Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics

Deborah Achtenberg

Description

With this new interpretation, Deborah Achtenberg argues that metaphysics is central to ethics for Aristotle and that the ethics can be read on two levels—imprecisely, in terms of its own dialectically grounded and imprecise claims, or in terms of the metaphysical terms and concepts that give the ethics greater articulation and depth. She argues that concepts of value—the good and the beautiful—are central to ethics for Aristotle and that they can be understood in terms of telos where 'telos' can be construed to mean 'enriching limitation' and contrasted with harmful or destructive limitation. Achtenberg argues that the imprecision of ethics for Aristotle results not simply from the fact that ethics has to do with particulars, but more centrally from the fact that it has to do with the value of particulars. She presents new interpretations of a wide variety of passages in Aristotle's metaphysical, physical, psychological, rhetorical, political, and ethical works in support of her argument and compares Aristotle's views to those of Plato, Marcus Aurelius, the Hebrew Bible, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Freud, and twentieth-century object relations theorists. Achtenberg also responds to interpretations of Aristotle's ethics by McDowell, Nussbaum, Sherman, Salkever, Williams, Annas, Irwin, Roche, Gomez-Lobo, Burnyeat, and Anagnostopoulos.
Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

Introduction

1. Valuable Particulars

2. Ethics and Moral Theory

3. Ethics and Metaphysics

4. The Mean

5. Analogy, Habit, Beauty, Unexpectedness

6. Emotions as Perceptions of Value

Conclusion: Imaginative Construction

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Éthique et morale
• Philosophie antique
• Ancient philosophy
• Ethique et morale

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 février 2012
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780791488638
• Langue: English

Extrait

COGNITION OF VALUE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

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COGNITION OF VALUE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction

Deborah Achtenberg

S TAT E U N I V E R S I T Y O F N E W Y O R K P R E S S

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2002 State University of New York

All rights reserved

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For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Christine L. Hamel Marketing by Patrick J. Durocher

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Achtenberg, Deborah, 1951– Cognition of value in Aristotle’s ethics : promise of enrichment, threat of destruction / Deborah Achtenberg. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-5371-5 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5372-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle—Ethics. I. Title.

B491.E7 A245 2002 171'.3—dc21

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2001055011

In memory of Gail and Irving Achtenberg

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Analogy, Habit, Beauty, Unexpectedness

Acknowledgments

123

1

i

x

9

x

Ethics and Moral Theory

215

207

Bibliography

179

3

1

Emotions as Perceptions of Value

vii

Valuable Particulars

1

.

.

5

Conclusion: Imaginative Construction

159

C O N T E N T S

Index

6

.

Notes

191

The Mean

Ethics and Metaphysics

Introduction

Abbreviations

3

.

4

.

.

2

1

6

1

7

i

9

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

I have worked on this book for many years. It has been a solitary pro- ject, reflecting interests and concerns that have appeared to be my own. Still, there are some people whose responses to parts of this project have aided or encouraged me. First, I would like to thank Stewart Umphrey for working with me on previous stages of this work when I was a student at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. Thanks also to the orga- nizers of the Conference on the Virtues at the University of San Diego for showing interest in the first essay I wrote on the topics discussed in this book, and to Alasdair MacIntyre for the interest he showed in aspects of my work that relate to his project and Martha Nussbaum for encouraging comments on the original sketch of this project. Emily Hauptmann’s comments on an essay that was a spin-off of this book while it was in progress were insightful and helpful. Charles Young’s comments on chapters 2, 3, and 6 were incisive and usefully critical. I wonder if I have responded well enough to them. Alasdair MacIntyre’s comments on chapter 3 were thought-provoking. I hope I have answered his questions about that chapter in the other chapters of the book. I do not think that any author is fully responsible for the contents of his or her work, since I do not think culture works that way. Instead, I think culture creates a work as much as a work contributes to culture. To the extent, though, that an author is responsible for what he or she writes, I, and none of those just mentioned, am responsible for the guid- ing themes, claims, and intellectual preoccupations in this book. Because I took them to be different enough from those found in other recent books on Aristotle, I set out to write this book, little knowing the num- ber of topics I would have to consider in order to bring the book to what counts for a conclusion.

ix