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Description
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Informations
Publié par | Everest Media LLC |
Date de parution | 16 mai 2022 |
Nombre de lectures | 0 |
EAN13 | 9798822511422 |
Langue | English |
Poids de l'ouvrage | 1 Mo |
Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0100€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.
Extrait
Insights on Benjamin Baumer & Andrew Zimbalist's The Sabermetric Revolution
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7
Insights from Chapter 1
#1
The book, Moneyball, has sold well over a million copies. It was a significant catalyst in spreading the sabermetric gospel in baseball offices, as well as feeding the growing popularity of sports analytics over the Internet.
#2
The movie and the book both claim that the A’s implemented this philosophy. It is also claimed that the strategy worked and explains why the team won an American League record twenty straight games in 2002.
#3
The movie portrays the trades of Billy Beane as being based on sabermetric principles, and they are responsible for the team’s turnaround. However, the facts say otherwise.
#4
There are various sins of omission in the film, such as Sandy Alderson being left out of the film entirely. Alderson served as GM of the Oakland A’s from 1983 through 1997, and he hired Billy Beane and made him his assistant GM in 1993.
#5
The movie is faithful to the book, but it suffers from a fundamental misrepresentation of what happened in Oakland and its relationship to the principles of moneyball.
#6
Lewis’s argument is that the A’s, through the systematic application of new statistical analysis, were able to produce a winning team despite being from a small market and having an undersized budget.
#7
The A’s were able to win over 100 games in 2002, but were eliminated in the first round of the playoffs. Lewis argues that the team’s success was tied to the incorporation of sabermetric insights, but the team actually seemed to be moving in a counter-sabermetric direction based on the OBP metric.
#8
The A’s success in 2002 was not solely due to the contributions of Brad Bradford, as he was only a part of the team’s pitching staff. The team’s defense, which was another central aspect of success, was largely ignored by Lewis.
#9
The A’s used sabermetric principles to identify diamonds in the rough and out-smart their competition. They drafted eight pitchers and twelve position players, but only three of those players have played significantly in the majors.
#10
The A’s 2002 draft slightly outperformed expectations, but the draft does not prove that statistics should supersede scouting in the evaluation of amateur players. Fully 89 percent of the WAR accumulated by these thirteen players was earned by just two players: Swisher and Blanton, who were first-round picks on the basis of traditional scouting.
#11
The A’s took the sabermetric observation that college picks had a higher success rate than high school picks, and made it religious dogma. They believed that the level of play was too low and too uneven to be able to make much out of performance statistics.
#12
The history of baseball statistics is much richer than what is presented in Moneyball.