Pragmatist Ethics

James Jakób Liszka

Description

Grounded in American pragmatism, Pragmatist Ethics proposes a rethinking of ethics. Rather than looking to the good—a concept for which consensus is difficult to achieve—pragmatists instead advocate for tending to the problems of the day. James Jakób Liszka examines how daily practices and institutions are originally conceived and then evolve to solve certain problems, and that their failure to do so is the source of most problems. Liszka argues that the ethical goal, therefore, is to improve upon these practices and that the sort of practical reasoning that characterizes practices can be enhanced by a more scientific, empirical approach. But how do we know when changes to practices and institutions are progressive? Problems will plague the best of communities; the better community is the one that succeeds best at solving its problems. Pragmatist Ethics examines various accounts of improvement and progress, concluding that the problem-solving effectiveness of communities is the key to progressive changes.
Acknowledgments
Notes on In-Text Citations

Introduction

1. What's the Good of Goodness?
Plato's Doubts
James's Doubts
The Tragic Sense of Life
Problem-Based Ethics

2. Pragmatism and the Roots of Problem-Based Ethics
The Pragmatic Maxim: Theory to Practice
Truth and Goodness Reconceived
Communities of Inquiry
Democracy as a Community of Inquiry
Scientific Ethics and Experiments of Living
Meliorism: Convergence, Growth, Improvement, Progress

3. Practical Life
Practices
Practices as Solutions to Problems
What Is a Problem?
The Normative Character of Practices
The Normative Governance of Practices

4. Practical Reasoning
The Desire-Belief Model of Moral Motivation
From Practical Reasoning to Practical Knowledge
Problems as Moral Guidance

5. Normative Science
The General and the Particular in Practical Knowledge
Know-How and Know-That
Practical Hypotheses
Normative Naturalism
The Empirical Warrant for Prudential Norms
The Empirical Warrant for Good Ends and Righteous Means

6. Communities of Inquiry
The Ends and Means of Inquiry
The Problem of Epistemarchy
Problems and the Governance of Practices

7. Change for the Better
Progress as Preference for Ways of Life
The Cumulative Theory of Progress
Progress as a Function of Problem-Solving Effectiveness
Moral Progress
Has There Been Progress?
Generalizing Problem-Solving Effectiveness

Conclusion

References
Index

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Épistémologie
• Éthique et morale
• Philosophie de la religion
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Epistémologie
• Pragmatism
• Philosophy of religion
• Ethique et morale

Informations

• Publié par: State University of New York Press
• Date de parution: 01 novembre 2021
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9781438485898
• Langue: English

Extrait

Pragmatist Ethics
SUNY series in American Philosophy and Cultural Thought

Randall E. Auxier and John R. Shook, editors
Pragmatist Ethics
A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters
James Jakób Liszka
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2021 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Name: Liszka, James Jakób, 1950– author.
Title: Pragmatist ethics : a problem-based approach to what matters / James Jakób Liszka.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, [2021] | Series: SUNY series in American philosophy and cultural thought | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021023967 | ISBN 9781438485874 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781438485898 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics. | Pragmatism. | Ethical problems.
Classification: LCC BJ1031 .L57 2021 | DDC 170—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021023967
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Genie Babb
How does one go from a God-ordered world to one of flesh and bone?
Is it like a veil lifted?
Or does it crumble like weather-worn mortar?
Gradually, the wall falls apart
And the cold truth comes through.
What’s the exchange?
Heaven for earth, life for death, safety for risk, solace for none.
It’s no bargain.
Yet truth has its soothing ways
When one sees the falseness of others.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Notes on In-Text Citations
Introduction
Chapter 1. What’s the Good of Goodness?
Plato’s Doubts
James’s Doubts
The Tragic Sense of Life
Problem-Based Ethics
Chapter 2. Pragmatism and the Roots of Problem-Based Ethics
The Pragmatic Maxim: Theory to Practice
Truth and Goodness Reconceived
Communities of Inquiry
Democracy as a Community of Inquiry
Scientific Ethics and Experiments of Living
Meliorism: Convergence, Growth, Improvement, Progress
Chapter 3. Practical Life
Practices
Practices as Solutions to Problems
What Is a Problem?
The Normative Character of Practices
The Normative Governance of Practices
Chapter 4. Practical Reasoning
The Desire-Belief Model of Moral Motivation
From Practical Reasoning to Practical Knowledge
Problems as Moral Guidance
Chapter 5. Normative Science
The General and the Particular in Practical Knowledge
Know-How and Know-That
Practical Hypotheses
Normative Naturalism
The Empirical Warrant for Prudential Norms
The Empirical Warrant for Good Ends and Righteous Means
Chapter 6. Communities of Inquiry
The Ends and Means of Inquiry
The Problem of Epistemarchy
Problems and the Governance of Practices
Chapter 7. Change for the Better
Progress as Preference for Ways of Life
The Cumulative Theory of Progress
Progress as a Function of Problem-Solving Effectiveness
Moral Progress
Has There Been Progress?
Generalizing Problem-Solving Effectiveness
Conclusion
References
Index
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my colleagues whose comments helped to shape and refine this book. These included presentations at the Society for American Philosophy, the American Philosophy Association, the Charles S. Peirce Society, and the Center for Pragmatism Studies at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo. In addition, I’m grateful to the reviewers of the manuscript whose careful reading improved the original. I would like to acknowledge the very helpful conversations, both written and spoken, with Nathan Houser, Vincent Colapietro, André De Tienne, Ivo Ibri, and Cornellis de Waal. I’m especially beholden to Genie Babb for many long talks that helped to work out some of the more difficult arguments of the book. This book is dedicated to her. I would also like to thank Dr. Michael Rinella, Senior Acquisitions Editor at SUNY Press, for being so helpful in shepherding the manuscript to its publication.
Parts of chapter 2 are extracts from “Peirce’s Convergence Theory of Truth Redux,” published in Cognitio 20(1), 91–112 (2019), and “Rethinking the Pragmatic Theory of Meaning,” also published in Cognitio 10(1), 61–81. The introduction and chapter 1 use extracts from “New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics,” published in Cognitio 14(1), 51–62 (2009). Thanks to the editor, Ivo Ibri, for permission to use these passages. Parts of chapter 5 are extracts from “Peirce’s Idea of Ethics as a Normative Science,” published in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50(4), 459–79 (2014).
Notes on In-Text Citations
All in-text citations are in APA style, with the following exceptions:
Aristotle . ( title of work , standard Bekker number).
John Dewey . (original date, MW , volume, page). Reference to Dewey, John (2008a). John Dewey: The middle works, 1899–1924 (Jo Ann Boydson, Ed.). (15 vols.). Southern Illinois University Press.
(original date, LW , volume, page). Reference to Dewey, John (2008b). John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953 (Jo Ann Boydson, Ed.). (17 vols.). Southern Illinois University Press.
Charles Peirce. (original date, CP volume.paragraph). Reference to Peirce, Charles (1978). The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss Arthur Burks, Eds.). (8 vols.). Harvard University Press.
(original date, W volume, page). Reference to Peirce, Charles (1982–). Writings of Charles S. Peirce (Max Fisch, et al., Eds.). (7 vols.). Indiana University Press.
(original date, NEM volume, page). Reference to Peirce, Charles (1976). The new elements of mathematics (Carolyn Eisele, Ed.). (4 vols.). Mouton.
(original date, R number, page). Reference to the manuscripts of Charles Peirce, as catalogued in Robin, Richard (1967). Annotated catalogue of the papers of Charles S. Peirce . University of Massachusetts Press.
Plato ( title of work , standard Stephanus pagination).
Introduction
It has been the tradition in philosophy to develop a concept of the good with the hope that it might serve as a guide to solve the problems of practical life. What if the strategy were, instead, to forego a notion of the good in favor of looking to the problems themselves for such guidance? After all, problems tell us what needs fixing and solutions tell us what is better. In this way, they play a normative role comparable to any notion of the good. Serious problems have urgent clarity, but the good remains that obscure object of desire. Aristotle states the obvious “… [T]he removal of bad things must be good” ( Rhetoric , 1362a30–35). The case made here is for a pragmatist ethics, one that looks for moral guidance from the troubles in the works and days of practical life.
Advocates for various concepts of the good—such as pleasure, happiness, utility, flourishing, virtue—assume they can serve as a criterion to measure against the current state-of-affairs. Simply put, the more the difference between the outcomes of actions, and the outcomes envisioned by the particular concept of the good, the less morally satisfactory the current state of affairs. Problem-based ethics works on a different measure. It focuses on progress from previous states of affairs rather than progress toward an ideal good. In The Ethical Project , Philip Kitcher emphasizes that moral progress is not measured by decreasing the distance to a fixed goal of the good, but there is progress from as well as progress to (2011, p. 288). Progress can be measured in terms of the distance from a starting point—rather than progressing toward an ideal. Pragmatic progress, as he calls it, is a type of progress that focuses on overcoming problems in the current state (2015, p. 478). Colin Koopman echoes this thought: “… [I]nstead of talking about certain practices as true or good, we should instead talk about them as truer and better. Instead of focusing on … moral rightness, we should instead focus on … moral melioration, improvement, development, and growth” (2015, pp. 11–12). “For better or for worse? Isn’t that the crucial thing?” (2015, p. 13).
In the pragmatist approach, problems act like the stones a traveler feels for when crossing the river. A problem makes it patently clear what is undesirable and, thereby, points to an improvement when solved. Thinkers in this tradition, such as John Dewey, are puzzled as to why people think a concept of the good is necessary in order for people to want to improve their lives when, as he writes in Human Nature and Conduct , problems confront them daily, motivating them to fix things (1922, MW 14, p. 195). After all, as Dewey notes, a doctor rarely attempts to bring a patient to an ideal state of health but focuses rather on improving a poor health condition. Does the medication stop the infection or not, does it reduce the fever?
Problems are strong motivators because people are directly affected by them and, if not directly, then affected by those who are. Serious problems are like a sharp stick in the foot and need addressing one way or another. Sidney Hook noted that “a problematic moral situation … expresses a special concern or urgency” and “has a quasi-imperative force” (1950, p. 198). Just as doubt is a subcutaneous irritation, so problems call for resolution. When things are working with a minimum of problems, there’s no cry for change, as Dewey says in the Theory of Valuation (1939, LW 13, p. 220). If things are not working, there’s obviously something lacking in the existing situation that drives a change, and hopefully a solution to the problem. Think of the manifold problems of the day: climate change, famine, the COVID-1