After Physicalism

Benedikt Paul Göcke

Description

Although physicalism has been the dominant position in recent work in the philosophy of mind, this dominance has not prevented a small but growing number of philosophers from arguing that physicalism is untenable for several reasons: both ontologically and epistemologically it cannot reduce mentality to the realm of the physical, and its attempts to reduce subjectivity to objectivity have thoroughly failed. The contributors to After Physicalism provide powerful alternatives to the physicalist account of the human mind from a dualistic point of view and argue that the reductive and naturalistic paradigm in philosophy has lost its force.

The essays in this collection all firmly engage in a priori metaphysics. Those by Uwe Meixner, E. J. Lowe, John Foster, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne are concerned with ways to establish the truth of dualism. Essays by William Hasker, A. D. Smith, and Howard Robinson deal with the relation between physicalism and dualism. Benedikt Paul Göcke argues that the “I” is not a particular and Stephen Priest that “I have to understand myself not as a thing but as no-thing-ness.” In the final essay, Thomas Schärtl argues that there are limits to dualism as indicated by the concept of resurrection. By including two classical essays by Plantinga and Swinburne, the volume conveniently brings together some of the best and the newest thinking in making the philosophical case for dualism.

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Philosophie de l'esprit
• Philosophie de la religion
• Religious
• PHILOSOPHY
• Philosophie et théologie
• General officer
• Mind
• General
• Body

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 15 juin 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268080686
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

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e d i t e d B y b e n e D i k T P a U L G ö C ke

After Physicalism

After Physicalism

edîted by B E N E D I K T P A U L G Ö C K E

Unîversîty o Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, ïndîana

Copyright © 2012 by University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu All Rights Reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Chapter 4 by Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” is reproduced by permission of its author and the editor ofFaith and Philosophyand originally appeared in Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2006): 3–32.

Chapter 5 by Richard Swinburne, “From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism,” is reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press and originally appeared inPersons: Human and Divine,edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2007), 142–65.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data After physicalism / edited by Benedikt Paul Göcke. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-268-03000-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-268-03000-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) E-ISBN: 978-0-268-08068-6 1. Dualism. 2. Materialism. I. Göcke, Benedikt Paul, 1981– B812.A38 2012 147'.4—dc23 2012014926

∞The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

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(1941– 2009)

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