The Framers' Intentions

Robert E. Ross

Description

Robert Ross addresses a fascinating and unresolved constitutional question: why did political parties emerge so quickly after the framers designed the Constitution to prevent them? The text of the Constitution is silent on this question. Most scholars of the subject have taken that silence to be a hostile one, arguing that the adoption of the two-party system was a significant break from a long history of antiparty sentiments and institutional design aimed to circumscribe party politics.

The constitutional question of parties addresses the very nature of representation, democracy, and majority rule. Political parties have become a vital institution of representation by linking the governed with the government. Efforts to uphold political parties have struggled to come to terms with the apparent antiparty sentiments of the founders and the perception that the Constitution was intended to work against parties.

The Framers’ Intentions connects political parties and the two-party system with the Constitution in a way that no previous account has, thereby providing a foundation for parties and a party system within American constitutionalism. This book will appeal to readers interested in political parties, constitutional theory, and constitutional development.

Partyism has constituted a threat to politics since the study of politics started. In The Republic, written around 380 B.C., Plato recognized the dangers of political divisions that tended to create disunity within a polity. For Plato, parties—or groups based on particular interests and opinions—were dangerous to the city and the soul because they were seen not as parts of the whole but as parts against it. Within the dialogue, Thrasymachus’ understanding of justice was fundamentally based on a division between the ruler and the ruled. For Thrasymachus, justice was nothing more than the ruler’s own selfishness and establishing laws that tended towards his own personal benefit. In this way, the ruler served only private interests at the expense of the rest of polity, thereby subverting the whole for a part. It is the concept of justice, then, that produced factions, hatred, and disunity among society. Plato’s dialogue would have to refute Thrasymachus’ assertion and prove that justice was beneficial for both the city and the individual soul. Or, as Socrates responded, “For surely Thrasymachus, it’s injustice that produces factions, hatreds, and quarrels among themselves, and justice that produces unanimity and friendship.” In his pursuit of justice, Plato needed to overcome divisions in society that tended to disrupt the unity of both the city and soul. For, “Have we any greater evil for a city than what splits it and makes it many instead of one? Or a greater good than what binds it together and makes it one?” Overcoming partyism could only be accomplished by establishing the common good and having every individual, not just a part, gain his or her fulfillment from the prosperity of the whole. Based on the dialogue with Thrasymachus, partyism made political justice unobtainable, and Plato’s proposed city in speech was intended to subvert divisions in the city and soul and promote unity within each. Hence Socrates’ provisionary definition of justice, “this—the practice of minding one’s own business—when it comes into being in a certain way, is probably justice.” Furthermore, Socrates described the importance of each part of the city and the soul ensuring their individual interests did not interfere with the collective good: “But a city (and soul) seemed to be just when each of the three classes of natures presented in it minded its own business.” Plato acknowledged the division within the city and the soul and even cast the separate parts of each as natural. However, the parts, no matter how natural, needed to be subordinate to the greater good. No part could be granted political recognition without creating disunity. Parties were considered internal enemies of both the city and the soul, and no part had claim to rule over the whole; otherwise, the whole could be subverted by and to a part. Unity required that each part shared in the same interest rather than having separate interests. Ambition was not designed to counteract ambition; ambition was to be tamed by and subordinate to the common good. For Plato, the natural divisions with the city and soul were not simply parts of the whole that needed to be balanced by something like a mixed constitution. Rather, the parts were understood to have a tendency to work against the whole and needed constraining to achieve true unity. Constraining the parts to achieve unity in the whole was a dominant method for combating if not completely eliminating partyism in politics. Centuries later, Thomas Hobbes appropriated this method. In The Leviathan, published in 1657, Hobbes depicted individuals as naturally predisposed to self-preservation and engaged in a war, “where every man is enemy to every man.” In this natural state, violent individualism precludes the possibility of society because individuals were left as the final arbiter of what is necessary to self-preservation. Any association with others was temporarily necessitated by self-preservation and gaining an individual advantage. Once the necessity had passed, individuals disassociated due to distrust of fellow associates. Hobbes depicted antipartyism at its most extreme, as individual self-judgment subverted any semblance of unity or the common good. Unity was central to Hobbes’ political project, and he attempted to explain how to unite individuals without this unity devolving into a state of war. Self-interested individuals maintaining sovereignty over questions of peace and necessity caused this perpetual division and insecurity. Indeed, Hobbes observed “the disease of a commonwealth” was “that every private man is judge of good and evil actions.” Problems in Hobbes’s state of nature and civil society arose when there was no external source to arbitrate controversies. Individuals were left to their own biased self-judgments, which resulted in definitions of right and wrong based simply on the individual’s own preference. This situation was indeed dire: “To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.” Hobbes required an external arbiter to establish law, justice, and right to avoid lawlessness, injustice, and wrong. This meant that individuals no longer settled questions of right and wrong because these disputes have but one of two outcomes, “their controversie must either come to blows, or be undecided.” To avoid this problem, an absolute, undivided sovereign was required to establish law. For if sovereignty was divided, there would be continual disputations over governance. Matters of right and wrong would never be settled, thereby thrusting individuals back to the state of war. (excerpted from ch 1)

Introduction: Antipartyism and the Constitution: Reassessing the “Constitution-Against-Parties” Thesis

1.Antiparty Constitutionalism and the Tradition of Political Parties Partyism Before the Constitution

2.Partyism and the First Amendment: Organizing Opposition and the Partisan Press

3.Partyism and the Presidential Selection System: The Twelfth Amendment and Political Opposition

4.Partyism and Organized Opposition in Elections

5.Partyism and the Electoral College: Completing the Twelfth Amendment

6Partyism, the Election Clause, and the House of Representatives

7.Conclusion: Partyism and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Entrenching the Two-Party Constitution

Sujets

• Political Parties
• Political Process
• American Government
• Political Science
• HISTORY
• Federal government of the United States
• History of the United States
• United States Constitution
• Political party
• United States
• National

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 31 mai 2019
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268105518
• Langue: English

Extrait

THE FRAMERS’ INTENTIONS
THE FRAMERS’ INTENTIONS
The Myth of the Nonpartisan Constitution
ROBERT E. ROSS
University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, Indiana
University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
undpress.nd.edu
Copyright © 2019 by the University of Notre Dame
All Rights Reserved
Published in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Ross, Robert E., 1981–, author.
Title: The Framers’ intentions : the myth of the nonpartisan Constitution / Robert E. Ross.
Description: Notre Dame, Indiana : University of Notre Dame Press, [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2019002908 (print) | LCCN 2019015519 (ebook) | ISBN 9780268105525 (pdf) | ISBN 9780268105518 (epub) | ISBN 9780268105495 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 0268105499 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Political parties—United States—History—18th century. | Political parties—United States—History—19th century. | Constitutional history—United States. | United States. Constitution. 1st Amendment. | United States. Constitution. 12th Amerndment. | Founding Fathers of the United States.
Classification: LCC JK2260 (ebook) | LCC JK2260 .R67 2019 (print) | DDC 342.73/07—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019002908
∞This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).
This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [e-mail]
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION Antipartyism and the Constitution: Reassessing the Constitution-against-Parties Thesis
CHAPTER ONE Antiparty Constitutionalism and the Tradition of Political Parties
CHAPTER TWO Partyism prior to the Constitution
CHAPTER THREE Partyism and the First Amendment: Organizing Opposition and the Partisan Press
CHAPTER FOUR Partyism and the Presidential Selection System: The Twelfth Amendment and Political Opposition
CHAPTER FIVE Partyism and Organized Opposition in Elections

CHAPTER SIX Partyism and the Electoral College: Completing the Twelfth Amendment
CHAPTER SEVEN Partyism, the Elections Clause, and the House of Representatives
CONCLUSION Partyism and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Entrenching the Two-Party Constitution
Notes
Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project is the product of countless individuals to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for their efforts on my behalf.
I wish to thank my colleagues and teachers at the University of Houston, where this project began from a question posed in a seminar on political parties, and at Utah State University, where it was finally completed. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to Jeremy Bailey, who exemplarily embraced the role of adviser and mentor. Jeremy taught me how to be a scholar, and I constantly recognize his influence on my work. I express my gratitude to Michael Zuckert, Jeffrey Church, and Richard Murray, who read various versions of the manuscript and provided invaluable feedback. I am grateful for Andrea Eckelman, Sarah Mallums, Bruce Hunt, Roger Abshire, Marcia Beyer, Luke Williams, and Markie McBrayer, who offered encouragement and support through the initial stages of the project. At Utah State University, I owe Peter McNamara, Tony Peacock, Damon Cann, Michael Lyons, and Josh Ryan my gratitude for pushing me to complete the project.
The University of Notre Dame Press has made this project a reality. I owe thanks to my editor, Eli Bortz, the staff, and the reviewers: all of you made valuable comments that vastly improved the manuscript. Publius: The Journal of Federalism has given permission to reprint a portion of chapter 6 , which is a revision of “Federalism and the Electoral College: The Development of the General Ticket Method for Selecting Presidential Electors,” Publius 46, no. 2 (2016): 147–69. Likewise, Polity has given permission to reprint a portion of chapter 7 , which is a revision of “Recreating the House: The 1842 Apportionment Act and the Whig Party’s Reconstruction of Representation,” Polity 49, no. 3 (2017): 408–33.
Finally, I would not have completed this project without the support of my family. My parents, Charles and Sandra Ross, offered support and encouragement no matter how obscure my project seemed to them. Likewise, Harold and Teresa Kunz provided as much support as in-laws could possibly give. To my children, Nathaniel and Scarlett, thank you for patiently waiting for me to finish working before requesting my return to the good life. Finally, my wife Erin was my constant amid persistent uncertainty. Thank you for loving me through it all.
INTRODUCTION
Antipartyism and the Constitution
Reassessing the Constitution-against-Parties Thesis
It is well known by party scholars that many members of the founding generation held deep antiparty sentiments and aimed to design a constitutional system that would exclude political parties. The Constitution is silent on parties, and most scholars have interpreted this as a hostile silence. The new constitutional system was intended to include a level of popular sovereignty but not through mass participation by way of political parties. Rather, institutions were designed to limit popular influence and mute party competition. 1 Competition among various interests and institutional features like the division and separation of powers would constrain and contain party conflict and dialogue. 2 With the Constitution’s ratification, democracy in the United States was intended to proceed without the intervention of political parties. However, political parties developed quickly, and the intention of designing a constitutional government without political parties was short-lived. Even more to the point, many of the founders who expressed antiparty sentiments, such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, were also central in creating the first political parties. Political parties have an unsettled place in American constitutionalism because they are deemed useful, if not necessary, to politics, even for those who seemingly despise them.
Contemporary society faces the same party paradox as the founding generation. For all the claims against partyism and partisan obstinacy, parties are embraced because they provide salutary benefits for the political process at every level of government. While political parties and an institutionalized party system were never intended to be a prominent feature in the American constitutional order, American politics are fundamentally structured and organized by political parties and a system of partisan competition for elected offices. 3 Unlike any other institution in American politics, political parties have the capacity to divide while also providing a mechanism for unity across the vast nation. At the national and local levels, parties play a pivotal role in electing candidates and recruiting political leadership, educating citizens by transmitting political information and values, and governing by organizing individuals and groups into majorities. Yet parties threaten the overall needs of the nation because they represent only partial or special interests. As James Madison warned, “The public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and . . . measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.” 4 Political parties are institutionalized features of American constitutionalism, and attempts to promote or strengthen parties and the party system because of their utility must be reconciled with the clear attempts to eliminate or circumscribe their influence in politics and vice versa.
Given the promise and peril of partyism for politics, the purpose of this book is to understand how political parties became deeply entrenched in a constitutional order that was intended to work against them. The notion that the Constitution was intended to work against political parties, or what the historian Richard Hofstadter calls the Constitution-against-parties thesis, 5 has long been a pillar of American political and constitutional development. The primary aim of this book is to address how the framers interpreted the Constitution in relation to the emergence of the first political parties in the United States. To a large extent, the turn to political parties came in response to the Constitution’s promise of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Political actors interpreted the Constitution and constructed constitutional meaning to ensure political and electoral outcomes were achieved through majoritarian, albeit partisan, means. In this way, early political parties were not necessarily antithetical to the Constitution, and the turn to partyism can be understood as a legitimate part of the constitutional order rather than an aberration of it. However, to successfully situate the development of partyism within the early constitutional system, we must reassess the prominent Constitution-against-parties thesis.
T HE C ONSTITUTION-AGAINST -P ARTIES T HESIS
There is no shortage of examples detailing the way in which antipartyism influenced the framers in creating our constitutional system. Thomas Jefferson remarked that the “addiction [to a political party] is the last degradation of a free and moral agent.” 6 In his Farewell Address, George Washington discussed the “baneful effects of the spirit of party,&#