for politisk psykologi p London School of Economics, hvor han besk ftigede sig med instinkter i politik og beslutningsrationalitet (Stone 1981: 10). Wallas linje blev fulgt af Harold Lasswell, som i 1930 udgav bogen Psychopathology and Politics , hvori han eksperimenterede med freudianske metoder inden for statskundskabens genstandsfelt. Der er p den m de produceret vigtige og jen bnende v rker inden for politisk psykologi i 1920 erne og 1930 erne, men de var forholdsvis enkeltst ende og skabte f rst for alvor akademisk debat fra 1940 erne og frem.
Politisk psykologi kan som disciplin opdeles i fire faser, der str kker sig fra 1940 erne til i dag. Skiftene mellem de forskellige faser i politisk psykologi er for rsaget af de aktuelle politiske udfordringer, som is r vestlige stater har st et over for. Selvom hver fase betyder et brud med den tidligere fase, er det v sentligt at p pege, at der er en h j grad af kontinuitet i disciplinen. De metoder og empiriske genstandsfelter, der pr ger en given epoke, kan derfor ofte ogs findes i andre faser. Dette skyldes bl.a., at de fleste forskere bliver ved med at forske i den samme subdisciplin, ogs selvom det overordnede fokus i politisk psykologi konstant flytter sig (McGuire 1993: 30).
Figur 2 : Faserne inden for politisk psykologi

F ASE 1: POLITISKE LEDERES PERSONLIGHED
Politisk psykologi blev grundlagt, da en r kke forskere i 1940 erne fandt det hensigtsm ssigt at udforske politiske lederes personlighed, hvor fokus var p forbindelsen mellem individets personlighed og de strukturelle omgivelser. Det var en reaktion p b de en historisk og en teoretisk udvikling, som tog sin begyndelse i 1930 erne, da en r kke af mere eller mindre obskure politiske ledere tr dte ind p den politiske verdensscene. Dette aff dte dels et behov for at forst disse patologiske tilf lde s vel som det faktum, at borgere i demokratiske og civiliserede lande uden st rre overvejelser bidrog til tortur og folkemord. Anden Verdenskrig var alts en central begivenhed i disciplinens opst en. Krigen skabte et behov for at forst individerne i samfundet, b de eliter og masser. Det blev p tr ngende at forst , hvorn r og hvorfor vi opf rer os som fredelige demokratiske mennesker, og hvorn r vi udviser patologisk adf rd.
I studiet af koblingen mellem omgivelser og personlighed var Sigmund Freuds arbejde en uvurderlig inspirationskilde. Ikke nok med at Freud havde udviklet et teoriapparat, han havde ogs sammen med William Bullit forfattet en psykobiografi om den tidligere amerikanske pr sident Woodrow Wilson. Selvsamme Wilson blev offer for det nok vigtigste bidrag til disciplinens f rste fase, da han var analyseobjekt i Alexander George og Juliette Georges psykobiografiske analyse Woodrow Wilson And Colonel House: A Personality Study (1956). I dette v rk blev Wilsons selvudslettende personlighed beskrevet med udgangspunkt i Freuds psykoanalyse. Denne psykobiografiske metode var revolutionerende, fordi den modsat klassisk freudiansk psykoanalyse unders gte et individs personlighed ud fra andenh ndskilder i stedet for direkte samtale. Metoden viste sig at v re s anvendelig, at CIA begyndte at benytte den til at analysere politiske ledere og stadig bruger den i dag. For eksempel blev Saddam Husseins personlighed kortlagt forud for Golf-krigene (Post 1990). S ledes var den psykologiske biografi et n dvendigt redskab i den amerikanske udenrigspolitik forud for Irak-krigen i 1990. I denne periode udkom ogs en del litteratur om forholdet mellem eliten og masserne. S ledes var fokus ikke kun p lederes personlighed per se , men p menneskets personlighed. I forskningen tilsigtedes det at finde ud af, hvad man kan f mennesker til at g re. Denne forskning inkluderer vigtige bidrag som The Authoritarian Personality (1950) af Adorno et al., og Milgrams fors g med lydighed over for autoriteter (bedst opsummeret og beskrevet 20 r senere i Milgram 1974). F lles for denne forskning er, at den pr ver at forst , hvordan tilsyneladende almindelige mennesker accepterer at p f re andre mennesker smerte og d d, s fremt en autoritetsperson opfordrer dem til at g re det. At disse studier stadig er relevante, illustreres af Jerry Burger, som i 2008 foretog en delvis gentagelse af Milgrams fors g og fik nogenlunde samme resultater: Mellem 60 og 70 % af alle m nd og kvinder er villige til at give en anden person elektrisk st d p mere end 150 volt, s fremt en autoritetsperson beder dem om at g re det (Burger 2009).
F ASE 2: BEHAVIORISME OG POLITISK ADF RD
Den anden fase vandt frem i begyndelsen af 1960 erne, da b de statskundskab og politisk psykologi undergik en behavioristisk revolution, ikke mindst takket v re rational choice-teorien (Simon 1983; Simon 1995). En vigtig, men ikke s rlig radikal figur, var konomen Herbert Simon, der i starten af 1950 erne indledte sit arbejde med teorien om bundet rationalitet , bounded rationality , som for alvor slog igennem i det efterf lgende rti. Simon anerkender, at der eksisterer rationalitet, omend den er mere begr nset end rational choiceproponenter forventer. Akt ren samler information, bearbejder den, fordeler den p de forskellige alternativer og tr ffer herefter en beslutning - men akt ren stopper med at bruge ressourcer p en given beslutning, n r han finder et alternativ, der er tilfredsstillende. If lge rational choice-teorien ville en akt r derimod blive ved, til han finder det optimale alternativ.
Behaviorismens sejrstogt medf rte et st rkt fokus p kvantitativ metode og statistisk analyse af data. Fokus blev derfor rettet mod holdninger og adf rd, der huserede blandt de brede masser i samfundet. Det empiriske genstandsfelt i denne periode var domineret af politisk adf rd, prim rt set ud fra et behavioristisk perspektiv (Sullivan, Rahn og Rudolph 2002a: 24). Den vigtigste forsker i denne periode er formentlig Philip Converse, som i artiklen The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964) analyserede den amerikanske befolknings politiske viden eller mangel p samme ud fra kvantitative parametre. Rational choice-teorien blev udviklet til sit nuv rende stadium: Den indstiftede sin antagelse om n sten ubegr nset menneskelig rationalitet. Politisk psykologi begyndte her at demonstrere, at den menneskelige rationalitet er begr nset, og at b de den menneskelige natur og sociale faktorer forhindrer, at individer agerer p samme m de, som rational choice-forskerne forudsiger. Det var ogs i denne periode, at politisk psykologi udviklede sig til et selvst ndigt fag p universiteter, at der udkom b ger om faget, ligesom tidsskriftet Political Psychology blev lanceret (Sears og Funk 1991: 345; P rez 2001: 348f).
F ASE 3: KOGNITION OG BESLUTNINGSPROCESSER
I begyndelsen af 1980 erne tog politisk psykologi en ny drejning, som blev en overbygning til de to f rste faser. Med udgangspunkt i kognitiv psykologi begyndte forskere at unders ge, hvordan mennesker, b de eliter og masser, bearbejder information. Denne udvikling skal ses i lyset af den kolde krig, hvor det i stigende grad blev klart, at selv en lille fejl i perception eller informationsbearbejdelse kunne udl se en atomkrig. For eksempel gav b de USA s og Sovjets early warning systemes flere tusinde fejlagtige meddelelser om n rt forest ende atomangreb og illustrerede dermed, hvordan simple fejl er uundg elige i en verden best ende af og indrettet af mennesker (BBC 1998). Den foretrukne metode i disciplinens tredje fase var eksperimentelle studier, hvorigennem variable isoleres ved at uds tte fors gspersonerne for bestemte stimuli, for derigennem at teste hypoteser om menneskelig adf rd og rationalitet. Centrale forskere i denne fase var Daniel Kahneman og Amos Tversky, Robert Jervis og Philip Tetlock, som alle figurerer med v rker i n rv rende antologi.
Reaktionen mod rational choice-teorien blev nu endnu tydeligere, eftersom forskere inden for politisk psykologi p begyndte en m lrettet indsats for at finde afvigelser fra den g ngse opfattelse af rationalitet og rationel handling. Den vigtigste opdagelse var ikke bare, at der var afvigelser fra det mest rationelle valg, men ogs at disse afvigelser var systematiske og fulgte et m nster, som kunne kortl gges. Opdagelsen af systematiske afvigelser bet d endvidere, at det blev muligt at komme med mere pr cise forudsigelser, end hvad rational choice-teorien kunne pr stere (Schildkraut 2004: 807). Fokus blev derfor lagt p valg og p , hvordan information benyttes og bearbejdes af mennesker i almindelighed, og af politikere i s rdeleshed. Studierne i denne periode var forholdsvis brede, da de b de omfattede, hvordan information opfattes og misforst s, hvordan denne information bearbejdes, og hvordan beslutningsprocesser og risikovillighed h ndteres. Politisk psykologi udviklede og raffinerede p afg rende vis metoder i denne tredje fase, hvilket medf rte meget kreativ og jen bnende forskning. Antologien afspejler udviklingen ved at inkludere mange tekster fra denne periode, hvor flere hovedv rker inden for disciplinen blev skrevet.
F ASE 4: NEUROVIDENSKAB
De forskellige faser er p mange omr der udtryk for forskellig v gtning af metoder og empiri. Samtidig er de udtryk for, at ny psykologisk viden udvikles i takt med opfindelsen af nye teknologiske v rkt jer i studiet af hjernen. Det nyeste skud p denne stamme og den prim re motor i fjerde fase er neurovidenskab, som har givet ny og bedre indsigt i, hvordan hjernen fungerer (Marcus 2008: 321). Neurovidenskab viser eksempelvis, at det kun er en br kdel af alle beslutninger, der tr ffes bevidst, hvormed hjernen automatisk klarer resten. At man ikke engang registrerer st rstedelen af de beslutninger, man tr ffer, st r i st rk kontrast til rational choice-modellens forventning til grundige cost-benefit-analyser forud for beslutninger. I forl ngelse heraf st r neurologen Antonio Damasio som en central figur i nyere politisk psykologi. I sit v rk Descartes Error s tter han sp rgsm lstegn ved adskillelsen mellem f lelser og fornuft, eftersom det i h j grad er f lelser, der bestemmer, hvorn r rationelle og bevidste beslutninger igangs ttes (Stein 2008; Damasio 1994). Gennem studier af hjernens pr frontale cortex forklarer Damasio, at en kombination af f lelser og rationalitet er udgangspunktet for at tr ffe sunde og hensigtsm ssige beslutninger. Gennem en r kke analyser af mennesker med l sioner i den pr frontale cortex viser Damasio, at folk, der ikke form r at inddrage f lelser i beslutninger, tr ffer patologiske beslutninger (Damasio 1994; Montague 2006: 125). Drew Westen anvender denne neurovidenskabelige forskning inden for politologi ved at se p , hvordan henholdsvis republikanere og demokrater appellerer til forskellige dele af hjernen. Demokraterne til fornuft, og republikanerne til f lelser. Som oftest vinder republikanerne, fordi mennesker prim rt handler ud fra emotionalitet frem for form lsrationalitet (Westen 2007).
Ovenst ende historiske gennemgang understreger to pointer: at politisk psykologi er et meget fragmenteret og pluralistisk emneomr de, og at disciplinen form r at tilpasse sig de udfordringer, vestlige samfund st r over for i en given tid. Som alle andre akademiske discipliner har politisk psykologi b de sine st rke og svage sider. Den h je grad af diversitet inden for politisk psykologi er et eksempel. Diversiteten er en styrke, fordi den giver megen fleksibilitet, hvormed forskerne har mulighed for at skifte emne og metode for at forklare begivenheder, som sker netop nu i samfundet. Den er en svaghed, fordi den skaber flygtighed og mangel p et overordnet forskningsparadigme. Den st rste begr nsning ved politisk psykologi, som disciplinen ser ud i dag, er, at det er en samling af meget sm og partikul re teorier. Der mangler et samlende forskningsprogram, der kan integrere de mange sm , men vigtige eksperimenter og resultater. I det sidste kapitel i denne bog vil vi s ledes fors ge at etablere et felt for politisk psykologi baseret p en r kke centrale antagelser. P den baggrund er det hensigten, at politisk psykologi skal kunne udvikle sig til en middle range -teori, der kan anvendes p lige fod med mere etablerede samfundsvidenskabelige teorier. Hermed tilsigtes, at der opstilles en r kke grundl ggende antagelser, som sammen med en r kke ad hoc-hypoteser kan forklare en lang r kke konkrete, samfundsm ssige begivenheder.
Politisk psykologi i Danmark
Selvom politisk psykologi har eksisteret i hen mod 60 r, er disciplinens plads p danske universiteter begr nset, til trods for at den er forholdsvis bredt forankret i lande, hvor danske forskere og studerende normalt henter inspiration og viden: USA, England, Tyskland og Holland (Bryder 1988; Adamsen 2004). 2 I slutningen af 1990 erne udgjorde artikler om politisk psykologi eksempelvis knap 21 % af alle artikler i de tre store amerikanske politologiske tidsskrifter American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science og The Journal of Politics (mens tallet for rational choice-artikler var godt 31 %) (Sullivan, Rahn og Rudolph 2002b: 156). Endvidere er disciplinen solidt forankret i spansktalende lande, hvor tidsskriftet Psicologia Politica l ses af ca. 30.000 mennesker. Danske forskere anvender i h j grad teori og metode fra disse lande, ikke mindst rational choice-teori, s hvorfor er politisk psykologi blevet underprioriteret? Der er givetvis mange forklaringer p dette frav r, men to aspekter synes vigtigst: 1) fork rlighed for at forklare f nomener i relation til strukturer snarere end individer og 2) en tilb jelighed til at afskrive psykologi som uvidenskabelig:
For det f rste kan sociale f nomener forklares i henhold til enten individer eller samfundsstrukturer. Man kan forklare en hvilken som helst h ndelse som et udfald af samfundets institutioner, eller man kan knytte selvsamme begivenhed til de individer, der spiller en mere eller mindre central rolle i den. For eksempel kan man forklare udbruddet af F rste Verdenskrig med, at der var en ustabil magtbalance i Europa kombineret med ekspansionslystne stater, eller man kan tilskrive Gavrilo Princip den tvivlsomme re, eftersom han myrdede arvingen til den strig-ungarske trone, kronprins Franz Ferdinand. Kun de f rreste betragter individer og samfundsstrukturer som en dikotomi. De fleste vil h vde, at en h ndelse er et resultat af begge faktorer, eller tilskrive sig en dialektisk og strukturationistisk forst else af dette samspil, hvor individer og strukturer reproducerer hinanden igennem historien (Berger og Luckmann 2004; Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1989; Bauman 1973). Begge l sninger giver dog plads til at tilskrive henholdsvis individ og samfund den m ngde betydning, som man synes, er passende. Tocqueville argumenterer for, at forskere i forskellige samfund og historiske epoker l gger varierende v gt p de to faktorer (Tocqueville 1998). Jo mere hierarkisk et samfund er opbygget, desto st rre del af historien tilskrives individerne. Det er selvf lgelig ikke alle individer, der har lige stor betydning for, hvordan et givent samfund udvikler sig, hvilket betyder, at fokus rettes imod de individer, der er verst i hierarkiet. Helt omvendt ser det ud i egalit re samfund, hvor statslige strukturer traditionelt spiller en st rre rolle, hvormed langt st rstedelen af individerne er nogenlunde lige, og hvor samfundet s tter sn vre rammer for, hvilke valg individet kan foretage. Det er derfor ikke overraskende, at politisk psykologi har en st rkere forankring i angloamerikanske lande end i europ iske lande pr get af lighed og egalitarisme, eftersom individet generelt tilskrives mere betydning i de f rstn vnte lande. De samfundsvidenskabelige fakulteter i Danmark har siden 1960 erne taget en forholdsvis klar position i den relative v gtning af henholdsvis individer og samfundsstrukturer, hvor de fleste f nomener forklares i henhold til sidstn vnte. Vigtigst i denne sammenh ng er marxismens solide forankring p de danske universiteter.
For det andet har politologer haft en tilb jelighed til at s tte lighedstegn mellem psykologi og Sigmund Freuds psykoanalytiske metode. Dermed er kritikken mod Freud blevet generaliseret til at g lde for hele det psykologiske felt, hvormed disciplinen er reduceret til psykoanalyse af underfundige eksistenser. Denne generalisering betyder, at store dele af den psykologiske teori er blevet afskrevet som ufalsificerbar pseudovidenskab. De fleste politologer vil i dag formentligt mene, at denne kritik af en hel disciplin er uretm ssig, hvilket berettiger til en revidering af politologernes syn p psykologiske teorier og deres anvendelighed i samspil med statskundskab (Tingley 2006). Endvidere er metodologien inden for psykologi blevet forbedret v sentligt siden 1960 erne, hvilket betyder, at politologer i andre lande nu anerkender psykologi p lige fod med politologi (Deutsch og Kinnvall 2002: 15). P mange m der er de psykologiske metoder faktisk mere raffinerede og systematiserede, n r det kommer til eksperimentelle design og computerbaserede neuro-programmer. Ovenst ende illustrerer den brede diversitet, der pr ger politisk psykologi.
Klassificering af politisk psykologi
Der er mange forskellige m der, hvorp disciplinen kan klassificeres, hvilket skyldes, at politisk psykologi er et interdisciplin rt emneomr de, der ikke i st rre udstr kning er gennemt nkt som et sammenh ngende forskningsprogram. Politisk psykologi kan eksempelvis klassificeres ud fra en af de to moderdiscipliner: politologi og psykologi. Ved at tage udgangspunkt i politologien kan det interdisciplin re emneomr de inddeles i henholdsvis forvaltning, komparativ politik og international politik. Dette bliver til dels gjort i praksis, eftersom megen forskning er dedikeret international politik. Klassificeringen er dog problematisk, i og med at udgangspunktet i politisk psykologi er individet - uafh ngigt af om dette optr der i forvaltningen, i det parlamentariske milj eller i det internationale system. At klassificere politisk psykologi ud fra den anden moderdisciplin, psykologi, giver mening ud fra den betragtning, at politisk psykologi prim rt handler om anvendelsen af psykologi inden for statskundskab. I den optik b r disciplinen klassificeres i personlighedspsykologi, neuropsykologi, socialpsykologi, kognitionspsykologi, p dagogisk psykologi, klinisk psykologi og psykiatri. Denne klassificering er imidlertid ikke egnet til politisk psykologi, eftersom genstandsfeltet prim rt er det politiske. Et udgangspunkt i den klassiske psykologiske opdeling vil derfor medf re et endnu mere fragmenteret emneomr de. I denne bog inddeles bidragene i fire sektioner, der klassificeres efter to parametre: individ/masse og tanker/handling. Inddelingen sker hermed p feltets egne pr misser, da den tager udgangspunkt i de mest centrale variable (Sears, Huddy og Jervis 2003: 4).
FIGUR 3 : Klassifikation af politisk psykologi Individ Masse Input: Kognition og tanker Kognition og bearbejdning af information (sektion I) Gruppedynamik og sociale processer (sektion III) Output: Beslutninger og handlinger
Beslutningsprocesser og mentale smutveje (sektion II)
Gruppebeslutninger og massernes viden (sektion IV)
I NDIVID/MASSE
Da individet er i centrum i politisk psykologi, klassificeres teorierne ud fra, om de beskriver individet som v rende alene eller en del af masserne. Sondringen mellem individ og masse er central, eftersom mennesker ofte handler forskelligt, afh ngig af om de er alene eller en del af en gruppe. I sektion I og II st der vi p artikler, der s ger at p vise, at den menneskelige hjerne har en r kke begr nsninger og er underlagt bestemte handlingsrationaler, som adskiller sig fra rational choice-teoriens antagelser og forventninger. De individuelle beslutningsprocesser og handlingsrationaler, der prim rt foreg r i individet, er dog ikke up virket af den sociale kontekst. Hvis en akt r er en del af en lille homogen gruppe, er der s ledes stor risiko for, at deres forst else af verden konvergerer omkring en meget partikul r ontologisk opfattelse. Endvidere er der risiko for, at grupper bliver ramt af massepanik, eller at de skaber meget st rke fjendebilleder mod andre grupper. Disse emner belyses i sektion III og IV.
T ANKER/HANDLINGER
Den anden parameter, hvorefter politisk psykologi kan klassificeres, er sondringen mellem tanker og handling. Eller sagt p en anden m de forskellen mellem input og output. Individer absorberer fra omverden en r kke input, som de gennemarbejder og fors ger at skabe mening i. P den anden side foretager individer hele tiden handlinger, som skaber et output. Denne sondring bruges bredt i politisk psykologi, da den omhandler de grundl ggende m der, hvorp individets hjerne arbejder og menneskets handlinger effektueres. Det er hensigtsm ssigt at sondre mellem input og output, fordi der kan opst forskellige fejlkilder i de to processer. Den kognition, som enkeltindivider og grupper genneml ber, danner grundlaget for vores beslutninger og handlinger. Med andre ord kan man ikke tr ffe perfekte rationelle beslutninger, hvis ikke de kognitive a priori -processer er perfekte. Hvis akt ren beg r fejl i behandlingen af data, bliver handlingerne ogs derefter.
En skematisk inddeling vil altid v re mere rigid end disciplinen, der tvinges ind i den. Der vil derfor kunne argumenteres for, at nogle af teksterne kan placeres i mere end n kategori. Pointen er, at de fire sektioner ikke b r ses som afgr nsede felter, men snarere som et heuristisk v rkt j til at forst disciplinen. Ud fra dimensionerne individ/masse og tanker/handlinger inddeles antologiens tekster i fire sektioner, der nu gennemg s.
I K OGNITION OG BEARBEJDNING AF INFORMATION
I antologiens f rste sektion rettes fokus mod de kognitive begr nsninger, der pr ger alle individer. Teksterne peger pr cist p , hvor og hvorn r rational choice-teorien tager fejl i forhold til dens antagelser om de menneskelige kapaciteter. Hermed danner disse bidrag grundlag for en mere realistisk, kompleks og empirisk-funderet forst else af akt ren. Alexander George og Juliette George forklarer, hvordan opdragelsen kan have alvorlige konsekvenser for, hvordan politikere t nker senere i livet. Herbert Simon introducerer teorien om bounded rationality, hvori det ikke l ngere antages, at mennesker er rationelle nok til at nyttemaksimere, men n jes med at satisficere . Hermed forst s, at akt ren ikke str ber efter den bedste l sning, men blot en l sning, som er god nok. Daniel Kahneman og Amon Tversky retter lyset mod akt rens nyttefunktion, der ikke er line r, som rational choice-teorien antager. Kurven er derimod S-formet, hvilket resulterer i, at vores grad af risikoaversitet afh nger af fremstillingen af den konkrete situation snarere end af den bagvedliggende objektive sandsynlighed. Den S-formede kurve betyder, at vi er mere villige til at tage store risici, hvis vi st r i en usikker situation med udsigt til tab, end hvis vi st r i en gunstig situation. I samme tr d tager Susan Jackson og Jane Dutton fat i akt rens intuitive forst else af en situation. Individets forst else og handlingsm nster afh nger nemlig i h j grad af, om det betragter en situation som en mulighed eller en trussel. M let i denne blok er alts at kortl gge, hvad individet kan og ikke kan. Herigennem skabes grundlaget for at forst menneskelige beslutninger, hvilket er omdrejningspunktet i sektion II.
II B ESLUTNINGER
Teksterne i sektion unders ger, hvordan vores hjerner, vores begr nsede menneskelige computere, klarer sig i den virkelige verden, n r beslutninger skal tages. Robert Jervis forklarer, at vi minder mere om det fulde menneske end om det rationelle menneske . I sektion II s f rste artikel fokuserer Jervis p konkrete mentale smutveje, der g r, at vi langtfra handler som rational choice-teorien antager. I den efterf lgende tekst anerkender Yuen Foong Khong ligeledes, at mennesket ikke er s rligt kapabelt til at basere beslutninger p den bedst mulige information. Mere konkret fokuserer han p , hvordan vi reducerer behovet for information ved at benytte analogier, uanset om disse analogier egentlig svarer til den nuv rende situation. Jon Krosnick og Donald Kinder unders ger, hvilke hensyn der ligger til grund for befolkningens syn p politikere. De to forfattere argumenterer for, at det afg rende er mediernes dagsordens tning, da masserne l gger relativt meget v gt p den mest tilg ngelige information. Dermed bliver masserne ogs lette at manipulere med. I sektion II s sidste bidrag unders ger Philip Tetlock og Richard Ned Lebow, hvordan eksperter i international politik benytter kognitive smutveje, n r de skal forst og fortolke verden og historiske begivenheder. De to forfattere argumenterer for, at den teori eksperter har tiltro til, i vid udstr kning er styrende for, hvilke ting de perciperer og vurderer som v rende relevante. Det betyder, at information der er modstridende med eksperternes teori i vid udstr kning ignoreres eller vurderes irrelevant.
III G RUPPEDYNAMIK OG SOCIALT PRES
I antologiens tredje sektion skifter fokus fra individ til grupper og masser, det vil sige den interaktion, der opst r, n r mennesker m des. Skiftet fra individ til aggregering af individer n dvendigg res af, at de empiriske fund, der danner grundlag for de to f rste sektioner, ikke uden videre kan overf res til grupper. Dette aggregeringsproblem betyder, at studiet af individet som isoleret enhed ikke er nok til at forst , hvordan mennesker handler sammen i grupper. I grupper skabes der en r kke sociale pres, der dels har betydning for, hvordan kognitive processer fungerer, og dels for den m de, hvorp individer handler over for hinanden. Selvom fokus skifter fra individ til masse, er der en st rk kontinuitet: Man kan ikke forst massernes logik uden at forst individet. Philip Tetlock unders ger, hvordan vores hjerne fungerer, n r vi er sammen med andre mennesker. If lge disse studier viser det sig, at akt ren er bedre til at indtage ny information, der udfordrer hans eksisterende verdensbillede, n r han stilles til regnskab for informationen i sit sociale milj . Roderick Kramer forklarer herefter, at vores beslutninger ofte b rer pr g af, at vi henfalder til en paranoid kognition. Det medf rer, at beslutninger tages p baggrund af et vrangbillede i stedet for en mere n gtern analyse af virkelighed. Endelig s ger Hadley Cantril at forklare, hvorfor massepanik opst r. F nomenet kan opst , n r en folkem ngde har f lles interesser og/eller et st rkt forklaringsbehov i forhold til en p tr ngende situation.
IV L EDEREN OG MASSEN
De f rste 10 tekster viser, at beslutninger aldrig er perfekte, heller ikke hvis de tr ffes af specialiserede eliter. Antologiens sidste sektion omhandler, hvorvidt borgerne i moderne vestlige demokratier er i stand til at tr ffe kvalificerede politiske beslutninger. Walter Lippman og Philip Converse fremh ver begge, at masserne ikke har de forn dne evner og videnshorisonter til at tr ffe meningsfulde beslutninger. I hver deres tekst argumenterer de for, at s danne vigtige beslutninger b r overlades til eksperter og politikere - s som dem selv. I sektionens og antologiens sidste tekst forklarer Douglas Foyle, at massernes viden ikke er det afg rende for, om de har noget at sige. Det er derimod lederens personlige syn p befolkningens evner, der har betydning for, om der bliver lyttet til den.
God l selyst!
Noter
1 For kritik af denne metode henvises til Smith (1991) og Riker (1995).
2 Der findes dog f undtagelser fra det vakuum, politisk psykologi befinder sig i p dansk grund. Vigtigst i denne henseende er politologen Tom Bryder, som j vnligt har publiceret artikler i tidsskriftet Political Psychology over de sidste 20 r. Andre forskere, som har ber rt politisk psykologi i Danmark, t ller blandet andet Lise Togeby inden for meningsdannelse og forandring (2004), Kasper M ller Hansen inden for issue framing og meningsdannelse (2007), Rune Slothuus inden for kognitive processer, issue framing, meningsdannelse og forholdet mellem eliter og masser (2008a, 2008b), samt Sigge Winther Nielsen (2009) inden for politisk marketing.
Litteratur
Adamsen, B. (2004): P sporet af den politiske sprogpsykologi . Kommunikationsforum. http://www.kommunikationsforum.dk/default.asp?articleid=11504
Adorno, T. W. (1950): The authoritarian personality . New York, Harper Bauman, Z. (1973): Culture as praxis . London, Routledge
Baynes, K. (1998): Habermas, J rgen. In Craig, E. (Ed.): Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy . New York, Routledge
BBC (1998): How I stopped nuclear war. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/198173.stm
Bell, D. E., H. Raiffa and A. Tversky (1988): Decision making: Descriptive, normative and prescriptive interactions . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann (2004): Den sociale konstruktion af virkeligheden en vidensociologisk afhandling (oversat af Morten Visby). K benhavn, Akademisk Forlag
Boudon, R. (1998): Limitations of rational choice theory. American Journal of Sociology , Vol. 104, pp. 817-828
Bourdieu, P. (1989): Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste . London, Routledge
Bryder, T. (1988): Anmeldelse: Eggert Petersen, Knud-Erik Sabroe, Ole Steen Kristensen og Bo Sommerlund: danskernes tilv relse under krisen. Politica , Vol. 20
Burger, J. (2009): Replicating Milgram. American Psychologist , Vol 64, pp. 1-11
Cohen, M., C. James and J. Olsen (1972): A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol. 17, pp. 1-25
Damasio, A. R. (1994): Descartes error: Emotion, reason and the human brain . New York, G.P. Putnam
Derrida, J., C. Porter and E. Morris (1983): The principle of reason: The university in the eyes of its pupils. Diacritics , Vol. 13, pp. 2-20
Deutsch, M. and C. Kinnvall (2002): What is political psychology? In K. R. Monroe (Ed.): Political psychology . Mahwah, L. Erlbaum
Dunleavy, P. (1991): Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice economic explanations in political science . London, Harvester Wheatsheaf
Elster, J. (2000): Solomonic judgements: Studies in the limitations of rationality . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Festinger, L., H. Riecken and S. Schachter (1956): When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of A Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World . New York, Harper-Torchbooks
Foucault, M. (1970): The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences . London, Tavistock Publications
Foucault, M. (1979): Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, Pantheon Books
Foucault, M. and L. D. Kritzman (1988): Politics, philosophy, culture: Interviews and other writings, 1977-1984 . New York, Routledge
Friedman, M. (1953): Essays in positive economics . Chicago, University of Chicago Press
George, A. L. and J. L. George (1956): Woodrow Wilson and colonel house: a personality study . New York, J. Day Co.
Giddens, A. (1984): The constitution of society: Introduction of the theory of structuration . Berkeley, University of California Press
Giddens, A. (1991): Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age . Cambridge, Polity Press
Gordon, C. (1991): Governmental rationality: An introduction. In Foucault, M., G. Burchell and P. Miller (Eds.) The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality: With two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault . London, Harvester Wheatsheaf
Grafstein, R. (1995): Rationality as conditional expected utility maximization. Political Psychology , Vol. 16, pp. 63-80
Green, D. (1992): The price elasticity of mass preferences. American Political Science Review , Vol. 86, pp. 128-148
Green, D. P. and I. Shapiro (1994): Pathologies of rational choice theory: A critique of applications in political science . New Haven, Yale University Press
Habermas, J. (1984): The theory of communicative action: Volume 1, reason and the rationalization of society. Boston, Beacon Press
Habermas, J. (1987): The theory of communicative action: Volume 2, system and lifeworld: A critique of functionalist reason. Boston, Beacon Press
Hansen, K. M. (2007): The Sophisticated Public: The Effect of Competing Frames on public opinion. Scandinavian Political Studies . Vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 377-396.
Horkheimer, M. and T. W. Adorno (2002): Dialectic of enlightenment. Stanford, Stanford University Press
Iyengar, S. (1993): An overview of the field of political psychology. In Iyengar, S. and W. J. Mcguire (Eds.): Explorations in political psychology . Durham, Duke University
Janis, I. L. and L. Mann (1977): Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice and commitment . New York, Free Press
Jervis, R. (1993): The drunkard s search. In Iyengar, S. and W. J. McGuire (Eds.) Explorations in political psychology . Durham, Duke University
Jones, B. D., G. Boushey and S. Workman. (2006): Behavioral rationality and the policy processes: Toward a new model of organizational information processing. In Peters, B. G. and J. Pierre (Eds.): Handbook of public policy . London, Thousog Oaks, Sage Publications
Jost, J. T. (2008): John Jost on political psychology . The Situationist. http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2008/12/15/john-jost-on-political-psychology/">
Jost, J. T. and J. Sidanius. (2004): Political psychology: An introduction. In Jost, J. T. and J. Sidanius (Eds.): Political psychology: Key readings . New York, Psychology Press
Kahneman, D. (2003): Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. American Economic Review , Vol. 93, pp. 1449-75
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1984): 1983 APA award address: Choices, values and frames. American Psychologist , Vol. 39, pp. 341-350
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (2002): Choices, values and frames . Cambridge, Cambridge University press
Kinder, D. R. and T. R. Palfrey (1993): On behalf of an experimental political science. In Kinder, D. R. and T. R. Palfrey (Eds.): Experimental foundations of political science . Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press
Krosnick, J. A. and K. M. McGraw (2002): Psychological political science versus political psychology true to its name: A plea for balance. In K. R. Monroe (Ed.): Political psychology . Mahwah, L. Erlbaum
Kuhn, T. S. (1996): The structure of scientific revolutions . Chicago, University of Chicago Press
Kuklinski, J. H. (2002): Thinking about political psychology . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Lane, R. E. (2002): Turning political psychology upside down . Political psychology. Mahwah, Erlbaum
Lemke, T. (2001): The birth of bio-politics : Michel Foucault s lecture at the coll ge de france on neo-liberal governmentality. Economy And Society , Vol. 30, pp. 190-207
March, J. H. and J. P. Olson (1998): The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International Organization , Vol 52, pp. 943-969
Marcus, G. (2008): Blinded by the light: Aspiration and inspiration. Political Psychology , Vol. 29 pp. 313-30
McDermott, R. (2004): Political psychology in international relations . Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press
McGraw, K. (2000): Contributions of the cognitive approach to political psychology. Political Psychology , Vol. 21, pp. 805-832
McGuire, W. J. (1993): The poly-psy relationships: Three phases of a long affair. In Iyengar, S. and W. J. McGuire (Eds.) Explorations in political psychology . Durham, Duke University
Milgram, S. (1974): Obedience to authority; an experimental view . New York, Harper and Row
Miller, L. H. (1962): Chicago school of economics. The Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 70, pp. 64-69
Monroe, K. R. and A. Downs (1991): The economic approach to politic: A critical reassessment of the theory of rational action . New York, Harper Collins
Monroe, K. R. and K. Maher (1995): Psychology and rational actor theory. Political Psychology , Vol. 16, pp. 1-21
Montague, R. (2006): Your brain is (almost): perfect: How we make decisions . New York, USA, Plume
Niskanen, W. (1975): Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 18, pp. 617-643
P rez, G. A. (2001): Political psychology as discipline and resource. Political Psychology , Vol. 22, pp. 347-356
Plous, S. (1993): The psychology of judgment and decision making . Philadelphia, Temple University Press
Post, J. M. (1990): Statement presented before the house armed service committee , December 1990
Rahn, W., J. Sullivan and T. Rudolph (2002): Political psychology and political science. In Kuklinski, J. H. (Ed.): Thinking about political psychology . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Riker, W. (1995): The political psychology of rational choice theory. Political Psychology , Vol. 16, pp. 23-44
Riker, W. and W. Zavoina (1970): Rational behavior in politics: Evidence from a three person game. The American Political Science Review , Vol. 64, pp. 48-62
Schelling, T. C. (1978): Micromotives and macrobehavior . New York, Norton
Schildkraut, D. (2004): All politics is psychological: A review of political psychology syllabi. Perspectives on Politics , Vol. 2, pp. 807-819
Schoemaker, P. (1982): The expected utility model: Its variants, purposes, evidence and limitations. Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. 20, pp. 529-63
Scott, J. (2000): Rational choice theory. In Browning, J. (Ed.): Understanding contemporary society: Theories of the present . Halcli: Sage Publications
Sears, D. (1993): Symbolic politics: A socio-psychological theory. In Iyengar, S. and W. J. McGuire (Eds.): Explorations in political psychology . Durham, Duke University
Sears, D. and C. Funk. (1991): Graduate education in political psychology. Political Psychology , Vol. 12 pp. 345-362
Sears, D. O., L. Huddy and R. Jervis. (2003): Oxford handbook of political psychology . New York, Oxford University Press
Simon, H. A. (1957): Models of man: Social and rational; mathematical essays on rational human behavior in a social setting . New York, Wiley
Simon, H. A. (1983): Reason in human affairs . Stanford, Stanford University Press
Simon, H. A. (1995): Rationality in political behavior. Political Psychology , Vol. 16, pp. 45-61
Simon, H. A. (1997): Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations . 4. edition, New York, Free Press
Stanford (2008): What is Political Psychology? , hentet p http://www.stanford.edu/group/sipp/ .
Slothuus, R. (2008a): How Political Elites Influence Public Opinion: Psychological and Contextual Conditions of Framing Effects . Forlaget Politica, Aarhus.
Slothuus, R. (2008b): More Than Weighting Cognitive Importance: A Dual-Process Model of Issue Framing Effects, Political Psychology , Vol. 29 nr. 1, pp. 1-28
Smith, V. (1991): Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 99, pp. 877-896
Stein, J. G. (2008): Foreign policy decision-making: Rational, psychological and neurological models. In Smith S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (Eds.): Foreign policy theories, actors, cases . Oxford, Oxford University Press
Stone, W. F. (1981): Political Psychology: A Whig History. In S. L. Long (Ed.): The Handbook of Political Behavior. Vol. I . New York, Plenum Press
Sullivan, J., W. Rahn and T. Rudolph (2002a): The countours of political psychology: Situating research on political information processing. In Kuklinski, J. H. (Ed.): Thinking about political psychology . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Sullivan, J., W. Rahn and T. Rudolph (2002b): Political psychology and political science. In Kuklinski, J. H. (Ed.): Thinking about political psychology . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Tetlock, P. E. and J. Lerner (1999): Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin , Vol. 125, pp. 255-275
Tetlock, P. E. (2005): Expert political judgment how good is it? How can we know? Princeton, Princeton University Press
Tingley, D. (2006): Neurological imaging as evidence in political science: A review, critique and guiding assessment. Social Science Information , Vol. 45, pp. 5-18
Tocqueville, A. D. (1998): Democracy in America . London, Wordsworth Classics
Togeby, L. (2004): Man har et standpunkt om stabilitet og forandring i befolkningens holdninger. rhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
Tversky, A. (1975): A critique of expected utility theory: Descriptive and normative considerations. Erkenntnis , Vol. 9, pp. 163-173
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992): Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , Vol. 5, pp. 297-323
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1947): Theory of games and economic behavior . Princeton, Princeton University Press
Walt, S. (1999): Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies. International Security , Vol. 23, pp. 5-48
Waltz, K. N. (1979): Theory of international politics . Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
Waltz, K. N. (2000): Structural realism after the cold war. International Security , Vol. 25, pp. 5-41
Waltz, K. N. (2001): Man, the state and war; a theoretical analysis . New York, Columbia University Press
Westen, D. (2007): The political brain: The role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation . New York, PublicAffairs
Winter, D. (1992): Personality and foreign policy: Historical overview of research. In Singer, E. and V. M. Hudson (Eds.): Political psychology and foreign policy . Boulder, Westview Press
Winter, D. (2004): Leader appeal, leader performance and the motive profiles of leaders and followers: A study of american presidents and elections. In Jost, J. T. and J. Sidanius (Eds.): Political psychology: Key readings . New York, Psychology Press
Winther Nielsen, S. (2009): Politisk Marketing - Hvad skal det nytte? Tidsskriftet Politik , Vol. 12, no. 2
Zuckert, C. H. (1995): On the rationality of rational choice. Political Psychology , Vol. 16, pp. 179-198
SEKTION I KOGNITION OG BEARBEJDNING AF INFORMATION
1 SOME USES OF DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY IN POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY: CASE MATERIALS ON WOODROW WILSON
Alexander L. George (1956)
More so than historical writing at large, biography is selective. By choosing a single individual as his concern, the biographer can focus on those aspects of the historical process which interacted most directly with his subject. The nature of this interaction and, particularly, the extent to which it is reciprocal, is one of the central problems of biography. To what extent was the behavior of the subject culturally and situationally determined? To what extent did it reflect the individuality of his personality? Though variously worded by different writers, this twofold task of the biographer is a familiar and perplexing one.
In a brief but acute statement of the problem, the Committee on Historiography emphasized that the writing of biography requires both a systematic field theory of personality and hypotheses as to social roles (Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Historiography 1954). 1 While agreeing with this twofold emphasis, we have chosen for several reasons to focus attention in the present article upon the need for a systematic approach to personality factors
First, it would appear that historians generally are already more favorably disposed to the cultural approach and better prepared to employ it, than to a system-atic handling of personality components in biography.
Second, we wish to show by introducing concrete case materials that a systematic personality approach may be necessary and particularly rewarding in the biographical study of innovating leaders, those who attempt to reinterpret and expand the functions of existing roles or to create new roles. We are particularly interested, that is, in role-determining as against role-determined leadership. At the same time, we agree that the creation or reinterpretation of leadership roles can only be understood in the context of social-historical dynamics and the institutional setting. The great leader, as Gerth and Mills observe, has often been a man who has successfully managed such institutional dynamics and created new roles of leadership (Gerth and Mills 1953: 87, 88).
We shall draw upon our previously reported study of Woodrow Wilson (George and George 1976) in order to demonstrate how the personality component in a biography may be handled in a systematic fashion. And we shall attempt to show that dynamic psychology provides a number of hypotheses which can supplement a cultural or role analysis of Wilson s interest in constitution-writing and which permit the biographer to view the relationship between his Presbyterian conscience and his political stubbornness in a new light.
Some Deficiencies of Psychological Biographies
In the past three or four decades historians have occasionally turned to the new field of dynamic psychology for assistance in this task. At the same time, specialists in psychology, especially psychoanalysts, have themselves occasionally attempted to apply the insights and theories of their practice to historical figures. 2 The results of such efforts, from both sides, to merge history and psychology in the writing of political biography have not been encouraging. Even when their purpose was not to debunk a historical figure, most psychoanalytical biographies suffered from pronounced and basic deficiencies.
Three major deficiencies in this type of biography may be briefly mentioned. In the first place, in varying degrees such biographies exaggerate the purely psychological determinants of the political behavior of their subjects. In the cruder of these studies, the subject is represented as if in the grip of powerful unconscious and irrational drives which dictate his every thought and action. Even in more discriminating analyses, the revelation of human motive resulting from incisive insights into the subject s personality can easily oversimplify the complexity of motivation and political action.
Secondly, in viewing adult character and behavior as the legacy of certain early childhood experiences, psychological biographies often oversimplify the process of personality formation and the intricacy of personality structure and functioning. Such a psychological approach is by today s standards inadequate for it overlooks the relevance of important developments in ego psychology in the past few decades. 3 Contemporary students of personality emphasize that in the course of his development the individual develops a variety of defenses against underlying anxieties and hostilities. He may learn ways of curbing and controlling tendencies which handicap him in various situations; and he may even devise constructive strategies for harnessing personal needs and motivations and directing them into fruitful channels. In other words, the individual attempts to cope simultaneously with the demands of impulse, conscience and reality in developing a philosophy of life, a system of values, a set of attitudes and interests and in choosing in various situations from among alternative| courses of action. 4
And, finally, to conclude this brief review of the major deficiencies encountered in psychological biographies, one is struck by the fact that the actions of the subject are often interpreted in ways which seem highly speculative and arbitrary. Few investigators in this field have come to grips with the admittedly difficult problem of making rigorous reconstructions of personality factors and plausible interpretations of their role in behavior from the types of historical materials usually available to the biographer. The result is that the use which the biographer makes of dynamic psychology often appears to consist in little more than borrowing certain terms and hypotheses and super-imposing them, more or less arbitrarily upon a smattering of the available historical materials concerning the subject.
Personality Types: The Problem of Diagnosis and Classification
Typologies of personality or character are provided by most of the various schools of psychoanalysis and dynamic psychology. The depiction of a type is usually on the basis of one or more traits, or behavioral tendencies. Often, the characterization of types also includes some indication of the origins and underlying psychodynamics of that type of behavior, which enhances the usefulness of the typology to the biographer. We do not propose to review these typologies here or to attempt to assess their relative worth to the biographer. 5 Rather we wish to consider the status or nature of these personality types and some of the problems which arise in efforts to utilize them in biography.
Most of the types in question are to be understood as being general constructs, or ideal types . Though derived from empirical observation, they abstract and deliberately oversimplify reality (Murphy 1947: 749-752). Accordingly, their value to the biographer is necessarily limited, since his task is to describe and explain a particular individual in all his concreteness and complexity.
The biographer cannot be satisfied merely to label his subject as constituting an instance of, or bearing a certain resemblance to, a certain personality or character type. To do so oversimplifies the task of making fruitful use of the theories and findings of dynamic psychology and yields results of a limited and disappointing character. Many investigators whose initial attempt to use a personality approach in biography is of this character become disillusioned and abandon the task. They sense that to type their subject, as a compulsive for example, tends to caricature him rather than to explain very much of the richness, complexity and variety of his behavior throughout his career.
We are concerned here with a problem not always clearly recognized in the writing of psychological biographies. Classification is often confused with diagnosis . To tag the subject of the biography with a label or to pigeonhole him in one of a number of existing categories does not in itself provide what the biographer will need most: namely, a discriminating theory, i.e., a set of assumptions or hypotheses, as to the structure and dynamics of his subject s personality system.
The diagnosis vs. classification problem also exists in clinical psychiatry where a distinction is sometimes made between the sponge and the file-drawer clinician. 6 The sponge -type clinician attempts to approach his patient with a relatively open mind, trying to derive a theory about that particular patient from an intensive analysis of his behavior and case history. In contrast, the file-drawer -type of clinician is more inclined to orient himself to the patient on the basis of general theories and past experience. The one attempts to construct a theory about the patient de nouveau , a theory that, as a result, may be highly particularistic; the other stresses gaining insight into the patient by making an astute classification of him on the basis of accumulated theory and experience.
The difference between these clinical approaches is mentioned here in order to point up alternative approaches available to the biographer. As will become clear, we are suggesting that though the biographer should indeed be familiar with available personality theories, he should nonetheless approach his subject as does the sponge -type clinician and undertake to develop as discriminating and refined a theory as possible of that particular personality.
In attempting to account for the subject s actions throughout his career, the biographer will have to make specific diagnoses of the operative state of his personality system in numerous situations. To this end, the biographer starts with as good a theory of the subject s personality as he can derive from secondary accounts and from a preliminary inspection of historical materials. Then he reviews chronologically, or developmentally, the history of his subject s behavior, attempting to assess the role that situational and personality factors played in specific instances. 7
In utilizing a preliminary theory of the subject s personality to make specific diagnoses the biographer in a real sense also tests that theory. Detailed analysis of the subject s actions in a variety of individual situations provides new insights into the motivational dynamics of the subject s behavior; these insights, in turn, enable the biographer to progressively refine and improve the theory of the subject s personality with which he started. What the biographer hopes to achieve eventually is an account of the subject s personality that gives coherence and depth to the explanation of his behavior in a variety of situations and that illuminates the more subtle patterns that underlie whatever seeming inconsistencies of character and behavior he has displayed.
Two Uses of Personality Types in Biography
Despite the general nature of personality and character types, they may be of substantial use to the biographer in several ways. First, knowledge of these types assists the biographer in developing the kind of preliminary theory about the personality of his subject to which reference has already been made. Second, familiarity with the psycho-dynamics of behavior associated with a particular personality or character type provides the biographer with hypotheses for consideration in attempting to account for the actions of his subject, especially those that cannot be easily explained as adequate responses to the situation which confronted him. Let us consider these two general uses in somewhat greater detail.
A major shortcoming in many conventional biographies, including those of Wilson, is that they lack a systematic theory about the subject s personality and motivations. The biographer is usually satisfied to catalogue individual traits exhibited by the subject without exploring their possible interrelationship and their functional significance within the personality as a whole. 8 Various of Wilson s biographers, 9 for example, have called attention to his marked conscientiousness, stubbornness, single-track mind, and various other traits. They have done so, however, without indicating awareness that, according to Freudian theory, these traits are commonly exhibited by compulsive persons.
The term compulsive today is commonly applied to persons whose lives are regulated by a strict super-ego, or conscience, which dominates their personalities. Perhaps not generally known, however, is the fact that this type of behavior has been carefully studied over a period of many years by many clinicians; as a result, there are a number of detailed analyses and theories of compulsiveness and the compulsive type that attempt to account for the genesis and underlying dynamics of this type of behavior. Later in this paper we shall attempt to show how this rich body of observation and theory can be used by the biographer. It suffices here to observe that biographers of Wilson, being generally unfamiliar with such materials, have not been in a position to assess the significance of individual traits displayed by Wilson in terms of their underlying dynamics. 10
Occasionally biographers of Wilson have been able, on the basis of an intensive analysis of a particularly well-documented episode in Wilson s career, to infer or to suggest that his choice of action in a particular situation was apparently governed by personal motives other than the aims and values which he was publicly espousing. 11 But generally they have hesitated to make diagnoses of the operative state of Wilson s personality system in specific situations, to explore in any systematic fashion the complexity and deeper levels of his motivation, or to postulate in detail the role of his personality in his political behavior. Therefore, while these biographers have sensed Wilson s personal involvement in politics and called attention to his many contradictions, their portraits of Wilson s personality are inevitably somewhat flat, even though accurately depicting behavioral tendencies at a surface level.
A familiarity with personality and character types identified in the literature of dynamic psychology will assist the biographer to construct a preliminary theory, or model, as to the structure and functioning of his subject s personality. For this purpose there are available to the biographer a variety of typologies of personality and character. Some of these are predominantly sociopsychological rather than clinical in their conception and orientation. Not all typologies of personality are comparable, since they have been constructed from different theoretical standpoints, for different purposes and applications. An overlapping can be noted, however, particularly among some of the typologies provided by various schools of psychoanalysis. Thus, for example, the aggressive person in Karen Horney s system bears a substantial resemblance to the Freudian concept of the compulsive type. Similarly, Alfred Adler s central emphasis upon the drive to power and superiority as a means of compensation for real or imagined defects finds a place in many other personality theories as well.
Given the variety of alternative typologies available, the biographer must obviously consider a number of them before choosing the type or types that seem most appropriate to his subject and most useful for the specific questions about the subject s motivations and behavior he is trying to clarify.
Personality theorists, Freudian and non-Freudian, have emphasized that the type-constructs formulated by them are not pure types. Rather, they view the personality functioning of an individual as a mixture of several trends, or types, in a more or less dynamic relationship to each other. This observation applies with particular force to Wilson, in whom several diverse trends can be detected. 12 Nonetheless, the present account is limited to discussing the applicability of the compulsive type to Wilson, partly because of limitations of space and partly because we feel that the compulsive component of his personality is particularly important for illuminating the self-defeating aspects of his behavior.
In any case, having found much evidence of compulsiveness and of the compulsive syndrome in the historical accounts of his life and career, we felt justified in adopting as a tentative working theory that Wilson had a compulsive personality.
We then considered his development and behavior in detail from this standpoint, examining the voluminous documentation of his career that is available to the biographer. In doing so, we encountered increasing evidence of behavior on his part that could not easily be subsumed under the simple model of the compulsive type. This forced us to refine and elaborate the theory as to his compulsiveness and to attempt to state the conditions and to characterize the situations in which he did and did not behave in a way (for example, stubbornly) that was in accord with the expectations explicit or implicit in the personality model with which we were working (George and George 1956: 15-22).
Gradually, then, the general construct of the compulsive type (which, as already mentioned, is to be taken as an abstraction and deliberate oversimplification of reality) was modified and brought into consonance with the complexities encountered in the individual case at hand. The point was reached when the picture of Wilson s personality that was emerging became too complex to be retained within the bounds of the compulsive model with which we had started. What remained of that model or theory was the notion of an important compulsive component in his personality and functioning. This component, we shall attempt to show, remained of considerable value as an explanatory principle for some of Wilson s political behavior that has puzzled and distressed many of his contemporaries and biographers.
Another major use of typologies and theories of personality to the biographer is that of providing alternative hypotheses for consideration in attempting to account for the actions and behavioral patterns of his subject. Such general hypotheses are not ready-made explanations to be employed arbitrarily or to be superimposed upon the data. Rather, as a statement of the dynamics of behavior and motivation often or typically associated with a certain personality type, they may serve to orient the biographer s effort to explain the actions of his subject. 13 A familiarity with such hypotheses broadens and deepens the biographer s assessment of the aims and values that the subject pursues in a given situation or in a series of situations. Furthermore, it sensitizes him to historical evidence of the possible operation of unconscious or unstated motives he might otherwise overlook.
During the preparation of our study of Wilson we combed the technical literature for hypotheses about the dynamics of motivation and behavior associated with compulsiveness that might illuminate the nature of Wilson s personal involvement in political activities. 14 We hoped to find clues to certain inept and apparently irrational actions on his part and to discover, if possible, a consistent pattern or thread in the various inconsistencies of behavior and character he displayed.
If Wilson is not the simple clinical stereotype of a compulsive, neither can he be regarded as a full-blown neurotic. True, one cannot read, for example, Karen Homey s insightful and penetrating descriptions of neurotic drives and of the neurotic character structure without being struck by the applicability of much of what she says to Wilson. But these descriptions are applicable only to a certain point and, upon reflection, one is on balance equally or more impressed with the extent to which Wilson s behavior and career diverge from those of her patients. This divergence from the clinical picture concerns precisely the critical question whether the neurotically disposed individual is able to deal adequately with his conflicts and hence retains the ability to function effectively.
For Wilson was, after all, a highly successful person. He was able to overcome a severe disturbance in childhood development; thereafter, not only did he keep fairly well in check the compulsive and neurotic components of his personality but he succeeded in large measure in harnessing them constructively to the achievement of socially productive purposes (George and George 1956: 320, 268-310, 487-488, 530-531). To the clinical psychologist, therefore, Wilson is interesting as much because he was able to overcome childhood difficulties and to perform as successfully as he did in public life, as he is because of the pathological pattern of self-defeating behavior he tended to repeat on several occasions during his public career. 15
Compulsiveness and the Compulsive Type
To indicate briefly what is meant by compulsiveness and the compulsive type of personality is not an easy task since these concepts are employed somewhat differently within the various theoretical schools which comprise dynamic psychology. The point to be made here is that the existence of different theoretical orientations and, particularly, of important lacunae in knowledge and theory within the field of dynamic psychology need not prevent the biographer from making fruitful use of systematic personality theory as a source of hypotheses that serve to orient and give direction to his own research. 16
In any case, the usefulness of the technical literature to the biographer will be enhanced if the distinction is kept in mind between the question of the origins of compulsiveness and compulsive traits, about which there are various views and the dynamics of such behavior, about which there is less disagreement. Similarly, the biographer will observe that specialists seem able to agree more readily on a characterization of the quality of compulsive behavior than on a list of specific traits common to all compulsive persons.
In Freudian theory various correlations are predicted between disturbances of different stages in libido development and the emergence of certain adult character traits. Disturbances in one of these stages of development leads, according to the theory, to the presence of orderliness, stinginess and stubbornness in adult behavior. 17 These are general traits, or broad tendencies, that manifest themselves more specifically in a variety of ways. By combing the technical literature one can easily construct a richer, more elaborate list of traits which together comprise the syndrome or constellation. 18
Thus, for example, the general trait orderliness may manifest itself in (a) cleanliness (corporeal, symbolic); (b) conscientiousness (single-track mind, concentration, drive, pedantism, reliability, punctuality, punctiliousness and thoroughness); (c) regularity (according to spatial and temporal aspects); (d) plannedness ; (e) norm conformity. 19
Most personality and character types are usually described, at least in the first instance, in terms of certain manifest behavioral traits such as those that have been listed. If the description of a type does not link the traits in question with a theory of personality structure and motivational dynamics, the type-construct will obviously be of little value for motivational and situational analysis of an individual s behavior. At the same time, however, it is overly sanguine to expect that relationships between most manifest behavior traits and their inner, subjective functions for the personality will be of a simple oneto-one character. For, as clinical psychologists have particularly emphasized, the same item of manifest behavior may fulfill different functions for different personalities or, at different times, for the same individual. Particularly the political and social behavior of an individual, in which the biographer is most interested, is not likely to reflect single motives; it is more likely to be the outcome of a complex interplay of several motives and of, efforts on the part of the person to adjust inner needs and strivings to one another as well as to external reality considerations.
A personality type construct is potentially more useful, therefore, if it is associated with a more or less distinctive type of motivational dynamics, whether or not this be invariably accompanied by a set of distinctive behavioral traits. From this standpoint, leaving aside for the present the question of its validity, the Freudian concept of the compulsive type is a particularly rich one in that it includes, in addition to the syndrome of traits already noted, a rather explicit and detailed set of structural-dynamic hypotheses of this kind.
We shall not attempt to recapitulate the rather involved and technical set of structural-dynamic hypotheses associated with the compulsive type in Freudian theory. Of immediate interest here is the fact that orderliness and stubbornness in persons of this type are said to derive in part from a desire for power or domination, which in turn is said to be related to a more basic need for self-esteem, or security. 20 Thus, according to the technical literature compulsives often show a marked interest in imposing orderly systems upon others, an activity from which they derive a sense of power. They also hold fast obstinately to their own way of doing things. They dislike to accommodate themselves to arrangements imposed from without, but expect immediate compliance from other people as soon as they have worked out a definite arrangement, plan or proposal of their own.
In the spheres of activity in which they seek power gratifications, compulsives are sensitive to interference. They may take advice badly (or only under special circumstances). Often they exhibit difficulties in deputing work to others, being convinced at bottom that they can do everything (in this sphere) better than others. This conviction is sometimes exaggerated to the point that they believe they are unique. Negativeness, secretiveness and vindictiveness are traits often displayed by compulsives. (Considerable evidence of most of these traits and tendencies, too, can be found in the historical materials on Wilson, many of them being noted by contemporaries and biographers.) 21
While particularly that aspect of Freudian theory that regards interferences with libido development as the genesis of adult character traits has been criticized, the existence of certain constellations of adult traits, as in this instance, is less controversial and, in fact, appears to enjoy some empirical support (Sears 1943: 67-70).
In revisions and elaborations of Freudian theory somewhat less emphasis is often placed upon specifying a distinctive content of compulsive behavior. Karen Horney, for example, regards compulsiveness as a characteristic quality of all neurotic needs. Thus, the craving for affection, power and prestige and the ambition, submissiveness and withdrawal which different neurotics manifest all have a desperate, rigid, in-discriminate and insatiable quality, i.e., the quality of compulsiveness (Horney 1937).
Much that is common to various of these formulations has been summarized in Harold D. Lasswell s account of the functional role of the compulsive dynamism in the personality system and of the general character of the circumstances in which it is adopted (Laswell 1948: 44-49). Thus, the compulsive dynamism is one of several possible defensive measures a child may adopt as a way out of an acute tension-producing situation that may arise during the course of socialization and learning. Tension is produced when a relatively elaborate set of requirements are imposed upon the child and reinforced by a system of rewards and punishments of a special intensity and applied in such manner so that deprivations and indulgences are balanced. One possible defensive measure against the ensuing tension is the adoption of a blind urge to act with intensity and rigidity, i.e., the dynamism of compulsiveness.
The reasons and conditions for the emergence of compulsiveness are, as has been suggested, somewhat difficult to formulate precisely. However, in making use of available knowledge of the compulsive personality for purposes of political biography, an answer to the causal question is not essential. Whatever creates a given personality dynamism, the dynamism itself-which is what interests the biographer the most-can be fairly readily identified in accounts of the subject s behavior.
In Wilson s case, even the circumstances under which the compulsive dynamism was adopted are richly suggested in materials collected by the official biographer. 22 Thus, accounts of early efforts at the boy s education, in which the father played a leading role, strongly suggest the sort of acute tension-producing situation that, we have already noted, is considered by specialists as predisposing to the adoption of the compulsive dynamism. This, however, evidently was not Wilson s initial method of coping with the tension-inducing situation; rather, for quite a while his method of defense took the form of a tendency to withdraw from the situation. For the time being the boy was unable, perhaps out of fear of failure, or unwilling, perhaps out of resentment, to cooperate with his father s efforts to advance his intellectual development. Wilson s early slowness (which specialists today might well consider a case of reading retardation based on emotional factors) was a matter of considerable concern to his family; it manifested itself most strikingly in his not learning his letters until he was nine and not learning to read readily until the age of eleven. 23
At about this time the boy showed signs of beginning to cooperate actively with his father s efforts to tutor him and to make prodigious efforts to satisfy the perfectionist demands that the Presbyterian minister levied upon his son. 24 One can only speculate at the reasons for the change at this time; possibly it was connected with the birth of a younger brother when Wilson was ten. (Wilson had two older sisters but no younger brothers or sisters until this time; he himself recalled that he had clung to his mother and was laughed at as a mama s boy until he was a great big fellow.)
In any case, it is easy thereafter to find evidence of a compulsive bent to the young adolescent s personality. It requires no great familiarity with the technical literature on such matters to detect indications of compulsiveness in the youth s extreme conscientiousness, the manner in which he drove himself repeatedly to physical breakdowns and the singleness of purpose he displayed in applying himself to the task of achieving knowledge and skill in the sphere of competence-politics and oratory-with which he quickly identified his ambitions (Baker 1927).
Wilson s Interest in Constitutions
In the remainder of this paper we should like to develop the case, mainly by way of illustrative materials from the study of Wilson, for supplementing cultural and historical components in biography by an intensive and relatively systematic appraisal of personality.
A number of Wilson s biographers, including the official biographer (Baker 1927: 45, 75-76, 94, 123-124, 148, 198-200, 302-303), have been struck by the interest in constitutions he displayed from early youth. Beginning in his fourteenth year he wrote or revised a half dozen constitutions, an activity that culminated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is our thesis that this activity on his part reflects the type of interest in order and power that compulsive persons often display. In other words, he was motivated in part (though not exclusively) by a desire to impose orderly systems upon others, deriving there from a sense of power or domination.
The historian will quickly object and rightly so, offering a more obvious counter-hypothesis, which is certainly plausible; namely that Wilson s interest in writing constitutions was culturally determined. After all, it was part of the belief system of the age that progress in human affairs was to be achieved by such instrumentalities as better constitutions, institutional reform, etc. The fact that Wilson wrote or revised many constitutions, therefore, does not necessarily attest to a personal interest in order and power.
Is it possible to demonstrate that Wilson s motivation in the matter did not stem exclusively from identification with a role that was socially approved? Or is such a question entirely out of the reach of the historian? In the following remarks we shall attempt to show that such questions are capable of being dealt with on the basis of the materials and method of the historian.
First, why Wilson and not someone else? Why, in other words, did the belief system in question impress itself particularly on Wilson? Is it not more than a coincidence that in every club he joined as a youth he seized the earliest opportunity, often making it the first order of business, to revise its constitution in order to transform the club into a miniature House of Commons? Granted that constitution-making was part of the existing cultural and political ethos and that admiration for the British system was already widespread among American students of government, why should the task of revising the constitution and political structure of these groups always fall to Wilson? Why were none of these constitutions revised along desirable lines by others, before Wilson joined these clubs? It would seem that among his contemporaries it was Wilson who found constitution-making a particularly attractive occupation. The readiness with which he accepted for himself a role that was, to be sure, culturally sanctioned makes the inference plausible that personal motives were strongly engaged by the possibility that constitution writing afforded of ordering the relations of his fellow-beings. 25
Secondly, what evidence can be found of an unconscious motive or need to impose orderly systems upon others? If such a motive exists, we may expect appropriate pleasurable feelings to ensue from its gratification. However, we cannot reasonably expect that the pleasure experienced by the individual in such instances will be fully articulated under ordinary circumstances. Hence, in the type of historical materials on the subject s inner life usually available to the biographer we can expect only episodic and fragmentary evidence of the fact that an activity on his part has satisfied deeply felt personality needs. This is in fact what we find in this case. For example, after rewriting the constitution of the Johns Hopkins debating society and transforming it into a House of Commons, Wilson reported to his fiancee the great pleasure he had derived from the project: It is characteristic of my whole self that I take so much pleasure in these proceedings of this society. I have a sense of power in dealing with men collectively that I do not feel always in dealing with them singly (Baker 1927: 199; George and George 1956: 22).
That constitution-writing had a deep personal meaning for Wilson is further suggested by the fact that such activities were always instrumental to his desire to exercise strong leadership. It is rather obvious even from historical accounts that rewriting constitutions was for Wilson a means of restructuring those institutional environments in which he wanted to exercise strong leadership. He wished to restructure the political arena in these instances in order to enhance the possibility of influencing and controlling others by means of oratory. This was a skill in which he was already adept as an adolescent and to the perfection of which he assiduously labored for years. In the model House of Commons which Wilson created and in which as the outstanding debater he usually became Prime Minister, independent leadership was possible and, as Wilson had foreseen, the skillful, inspirational orator could make his will prevail (Baker 1927; George and George 1956).
From an early age, then, Wilson s scholarly interest in the workings of American political institutions was an adjunct of his ambition to become a great statesman. He wished to exercise power with great initiative and freedom from crippling controls or interference. The relationship between Wilson s theories of leadership and his own ambitions and changing life situation, which we cannot recapitulate here, is revealing in this respect (George and George 1956: 144-148, 321-322). Suffice it to say that when Wilson s career development is studied from this standpoint considerable light is thrown on the intriguing question of the role of personal motivations in political inventiveness and creativity. Political psychologists have hypothesized that a compulsive interest in order and power is often to be found in strong political leaders who were great institution-builders and who made it their task to transform society. The case study of Wilson lends support to this general hypothesis.
To posit such personal, unconscious components in the political motivation of some leaders by no means excludes the simultaneous operation of cultural determinants There is no doubt in Wilson s case that his personal interest in order and power was defined and channelized by the cultural and political matrix of the times. Moreover, concrete opportunities to rewrite constitutions and to exercise and perfect his talents as orator-leader were provided by existing situations in which he found himself or that he actively sought out.
Thus, the external situation in which the individual exists necessarily defines and delimits the field in which personality develops and in which personality needs and traits find expression. On the other hand, the interaction between the personality of a political leader and the milieu in which he operates may be, in an important sense, a reciprocal one. A leader s basic needs and values, his motives and dispositions, shape his perception of the situations that confront him and influence his definition and evaluation of the choices of action open to him (George and George 1956: xvii).
What is gained by attributing motivations of this character to a political leader? In this case, what difference does it make whether Wilson s interest in writing constitutions had the type of personal motivation in question? The postulate of a deep-seated, unconscious interest in imposing orderly systems upon others as a means of achieving a sense of power, we believe, accounts in part (but only in part) for Wilson s peculiar involvement in the League Covenant and in the making of the peace, the many strands of which we have attempted to document in our book. The biographer who is sensitive to the possible role of unconscious motivation is struck, for example, by the fact that it was Wilson s constant concern to reserve to himself final authorship of the Covenant, even though none of the ideas that entered into it were original with him and that he appeared to derive peculiar pleasure from giving his own stamp to the phraseology of the document (George and George 1956: 208-210, 223, 226-228).
Similarly, the postulate that Wilson derived from constitution-writing gratification of unconscious personal needs for power and domination may account in part (again only in part) for the tenacity with which he resisted efforts by various Senators to rewrite parts of the Covenant, which in some cases amounted merely to an alteration of its wording. Wilson appears to have subconsciously experienced all such efforts as attempts to interfere with or dominate him in a sphere of competence that he regarded as his own preserve.
Such an interpretation, taken alone, will seem highly speculative. The reader, we hope, will find it more plausible in the context of the theory of Wilson s personality that we have worked out and utilized in detail for purposes of analyzing Wilson s entire development and career. Briefly paraphrased here, the theory is that political leadership was a sphere of competence Wilson carved out for himself (from early adolescence on!) in order to derive therefrom compensation for the damaged self-esteem branded into his spirit as a child. Particularly when performing in his favored role as interpreter and instrument of the moral aspirations of the people, he considered himself as uniquely endowed and virtually infallible. His personality needs were such that in the sphere of competence, which he regarded as peculiarly his own, he had to function independently and without interference in order to gain the compensatory gratification he sought from the political arena. These we believe to have been the underlying dynamics of his somewhat autocratic style of leadership to which many contemporaries and biographers have called attention. 26
The Relationship Between Wilson s Morality and His Stubbornness
The extraordinary role of conscience and stubbornness in Wilson s political behavior has been noted by numerous of his contemporaries and biographers. It has often been said that Wilson s refusal to compromise on certain notable occasions, particularly as President of Princeton and as President of the United States, was a reflection of his Presbyterian conscience. When great principles were at stake, as on these occasions, he could not bring himself to compromise. In such situations Wilson characteristically portrayed himself as confronted by a choice between dishonorable compromise of principles and an uncompromising struggle for moral political goals. Accordingly, for him, there could be no alternative but to fight for truth and morality against all opposition, whatever the consequences.
No matter that others (including careful historians such as Arthur S. Link) (Link 1947: 76) find his characterization of the situation in these terms unconvincing; that in fact Wilson was not really confronted by such an unpleasant either-or choice. The fact remain that Wilson saw it thus. However much one may deplore the political consequences of his refusal to compromise, so the argument goes, surely the only valid conclusion that can be drawn is that Wilson was possessed by an unusually strong sense of morality and rectitude that exercised a determining influence upon his political behavior.
It has seemed plausible, therefore, to attribute great importance to the Presbyterian culture in which Wilson was reared and from which, to condense this familiar thesis, he derived his unusual conscience and sense of morality.
Such a thesis must cope with various questions that can be legitimately raised. For example: If Wilson s refusal to compromise in certain instances is simply a matter of his Presbyterian conscience, then what of the numerous instances in which that same conscience was no bar to highly expedient, if not opportunistic, political behavior on his part? (Link 1947; George and George 1956). Clearly, at the very least a more refined theory as to the nature of the Presbyterian conscience and of its influence on political behavior is needed.
This general question is merely posed here. Instead of pursuing it further on this occasion let us consider, rather, the usefulness of looking at the relationship between Wilson s morality and his political stubbornness in terms of what is known about the dynamics of the compulsive type. To examine the problem of Wilson in these terms is not to deny the importance of his Presbyterian upbringing or related cultural factors. Nor does it thereby ignore the possibility, which need not be explored here, that compulsive personalities are or were frequently to be found among members of the Presbyterian subculture. Indeed, the Presbyterian ethos no doubt provided reinforcement and rationalization for Wilson s stubbornness. We have elsewhere observed that such a creed produces men of conviction who find it possible to cling to their principles no matter what the opposition. The feeling that they are responsible, through their conscience, only to God, gives them a sense of freedom from temporal authority and the opinions of their fellow men (George and George: 4-5).
The problem of Wilson s convictions that he was right in refusing to compromise and was acting in conformity with moral standards, however, is more complex than it appears at first glance, as we will try to show.
The analysis of stubborn behavior in compulsive personalities indicates that it is often a form of aggression. Thus aggressive tendencies, usually repressed, find expression in situations that actually comprise, or can be represented by the individual to himself as comprising, struggles on behalf of goals that receive strong endorsement by the conscience. The operative mechanism is referred to as idealization and has been described in the following terms: The realization that an ideal requirement is going to be fulfilled brings to the ego an increase in self-esteem. This may delude it into ignoring the fact that through the idealized actions there is an expression of instincts that ordinarily would have been repressed the ego relaxes its ordinary testing of reality and of impulses so that instinctual [in this case, aggressive] impulses may emerge relatively uncensored. (Fenichel 1945:485-486). One is reminded in this connection of Wilson s repeated expressions of his pleasure and delight at an opportunity for a good fight on behalf of a good cause and his highly aggressive outbursts against opponents who blocked his high moral purposes. The instinctual nature of these eruptions is suggested by their extreme and intemperate quality; they were often personally unbecoming as well as politically inexpedient and on occasion left Wilson shortly thereafter much chagrined at his loss of self-control.
Whatever the satisfactions of an uncompromising fight for what is right, it may lead the compulsive person into essentially immoral behavior, behavior which strongly conflicts with role requirements and expectations. Given a culture in which political power is shared and in which the rules of the game enjoin compromise among those who participate in making political decisions for the community, to insist stubbornly that others submit to your own conception of what is truth and morality may if fact contravene political morality. The right thing for Wilson to do in the critical phases of his struggles at Princeton and with the Senate in the League matter, in terms of the prevailing political mores, was to have worked together with others who legitimately held power in order to advance as far as possible towards desirable political goals.
Wilson was well aware of this requirement. As a historian and astute student of American political institutions, he knew very well that the right thing for a statesman to do is to be practical and accomplish what he can. And he had expressed himself often on this very problem. In an address before the McCormick Theological Seminary, in the fall of 1909, for example, he had said: I have often preached in my political utterances the doctrine of expediency and I am an unabashed disciple of that doctrine. What I mean to say is, you cannot carry the world forward as fast as a few select individuals think. The individuals who have the vigor to lead must content themselves with a slackened pace and go only so fast as they can be followed. They must not be impractical. They must not be impossible. They must not insist upon getting at once what they know they cannot get (Baker 1927: 307).
However, at several critical junctures in his public career, when he found his righteous purposes blocked by opponents who would not bend to his will, Wilson did not do the right thing; he did not compromise or accommodate, even when friends and political associates enjoined him to do so. Rather, he stubbornly persisted in his course and helped bring about his own personal defeat and the defeat of worthwhile measures which he was championing.
It seems, then, that we are confronted here by a form of self-defeating behavior in which the role of conscience in political stubbornness is perhaps much more complex than is implied in the familiar thesis of Wilson s Presbyterian conscience and his stiff-necked morality.
But why must stubborn refusal to compromise be pushed to the point of self-defeat and the frustration of desirable legislation if not for Wilson s stated reason that he would have found it immoral to compromise great principles? Once again the literature on compulsiveness provides an alternative set of hypotheses with which to assess the available historical data. It is our thesis, which we have tried to document elsewhere (George and George 1956: 290-98), that Wilson s stubborn refusals to compromise in situations where true morality and the requirements of his role demanded accommodation created feelings of guilt within him. He was vaguely disturbed by what he subconsciously sensed to be his own personal involvement in the fights with his opponents. The greater the stubbornness (a form of aggression against his opponents), the greater the inner anxiety at violating the moral injunction to compromise, which was a very real requirement of his political conscience.
This predicament was worked out in the following manner: stubborn refusal to compromise was maintained to the point where Wilson could demonstrate his moral superiority over his opponents. This could be achieved by manipulating the situation so that his opponents were also involved in immoral behavior, for example, by permitting their dislike of Wilson to warp their political good sense, by conspiring to defeat Wilson despite the merits of the issue at stake, by refusing to support desirable proposals just because he was championing them, etc. Thus, stubbornness was maintained so that, should it not succeed in forcing the capitulation of his opponents, it would provoke his defeat by selfish and immoral opponents. Thereby, he could at least assuage his anxiety and guilt for, whatever his crime, it was outweighed by the demonstration in defeat of his moral superiority over his opponents.
These, we believe, were the underlying dynamics of the search for martyrdom which other writers (e.g., Hofstadter 1954; Bailey 1945) as well have seen in Wilson s ill-fated Western speaking tour on behalf of the League of Nations. Whether the available historical materials which we have cited in support of this thesis render it sufficiently plausible and convincing must be left to individual judgment. Instead of rephrasing the evidence and reasoning already presented on its behalf in our book, we shall confine ourselves here to noting that the mechanisms described above, as underlying the possible quest for martyrdom, are very well described in the literature on compulsive stubbornness.

What is usually called stubbornness in the behavior of adult persons is an attempt to use other persons as instruments in the struggle with the super-ego. By provoking people to be unjust, they strive for a feeling of moral superiority which is needed to increase their self-esteem as a counter-balance against the pressure of the super-ego (Fenichel 1945: 279).
The stubborn behavior is maintained the more obstinately, the more an inner feeling exists that it is impossible to prove what needs to be proven and that one is actually in the wrong. The feeling, Whatever I do is still less wicked than what has been done to me, is needed as a weapon against the super-ego and, if successful, may bring relief from feelings of guilt (Fenichel 1945: 497; Olden 1953: 240-255).
In brief, therefore, the very morality in. terms, of which Wilson could initially legitimize the open expression of pent-up aggression and hostility ensnared him in profoundly immoral political behavior. His repeated protestations as the struggle with his opponents wore on that he had to do what was right and what conscience demanded were, in fact, a cloak for activity that was contrary to the requirements of his leadership role and some of the demands of his own conscience. The repeated protestations that he was acting merely as an instrument of the people s will and had no personal stakes in the battle were the external manifestation of desperate efforts to still inner doubts of the purity of his motivation in refusing compromise and to controvert the knowledge that gnawed from within that he was obstructing his own cause (George and George 1956: 297-298). We have here an instance not of stern morality but of a type of rationalization which has been labelled the moralization mechanism, i.e., a tendency to interpret things as jf they were in accord with ethical standards when they are actually (and subconsciously known to be) in striking contrast to them (e.g., Fenichel 1945: 486).
Thus did Wilson go down to tragic defeat. A subtle personal involvement in political struggle prevented him from anchoring his actions in the profound wisdom of the maxim: There comes a time in the life of every man when he must give up his principles and do what he knows is right. 27
The Self-Defeating Pattern in Wilson s Career
The thesis of a self-defeating dynamism in Wilson s personality gains in plausibility from evidence that it was part of a pattern which tended to repeat itself under similar conditions during his career. 28 A number of Wilson s biographers have noted that Wilson s defeat in the fight for the League fits into a pattern of behavior he had displayed earlier in public life. Thus, after a painstaking analysis of the bitter and unsuccessful struggle Wilson waged with his opponents at Princeton, Professor Link was led to remark that a political observer, had he studied carefully Wilson s career as president of Princeton University, might have forecast accurately the shape of things to come during the period when Wilson was president of the United States. Calling the former period a microcosm of the latter, Link ascribed to Wilson s uncompromising battles both in the graduate college controversy and in the League of Nations battle with the Senate the character and proportions of a Greek tragedy (Link 1947: 90-91). 29
Similarly, writing many years before, Edmund Wilson, the distinguished man of letters, saw in the same events of Wilson s career evidence of a curious cyclical pattern that can be detected in the lives of other historical figures as well:
It is possible to observe in certain lives, where conspicuously superior abilities are united with serious deficiencies, not the progress in a career or vocation that carries the talented man to a solid position or a definite goal, but a curve plotted over and over again and always dropping from some flight of achievement to a steep descent into failure (Wilson 1952: 322).
The type of enigmatic personality described here by a humanist is one which has been of long-standing interest to the clinician as well. Influenced by Freud s earlier description and analysis of neurotic careers, Franz Alexander in 1930 presented what has become a classical psychoanalytical account of this general character type (Alexander 1930). 30 In many cases, driven by unconscious motives, persons of this type alternate between committing a transgression and then seeking punishment. Thereby, their careers may exhibit alternating phases of rise and abrupt collapse, a pattern indicating that aggressive and self-destructive tendencies run along together. The neurotic character, Alexander continues, has fired the literary imagination since time immemorial. They are nearly all strong individualities who struggle in vain to hold the anti-social tendencies of their nature in check. They are born heroes who are predestined to a tragic fate.
Let us examine more closely the repetitive pattern of behavior that observers working from different standpoints have detected in his career. 31 As President of Princeton, Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States, Wilson gained impressive early successes only to encounter equally impressive political deadlocks or set-backs later on. He entered each of these offices at a time when reform was the order of the day and with a substantial fund of goodwill to draw upon. In each case there was an initial period during which the type of strong leadership he exercised in response to his inner needs coincided sufficiently with the type of leadership the external situation required for impressive accomplishment. He drove the faculty and trustees at Princeton to accomplish an unprecedented series of reforms. The New Jersey legislature of 1911 was a triumph of productivity in his hands. Later, he exacted a brilliant performance from the Sixty-Third Congress of the United States.
We are forced to recognize, therefore, that Wilson s personal involvements contributed importantly to the measure of political accomplishment he attained. In each position, however, his compulsive ambition and imperious methods helped in time to generate the type of bitter opposition that blocked further successes and threatened him with serious defeats. Wilson was skillful in the tactics of leadership only so long as it was possible to get exactly what he wanted from the trustees or the legislature. He could be adept and inventive in finding ways of mobilizing potential support. He could be, as in the first year of the Governorship and in the honeymoon period of the Presidency, extremely cordial, if firm; gracious, if determined; and generally willing to go through the motions of consulting and granting deference to legislators whose support he needed. It is this phase of his party leadership that excited the admiration of contemporaries, historians and political scientists alike. It is essential to note, however, that Wilson s skillfulness in these situations always rested somewhat insecurely upon the expectation that he would be able to push through his proposed legislation in essentially unadulterated form. (As Wilson often put it, he was willing to accept alterations of detail, but not of the principles of his legislative proposals.)
Once opposition crystalized in sufficient force to threaten the defeat or marked alteration of his proposed legislation, however, Wilson was faced with a different type of situation. Skillful political behavior-the logic of the situation-now demanded genuine consultation to explore the basis of disagreement and to arrive at mutual concessions, bargains and formulas that would ensure passage of necessary legislation. In this type of situation Wilson found it difficult to operate on the basis of expediential considerations and at times proved singularly gauche as a politician. Once faced with genuine and effective opposition to a legislative proposal to which he had committed his leadership aspirations , Wilson became rigidly stubborn and tried to force through his measure without compromising it. 32 The greater the opposition, the greater his determination not to yield. He must win on his own terms or not at all!
Personally involved in these struggles, Wilson was incapable of realistically assessing the situation and of contriving skillful strategies for dividing the opposition and winning over a sufficient number to his side. Both at Princeton and later in the battle with the Senate over ratification of the treaty, Wilson was incapable of dealing effectively in his own interest with the more moderate of his opponents. In the heat of the battle, he could tolerate no ambiguity and could recognize no legitimate intermediate position. He tended to lump together all of his opponents. In such crises, therefore, his leadership was strongly divisive rather than unifying. He alienated the potential support of moderate elements who strongly sympathized with his general aims but felt some modification of his proposals to be necessary. Instead of modest concessions to win a sufficient number of moderates over, he stubbornly insisted upon his own position and rudely rebuffed their overtures, thus driving them into the arms of his most bitter and extreme opponents (George and George 1956: 38, 45, 286-89). It was his singular ineptness in the art of political accommodation, once the battle was joined, which was at bottom responsible for some of Wilson s major political defeats at Princeton and in the Presidency.
In these situations-when opposition crystalized and threatened to block Wilson s plan-the desire to succeed in achieving a worthwhile goal, in essence if not in exact form, became of less importance than to maintain equilibrium of the personality system. He seems to have experienced opposition to his will in such situations as an unbearable threat to his self-esteem. To compromise in these circumstances was to submit to domination in the very sphere of power and political leadership in which he sought to repair his damaged self-esteem. Opposition to his will, therefore, set into motion disruptive anxieties and brought to the surface long-smouldering aggressive feelings that, as a child, he had not dared to express. The ensuing struggle for his self-esteem led, on the political level, to the type of stubborn, self-defeating behavior and the search for moral superiority over his opponents that we have already described.
Notes
1 By field theory of personality the Committee had in mind one which takes into account the fact that external factors/not just childhood training, set norms and incentives and influence motivation and codes of conduct. See Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Historiography (1954).
2 For a recent review of such studies see Garraty (1954) and Airport (1942).
3 For a brief review of this development see Hall and Lindsey (1957: 64-65).
4 For a useful statement of major trends in social psychology and personality theory see Smith, Bruner and White (1956: chapter 2). For a useful summary and synthesis of the ways in which unconscious needs find expression in political behavior see Lane (1959: chapter 9).
5 Useful accounts of some of these typologies and others drawn partly from social-psychological standpoints, are available in Monroe (1955), Lasswell (1948), Lane (1953: 397-398). On trends in the study of poliyical leadership see Seligrnan (1950).
6 I am indebted to Dr. David Hamburg, Chairman, Psychiatry Department, Stanford University, for bringing this to my attention.
7 The need for developmental analysis of personality that starts with some preliminary theory, or set of hypotheses, has been frequently emphasized by those writing on the problems of biography. See, for example, the following statement by the historian Thomas C. Cochran: Faced with the task of constructing an interpretive biography, the investigator trained in psychological methods would formulate hypotheses as he started work on the early life of his subject-hypotheses as to what sort of person the man would prove to be when he later became involved in different types of situations. A systematic testing of these hypotheses against the evidence provided at different stages in the life history would not only provide clues to the understanding of motives but would also focus the biography sharply on the processes of personality development (Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Historiography 1954: 67).
8 Much dissatisfaction has been expressed in recent times with the conventional trait approach to the study of personality and leadership (e.g., Gibb 1947: 267-284; Gouldner 1950).
9 Among the many useful personality sketches and interpretations of Wilson see particularly those recently provided by Wilson (1956: 61), Garraty (1957) and Blum (1956).
10 Thus Blum refers only parenthetically to Wilson s compulsiveness and his obsessive sense of unrest (Blum 1956: 5,11, 75). Though he has explored the technical literature on compulsive behavior, Blum did not attempt a methodical exploitation of it in preparing his study of Wilson (Personal communication to the author). The compulsive nature of Wilson s ambition and political style, his inability to pace his demands for reform more expediently, was earlier grasped by the official biographer Baker (1927), Link (1947), Wilson (1952) and Corwin (1946).
11 See, for example, Arthur S. Link s perceptive account of Wilson s highly revealing reaction when his opponents at Princeton unexpectedly offered to accept a compromise proposal to which he had earlier committed himself (Link 1947: 69-71, 75-76, George and George 1956: 42-43).
12 Thus, a fuller statement of the personality trends or types that can be detected in Wilson s personality would, in Freudian terms, probably have to include reference to the oral character and the neurotic character (Horney 1945: 92, 93), as well as to the compulsive type. Similarly, if Karen Horney s typology is employed, Wilson would probably have to be described as an amalgam of her compliant, aggressive and detached personality types (Horney 1945).
It should be noted that some of the contradictions in Wilson s character, often noted by contemporaries and biographers, can be understood in terms of the combination of trends, or types, of which his personality was composed.
13 I have omitted from this paper a discussion of the historian s method for explaining the subjective side of action (the logic-of-the-situation approach) and of the prospects for merging it with that of the clinician s. These prospects are not unfavorable, though the task is admittedly difficult. Both the historian and the clinician (as well as the political scientist!) are interested in intensive causal analysis of the single case and employ for this purpose a variant of the same type of interpretive procedure.
14 A useful, detailed summary of theories about the dynamics of behavior in compulsives is provided in Fenichel (1945: 268-310, 487-88, 530-31).
15 We must reserve for another occasion an effort to account for Wilson s development of a viable personality organization and the ability to function as successfully as he did.
16 The fact that there are various specialized terminologies within the field of dynamic psychology and that members of the various schools at times state their differences polemically tends to obscure the wide area of fundamental agreement among them and the fact that an important body of knowledge and insight into human behavior has been gradually developed around a common dynamic point of view. Moreover, dynamic psychology has based itself more recently upon a core of assumptions common to a number of approaches to the study of behavior: psychoanalysis, social anthropology, social psychology and learning theory. (Mowrer and Kluckhohn 1944).
17 These traits, comprising the so-called anal or anal compulsive character, are sometimes formulated in different terms as instances of sublimations or reaction formations. Freud s statement of the type appears in Freud (1950). For more recent formulations, see Fenichel (1945: 278-285). An important restatement and interpretation of Freud s libido theory is provided by Erik H. Erikson in his Childhood and Society (Erikson 1950). See also the attempt to clarify and elaborate operationally the Freudian character types in Murray (1938: 361-85).
18 For this purpose, in addition to the sources cited in the preceding footnote, see for example, Healy and Bronner (1930) and Menninger (1943).
19 In the initial phase of our research we collected a large amount of evidence of the presence of most of these orderly traits in Wilson. Contemporaries and biographers have been impressed by various orderly traits in Wilson. For example, Wilson was a stickler for accuracy (Lawrence 1928: 342), he had an extraordinary ability to concentrate and compartmentalize (Baker 1927: 44) and himself often referred to his single-track mind (Low 1918: 282); he attempted to rigidly separate thinking and emotions and leaned over backwards to prevent private and personal considerations from interfering with public duties (Baker 1927: 2; Wilson 1939: 162; Tumulty 1921: 473-74), he was pedantic, dogmatic and fastidious as a teacher (Mosher 1930; Baker1927: 13), he was reliable and scrupulous in keeping his word, no matter what the inconvenience (Wilson 1939: 171; Tumulty 1921: 469), his punctuality was well-known and it was said that one could set one s watch from his comings and goings (McAdoo 1937: 22, 60, 213; Lawrence 1928: 126), he was punctilious, thorough and methodical (Baker 1927: 86-87,182; McAdoo 1937: 24, 188; Wilson 1939: 90, 307, 347; Link 1947: 94), he was strikingly neat, orderly and regular in personal working habits (Baker 1927: 46; McAdoo 1937: 20; Wilson 1939: 79).
20 The hypothesis that certain types of (compulsive or neurotic) personalities pursue power as a means of obtaining compensation for low self-esteem can be and has been divorced from the distinctive structural-dynamic framework and terminology of the Freudian school. Various versions of a similar hypothesis are provided by other schools of dynamic psychology.
21 In his personality profile of Wilson, Arthur S. Link, for example, identifies the following traits: a demand for unquestioning loyalty, egotism and a belief in the infallibility of his own judgment, vanity and a belief in his own superior wisdom and virtue, inability to rely upon others, indulgence in narrow prejudices and vindictiveness, intolerance of advice and resentment of criticism, a tendency to equate political opposition with personal antagonism, susceptibility to flattery. (Link 1956: 67-68) In his Wilson: The Road to the White House, the same biographer referred to his subject as possessing an imperious will and intense conviction, a headstrong and determined man who was usually able to rationalize his actions in terms of the moral law and to identify his position with the divine will (Link 1947: ix).
In compulsives, too, an overevaluation and high development of the intellect is often found. At the same time, however, intellectualization is curiously combined with archaic features (superstitiousness and magical beliefs). It is noteworthy, therefore, that many writers (Link 1947: 94) have been struck by the curious streak of superstitiousness in Wilson, a man otherwise noted for his emphasis on the intellect and on being guided by reason.
22 Some of these materials are presented in volume I (pp. 36 ff.) of Baker (1927). However, other relevant materials on Wilson s childhood and, especially, on his relationship with his father were not included in the official biography and are to be found in the Baker Papers, Library of Congress. A fuller summary and interpretation of this material than is possible here is given in George and George (1956: chapter 1).
23 The significance of this childhood developmental problem has been overlooked in the otherwise authoritative biography by Arthur S. Link. There is no reference to it in Link s account of Wilson s formative years. On the contrary, Link asserts that Wilson s boyhood was notable, if for nothing else, because, of his normal development. (Link 1947: 2). The fact of Wilson s slowness is also omitted in the biographies by Garraty and Blum, though it is mentioned (and glossed over) by Baker (1927: 36-37). The stem, domineering and caustic manner of Wilson s father, a source of acute tension and discomfort for Wilson, is also muted in Baker s published account, though not in the materials which Baker collected for his biography. (See the preceding footnote.)
24 A belated identification with his father appears to have accompanied Wilson s adoption of the compulsive dynamism at this time. The identification with the father was extremely strong on the manifest level and was rigidly maintained throughout Wilson s lifetime. At the same time, however, feelings of inferiority vis a vis the father, who had been the chief instrument of Wilson s damaged self-esteem, persisted throughout Wilson s life. For this and other reasons, accordingly, we have felt it necessary to postulate that the father-son conflict persisted in Wilson at an unconscious level. (Readers familiar with the technical literature will be reminded of the Freudian theory of the Oedipal basis of the inferiority complex.)
We have also postulated that aspects of Wilson s behavior in the struggles with Dean West and Senator Lodge constituted a displacement, or acting out, of the unconscious hostility that he had experienced towards his father as a child but had not dared to express. For a fuller statement of the thesis concerning the father-son relationship, see George and George (1956: chapter 1, 46, 114-115, 270-273). On the conditions under which Wilson s latent aggressive impulses could find overt expression against political opponents, see the discussion of idealization .
25 In more general terms we are asserting the possibility that personality needs and motives of an unconscious character may govern an individual s selection of social and political roles and that these needs and motives may infuse themselves into the individual s performance of those roles. The fact that a person s behavior can be interpreted in terms of role theory, therefore, does not relieve the investigator from considering the possibility that aspects of basic personality are also expressing themselves in such behavior. It is incorrect, therefore, to define the problem as some proponents of role theory tend to do in terms of role vs. personality. Rather, the interplay of role and personality needs to be considered.
26 This theory is a special application of a general hypothesis concerning the pursuit of power as a means of compensation for low self-estimates, which Harold D. Lasswell has extracted from the findings and theories of various schools of dynamic psychology (Laswell 1948: 39). The hypothesis is evidently of wide, though not universal, application in the study of political leaders.
We have discussed some of the problems of applying this general hypothesis to someone like Wilson, who pursued other values as well as power, in George and George (1956: 319-322) and in the paper, Woodrow Wilson: Personality and Political Behavior , presented before a panel of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1956.
As already noted, the pervasiveness of power strivings as compensation for organic or imagined defects was given early emphasis by Alfred Adler. The fruitfulness of Adler s theories for subsequent social psychological approaches to personality is now widely recognized (e.g., Murphy 1947: chapter 24).
27 It might be added that we have encountered no evidence that Wilson subsequently ever expressed or experienced any self-doubts as to the wisdom or correctness of his refusal to compromise in the struggle to ratify the peace treaty. On the contrary, his defeat and physical breakdown seem to have provided relief from the feelings of uneasiness experienced at the time.
28 It should be emphasized that whether, to what extent and how often the self-defeating dynamism referred to here finds expression depends upon the character of the situations encountered by the subject during his lifetime. Similarly, we have postulated that this destructive tendency was held in check to some extent by the development in Wilson s personality system of a constructive strategy whereby he generally committed his need for domination and achievement only to political projects which were about ready for realization. On this point, not discussed further in this paper, see George and George (1956: 118, 320-22).
29 A similar observation is made by Blum, op. cit., p. 36.
30 In contrast to true neurotics who squander their energy in futile inactivity, Alexander noted, persons of this character type live active and eventful lives; they act out repressed unconscious motives that are unacceptable to their ego. The neurotic element in such persons appears, that is, not so much in the form of circumscribed symptoms but permeates the personality and influences their entire behavior.
31 The following paragraphs are a brief paraphrase of materials presented in George and George (1956: 116-121, 320-322) and in a paper at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1956.
32 The italicized phrase is an important qualification to the general proposition. In the case of legislative proposals which were not his or to which he had not committed his aspirations for high achievement, for example the military preparedness legislation of 1915-16, Wilson was more flexible when confronted by effective Congressional opposition. (George and George 1956: 116, 121)
References
Airport, G. W. (1942): The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science. Social Science Research Council Bulletin , Vol. 49
Alexander, F. (1930): The Neurotic Character. International Journal of Psychoanalysis , Vol. 11, pp. 292-311
Bailey, T. A. (1645): Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal . New York, The Macmillan company
Baker, R. S. (1927): Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters . New York, Doubleday, Page and Co.
Blum, J. M. (1956): Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality. Boston, Little, Brown
Bruner, J. S., M. B. Smith and R. W. White (1956): Opinions and Personality. New York, Wiley
Corwin, E. S. (1946). In Meyers, W. S. (Ed.): Woodrow Wilson: Some Princeton Memories. Princeton, Princeton University Press
Erikson, E. H. (1950): Childhood and Society. New York, Norton
Fenichel, O. (1945): The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York, Norton
Freud, S. (1950): Collected Papers . London, The Hogarth Press
Garraty, J. A. (1954): The Interrelations of Psychology and Biography. Psychological Bulletin , Vol. 51 No. 6, pp. 569-582
Garraty, J. A. (1957): Woodrow Wilson: A Study in Personality. The South Atlantic Quarterly , Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 176-185
George, A. L. and J. L. George (1956): Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York, J. Day Co.
Gerth, H. and C. W. Mills (1953): Character and Social Structure. New York, Harcourt, Brace
Gibb, C. A. (1947): The Principles and Traits of Leadership. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology , Vol. 42, pp. 267-184
Gouldner, A. (1950): Studies in Leadership. New York, Harper
Hall, C. S. and G. Lindzey (1957): Theories of Personality. New York, Wiley
Healy, W. and A. F. Bronner (1930): The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis as Related to Personality and Behavior. New York, A. A. Knopf
Hofstadter, R. (1954): The American Political Tradition . 2. edition, New York, Vintage Books
Horney, K. (1937): The Neurotic Personality of Our Time . New York, W. W. Norton and Company inc.
Horney, K. (1945): Our Inner Conflicts. New York, W.W. Norton and Company inc.
Lane, R. E. (1953): Political Character and Political Analysis. Psychiatry , Vol. 16, pp. 387-398
Lane, R. E. (1959): Political Life. Glencoe, The Free Press
Lasswell, H. D. (1948): Power and Personality . New York, Norton
Lawrence, D. (1928): The True Story of Woodrow Wilson. New York, George H. Doran Company
Link A. S. (1947): Wilson: The Road to the White House. Princeton, Princeton University Press
Link, A. S. (1956): Wilson: The New Freedom. Princeton, Princeton University Press
Low, A. M. (1918): Woodrow Wilson - An Interpretation . Boston, Little, Brown and Co.
McAdoo, E. W. (1937): The Woodrow Wilsons . New York, The Macmillan company
Menninger, W. C. (1943): Characterologic and Symptomatic Expressions Related to the Anal Phase of Psychosexual Development. Psychoanalytic Quarterly , Vol. 12, pp. 161-193
Monroe, R. L. (1955): Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought. New York, Rinehart and Winston
Mosher Jr., C. W. (1930): Woodrow Wilson s Methods in the Classroom. Current History , Vol. 32
Mowrer, O. H. and C. Kluckhohn (1944): Dynamic Theory of Personality. In Hunt, J. McV. (Ed.): Personality and the Behavior Disorders . New York, The Ronald press company
Murphy, G. (1947): Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure. New York, Harper
Murray, H. A. (1938): Explorations in Personality . New York, Oxford University Press
Olden, C. (1943): The Psychology of Obstinacy. Psychoanalytic Quarterly , Vol. 12, pp. 161-193
Sears, R. R. (1943): Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts. Social Science Research Council Bulletin , Vol. 51, pp. 67-70
Seligman, L. G. (1950): The Study of Political Leadership. American Political Science Review , Vol. 44, pp. 904-15
Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Historiography (1954): A Report of the Committee on Historiograph. Los Angeles, Social Science Research Council
Tumulty, J. (1921): Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him. New York, Doubleday, Page and company
Wilson, E. B (1939): My Memoir. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company
Wilson, E. (1952): Shores of Light. New York, Farrar, Straus and Young
2 A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Herbert A. Simon (1955)
Traditional economic theory postulates an economic man, who, in the course of being economic is also rational. This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. 1
Recent developments in economics and particularly in the theory of the business firm, have raised great doubts as to whether this schematized model of economic man provides a suitable foundation on which to erect a theory - whether it be a theory of how firms do behave, or of how they should rationally behave. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these doubts, or to determine whether they are justified. Rather, I shall assume that the concept of economic man (and, I might add, of his brother administrative man ) is in need of fairly drastic revision and shall put forth some suggestions as to the direction the revision might take.
Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. One is tempted to turn to the literature of psychology for the answer. Psychologists have certainly been concerned with rational behavior, particularly in their interest in learning phenomena. But the distance is so great between our present psychological knowledge of the learning and choice processes and the kinds of knowledge needed for economic and administrative theory that a marking stone placed halfway between might help travellers from both directions to keep to their courses.
Lacking the kinds of empirical knowledge of the decisional processes that will be required for a definitive theory, the hard facts of the actual world can, at the present stage, enter the theory only in a relatively unsystematic and unrigorous way. But none of us is completely innocent of acquaintance with the gross characteristics of human choice, or of the broad features of the environment in which this choice takes place. I shall feel free to call on this common experience as a source of the hypotheses needed for the theory about the nature of man and his world.
The problem can be approached initially either by inquiring into the properties of the choosing organism, or by inquiring into the environment of choice. In this paper, I shall take the former approach. I propose, in a sequel, to deal with the characteristics of the environment and the interrelations of environment and organism.
The present paper, then, attempts to include explicitly some of the properties of the choosing organism as elements in defining what is meant by rational behavior in specific situations and in selecting a rational behavior in terms of such a definition. In part, this involves making more explicit what is already implicit in some of the recent work on the problem - that the state of information may as well be regarded as a characteristic of the decision-maker as a characteristic of his environment. In part, it involves some new considerations - in particular taking into account the simplifications the choosing organism may deliberately introduce into its model of the situation in order to bring the model within the range of its computing capacity.
Some General features of Rational Choice
The flavor of various models of rational choice stems primarily from the specific kinds of assumptions that are introduced as to the givens or constraints within which rational adaptation must take place. Among the common constraints - which are not themselves the objects of rational calculation - are (1) the set of alternatives open to choice, (2) the relationships that determine the pay-offs ( satisfactions, goal attainment ) as a function of the alternative that is chosen and (3) the preference-orderings among pay-offs. The selection of particular constraints and the rejection of others for incorporation in the model of rational behavior involves implicit assumptions as to what variables the rational organism controls - and hence can optimize as a means to rational adaptation - and what variables it must take as fixed. It also involves assumptions as to the character of the variables that are fixed. For example, by making different assumptions about the amount of information the organism has with respect to the relations between alternatives and pay-offs, optimization might involve selection of a certain maximum, of an expected value, or a minimax.
Another way of characterizing the givens and the behavior variables is to say that the latter refer to the organism itself, the former to its environment. But if we adopt this viewpoint, we must be prepared to accept the possibility that what we call the environment may lie, in part, within the skin of the biological organism. That is, some of the constraints that must be taken as givens in an optimization problem may be physiological and psychological limitations of the organism (biologically defined) itself. For example, the maximum speed at which an organism can move establishes a boundary on the set of its available behavior alternatives. Similarly, limits on computational capacity may be important constraints entering into the definition of rational choice under particular circumstances. We shall explore possible ways of formulating the process of rational choice in situations where we wish to take explicit account of the internal as well as the external constraints that define the problem of rationality for the organism.
Whether our interests lie in the normative or in the descriptive aspects of rational choice, the construction of models of this kind should prove instructive. Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly with respect to computational and predictive ability), actual human rationalitystriving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind af global rationality that is implied, for example, by game-theoretical models. While the approximations that organisms employ may not be the best - even at the levels of computational complexity they are able to handle - it is probable that a great deal can be learned about possible mechanisms from an examination of the schemes of approximation that are actually employed by human and other organisms.
In describing the proposed model, we shall begin with elements it has in common with the more global models and then proceed to introduce simplifying assumptions and (what is the same thing) approximating procedures.
P RIMITIVE T ERMS AND D EFINITIONS
Models of rational behavior - both the global kinds usually constructed and the more limited kinds to be discussed here - generally require some or all of the following elements:
1. A set of behavior alternatives (alternatives of choice or decision). In a mathematical model, these can be represented by a point set, A.
2. The subset of behavior alternatives that the organism considers or perceives. That is, the organism may make its choice within a set of alternatives more limited than the whole range objectively available to it. The considered subset can be represented by a point set , with included in A ( A ).
3. The possible future states of affairs , or outcomes of choice, represented by a point set, S . (For the moment it is not necessary to distinguish between actual and perceived outcomes.)
4. A pay-off function, representing the value or utility placed by the organism upon each of the possible outcomes of choice. The pay-off may be represented by a real function, V(s) defined for all elements, s , of S . For many purposes there is needed only an ordering relation on pairs of elements of S - i.e., a relation that states that s 1 is preferred to s 2 or vice versa - but to avoid unnecessary complications in the present discussion, we will assume that a cardinal utility, V(s) , has been defined.
5. Information as to which outcomes in S will actually occur if a particular alternative, a , in A (or in ) is chosen. This information may be incomplete - that is, there may be more than one possible outcome, s , for each behavior alternative, a . We represent the information, then, by a mapping of each element, a , in A upon a subset, S a - the set of outcomes that may ensue if a is the chosen behavior alternative.
6. Information as to the probability that a particular outcome will ensue if a particular behavior alternative is chosen. This is a more precise kind of information than that postulated in (5), for it associates with each element, s , in the set S a , a probability, P a (s) - the probability that s will occur if a is chosen. The probability P a (s) is a real, non-negative function with
Attention is directed to the threefold distinction drawn by the definitions among the set of behavior alternatives, A , the set of outcomes or future states of affairs, S and the pay-off, V. In the ordinary representation of a game, in reduced form, by its pay-off matrix, the set S corresponds to the cells of the matrix, the set A to the strategies of the first player and the function V to the values in the cells. The set S a is then the set of cells in the a th row. By keeping in mind this interpretation, the reader may compare the present formulation with classical game theory.
C LASSICAL C ONCEPTS OF R ATIONALITY
With these elements, we can define procedures of rational choice corresponding to the ordinary game-theoretical and probabilistic models (Arrow 1951).
A. Max-min Rule. Assume that whatever alternative is chosen, the worst possible outcome will ensue - the smallest V(s) for s in S a will be realized. Then select that alternative, a , for which this worst pay-off is as large as possible.

Instead of the maximum with respect to the set, A , of actual alternatives, we can substitute the maximum with respect to the set, , of considered alternatives. The probability distribution of outcomes, (6) does not play any role in the max-min rule.
B. Probabilistic Rule. Maximize the expected value of V(s) for the (assumed known) probability distribution, P a (s) .

C. Certainty Rule. Given the information that each a in A (or in ) maps upon a specified s a in S , select the behavior alternative whose outcome has the largest pay-off.

The essential simplifications
If we examine closely the classical concepts of rationality outlined above, we see immediately what severe demands they make upon the choosing organism. The organism must be able to attach definite pay-offs (or at least a definite range of pay-offs) to each possible outcome. This, of course, involves also the ability to specify the exact nature of the outcomes - there is no room in the scheme for unanticipated consequences. The pay-offs must be completely ordered - it must always be possible to specify, in a consistent way, that one outcome is better than, as good as, or worse than any other. And, if the certainty or probabilistic rules are employed, either the outcomes of particular alternatives must be known with certainty, or at least it must be possible to attach definite probabilities to outcomes.
My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual human choice situations of any complexity, these computations can be, or are in fact, performed. The introspective evidence is certainly clear enough, but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker than the conscious. Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that the classical concepts do describe the decision-making process, it seems reasonable to examine the possibility that the actual process is quite different from the ones the rules describe.
Our procedure will be to introduce some modifications that appear (on the basis of casual empiricism) to correspond to observed behavior processes in humans and that lead to substantial computational simplifications in the making of a choice. There is no implication that human beings use all of these modifications and simplifications all the time. Nor is this the place to attempt the formidable empirical task of determining the extent to which and the circumstances under which humans actually employ these simplifications. The point is rather that these are procedures which appear often to be employed by human beings in complex choice situations to find an approximate model of manageable proportions.
S IMPLE P AY-OFF F UNCTIONS
One route to simplification is to assume that V(s) necessarily assumes one of two values, (1,0), or of three values, (1,0, - 1), for all s in S. Depending on the circumstances, we might want to interpret these values, as (a) (satisfactory or unsatisfactory), or (b) (win, draw or lose).
As an example of (b), let S represent the possible positions in a chess game at White s 20th move. Then a (+1) position is one in which White possesses a strategy leading to a win whatever Black does. A (0) position is one in which White can enforce a draw, but not a win. A (- 1) position is one in which Black can force a win.
As an example of (a) let S represent possible prices for a house an individual is selling. He may regard $15,000 as an acceptable price, anything over this amount as satisfactory, anything less as unsatisfactory / In psychological theory we would fix the boundary at the aspiration level ; in economic theory we would fix the boundary at the price which evokes indifference between selling and not selling (an opportunity cost concept).
The objection may be raised that, although $16,000 and $25,000 are both very satisfactory prices for the house, a rational individual would prefer to sell at the higher price and hence, that the simple pay-off function is an inadequate representation of the choice situation. The objection may be answered in several different ways, each answer corresponding to a class of situations in which the simple function might be appropriate.
First, the individual may not be confronted simultaneously with a number of buyers offering to purchase the house at different prices, but may receive a sequence of offers and may have to decide to accept or reject each one before he receives the next. (Or, more generally, he may receive a sequence of pairs or triplets or n -tuples of offers and may have to decide whether to accept the highest of an n -tuple before the next n -tuple is received.) Then, if the elements S correspond to n -tuples of offers, V(s) would be 1 whenever the highest offer in the n -tuple exceeded the acceptance price the seller had determined upon at that time. We can then raise the further question of what would be a rational process for determining the acceptance price. 2
Second, even if there were a more general pay-off function, W(s) , capable of assuming more than two different values, the simplified V(s) might be a satisfactory approximation to W(s). Suppose, for example, that there were some way of introducing a cardinal utility function, defined over S , say U(s). Suppose further that U(W) is a monotonic increasing function with a strongly negative second derivative (decreasing marginal utility). Then V(s) = V{ W( s )} might be the approximation as shown on page 107.
FIGURE 1 :

When a simple V(s) , assuming only the values (+1, 0) is admissible, under the circumstances just discussed or under other circumstances, then a (fourth) rational decision-process could be defined as follows:
D. (i) Search for a set of possible outcomes (a subset, S in S) such that the pay-off is satisfactory (V(s) = 1) for all these possible outcomes (for all s in S ).
(ii) Search for a behavior alternative (an a in ) whose possible outcomes all are in S (such that a maps upon a set, S a , that is contained in S ).
If a behavior alternative can be found by this procedure, then a satisfactory outcome is assured. The procedure does not, of course, guarantee the existence or uniqueness of an a with the desired properties.
I NFORMATION GATHERING
One element of realism we may wish to introduce is that, while V(s) may be known in advance, the mapping of A on subsets of S may not. In the extreme case, at the outset each element, a , may be mapped on the whole set, S. We may then introduce into the decision-making process information-gathering steps that produce a more precise mapping of the various elements of A on nonidentical subsets of S. If the information-gathering process is not costless, then one element in the decision will be the determination of how far the mapping is to be refined.
Now in the case of the simple pay-off functions, (+1, 0), the informationgathering process can be streamlined in an important respect. First, we suppose that the individual has initially a very coarse mapping of A on S. Second, he looks for an S in S such that V(s) = 1 for s in S . Third, he gathers information to refine that part of the mapping of A on S in which elements of S are involved. Fourth, having refined the mapping, he looks for an a that maps on to a subset of S .
Under favorable circumstances, this procedure may require the individual to gather only a small amount of information - an insignificant part of the whole mapping of elements of A on individual elements of S. If the search for an a having the desirable properties is successful, he is certain that he cannot better his choice by securing additional information. 3
It appears that the decision process just described is one of the important means employed by chess players to select a move in the middle and end game. Let A be the set of moves available to White on his 20th move. Let S be a set of positions that might be reached, say, by the 30th move. Let S be some subset of S that consists of clearly won positions. From a very rough knowledge of the mapping of A on S , White tentatively selects a move, a , that (if Black plays in a certain way) maps on S . By then considering alternative replies for Black, White explores the whole mapping of a. His exploration may lead to points, s , that are not in S , but which are now recognized also as winning positions. These can be adjoined to S . On the other hand, a sequence may be discovered that permits Black to bring about a position that is clearly not won for White. Then White may reject the original point, a , and try another.
Whether this procedure leads to any essential simplification of the computation depends on certain empirical facts about the game. Clearly all positions can be categorized as won, lost, or drawn in an objective sense. But from the standpoint of the player, positions may be categorized as clearly won, clearly lost, clearly drawn, won or drawn, drawn or lost, and so forth - depending on the adequacy of this mapping. If the clearly won positions represent a significant subset of the objectively won positions, then the combinatorics involved in seeing whether a position can be transformed into a clearly won position, for all possible replies by Black, may not be unmanageable. 4 The advantage of this procedure over the more common notion (which may, however, be applicable in the opening) of a general valuation function for positions, taking on values from - 1 to 1, is that it implies much less complex and subtle evaluation criteria. All that is required is that the evaluation function be reasonably sensitive in detecting when a position in one of the three states - won, lost, or drawn - has been transformed into a position in another state. The player, instead of seeking for a best move, needs only to look for a good move.
We see that, by the introduction of a simple pay-off function and of a process for gradually improving the mapping of behavior alternatives upon possible outcomes, the process of reaching a rational decision may be drastically simplified from a computational standpoint. In the theory and practice of linear programming, the distinction is commonly drawn between computations to determine the feasibility of a program and computations to discover the optimal program. Feasibility testing consists in determining whether a program satisfies certain linear inequalities that are given at the outset. For example, a mobilization plan may take as given the maximum work force and the steelmaking capacity of the economy. Then a feasible program is one that does not require a work force or steel-making facilities exceeding the given limits.
An optimal program is that one of the feasible programs which maximizes a given pay-off function. If, instead of requiring that the pay-off be maximized, we require only that the pay-off exceed some given amount, then we can find a program that satisfies this requirement by the usual methods of feasibility testing. The pay-off requirement is represented simply by an additional linear inequality that must be satisfied. Once this requirement is met, it is not necessary to determine whether there exists an alternative plan with a still higher pay-off.
For all practical purposes, this procedure may represent a sufficient approach to optimization, provided the minimum required payoff can be set reasonably. In later sections of this paper we will discuss how this might be done and we shall show also how the scheme can be extended to vector payoff functions with multiple components (Optimization requires, of course, a complete ordering of pay-offs).
P ARTIAL O RDERING OF P AY-OFFS
The classical theory does not tolerate the incomparability of oranges and apples. It requires a scalar pay-off function, that is, a complete ordering of pay-offs. Instead of a scalar pay-off function, V(s) , we might have a vector function, V (s) ; where V has the components V 1 , V 2 , A vector pay-off function may be introduced to handle a number of situations:
1. In the case of a decision to be made by a group of persons , components may represent the pay-off functions of the individual members of the group. What is preferred by one may not be preferred by the others.
2. In the ease of an individual, he may be trying to implement a number of values that do not have a common denominator - e.g., he compares two jobs in terms of salary, climate, pleasantness of work, prestige, etc.;
3. Where each behavior alternative, a , maps on a set of n possible consequences, S a , we may replace the model by one in which each alternative maps on a single consequence, but each consequence has as its pay-off the n -dimensional vector whose components are the pay-offs of the elements of S a .
This representation exhibits a striking similarity among these three important cases where the traditional maximizing model breaks down for lack of a complete ordering of the pay-offs. The first case has never been satisfactorily treated - the theory of the n -person game is the most ambitious attempt to deal with it and the so-called weak welfare principles of economic theory are attempts to avoid it. The second case is usually handled by superimposing a complete ordering on the points in the vector space ( indifference curves ). The third case has been handled by introducing probabilities as weights for summing the vector components, or by using principles like minimaxing satisfaction or regret.
FIGURE 2 : Partial ordering of pay-offs

An extension of the notion of a simplified pay-off function permits us to treat all three cases in much the same fashion. Suppose we regard a pay-off as satisfactory provided that V i k i for all i. Then a reasonable decision rule is the following:
E. Search for a subset S in S such that V( s ) is satisfactory for all s in S (i.e.; ).
Then search for an a in A such that S a lies in S .
Again existence and uniqueness of solutions are not guaranteed. Rule E is illustrated in Figure II for the case of a 2-component pay-off vector.
In the first of the three cases mentioned above, the satisfactory pay-off corresponds to what I have called a viable solution in A Formal Theory of the Employment Relation and A Comparison of Organization Theories. (Simon 1951; Simon 1953) In the second case, the components of V define the aspiration levels with respect to several components of pay-off. In the third case (in this case it is most plausible to assume that all the components of k are equal), k i may be interpreted as the minimum guaranteed pay-off - also an aspiration level concept.
Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions
Throughout our discussion we have admitted decision procedures that do not guarantee the existence or uniqueness of solutions. This was done in order to construct a model that parallels as nearly as possible the decision procedures that appear to be used by humans in complex decision-making settings. We now proceed to add supplementary rules to fill this gap.
O BTAINING A U NIQUE S OLUTION
In most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made. In actual human decision-making, alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure. When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one actually selected.
If a chess player finds an alternative that leads to a forced mate for his opponent, he generally adopts this alternative without worrying about whether another alternative also leads to a forced mate. In this case we would find it very hard to predict which alternative would be chosen, for we have no theory that predicts the order in which alternatives will be examined. But in another case discussed above - the sale of a house - the environment presents the seller with alternatives in a definite sequence and the selection of the first satisfactory alternative has precise meaning.
However, there are certain dynamic considerations, having a good psychological foundation, that we should introduce at this point. Let us consider, instead of a single static choice situation, a sequence of such situations. The aspiration level , which defines a satisfactory alternative, may change from point to point in this sequence of trials. A vague principle would be that as the individual, in his exploration of alternatives, finds it easy to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level rises; as he finds it difficult to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level falls. Perhaps it would be possible to express the ease or difficulty of exploration in terms of the cost of obtaining better information about the mapping of A on S , or the combinatorial magnitude of the task of refining this mapping. There are a number of ways in which this process could be defined formally.
Such changes in aspiration level would tend to bring about a near-uniqueness of the satisfactory solutions and would also tend to guarantee the existence of satisfactory solutions. For the failure to discover a solution would depress the aspiration level and bring satisfactory solutions into existence.
E XISTENCE OF S OLUTIONS : F URTHER P OSSIBILITIES
We have already discussed one mechanism by which the existence of solutions, in the long run, is assured. There is another way of representing the processes already described. Up to this point little use has been made of the distinction between A , the set of behavior alternatives and , the set of behavior alternatives that the organism considers. Suppose now that the latter is a proper subset of the former. Then, the failure to find a satisfactory alternative in may lead to a search for additional alternatives in A that can be adjoined to . 5 This procedure is simply an elaboration of the informationgathering process previously described. (We can regard the elements of A that are not in as elements that are initially mapped on the whole set, S.)
In one organism, dynamic adjustment over a sequence of choices may depend primarily upon adjustments of the aspiration level. In another organism, the adjustments may be primarily in the set : if satisfactory alternatives are discovered easily, narrows; if it becomes difficult to find satisfactory alternatives, broadens. The more persistent the organism, the greater the role played by the adjustment of , relative to the role played by the adjustment of the aspiration level. (It is possible, of course and even probable, that there is an asymmetry between adjustments upward and downward.)
If the pay-off were measurable in money or utility terms and if the cost of discovering alternatives were similarly measurable, we could replace the partial ordering of alternatives exhibited in Figure II by a complete ordering (an ordering in terms of a weighted sum of the pay-off and the cost of discovering alternatives). Then we could speak of the optimal degree of persistence in behavior - we could say that the more persistent organism was more rational than the other, or vice versa. But the central argument of the present paper is that the behaving organism does not in general know these costs, nor does it have a set of weights for comparing the components of a multiple pay-off.

  • Accueil Accueil
  • Univers Univers
  • Ebooks Ebooks
  • Livres audio Livres audio
  • Presse Presse
  • BD BD
  • Documents Documents