Zimbabwe's Trajectory

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At Independence in 1980, Julius Nyerere called Zimbabwe 'the jewel of Africa', and cautioned its new leaders not to tarnish it. Tragically, they paid no heed to Africa's esteemed elder statesmen. Arguably - and only if one ignores the carnage of Gukurahundi - the first decade was a developmental one, with resources being used prudently to benefit the formerly disadvantaged majority population. However, the 1990s witnessed a transition from a developmental to a predatory leadership which saw Zimbabwe cross the millennial line in crisis, where it has remained ever since. While many African countries have moved forward over the last three decades, Zimbabwe has gone relentlessly backwards, save for the four-year interregnum of the tripartite coalition government, 2009-2013. Virtually all development indicators point in the wrong direction and the crisis of poverty, unemployment, and the erosion of health. education and other public goods continues unabated. The imperatives of political survival and power politics supersede those of sound economics and public welfare. Moreover, unless good politics are conjoined with a sound people-first policy, the country will continue sliding downhill. Zimbabwe's Trajectory tells the story of the country's post-independence dynamics and its recent descent into becoming one of the three most unhappy countries in the world.

Informations

• Publié par: Weaver Press
• Date de parution: 11 novembre 2020
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781779223784
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 7 Mo

Extrait

Published by Weaoer Press, BOx A1922, AoOndale, Harare. 2020 and The Mass Public ÔpiniOn Institute (MPÔI), BOx 8360, Harare, 2020

© This cOllectiOn MPÔI and Weaoer Press 2020 © Each single chapter the authOr(s) 2020

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ISBN: 978-1-77922-376-0 (p/b) ISBN: 978-1-77922-377-7 (PDF) ISBN: 978-1-77922-378-4 (ePub)

List of Tables and Figures Notes on Contributors 1Zimbabwe’s Fragile Independence, 1980-2020 Eldred V. Masunungure 2November 2017: Continuity or Rupture? Eldred V. Masunungure and Natasha Mataire 3The July 2018 Elections in Zimbabwe: Watershed that Never Was? Richman Kokera, Simangele Moyo-Nyede and Jonathan Kugarakuripi 4Zimbabwe’s Predatory Ruling Elite Coalition: Continuities Beyond Mugabe Eldred V. Masunungure 5Political Parties in Zimbabwe’s Constrained Democratic Space Eldred V. Masunungure and Stephen Ndoma 6Public Opinion Before and After the July 2018 Harmonised Elections Anyway Chingwete and Stephen Ndoma 7Media Policy in Zimbabwe: A Mirror of Politics of the Day Nhlanhla Ngwenya and Tabani Moyo 8The Security Sector: The Elephant in the Room? Pedzisai Ruhanya 9Untangling the Gordian Knot: Zimbabwe’s National Dialogue Stephen Ndoma 10Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Framework Greg Linington 11Dancing Around the Same Spot: The Elusive Quest for Devolution in Zimbabwe’s Last Four Decades Alois Madhekeni 12The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the Zimbabwe Political Question: Policy Continuity beyond Mugabe Lawrence Mhandara 13Re-engagement under the ‘New Dispensation’: Dead in the Water? Ashton Murwira Conclusion: Zimbabwe’s Unrelenting Fragility Eldred V. Masunungure Appendix 1: President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s first Cabinet Appendix 2: Splitsinthe MDC explained Appendix 3:Sections of the Draft ZMC in violation of the Zimbabwean Constitution

Tables Table 1.1: Table 1.2: Table 1.3: Table 5.1: Table 5.2: Table 9.1: Table 11.1: Figures Figure 1.1: Figure 1.2: Figure 1.3: Figure 1.4: Figure 1.5: Figure 1.6: Figure 3.1: Figure 3.2: Figure 5.1: Figure 5.2: Figure 5.3: Figure 6.1: Figure 6.2: Figure 6.3: Figure 6.4: Figure 6.5: Figure 6.6: Figure 6.7: Figure 6.8: Figure 6.9: Figure 6.10: Figure 6.11: Figure 6.12: Figure 6.13: Figure 6.14:

Figure 6.15: Figure 6.16: Figure 6.17:

List of Tables and Figures

Land holding by race at independence in 1980 Corruption Perception Indices for Zimbabwe, 1998-2019 Corruption scandals, 1982-2014 Candidates fielded by the main political parties, Zimbabwe harmonised elections, 2018 National Assembly results, Zimbabwe harmonised elections, 20183 Multiple dialogue permutations in Zimbabwe, post-2018 elections ZANU-PF’s response to COPAC’s Second Draft

Zimbabwe’s Country Direction, 2012-2018 Growth Rates for Zimbabwe and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981-2018 Inflation rate in Zimbabwe, November 2018-October 2019 Government performing badly on job creation | | Zimbabwe | 1999-2018 Zimbabwe happiness index, 2013-2019 Trust in Zimbabwe Electoral Commission | 2009-2018 Zimbabwean’s most preferred method of choosing a leader Zimbabwe presidential election results, 1990-2018 Awareness of political-party alliances, Zimbabwe, 2018 Trust in political parties, Zimbabwe, 2018 Media coverage of presidential candidates, Zimbabwe, 2018 Country directions by economic conditions, Zimbabwe, May 2018 Most important problems campaign should address, Zimbabwe, May 2018 Support for regular, open, and honest elections, Zimbabwe, 2009-2018 Public attitudes to voting, Zimbabwe, 2018 Perceptions of power to influence circumstances, Zimbabwe, 2018 Support for multi-party politics, Zimbabwe, 2018 Rejection of military rule, Zimbabwe, 2018 Trend in freedom of expression, Zimbabwe, 2009-2017 Trend in perceptions of self-censorship, Zimbabwe, 2009-2018 Perceptions of likelihood of election irregularities, Zimbabwe, May-July 2018 Popular concerns about election’s final stages, Zimbabwe, May-July 2018 Is ZEC neutral or biased? Zimbabwe, 2010-2018 Trust in Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 2009-2018 Trend in fear of political intimidation or violence during election campaigns, Zimbabwe, 2009-2017 Discussion of political matters, Zimbabwe, 2009-2018 Trend in carefulness during voting in elections, Zimbabwe, 2017-2018 Trend in perceptions of freeness and fairness of elections, Zimbabwe, 2009-2018

Notes on Contributors

ANYWAYCHINGWETE holds a Master’s degree in Population Studies and an Honours degree in Economics from the University of Zimbabwe. She has trained in survey methodology, research analysis and poverty in Africa and currently works for the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town as the Project Manager on the Afrobarometer Project. She has contributed regularly to the Afrobarometer publication database since 2005, and sits on the management committee of the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa, based at the University of Cape Town.

RICHMANKOKERAis a Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the University of Zimbabwe, and is a former Research Officer at the Mass Public Opinion Institute.

JONATHANKUGARAKURIPI is a Research Officer at MPOI. He holds an Honours degree in Psychology from the University of Zimbabwe and has a particular interest in political psychology research.

GREGLININGTONa lawyer and lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative is Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He holds two Masters degrees, one in Constitutional Law (UNISA and another in Public International Law (London. His research interests include investigating constitutional amendment theories and the interpretation and enforcement of provisions in the Declaration of Rights. He has written a book on Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Law, as well as articles and book chapters on aspects of constitutional law.

ALOISMADHEKENI is a democracy and governance expert who specialises in power politics and governance in southern Africa. He has taught local government courses at the University of Zimbabwe and is currently the co-ordinator of the community development programme of Silveira House Jesuit Social Justice and Development Centre. He holds a PhD in multilevel government law and policy from the University of the Western Cape.

ELDREDV. MASUNUNGURE is a Political Science and Public Administration graduate of the University of Zimbabwe and Dalhousie University (Canada and teaches Public Policy and Political Theory courses at both undergraduate and post-graduate levels in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He has published widely, including editing Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections(2009 and co-editingZimbabwe: Mired in Transition(2012. He is the Director of the Harare-based Mass Public Opinion Institute, where he is the Principal Investigator of the Afrobarometer Project.

NATASHAMATAIREa Masters degree in International Relations from the University of has Zimbabwe and is a former teaching assistant at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. She has experience in elections-related research at an NGO in Harare. Other areas of research include human rights, international political economy and foreign affairs. She is a regular contributor to the Black and White Youth Movement in Africa, an NGO that seeks to elevate African youth regardless of race. She is preparing to embark on her PhD studies in 2021.

LAWRENCEMHANDARAholds a PhD in Peace Studies and is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. His research covers politics, security and conflict issues. His latest publication, ‘The Great Lakes Region Security Complex: Lessons for the African Solutions for Peace and Security Approach’, was published in the Institute of Peace and Security Studies’ Journal of African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security.

TABANIMOYOis the Director of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Zimbabwe. Prior to his appointment, he served as MISA’s Programmes Officer, doubling as the Branding Manager for the network Regional Office. He has wide experience in the print media, communications and advertising industries. He holds a Masters in Business Adminstration (ESAMI, Tanzania, a Postgraduate Diploma in Marketing Management (Chartered Institute of Marketing, London, and is studying towards a DBA at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

SIMANGELEMOYO-NYEDE is a Research Officer with the Mass Public Opinion Institute. She holds an MSc in International Relations and a BSc Honours degree in Political Science, both from the University of Zimbabwe. Her research interests include women’s rights and governance.

ASHTONMURWIRAholds a Phd in Peacebuilding (Durban University of Technology, and an MSc in International Relations and a BSc Honours in Political Science from the University of Zimbabwe, where he is a lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at UZ. He lectures in courses that include Comparative Politics, International Relations and Foreign Policy. His research interests are in peace and conflict, international relations, and governance.

STEPHENNDOMAa researcher based in Harare. He has an MA in Public Administration and a is BSc Honours in Politics and Administration from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently employed as Principal Researcher at the Mass Public Opinion Institute where he has managed a series of projects commissioned by the Afrobarometer Network. His strength lies in research planning, execution, data analysis and dissemination of research findings

NHLANHLANGWENYAis currently the Media Manager for OSISA and was the Director of MISA Zimbabwe until 2017, following a decade at the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe. He holds an MA in International Development Management (University of Bradford, UK, and a BA Honours in Linguistics, an MA in Media and Communications Studies, and a Postgraduate Diploma in Media and Communications Studies, all from the University of Zimbabwe. He is the Chairperson of the privately run online news platform Radio VOP and sits on the Management Committee of the Human Rights NGO Forum.

PEDZISAIRUHANYA is a Senior Lecturer in the Journalism and Media Studies section of the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of English. He holds a BSc Honours in Sociology from the University of Zimbabwe, an MA in Human Rights from the University of Essex (UK, and a PhD in Media and Democracy from the University of Westminster (UK. He has published articles in peer- reviewed journals on media and democracy, and co- edited, with Professor Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu, The History and Political Transition of Zimbabwe– From Mugabe to Mnangagwa(2020.

1 Zimbabwe’s Fragile Independence, 1980-2020

Eldred V. Masunungure

Independent Zimbabwe is a success. …For the most part, Zimbabwe under Mugabe is moving forward with the tasks of national reconstruction and development in a manner that is heartening(Davidow, 1983: 95, 96).

Quintessentially, Zimbabwe, which is now one of the poorest countries in the world and rated the second failed state after Somalia, has gone through a series of disastrous political and economic errors over five decades’(Makina, 2010: 101)

‘The Zimbabwe I once loved has become a cemetery for my son’s future’ said Ashley Randen, 1 an unemployed single mother of a 12-year-old boy in Harare.

18 April 2020 marked a tumultuous four decades of political independence from white minority rule that was personified by its intransigent leader, Ian Douglas Smith, who was determined to exercise indefinite hegemony over an overwhelmingly black majority. Despite its repressive predations, the settler-colonial regime constructed one of the most robust states and economies in sub-Saharan Africa, which the post- colonial black government proceeded to systematically erode, apparently oblivious of the then Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere’s admonition to Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s new Prime Minister: ‘You have inherited a jewel: Keep it that way’. Today, both the state and the economy are shells of their former selves while the country’s citizens have been reduced to the Fanonian ‘wretched of the earth’. In early December 2019, the BBC’s ‘Hard Talk’ was entitled: ‘Zimbabwe: A giant facing economic collapse’. Indeed, for many Zimbabweans, life now approximates the Hobbesian state of nature where life is ‘solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short’. Zimbabwe’s four independent decades provide a chequered story but a pattern can be discerned. The first decade was, with the exception of the ill-fated ‘moment of madness’ i.e. the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi atrocities, a developmental one in its distributional benefits to the formerly disadvantaged majority population. At Independence, the country proudly stepped forward into the community of nations after one and half decades of international isolation and comprehensive, mandatory sanctions. It was a moment of jubilation though signals of predation had already begun to emerge towards the end of that decade. The second decade was a transitional one in both the socio-economic and political domains. In the latter, there was a sharp transition from a corporatist or statist economic framework of the 1980s to a liberal or market-oriented one in the 1990s. It was a decade that connected the first decade of a positive trajectory to the last two decades of serious decline leading to the birth and proliferation of civic organisations advocating for democratisation of the political agora and governance systems. In the first decade, everything that could go right went right; in the last two decades, anything that could go wrong went wrong. Today, Zimbabwe has become a fragile state. This book casts a longitudinal perspective in an attempt to understand the principal dynamics since the country’s independence in 1980. It is not and cannot be a definitive statement on Zimbabwe’s post- uhuru path. In any case, an ambition to do so would probably be unattainable given its puzzling complexity, enigmatic power politics, and a seemingly schizophrenic citizenry that is simultaneously one 2 of the most literate and one of the politically meekest populations on the African continent. Indeed, anyone who claims to fully know Zimbabwe and what makes it tick is either God or plainly dishonest. Fragility, in its various forms and degrees of intensity, has been the defining feature of the country’s last three of the four decades and this is notwithstanding the leadership change from former (and now late) President Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa in November 2017. In fact, if anything, the fragility of Zimbabwe’s political economy has deepened, another aspect of the vicious crisis the country has been trapped in since 1980. It is the country’s tumultuous four independence decades of chronic fragility that is the focus of this chapter, a story of a country’s descent from being the breadbasket of the region to becoming a basket case.

Fragility and a fragile situation: Conceptual considerations Like many Social Science concepts, fragility is a contested term with multiple definitions some of which tend to conflate fragility with failure especially when used with reference to the state. Based on their development experience in various parts of the world, several international development organisations have shared their insights and perspectives on what fragility entails. Three such definitions will suffice for our purposes. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that there cannot be a ‘one-size fits all’ definition of the term because fragility differs from one state to the other: Pockets of fragility may occur at a subnational level, making it hard to keep the fragile states terminology. The States of Fragility report 2015 marks a change towards defining dimensions of fragility: violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations and resilience. Thus, the OECD breaks down the drivers of fragility for each country and reveals different patterns of 3 vulnerability instead of trying to stringently define fragility. The International Monetary Fund offers a more comprehensive definition: … fragile states have characteristics that substantially impair their economic and social performance and these include weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, and often, violence or the legacy of armed conflict and civil war. In these countries the poor quality of policies, institutions and governance substantially impairs economic performance, the delivery of basic social services and the efficacy of donor assistance. … They also have considerable negative spill- over effects on 4 economic growth in neighbouring countries. Menocal and Othieno, after observing that there is no authoritative definition of fragility, point out that it is characterised by: … the presence of weak institutions and governance systems and a fundamental lack of… state capacity and/or political will to fulfil essential state functions, especially in terms of providing basic services to the poor…At its core, fragility is a deeply political phenomenon, even if this is something that donors are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge explicitly (Menocal and Othieno, 2008: 1-2, my emphasis). Applying the above definitions, it is beyond dispute that Zimbabwe’s fragility is embedded in its political system – the governance institutions, processes and associated leadership – whose malign ramifications have affected virtually all the other facets of society. Indeed, it is tempting to agree with those who have characterised the country as a failed state, a characterisation that this chapter does not endorse. Instead, we argue that Zimbabwe is afragilenot a state, failedone, noting, however, that the country is ever at risk of failing. Bratton and Masunungure, and following Brinkerhoff, argue that states fail ‘when they lose all three of the following attributes: (a) a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (b) the capacity to provide basic public services and (c) recognition of state sovereignty abroad’ (2009 7, 2). The point is that some aspects of the state apparatus may exhibit failure or breakdown while other parts continue to function, some even robustly. It is, for instance, difficult to identify any territorial part of Zimbabwe that would constitute an ‘ungoverned space’ in the sense visible in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Mali, Yemen and Syria. As the two authors assert, ‘a decline in state capacity is rarely an all-or- nothing occurrence as implied in the binary category of state failure. More often, institutional unravelling is a matter of degree’ (2009, 8). The notion of state failure came under increasing attack from both academics and development practitioners to the extent that from 2014, the Failed States Index (FSI) published by the United States Fund for Peace (FFP) and the American magazineForeign Affairsabandoned the terminology in favour of the term ‘Fragile States Index’. An early attack on the terminology of failed states came from Claire Leigh of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) who rejected the concept complaining that: … the label ‘failed state’ implies no degree of success or failure, no sense of decline or progress. Failed means there is no way back. Failed means a binary division between those countries that are salvageable and those beyond redemption. It is a word reserved for marriages and exams. It 5 does not belong in a pragmatic debate.