Beyond Realism and Antirealism

David L. Hildebrand

Description

Perhaps the most significant development in American philosophy in recent times has been the extraordinary renaissance of Pragmatism, marked most notably by the reformulations of the so-called "Neopragmatists" Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. With Pragmatism offering the allure of potentially resolving the impasse between epistemological realists and antirealists, analytic and continental philosophers, as well as thinkers across the disciplines, have been energized and engaged by this movement.

In Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists, David L. Hildebrand asks two important questions: first, how faithful are the Neopragmatists' reformulations of Classical Pragmatism (particularly Deweyan Pragmatism)? Second, and more significantly, can their Neopragmatisms work?

In assessing Neopragmatism, Hildebrand advances a number of historical and critical points:

• Current debates between realists and antirealists (as well as objectivists and relativists) are similar to early twentieth-century debates between realists and idealists that Pragmatism addressed extensively.

• Despite their debts to Dewey, the Neopragmatists are reenacting realist and idealist stands in their debate over realism, thus giving life to something shown fruitless by earlier Pragmatists.

• What is absent from the Neopragmatist's position is precisely what makes Pragmatism enduring: namely, its metaphysical conception of experience and a practical starting point for philosophical inquiry that such experience dictates.

• Pragmatism cannot take the "linguistic turn" insofar as that turn mandates a theoretical starting point.

• While Pragmatism's view of truth is perspectival, it is nevertheless not a relativism.

• Pace Rorty, Pragmatism need not be hostile to metaphysics; indeed, it demonstrates how pragmatic instrumentalism and metaphysics are complementary.

In examining these and other difficulties in Neopragmatism, Hildebrand is able to propose some distinct directions for Pragmatism. Beyond Realism and Antirealism will provoke specialists and non-specialists alike to rethink not only the definition of Pragmatism, but its very purpose.

Sujets

• Philosophie et théologie
• Philosophy

Informations

• Publié par: Vanderbilt University Press
• Date de parution: 01 mars 2003
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780826591692
• Langue: English

Extrait

Beyond Realism and Antirealism
THE VANDERBILT LIBRARY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY offers interpretive perspectives on the historical roots of American philosophy and on present innovative developments in American thought, including studies of values, naturalism, social philosophy, cultural criticism, and applied ethics.
Series Editors
Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., General Editor
(Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis)
Cornelis de Waal, Associate Editor
(Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis)
Editorial Advisory Board
Kwame Anthony Appiah (Harvard)
Larry Hickman (Southern Illinois University)
John Lachs (Vanderbilt)
John J. McDermott (Texas A&M)
Joel Porte (Cornell)
Hilary Putnam (Harvard)
Ruth Anna Putnam (Wellesley)
Beth J. Singer (Brooklyn College)
John J. Stuhr (Pennsylvania State)
Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists
David L. Hildebrand
Vanderbilt University Press
Nashville
© 2003 Vanderbilt University Press
All rights reserved
First Edition 2003
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hildebrand, David L., 1964–
Beyond realism and antirealism : John Dewey and the neopragmatists / David L. Hildebrand.
p. cm.—(The Vanderbilt library of American philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8265-1426-X (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-8265-1427-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Pragmatism. 2. Realism. 3. Dewey, John, 1859–1952. 4. Rorty, Richard. 5. Putnam, Hilary. 6. Philosophy, American. I. Title. II. Series.
B944.P72 H55 2003
144'.3—dc21
2002153463
For Margaret Louise
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Dewey and Realism
3. Dewey and Idealism
4. Rorty, Putnam, and Classical Pragmatism
5. Neopragmatism’s Realism/Antirealism Debate
6. Beyond Realism and Antirealism
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Preface
This book grew out a confrontation with a simple question: What is pragmatism? Perhaps I can save time for some readers by giving the answer: no one really knows. Ever since A. O. Lovejoy published “The Thirteen Pragmatisms” in 1908, any hope of permanently fixing a single meaning went out the window. Even now, the meaning of pragmatism is shifting, as it is appropriated and employed by philosophers, literary critics, historians, economists, art historians, and educators, to name just a few. Regardless, this book speaks confidently about “pragmatism” in an attempt to corral its meaning. (This is how one deals with unanswerable questions—one makes them their own.)
A few qualifications, at the outset, seem in order. While my primary objective is to contrast “classical pragmatism” with “neopragmatism,” let me be clear that I am primarily concerned with classical pragmatism in the mode of John Dewey, though William James and Charles S. Peirce are called upon from time to time. As for “neopragmatism,” it too does not name a single, unified philosophy; therefore, I have confined my attention to the two most interesting and influential neopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.
Beyond Realism and Antirealism has two general aims, one historical, the other pragmatic. The historical aim is to evaluate the cogency of the neopragmatists’ interpretations of Dewey’s pragmatism and to use those conclusions to assess neopragmatism per se. The pragmatic aim is to determine whether or not neopragmatism is a way “beyond” the realism/antirealism debate that currently consumes significant amounts of philosophical energy.
Acknowledgments
Douglas Browning, my dissertation advisor at the University of Texas at Austin, deserves my deepest gratitude. Friend and mentor, he gave generous and conscientious attention to my philosophical ideas and made sure I acquired the habits necessary to keep learning. Appreciation is also due to Gregory Pappas, whose insights into John Dewey have been invaluable to my own understanding. Detailed comments and suggestions are the highest form of flattery in philosophy; Johanna Seibt, Frank X. Ryan, and Tom Burke all deserve special thanks. Cornelis de Waal, Associate Editor at the Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy, and Joseph Margolis were sympathetic readers whose sound advice is much appreciated. Peter Hare and the anonymous reviewers at the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society were exacting but constructive critics of my work on Dewey, Putnam, and Kenneth Burke. Jacob Smullyan provided critical assistance with the index. A special debt is owed to Larry Hickman for his indispensable contributions as an interpreter and editor of Dewey; in particular, his editorship of The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953: The Electronic Edition has provided scholars with a resource of inestimable value.
Portions of Chapter 3 were drawn from “Progress in History: Dewey on Knowledge of the Past” in Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 26 (2000), and from a paper, “History Is in the Making: Pragmatism, Realism, and Knowledge of the Past,” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Portland, Maine, in March 2002. Portions of Chapter 4 were drawn from “Putnam, Pragmatism, and Dewey,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 36, no. 1 (2000). I am grateful to the editors of the aforementioned journals for permission to reprint material from these articles.
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used for references to John Dewey’s work as found in the standard critical edition, published by Southern Illinois University Press:
EW John Dewey: The Early Works, 5 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1972) MW John Dewey: The Middle Works, 14 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976–1988) LW John Dewey: The Later Works, 17 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–1991)
Many exchanges between Dewey and his early critics are collected in the following:
DC Sidney Morgenbesser, ed . Dewey and His Critics: Essays from “The Journal of Philosophy” (New York: Journal of Philosophy, 1977; reprint, Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press, 1977)
The following abbreviations are used to refer works by or about Richard Rorty:
CP Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972–1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) EHO Essays on Heidegger and Others, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) ORT Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, vol. 1 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) PMN Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)
PRM “Putnam and the Relativist Menace,” Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 9 (1993): 443–61 RAP Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, edited by Herman J. Saatkamp (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995) TP Truth and Progress, vol. 3 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
The following abbreviations are used to refer works by Hilary Putnam:
DL Dewey Lectures 1994: “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind,” Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 9 (1994): 445–517 POQ Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995) RHF Realism with a Human Face , edited, with an introduction, by James Conant (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) RP Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) RR Realism and Reason , vol. 3 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) RTH Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) WL Words and Life , edited by James Conant (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994) TC The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
Beyond Realism and Antirealism
1
Introduction
The dualism of matter and mind may no longer overtly supply currently dominant philosophical problems with their raison d’être . The assumptions underlying the cosmic dichotomy have, however, not been eliminated; on the contrary, they are the abiding source of issues which command today the attention of the very philosophers who pride themselves upon having replaced the philosophical “thinking” of a bygone period with a mode of treatment as exact as the former discussions were sloppy.
—John Dewey, “Experience and Nature: A Re-Introduction” (LW 1:349)
Realism, Antirealism, and Neopragmatism
Pragmatism has undergone an extraordinary renaissance in the last two decades. Burgeoning interest in John Dewey, William James, and Charles S. Peirce has led many to embrace pragmatism as a distinctively American via media , capable of bridging the contemporary divide between philosophy as cultural criticism and philosophy as fundamental science. Indeed, the avowal by certain prominent philosophers of pragmatic commitments has been so widespread as to earn them the title of “neopragmatists.” On one central issue, however, these philosophers’ interpretations of classical pragmatists have served to place them in opposing camps. This is the issue of whether the classical pragmatists’ views on truth and reality make them realists or antirealists and whether these views could legitimately serve as foundations for contemporary neopragmatism. For example, two prominent neopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, have taken quite opposite stands on this issue. Rorty derives from classical pragmatism a decidedly antirealistic position, which he calls, alternately, “p