Africa since Independence
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71 pages
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Distilled wisdom on what has happened on the African continent in the last fifty years by a well-known journalist and scholar.


Activist, scholar, and political journalist Colin Legum assesses Africa's experience since independence and offers judicious predictions about the continent's future. Covering 50 years of sweeping change, this provocative and insightful book examines Africa's struggle for democracy, mounting economic problems, and AIDS.


"The Romantic Period, 1939-1970"
"The Period of Disillusionment, 1970-1985"
"The Period of Realism, 1988-?"
"A Period of Renaissance?"

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Date de parution 22 novembre 1999
Nombre de lectures 0
EAN13 9780253027689
Langue English
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Africa since Independence
Africa since Independence
Colin Legum
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS
T HIS BOOK IS A PUBLICATION OF I NDIANA U NIVERSITY P RESS 601 N ORTH M ORTON S TREET B LOOMINGTON IN 47404-3797 USA
HTTP://WWW.INDIANA.EDU/~IUPRESS
T ELEPHONE ORDERS 800-842-6796 F AX ORDERS 812-855-7931 O RDERS BY E-MAIL IUPORDER@INDIANA.EDU © 1999 BY C OLIN L EGUM
A LL RIGHTS RESERVED
N O PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED OR UTILIZED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING AND RECORDING, OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER . T HE A SSOCIATION OF A MERICAN U NIVERSITY P RESSES ' R ESOLUTION ON P ERMISSIONS CONSTITUTES THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS PROHIBITION .
T HE PAPER USED IN THIS PUBLICATION MEETS THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF A MERICAN NATIONAL S TANDARD FOR I NFORMATION S CIENCES —P ERMANENCE OF P APER FOR P RINTED L IBRARY M ATERIALS , ANSI Z39.48-1984.
M ANUFACTURED IN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA .
L IBRARY OF C ONGRESS C ATALOGING-IN -P UBLICATION D ATA
L EGUM , C OLIN
A FRICA SINCE I NDEPENDENCE / C OLIN L EGUM
P.      CM .
I NCLUDES INDEX .
ISBN 0-253-33588-4 ( ALK. PAPER ).—ISBN 0-254-21334-7 ( PBK. : ALK. PAPER )
1. A FRICA —P OLITICS AND G OVERNMENT —1960–1. T ITLE
DT30.5.L44 1999
960.3’2—DC21                             99-29505
1   2   3   4   5   04   03   02   01   00   99
For my wife Margaret
My sternest and most valued critic
Contents
Acknowledgments
I. THE ROMANTIC PERIOD, 1939–1970
II. THE PERIOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT, 1970–1985
III. THE PERIOD OF REALISM, 1988-?
IV. A PERIOD OF RENAISSANCE?
Notes
Index
Acknowledgments
This book had its origins in a series of lectures I wasprivileged to give in 1997 as a Distinguished Fellow of theInstitute for Advanced Studies at Indiana University inBloomington.
My wife and I are grateful to Dave and Ruth Albrightfor their help in organizing our Fellowships, and to theInstitute's remarkable director, Henry Remak.
February 1988
KOB Cottage
Kalk Bay
Cape Peninsula 7975
South Africa
Africa since Independence
ONE
 
The Romantic Period, 1939–1970

Oh sons and daughters of Africa,
Flesh of the sun, and flesh of the sky,
Let us make Africa the tree of life.
Let all of us unite and toil together
To give the best we have to Africa
The cradle of mankind and fount of culture.
Pride and hope at break of dawn
—Last two verses of the Anthem of the
Organization of African Unity
Africa has passed through three phases in its learning cyclesince independence: the innocence of inexperience and theeuphoria of the early romantic period; the disillusioningexperience of adolescents (in this case, young nations)growing up in an adverse environment; and, finally, comingto terms with reality.
The modern period of African romanticism coveredroughly a quarter of a century from the end of World WarII to the early 1970s. In the West, no less than in Africa, itwas a time of optimism and high hopes for the renaissanceof a continent.
At the end of the war, there were only four independent states in the continent—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and SouthAfrica; over the next fifteen years the number almost quadrupled,but the hardest part of the decolonization process stilllay ahead—in Algeria, South West Africa, Rhodesia, the Portugesecolonies, and South Africa. Even though romanticismbegan to lose some of its optimistic innocence after the mid-1960s,confidence was still growing in the freshly sovereignstates that their demand of “Africa for Africans” was irresistible.Economic growth, averaging between 6 and 8 percent,promised a brighter future.
What is the Africa we are talking about? Is it the Africaseen through Western eyes—a huge underdeveloped landmass that is home to 650 million people (11 percent of theworld’s population); a continent which has slid into economicruin, corruption, despotic rule, coups, and civilwars? Or is it a continent seen through African eyes? If so,which African eyes? To read about Africa as described byAfrican poets and intellectuals is not to read about the conditionof one continent, but rather the conditions of manysocieties at different levels of political, social, and economicdevelopment. Allowing for errors arising from generalization,there are broadly speaking only two attitudes aboutwhich it can be said there is an African consensus—tworefrains which I hear wherever I travel in the continent. Thefirst is that at the core of independence is the assertion ofdignity of a Black people which was relentlessly assaultedby colonialism, but never destroyed, not even by the worstform of colonialism—slavery; the second refrain is that theWest is to blame for the poverty and fragmented disarrayfound in Africa. Nevertheless, attitudes to the West arestrongly ambivalent, expressing both admiration of Westernachievements and hatred of its hypocrisies and Eurocentricselfishness; this ambivalence is matched by Westernattitudes and feeling toward Africa and Black people ingeneral. The Indian poet Tagore traced the source of this ambivalence to the civilization of the West—the upholdingof dignity and of human relationships had no place in theadministration of its colonies. Tagore’s explanation wasreduced to a brilliant single Shavian sentence by Nehruwhen asked what he thought of Western civilization. “Itwould,” he replied, “be a good idea.”
To understand contemporary attitudes in postcolonialAfrica and the West it is useful, indeed necessary, to keepin mind this love-hate relationship between the formerlycolonized people and the colonizers; the former believethere has been no proper recognition of, nor retributionfor, the injury of colonialism; while the latter feel let downbecause Africa has not lived up to the expectations ofEuropean liberal values; and, of course, Western racialists—anancient and self-perpetuating breed—see all theirown prejudices about Black people justified by the selectiveheadlines provided for them by the myopia of a mediasociety which traps them in non-thinking stereotypes suchas presenting Africa as “a basket-case continent.”
Few writers, in my experience, express more clearly—and more elegantly—an African view of the continentthan does K. Anthony Appiah—himself the son of a cleverif mercurial Ghanaian politician, and grandson of a formerBritish Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps:
We are speaking of a continent of hundreds of millionsof people. We are talking of hundreds of languages.A thousand years of Christianity before it was establishedin most of Europe, and before Islam was settled in Egypt.African Kingships were millennia old. Africans worshippedthousands of gods whose posterity remains inshrines all over the continent. Long before Charlemagnewas crowned, the ancestors of San people in SouthernAfrica were living in nomadic communities free of rulers.Female regiments in Dahomey (now Benin), matrilinealkingdoms in Asanti, and patrilineal kingdoms in Yoruba.Religious diversity, political diversity, diversity in clothing and cuisine—Africa has enough diversity to satisfythe wildest “multiculturist.” 1
Except for the Dahomeyan female regiments and thematrilineal kingdoms of Asanti, this description of a continentrich in cultural diversity survives to this day, and isreflected in the characteristics of political parties and societiespeculiar to each of Africa’s fifty-three states. To speakof Africa as a single continent is accurate only in geographicterms. In other aspects, Africa is even more diverse than Europeor Asia.
In earlier times, Westerners drew a dividing line betweenthe Islamic states of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, andEgypt, and the largely non-Islamic states of Sub-SaharanAfrica. This dividing line between what the French called Afrique blanc and Afrique noire makes no more politicalsense than the Mason-Dixon line. There are, today, almostas many Black Muslims living around the southern andeastern perimeter of the Sahara as there are to its north.
Except for four hundred years of Portuguese rule overtheir few territorial “possessions,” and three centuries ofDutch and English rule in the Cape, colonialism had shallowhistoric roots in the continent. Most colonialism inAfrica began just over a century before its end. Long beforecolonialism, much of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was devastatedby the slave trade, first with the Arab states of theMiddle East, and later with the colonizers of the NewWorld. (There is a tendency, today, to speak only of the slaveryin the New World.) Slavery stretched from the Sudanand Mauritania in the north to the Eastern Congo andMalawi in the south, and along both the Indian Ocean andAtlantic coasts. In his Biography of the Continent (Knopf1999), the historian John Reader calculates that withoutthe slave trade, Africa’s population might have been anythingfrom 40 to 100 percent larger in 1850 than theactual figure of 50–60 million. I know of no adequate study into the effects of the slave trade on African minds andsociety. Even today it remains embedded in the Africanpsyche, sometimes expressed as anti-European or anti-Arabattitudes and feelings, and sometimes in what Jung calledthe “ethnic memory.”
In the early 1960s, when on a visit to Maiduguri, I visiteda small tribe who lived high up in Gwoza on the Cameroonmountains. Only in daylight did members of thetribe venture to the plains below to fetch water, feelingtruly safe only in their mountain villages where, more thana century earlier, they had taken refuge from slavers.
In the late 1950s, serious rioting broke out in Blantyre(Malawi) over the arrival in the stores of a new consignmentof a brand of corned beef with a picture of a red handon the label. The locals claimed the corned beef was madefrom African hands cut off by the slavers.
One night in the mid-1960s I returned late to my hotelin Lagos from a trip to Benin. I was passing luggage out ofmy car to a porter when he suddenly dropped one of thecarvings I had bought and ran screaming in terror into thenight. The carving was of a slave, bound and gagged as iffor transport. The young porter, who came from a notoriousslave-collecting area in Warri, had an imprint of slavingso strong, even centuries later, that he was terrified byeven a carved representation of a slave.
Although the war against the colonial invaders neverstopped, it was not until the Second World War that themodern anticolonial struggle spread from Indonesia andIndochina in the East across Southeast Asia, the MiddleEast, and Africa to the Caribbean. Two principal factorsaccount for the decline of western imperialism. World WarII had depleted the military and economic resources of themetropolitan powers; the propaganda of a war “fought fordemocracy” infected public opinion and governments inEurope, as well as anti-imperialist movements in the colonies led by modernizing elites. The other factor was thatcolonial possessions had begun to lose their economicvalue for Britain and France, though not yet for Portugal,Spain, and Belguim. The British socialist economist JohnStrachey wrote an impressive study of this latter factor in The End of Empire. 2 There were, of course, other contributingfactors, such as American pressure on the colonial powers,especially on the Dutch in Indonesia; the inspiration ofa non-white power like Japan confronting the Westernpowers; and the “spectre” of the USSR spreading its anti-Westerninfluence in the postwar world. Political analystsdiffer in their assessments of the weight to be assigned toeach of these factors, but few doubt that the major factorswere the commitment to a postwar democratic worldorder, and that the colonies had lost or were losing theireconomic value and had become, or were becoming, anincreasing burden. By the end of the war, the African anti-colonialmovements were swept along on the incomingtide of promised freedom for all, though what this meantwas by no means clear.
The situation in the immediate postwar years was thatEgypt had shaken off the British yoke, the United Nationshad ended Libya’s trusteeship, Emperor Haile Selassie wasback on his throne in Ethiopia, Liberia remained the solitaryindependent state in West Africa, and South Africahad embarked in 1948 on its disastrous course as an apartheidstate. France and Britain had begun to walk differentpaths in an effort to slow down the advance to full independence.The French, under the Bonapartiste de Gaulle,proposed a form of autonomy and federalism in West andCentral Africa; the British yielded under the pressure of athreatening violent situation to grant independence to theGold Coast. The birth of Ghana on 6 March 1957 was toprove to be as significant an event for the African continentas the independence of India had been for Asia just ten years earlier. Within seven years, all of British andFrancophone Africa south of the Sahara and north of theZambezi had sloughed off its colonial status. Thus, inAfrica, the domino theory proved to be correct.
Two remarkable factors about the decolonization of thevast African continent were the speed with which it occurredand the relative absence of violence. Except for three countries—Sudan,where a civil war with largely religious rootsbroke out on the morning after independence; Algeria,where a prolonged and bitter war began; and Rwanda,where the Hum asserted their majority claim to rule overthe Tutsis in the small new republic, thereby unleashingan ethnic conflict that still persists. In addition to Algeria,the worst violence occurred in those countries with significantpopulations of White settlers—South Africa, Rhodesia,and Kenya—and in Angola, Mozambique, and theCongo, where two metropolitan powers—Portugal and Belgium—soughtto resist the flow of history.
The uneasy years between the end of World War Twoand the independence of Ghana were a time of the dispersalof new ideas and the emergence of several distinctivetypes of African leaders—conservatives and left-wing militantradicals. These two developments influenced both thedirection of the anticolonial struggle and the differenttypes of postcolonial regimes.
Among the influential conservatives were King Hassanof Morocco, President Tubman of Liberia, Emperor HaileSelassie of Ethiopia, Philibert Tsiranana of Madagascar,Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya (whobegan as a radical but ended up as a conservative), FelixHouphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Kamazu (Hastings)Banda of Malawi, Seretse Khama of Botswana, and AbubakrTafawa Balewa of Nigeria.
When my wife and I interviewed Houphouet-Boigny inAbidjan in 1960, he told us: “I am not prepared to call for my country’s independence because we are not ready for it.Only when our people can compete on equal terms withthe French will we be justified in taking our independence—andthat might only come in the lifetime of mygrandson!” These were the sentiments of a French doctorand a former leader of the radical Rassemblement DemocratiqueAfricaine (RDA) which, in the war years, had workedwith the French Communist Party. Yet, within two yearsof that interview, Houphouet-Boigny was forced for hisown survival to lead his country into independence.
Against the conservatives were ranged two camps ofradicals and militants. Though close to each other, theydid not agree upon either tactics or goals. The radicals—like the joint father of Nigerian nationalism, Dr. NnamdiAzikiwe (known as Zik), Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, TomMboya of Kenya, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, MiltonObote of Uganda, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and EduardoMondlane of Mozambique—were pragmatists, reformers,and non-Marxists wary of Moscow. The militants—who included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, General Nasserof Egypt, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Sékou Touré ofGuinea, Modiba Keita of Mali, Ben Balla of Algeria, RobertMugabe of Zimbabwe, and Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau—werea mixture of revolutionaries and supportersof violent movements; they were strong proponents ofPan-Africanism and (except for Ben Bella) were influencedby Marxist ideas.
These are crude classifications which do not take intoaccount, for example, King Hassan’s decision to join themilitant Casablanca Group of Pan-Africanists against theMonrovia Group led by Liberia and Nigeria; or Julius Nyerere,who was a militant agrarian reformer and a passionatePan-Africanist opposed to the speed and methods urged byNkrumah, a devout Catholic and egalitarian socialist andcritic of Marxism. Others, like Patrice Lumumba and NelsonMandela, began as radicals and ended up as reformers because of their experiences in the struggle. There werealso rapid shifts in the positions of leaders depending ontheir perceptions of immediate interests. Consider the caseof Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe. He was a “bourgeois”nationalist who, because he was losing out in the powerstruggle with Mugabe (who had fallen under the spell ofMao Tse-tung), took himself off to Moscow, which wasalways keen to support any opponent of what it chose toclassify as a pro-Chinese leader; Nkomo was welcomeddespite his anti-communist credentials and his close tieswith Tiny Rowland of Lonrho in the city of London.
The advent in the 1960s of the USSR and China on theAfrican continent—first as allies and then as bitterrivals—provided opportunities for African leaders to playthe Communist powers off against each other and bothagainst the West, as well as pitting Bonn and Paris againstLondon and Washington. The ultra-conservative MuslimSiad Barre of Somalia overnight declared his country aMarxist state in alliance with Moscow, because the Westernpowers were supporting Somalia’s enemy, Haile Selassie;but when Moscow switched its support to the Emperor’ssuccessor, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Barre swung sharplyagainst Moscow and toward Washington. Except for Mengistu,no African leader or regime was ever a serious or reliableCommunist ally. They were “rhetorical” Marxistsadept at using Marxist slogans but loath to erect communistinstitutions; for example, a professed Marxist regimein the Congo People’s Republic always relied on budgetsupport from France. At the height of the Cold War, whenAfricans were loosening, though very few were breaking,their ties with the West, the hawks in Washington and insome European capitols became paranoid about the possibilityof Africa being “lost” to the West. They did notbelieve the martyred Tom Mboya when he declared thatthe postindependence African leaders were “neither pro-Moscownor pro-West, they are pro-African.” This was a simple idea but was apparently very difficult for the majorwestern powers to grasp, seeing the Soviet interest in thepostcolonial world as a potential threat to their strategicinterests, while the Soviets saw African left-wingers as possibleallies to their anti-Western cause.
The high-stakes three-handed diplomatic game playedduring the years of the Cold War had unfortunate consequencesfor independent Africa, highlighted by suchevents as the Suez crisis; the Cuban-Soviet-US confrontation;the South African role in fuelling the war in Angola;the murder of Lumumba; and the overthrow of Nkrumah.
These fugitive thoughts about the Cold War, Westernpostcolonial policies, and the place of communism in theliberation struggles are a good moment to turn to thespread of new political ideas in the time leading up toAfrican emancipation.
Unlike the Indian experience with the emergence of apro Japanese “national army,” African sympathies duringWorld War II were fully with the Allies, because a Germanvictory was seen as bringing in a new period of imperialismby the Nazis with their Aryan race theories,whereas an Allied victory held out the promise of the endof imperialism. The belief that emancipation awaited onlya final Allied victory bred confidence; by the end of thewar the only serious question being debated was the politicalshape of postimperial Africa—capitalist and pro-West,said the conservatives; socialist and non-aligned, said theradicals and militants.
The last major resistance to the imperial conquest in thenineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been led bytraditionalists whose base was in the rural areas—in theRift Valley of Morocco, the forests of Guinea, Zululand inNatal, the Asanti Confederacy in the Gold Coast, the Hererosin South West Africa, and the Wahehe of Tanganyika.All failed. The new African leadership was an almostentirely Western-educated modernizing elite. They were leaders who could fight their colonizers in their own language,using their political weapons, and challenging themon their own liberal democratic principles.
Their ideas for governing Africa were also derived fromthe West—separation of powers between the executive,legislative, and administrative institutions; habeas corpus; an independent judiciary; respect for the rights of minorities;press freedom; a non-political professional army; independenttrade unions; and other ideals. Few questioned thevirtues and values of an idealized Western democracy. Theonly difference, the new African leaders argued, “is thatunlike colonialists we will run our institutions democraticallyand, so, better and more efficiently.” Few questionedthe practicability of establishing these age-old institutionsin new evolving states or their relevance to the building ofnew nation-states in countries where, unlike the examplesin the history of Europe, the state was established beforethe nation was properly formed. Reading the speeches andwritings of the modernizing African elites from the 1940sto the 1960s, one is struck by two major facts: enthusiasmfor a multi-party democracy and confidence about the kindof institutions needed to replace the centralized colonialstate maintained by the baton and the gun. Nowhere haveI found in African writing—or for that matter in the studiesby Western writers—expression of the possibility thatAfrica’s postcolonial history would be written so largely bysoldiers. There were those like Julius Nyrerere, who, beforeTanganyika’s independence, echoed Nehru’s view: “Wedon’t need an army after independence.”
Throughout the continent, with the solitary exceptionof Swaziland, the inheritors of the power to rule were localmodernizing elites. Most of them were urbanized and hadat least some secondary education. In West Africa, especially,they included the sons and daughters of traditionalleaders and so provided a link between the capitol and thecountryside. Some leaders combined their traditional role with their role in the modernizing elite system—such asHouphouet-Boigny, who spent much of his political life inParis and Abidjan, but retained his roots in his nativeBaule country. This duality was true also of Seretse Khamaand his formidable uncle, Tshekedi, the maker of Botswana’sindependence; and of the Zulu chief Albert Luthuli, wholed the African National Congress through a difficult period.(Although Nelson Mandela comes from a royal family,he played no role in Tembu [a major Xhosa clan) traditionalaffairs.)
Traditional Africa remained very much alive at the comingof independence, but it was marginalized by the modernizingelites. In the same way that life in the rural countrysidewas undermined by the Industrial Revolution so, too,the priority given by the new political class to the modernsector in Africa resulted in the cities becoming powerfulmagnets for the impoverished, unemployed rural dwellers.
The modernizing elites comprised only a tiny percentageof each country’s population. They owed their power tothree principal factors: education; a dominant role in theprofessions, commerce, and the civil service; and, above all,the fact that the population widely accepted them as theonly people qualified to take over the colonial state andcapable of delivering on the promise of a better life.
The anticolonial struggle triggered what came to beknown as “a revolution of rising expectations,” and fuelledAfrican nationalism throughout the continent. Led bymodernizing elites, this nationalist fervor inspired massmovements which, at a later stage, were converted intocompeting political parties. (I use elites in a plural formbecause there were several competing elite groups withdifferent traditions and backgrounds.) The surprising phenomenonwas the similarity of their political ideas, eventhough they had passed through different educational systems—Protestantand Catholic mission schools; Islamiccenters; British private and public schools; the French baccalaureate; European, American, and South African universitiesand colleges; and later also Russian and other EasternEuropean higher education institutions. Even though thosecoming from Anglophone or Francophone countries hadrarely met each other before independence and most wereunable to read what was written in each other’s language,their political ideas were little different. This was perhapsnot surprising, since their ideas were eclectically chosenfrom Western constitutions, political and social concepts,principles, and practices. For example, the concept of thenation-state was appropriated wholesale.
In his book The Black Man’s Burden, historian BasilDavidson blames the failure of postindependence Africa onthe uncritical adoption of the nation-state at independence.But what other choice did African leaders have?Responding to Davidson, another historian, Joseph Ki-Zerboof Burkina Faso, agreed that “the nation-state hasbecome Africa’s principal burden,” but he asked: If werenounce the nation-state where do we go? 3 Davidson’sanswer is “to federalism”; Ki-Zerbo’s reply is that federalism, vide Nigeria, does not necessarily undo the internalcontradictions in embryonic nation-states.
This kind of debate found little place in the pre-independencediscussions among the makers of modern Africa.Except in the case of Nigeria, federalism was seen as athreat to the creation of a unified, multiethnic state, aswell as likely to strengthen secessionist movements. Thesewere the reasons, for example, why, in the lengthy negotiationsover South Africa’s new democratic constitution, theANC strongly fought against the idea of federalism; itremains the “f-word” in the ANC’s political lexicon. Onthe other hand, despite the threatened breakaway of theIbo-led Biafra state, federalism remains entrenched inNigeria, and was accepted as the basis for Ethiopia’s firstdemocratic constitution.
The sharpest difference between the evolution of the nation-state in Western Europe and in Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA) was that, in the European experience, the modern stategrew out of the formation of nations, whereas in Africa theboundaries and machinery of the state were created by thecolonial powers before the nation was formed. Thus thehistoric power of forming nation-states was stood on itshead in SSA.

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