Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life

Mikael Stenmark

Description

Mikael Stenmark examines four models of rationality and argues for a discussion of rationality that takes into account the function and aim of such human practices as science and religion.

Sujets

• Philosophie
• Éthique et morale
• Philosophie de la religion
• Movements
• Buddhist
• PHILOSOPHY
• Philosophie et théologie
• Humanism
• Buddhism

Informations

• Publié par: University of Notre Dame Press
• Date de parution: 15 septembre 2016
• Nombre de lectures: 0
• EAN13: 9780268091675
• Langue: English
• Poids de l'ouvrage: 1 Mo

Extrait

Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life
Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life
A Critical Evaluation of Four Models of Rationality
MIKAEL STENMARK
University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana
Copyright 1995 by University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46656
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stenmark, Mikael.
Rationality in science, religion, and everyday life : a critical evaluation of four models of rationality / Mikael Stenmark.
p. cm.
Originally presented as the author s thesis (doctoral)-Uppsala University, 1994.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 383).
ISBN: 978-0-268-04105-2
1. Rationalism. I. Title.
BD181.S74 1995
128 .3-dc20
94-41140
CIP
ISBN 9780268091675
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Material, ANSI Z39.48-1983 .
This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [e-mail] .
Contents
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
1. Science, Religion, and Everyday Life
2. Theoretical, Practical, and Axiological Rationality
3. Realistic and Idealized Models of Rationality
4. Philosophical Research Programs
5. Rationality and Religion
6. The Models of Rationality as Rational Reconstructions
2. The Nature of Rationality
1. Generic and Normative Rationality
2. Deontological Rationality
3. Means-End Rationality
4. The Connection between Deontological and Means-End Rationality
5. Holistic Rationality
3. Science and Formal Evidentialism
1. The Formal View of Science
1.1 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENTIALISM
1.2 EXPLICATING FOUNDATIONALISM
1.3 EXPLICATING EVIDENCE
1.4 THE RULES OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
1.5 EXPLICATING RULE-RATIONALITY
1.6 WHAT SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY IS
1.7 THE DEMARCATION STRATEGY: SCIENCE AND NON-SCIENCE
2. Formal Evidentialism
2.1 THE LOCUS OF RATIONALITY
2.2 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RATIONALITY
2.3 INTERNAL STANDARDS OF RATIONALITY
4. The Scientific and the Evidentialist Challenge to Religious Belief
1. Positivism and the Meaninglessness of Religious Discourse
1.1 THE VERIFICATION/FALSIFICATION ISSUE
1.2 THE SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF
1.3 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND RULE-RATIONALITY
2. The Evidentialist Challenge to Religious Belief
3. An Evidentialist Case For and Against Religious Belief
3.1 FORMAL JUSTIFICATION OF THEISM
3.2 ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE FOR OR AGAINST THEISM
3.3 RELIGION AND SCIENCE
3.4 THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE AND RELIGIOUS ASSENT
3.5 THE FORMAL EVIDENTIALIST CASE AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
4. Religious Belief as Properly Basic
4.1 IS BELIEF IN GOD PROPERLY BASIC?
4.2 PLANTINGA AND THE SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF
5. The Practice-Oriented View of Science
1. The Relevance of the History of Science
2. The Role of Informed Judgment in Science
2.1 EXPLICATING JUDGMENT
2.2 THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
3. Evidence and Commitment in Science
6. Social Evidentialism
1. The Appropriate Standards of Rationality
2. The Locus of Rationality
3. The Majoritarian Objection
4. Rationality and Truth
5. The Scope of Social Evidentialism
7. Social Evidentialism and Religious Belief
1. The Initial Presumption of Philosophy of Religion
2. The Exercise of Informed Judgments in Religion
3. The Social Requirement and Religious Judgments
4. The Social Evidentialist Challenge to Religious Belief
8. Presumptionism
1. A Realistic Model of Rationality
1.1 THE STATUS OF SCIENCE IN CONSTRUCTING A MODEL OF RATIONALITY
1.2 EVERYDAY BELIEVING: A CONTROL CASE OF RATIONALITY
2. Internal Rationality and the Structure of Human Memory
3. External Rationality and the Rejection of the Evidential Principle
4. The Principle of Presumption
5. Rationality, Knowledge and Truth
5.1 RATIONALITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE
5.2 RATIONALITY AND TRUTH
5.3 A QUALIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PRESUMPTION
6. The Person-Relativity of Rationality
7. Science and Presumptionism
9. The Nature and Function of Religious Belief
1. The Function of Religious Believing
2. A View of Life
3. The Conception of Religion
4. Existential Questions and Religious Belief
10. Religious Rationality
1. Rationality and Human Practices
2. The Rationality Debate in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion
2.1 THE QUESTIONS OF LIFE-VIEW RATIONALITY
2.2 THE RELEVANCE OF THE ACTUAL AIMS OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
2.3 DO SCIENCE AND RELIGION HAVE DIFFERENT RATIONALITIES?
2.4 THE SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE RECONSIDERED
2.5 THE EVIDENTIALIST CHALLENGE RECONSIDERED
2.6 EVIDENCE, GROUNDS, AND SKEPTICISM
2.7 IRRATIONALITY
2.8 THE PRESUMPTIONIST CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS BELIEVING
2.9 THE END OF THE RATIONALITY DEBATE
3. Religious Commitment and Rationality
11. Contextualism and Human Practices
1. The Contextual Principle
2. Autonomous Practices
3. The Issue of Incompatible Conceptions of Rationality
3.1 THE MEANING ARGUMENT
3.2 THE BASICALITY ARGUMENT
4. The Autonomy of Life-View Practice
5. Contextualism and Truth
6. MacIntyre s Dynamic Contextualism
12. Some Concluding Remarks
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
In completing this work, a revised version of my doctoral dissertation defended at Uppsala University in March 1994, I have incurred debts to many people. I am grateful to them for stimulating and critical discussions of ideas and preliminary drafts. It is two persons, in particular, to whom I am deeply grateful: Eberhard Herrmann, my mentor, who has read every draft and who has been throughout the time it took to complete this work a constant source of encouragement and inspiration; and Gary Gutting for making it possible for me to study one year at the University of Notre Dame and for taking time to read and comment on every chapter in this book.
Other people I would like to thank are: Ant nio Barbosa da Silva, Vincent Br mmer, Michael Byron, Carl Reinhold Br kenhielm, Carl-Henric Grenholm, Jon Gunnemann, Robert Heeger, Werner G. Jeanrond, Anders Jeffner, Ingvar Johansson, Simo Knuuttila, Lars Koen, Ernan McMullin, Alvin Plantinga, Susan Poppe, Mark Sluys, Janet Martin Soskice, David Vessey, and the participants of the research seminar in philosophy of religion, Uppsala.
I would like also to express my debt to The Swedish-American Foundation and The Swedish Institute for providing financial support during my year at the University of Notre Dame.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Elon and Alice Stenmark, for love and support, and my wife, Anna Romell-Stenmark, for much more than words can say.
1
Introduction
Something that is characteristic of us human heings is that we form beliefs about a vast number of things and under certain circumstances change and reject some of these beliefs. What we encounter not only makes us believe certain things, it also makes us change what we believe. So part of being human is to have the ability to form, revise, and reject beliefs. These cognitive tools of ours are sometimes called belief-formation and belief-regulation processes . We might wonder about when it is that people form and regulate their beliefs in a proper, responsible, or reasonable way. We often say that to perform such and such an action is not a reasonable thing to do, or to think so and so can hardly be justified. When we ask these kinds of questions we are, in fact, dealing with issues of rationality . And we make this kind of evaluation of what people do all the time and in almost all areas of life. A central problem for philosophy is, therefore, to try to make clear what rationality is and under what conditions we should say that something is rational.
People form and hold beliefs in a lot of different areas or contexts, in science, religion, everyday life, politics, and so on. However, people in different places, cultures, and times acquire a lot of different and incompatible beliefs about all sorts of things. And sometimes we say or hear: That was reasonable to believe for people living in the Middle Ages or that is reasonable for people of other cultures to believe, but not for us. Or alternatively, we say or hear: This is what they believe in a primitive tribe, but that is not reasonable to believe -and sometimes it is presupposed that what is reasonable is to believe as we do in a modern Western society. But what should we say of these assessments? Is rationality the same for all people and for all areas of life, or did rationality mean one thing then and another thing now and a certain thing in one area of life and something else in another? This is another question philosophers have to address and try to answer, whether this reasonableness or responsibility is the same in all the areas in which we form and hold beliefs or if it changes as we change areas or contexts. Another way of putting this is to ask whether the conditions for rational belief formation and regulation are the same everywhere or if they change with circumstances, and-if they change-to what degree.
Roughly, these are the questions that will occupy this study. Of course to be able to answer especially this last group of questions we need to know a bit about what rationality is, so that we know what to look for. On the other hand, I will claim, we cannot know what rationality is without examining some concrete instantiations of it in practice. Therefore, I will look at and compare three areas of human thought-science, religion, and everyday life. The focus will be on beliefs or believing , without, of course, assuming that that is all that is going on in these domains. In relation to these areas, four models of rationality will be developed and critically examined.